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I tried to paint it. All the time I tried to paint the 
industrial scene as well as I could. It wasn’t easy.
I wanted to get a certain effect on the canvas-; I couldn’t 
describe it, but I knew when I'd got it. Well, a camera 
could have done the scene straight off. That was no use 
to me. I wanted to get an industrial scene and be
f
satisfied with the picture."
L.S. LOWRY.
I saw the industrial scene, and I was affected by it.
ABSTRACT
It is pleasing to find small firms at the heart of contemporary economic 
and political discussion. This research helps to illuminate their role 
in the industrial economy hy examining their potential to organize their 
resources more efficiently and think ahead in a formal and systematic 
manner via the vehicle of corporate planning.
The research incorporates a cross-sectional analysis of 1^ 9$ small 
firms in U.K. manufacturing industry, including a sub-sample of 120 firms 
from the Construction sector. Using a mail survey questionnaire, data was 
collected from each firm on company type, ownership, management structure, 
market structure, internal financial operation and planning activity. In 
order to identify those characteristics associated with companies planning 
ahead formally and those planning .informally, the data was subjected, to two 
and three way crosstabulations with elaboration where necessary. A more 
rigorous analysis, using the Automatic Interaction Detector, was then performed 
on the data to substantiate the findings of the initial analysis and clarify 
the relationships when necessary.
The results show, among other things, that some form of formal planning 
exists in U.K. small firms, but this is largely restricted to larger small 
firms and subsidiary companies.
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CHAPTER ONE
^§M52M_^^_M5_2?^ral_theme
Objective of the Chapter
The aim of the chapter is to define the research theme upon which 
the thesis concentrates.
Organization of the Chapter
The chapter is segregated into five parts. Section 1.1 provides 
the initial introduction to the topic area and defines small firms for 
the purpose of this research. Section 1.2 focuses on the research theme 
to be examined by the research and provides the definition of corporate 
planning to be used in the thesis. Section 1.3 describes the research 
methodology and section 1.4 outlines the main research findings. Finally, 
in order to guide the reader through the thesis, section 1 .5 outlines its 
organization and the role of each chapter.
21.1 Introduction
The most dramatic transformation in recent economic and political 
literature has been the shift in emphasis from large to small scale 
industrial activity. Schumacher.1, in his classic script "Small is beautiful", 
states "All the indications are that the present structure of large scale 
enterprise, in spite of heavy taxation and an'endless proliferation of 
legislation, is not conducive to the public welfare".
It was this growing concern with the trend towards large scale 
activity and the monopolistic tendencies associated with it, that was 
the underlying reason behind the transformation process. Strong concern 
was also expressed over the failure of the rampant merger activity of the 
1960s and early 1970s to provide the expected benefits in terms of improved 
efficiency ' and, as this directed attention to smaller scale activity, 
economists and politicians detected benefits of a. more human kind - 'of 
personal job identification and improved industrial relations. More 
important politically, in an era of high unemployment, was that the labour 
intensive small firm sector could possibly help to alleviate this prime 
economic ailment. Economists, on the other hand, emphasised the contribution 
of the small firm sector to the economy - with 15 million independent 
small firms employing over 2 3% of the working population and producing 
around 20% of Gross National Product. In manufacturing alone, firms with 
less than 200 employees contribute over 18% of the output . Furthermore, 
they pointed to the role of the small firm as a seed-bed for innovation and 
the flow of entrepreneurial talent to prevent ossification of the industrial 
economy. Consequently, concern arose over the diminishing numbers of 
small firms in the economy, particularly when compared to the U.K.’s 
international competitors. This latter observation was a direct result ofothe monumental study of small firms by the Bolton Committee of 19.69-1971.
The Committee stated that "the small firm is in many ways, a highly 
efficient organism, better adapted to certain kinds of economic opportunity 
than larger units and having some special advantages that derive from 
the intense commitment of the owner-manager ."^  It described the small firm 
sector as providing eight economic functions contributing to the health of 
the economy: - '5
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3.The small firm provides a productive outlet for the energies 
of a large group of enterprising and independent people.
.In industries where the optimum size of production unit is 
small, often the most efficient form of business organisation 
is a small firm.
.Small firms act as specialist suppliers to larger companies 
of components and sub-assemblies.
.Small firms help to provide a wider variety of goods and 
services, especially in areas where larger firms would find it 
uneconomic to operate.
.Small firms provide a check on actual and potential competition.
.Small firms are an important source of new products, 
techniques and services.
•The small firm sector is the traditional breeding ground for new 
industries.
.Small firms provide an entry into business for entrepreneurial 
talent and the seed-bed from which new large companies will grow 
to challenge and stimulate the established leaders of industry.
The disparity of definition of the small firm has not aided the 
pedagogic process amid the many academic papers in the field. The Bolton 
Committee had their own problems of definition, but placed emphasis on a. 
firm with the following characteristics, a) a relatively small share of 
the market; b) managed by its owners or part-owners in a personalized way; 
c) it is independent from a larger enterprise. "The vast majority of 
enterprises in manufacturing employing less than 200 people do, in fact, 
conform to our criteria". They also pointed out that many firms with 
less than. "500 people conformed to these characteristics, but, for working 
purposes, they defined small firms in the U.K. manufacturing sector as 
those possessing the above characteristics and having 200 employees or 
less. For reasons of comparison, this research has chosen to adopt this 
very definition with two minor alterations. This research is concerned, 
among other things, with the growth and expansion of small firms over time. 
Hence, adopting a fixed upper limit of 200 is too restrictive and static 
and so the upper limit was allowed to fluctuate around the 200 mark.
If firms entered the sample with 200 or more employees they were not 
excluded from the analysis.** • Furthermore, subsidiary companies were
** There were 133 firms above the 200 employee mark in the total sample 
(both the 200 and 3000 sample together - see Chapter 3)
kexcluded from the Bolton definition and this negates a comparison between
the operations and efficiency of similar sized firms under different
ownership, which is central to the research in this instance. Hence the
characteristic of independence was relaxed in this research.
In its final paragraphs, the Committee concluded that "The field
(SMALL FIRMS)* offers enormous scope for further research; our own work
and that of our commissioned researchers has .suggested many avenues that
could be fruitfully pursued and which lack of time alone has prevented
7us from attempting." Since Bolton reported in 1971, major contributions
8 . 9in the small firm sector have come from Bannock and Prais . Both of 
these studies were largely concerned with the role of the small firm at 
a macro level and both were severely hampered, as was'Bolton before them, 
with the tragic deficiency in up to date and internationally comparable 
statistics in monitoring the number of small companies and hence the trend 
in the small firm sector. These thorough studies by Bolton, Bannock and 
Prais have left a vacuum in small firm research at the micro-level.
Knowledge is scarce on how individual companies across varying industrial 
sectors operate, their efficiency, performance,how ;they are managed and 
by whom, how they plan ahead, the ways and means by which their efficiency 
can be improved, how they react to threats and opportunities in their
markets and the type and extent of competition they face. There are a
host of similar areas that must be researched before a complete
understanding of small firms is possible.
1 .2  Scope of the Research
The current research focuses on the small firm at the micro-level.
The recent' vibrant debate on the small firm sector has raised propositions 
to the effect that small firms can possibly provide the necessary miraculous 
cure for many of the country's economic ailments. There are 1$ million 
small firms in the U.K. and as many people unemployed. The argument 
insists that if each small firm could employ one more person the situation 
is remedied. But there are problems here. e.g. Do small firms want to 
grow? Can they grow and expand given existing capital, managerial and 
machinery constraints? Will the market bear it? Will their competitors 
allow it? A further proposition is that if small firms could.increase 
their output then, ceteris paribus, their contribution to G.N.P. will rise. 
Once again the question must be asked - do they want to increase their 
output? Can they increase it given those resource limitations? Running 
through the literature are propositions that small firms can help to solve
^Capitals added
5such economic ailments, what is lacking in the literature are prescriptions
of just how such a heterogeneous sector of the industrial economy can
perform those functions.
One possible approach is through a more widespread adoption of formal
management methods and techniques, in an attempt to organize available
resources more efficiently and effectively and so arguably increase company
performance. Perhaps the most comprehensive and absorbing technique
available - in that in its formal form it would include the use of a wide
variety of other management techniques, is corporate planning. Drucker 
10(1959) Has defined it as "the continuing process of l) making present 
entrepreneurial (risk-taking) decisions, systematically and with the best 
possible knowledge of their futurity; 2) organising Systematically the 
efforts needed to carry on these decisions; 3) measuring the results of 
these dec.isions against the expectations through organised systematic 
feedback."
A collection of research studies in the area of small companies and '
11  • 12formal management techniques, notably those hy Galloway , Johnston and 
13Wild and Swann , have illustrated that the adoption of well-proven managerial
techniques in small companies in manufacturing industries can lead to a
l4considerable improvement m  company performance. Wild and Swann emphasise 
"the major implication of the study is that those companies which 
assess, formulate and execute their policies systematically and 
thoroughly, with the assistance of a variety of modern management 
techniques tend to be more efficient and profitable than"companies that
operate on a less formal basis". Further evidence is provided by
15 . . .Walsh , who examines a study by a group of American economists investigat­
ing the possible reasons for -the marked superiority of North American 
labour productivity over that of most of Europe. They argued that the 
American worker was producing 20% more than the European and suggested 
that the main reason was the far superior methods of organization and 
tighter management control with better information systems. These 
studies indicate that a potential source of improved company performance
is the adoption of more formal management methods and techniques, l6John Bolton has identified eight areas in which small businesses 
could usefully improve their performance and profitability. -They are:- 
finance*, costing and control information, information use and retrieval, 
personnel management, technological change and production scheduling/ 
purchase controls. "Obviously .to counter the need for higher working 
capital, better utilisation of assets is necessary, involving better 
control information. To cope with the tax situation it is necessary 
to plan, (or at least look) further ahead".
6This research is concerned with the potential of small firms to 
organize their resources more efficiently and think ahead in a formal 
and systematic way. In addressing itself to this theme the research 
must necessarily discover the depth and extent of small firm planning, 
its formality or informality, which firms plan formally, how many and 
in which industry, why do they plan formally, how sophisticated are 
small firm managers in their use of management techniques? It describes 
the characteris tics of management, e.g. age, education, the extent of 
nepotism, length of service, structure, together with the characteristics 
of the internal financial function, in order to establish the 
characteristics of companies planning ahead formally or informally.
The adoption of this theme has important repercussions for policy 
purposes. By considering the small firm at the micro-level, collecting 
data on its constituent parts and, more important, on the people who 
own and manage the companies, it is then possible to gain insights into 
the sectors potential to help solve the country’s economic and social 
problems. What is important in the adoption of this theme, is that the 
question - do small firms want to grow and expand? - must'precede the 
question - can they grow and expand? Both questions must be answered 
before the staggering claims relating to the small firm sector can he 
assessed. It is important, to see the role of the small firm through the 
eyes of the entrepreneur founder in order to answer the first of those 
two questions, as the destiny of the company is almost always in his 
hands. Government blanket policies across such a diverse sector run 
the great risk of having maximum benefit in some instances and minimum 
or negative impact in others. An understanding of how small firm men 
see their role and their desire and capability to grow and expand can 
only act to reduce that risk.
The second question is of considerable importance. Small firm 
men may not see their own potential. The problems of- excessive 
Government interference, the .burdens of legislation and form-filling, 
although they deserve sympathy and action, may well be only cries to 
vent excessive emotion, representing an intrinsic resentment of authority 
common to most entrepreneurs. WTith the help of sincere advice, some 
systematic planning and the use of simple management techniques, 
many small firm problems could well be relaxed, if not removed completely. 
By analysing what exists in terms of formality in this sector, it is 
easier to assess the potential of the sector to increase its own 
performance and, ceteris paribus, that of the economy as a whole.
7As a result of the increased interest in small firms, many academic 
institutions have provided small firm courses**, which, on the one hand , 
are geared to the active small firm manager and on the other, to business 
students at both under and post-graduate level. This research, thr.ough 
having to enquire into the internal structure and operations of small 
firms over a wide cross section of industry, provides empirical information 
not previously available on this scale which can be incorporated into 
such courses. Information as to what does happen in industry, rather 
than prescribing for managerial students descriptions, in textbooks of 
what should happen, prevents the release from academia of students with 
a naive and incomplete view of small firm operations. The small firms 
branch of industrial economics should never be allowed to suffer the 
vast gap between theory and practice, that occurred during the formative 
period in the subject's history - back in the days of the theory school 
of Knight and Hotelling and the empirical school of Allen and Sargent 
Florence, as there is no more practical form of business organisation 
than the small company. Academics themselves, must confront reality 
in this sector more than any other and refrain from watering down 
theories and techniques that relate to the larger scale enterprise.
An empirical investigation can only assist them in this effort.
The professions gain markedly from an increased understanding of 
what happens across a large cross-section of U.K. small firms, 
particularly in relation to the use of management techniques i.e. those 
that are actively used, those that have failed to gain acceptance 
and why. The research seeks to establish the role of the external 
advisor in the planning process, the importance of their advice and the 
extent of the employment of outside consultants in small firms.
But perhaps the most important benefit of such a research theme to the 
professions lies in the dearth of formal management education in small 
firms. This raises the question - who provides the advice? If small 
firms desire growth and expansion and that is feasible through the use 
of formal planning and other management techniques, the task of 
re-education necessary to instruct the small firm managers in the 
implementation and use of. these techniques and the provision of advice 
as to which technique is appropriate, must, fall on the professions - 
Accountants, Bank-managers or Consultants.
**"Over 30 teaching institutions, universities, polytechnics and colleges 
are engaged in providing management teaching for small business managers"? 
P. Gorb (Director, Institute of Small Business Management, London 
Business School). Besides the L.B.S., other institutions providing 
courses are Durham University Business School, N.E. London Polytechnic and 
Manchester Business School.
*see ref. 35 of Ch. 1.
. Such a theme also holds great store for small firm managers 
not only in the provision of empirical evidence that can be incorporated 
into managerial courses designed•specifically for them, hut also in 
the dissemination of knowledge on the extent and usage <bf formal 
techniques among other small firms, e.g. who is doing what and more 
important, why? Many -small firm managers are sceptical of modern 
management methods and techniques and perhaps the knowledge that some 
of these are working to improve the performance of other small firms - 
especially if they happen to he in the same industry and of the same 
size - may well lead to a wider adoption of the more effective methods 
and techniques among small firms; and if, as further research has shown, 
the adoption of the formal management techniques in small manufacturing 
companies can lead to a considerable improvement in performance, 
then that alone will be justification for the research theme.
1.3 The Research Approach
The paucity of information concerning corporate planning in small 
companies dictated the necessity to conduct as large a cross-sectional 
survey of firms as resources permitted. In this respect the mail survey 
was chosen as the most appropriate and economical data collection device. 
The general principles of questionnaire design were closely followed 
and problems arising from ambiguity and inadequacy were revised after 
pre-testing.
A random sample of 3000 companies in the U.K. manufacturing 
sector were chosen from the files of Dun and Bradstreet (Marketing 
Facts File). This file has particular advantages over other sample 
frames, in that it is continuously updated, with details of over
200,000 companies, it is more representative than trade directories or 
other available files as it is not based on high performing companies 
alone or companies that are members of employers’ federations. It also 
has cost and time advantages, as well as providing valuable ancilliary 
information that aids in controlling the mailshot, promoting reminders 
and cross-validating respondents7 replies.
The S.I.C. Orders sampled were:- 
ORDER
III Food, Drink and Tobacco
V Chemicals and Allied Industries
VI Metal Manufacture-. .. .
VII Mechanical Engineering
VIII Instrument Engineering
IX Electrical Engineering
X Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering
XI Vehicles
XII Metal Goods not elsewhere specified
XIII Textiles
XIV Leather, Leather Goods, and Fur
XV Clothing and Footwear
XVI Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement etc.
XVII Timber, Furniture etc.
XVIII Paper, Printing and Publishing
XIX Other Manufacturing Industries
In addition, 200 companies were systematically sampled (see Moser , 
p.' 83) from Dun and Bradstreet’s Guide to Key British Enterprises Volume II 
across S.I.C. Order XX^Contract Construction. (For cost reasons* this industry 
could not be included in the 3000 company random sample). It is recognized 
that the two samples are not strictly comparable due to their different 
sources and inherent bias in the 200 sample which is across companies who 
are mojre likely to be higher performers. In. addition, systematic sampling 
is not strictly a truly random procedure. Hence the necessary caution in 
interpreting the results is recommended.
RESPONSE SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Usable Replies 
Incomplete Replies 
Returned to Sender
3000 Sample 
1374 (45.8%) 
210 ( 7.0%) 
. . .6 1,( .2.0%)
200 Sample 
120 (60.0%) 
18 ( 9.0%) 
...15. (.7.5%)
.1645.(54.8%) .,153.(76.5%)
*See Chapter 3, page 117.
** See reference 1 of Chapter 39 p. 83.
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On average, industrial market research response rates appear to
r* M t 17 . 18fluctuate between 20% and 50% (see Pearce , Eliot-Chnstopher ,
19 20 * 21Boyd and Westfall , Stacey and- NTilson , Uhl and Schoner ). The above
rates appear to be acceptable in comparison.
Besides response rate, response speed and response quality were
22checked after the suggestion by .Houston and Ford . No major discrepancies 
were found in these areas. In addition, the sample was checked for 
representativeness from known population characteristics with the result 
that it was a close proxy for the population in the U.K. The responses 
were checked for potential bias from company size, S.I.C, Order and 
geographical area with no severe discrepancies. A one sample runs test 
was performed on the responses to test for randomness of the responses 
over time, as two follow-ups were used in the survey implementation 
The responses reflected a random distribution.
The Questionnaire
The mail survey questionnaire was divided into six sections, covert- 
ing the functional areas of Company type (main business area, age, 
subsidiary or not, who controls the company, extent of family control); 
Management Structure (levels of management, turnover of staff, ages of 
chief executives and managers, length of service, management training 
and qualifications)) Strategy and Competition (extent of monopsony, 
exports, type and extent of competition); Internal Business Operation 
(type of techniques in use, type of control system and extent of 
qualified personnel‘s type of finance, credit period, type of bad debtors)*, 
Company Planning (aims, people involved, formal or informal, planning 
horizons, techniques in active use, control and information systems, 
important considerations in developing plans, use of external advice, 
benefits, effect on management structure) and Trusted Information on 
company sales turnover, number of employees and chief executives 
feelings on small company planning).
Note:
(l) For the purpose of this research, planning was
dichotomized into formal and informal. Both the 
synoptic and adaptive** forms of corporate planning 
were considered as formal, whereas companies relying 
on intuition and rules of thumb for thinking ahead 
were considered to be informal planners.
**Definitions of these planning types appear in full in Chapter Two
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The empirical research attempted to 1) identify the characteristics 
of the companies with regard to the aspects of company type, management 
and finance; 2) identify the environment surrounding the company with 
regard to the extent and type of competition, customers and company 
policies in this area; 3) identify the type of planning activity within 
the company - together with the extent, depth and shape of this 
activity; k) attempt to discover tentative relationships between the 
type of planning activity and the previously identified internal and 
external characteristics; 5) provide additional information on small 
company operations and management attitudes towards small company planning.
The analysis was in two stages. Firstly9the results are subjected 
to two and three way cross-tabulations in an attempt to identify 
tentative relationships. Secondly, a more thorough analysis is performed 
on the complete data set using the Automatic Interaction Detector which also 
breaks down the vast array, of data into a more comprehensible format.
1.4 Outline of the Main 4 Findings
General Findings
i) A surprising 36% of small companies in the survey alleged 
a formal planning mode.
■ ii) No association was found between the age of a company and 
the adoption of either formal or informal planning modes, 
iii) No association was found between the geographical area of
the company’s operation and the adoption of formal or informal 
planning modes.
Company Characteristics
i) Subsidiary companies, although they may share some of the
characteristics of other small companies in terms of turnover
of sales, number of employees, market share and an element of
personalized management, can often readily call upon specialist
management functions and sources of finance from the parent
company. Further, they are likely to he an auxiliary arm of a
more comprehensive corporate plan, with consequent targets
23and accountability. Denning and Lehr.(1967) , when investigat­
ing the extent of adoption of corporate planning among 
large U.K. companies, found the practice in the main restricted 
to U.K. subsidiaries of overseas companies. This survey found 
a small but significant relation between subsidiary companies 
and formal planning modes. (The assymetric correlation ratio
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[ yx = 0,09) - subsidiary companies once again being far 
more likely to be involved in formal corporate planning than 
independent companies.. (Note: No measure of whether the parent 
of the subsidiary was from the U.K. or overseas was taken).
ii) A low but significant relationship was found between who 
controlled the company and type of planning mode.
yx = 0,05). Family controlled companies were far more 
likely'to be informal planners (69% of all informal planning 
companies were family controlled). Predictably, companies 
controlled by outside shareholders were dominated by a 
formal planning mode (72%). Controlling for subsidiary 
companies across this relationship, family companies 
dominated the category of independent companies.
Further, family controlled subsidiary companies were 
more likely to have established a formal planning 
framework (43%) than their counterparts in independent 
companies (29%). It is here that a planning gap 
has emerged between the company types - 6l% of‘subsidiary 
companies compared to 29% of independent companies employ 
formal planning procedures.
Clearly from i) and ii) formal planning procedures predominate 
among small subsidiary companies. In addition, family controlled 
companies (46% of the sample) are essentially informal planners. Where 
small companies were controlled by directors alone - with no family 
involvement (33% of the sample), these were made up of 37% formal 
. planners and 63% informal)so Reflecting the par for the sample.
iii) The survey enquired as to which techniques - managerial and 
financial alike - were in active use within the company.
TAble 1.1 Percentage of Companies without Formal ^Techniques.
Technique Informal 1. Planners
Formal 
2. Planners
All 
3. Companies
Financial 89% . 11%- 25%
Operational 81% 19% 31%
Management 79% • 19% .63%
Forecasts 92% 21% 27%
Investment ** 29%
** Errors in data
NOTE: 1. The percentages in columns 1 & 2
for financial and operational 
techniques add to 100 by chance.
13
The above table shows the percentage of small firms 
who use no techniques of any kind, (col. 3), columns 1 and 
2 show how this is split between the two planning type 
companies. Note, not only the high proportion of firms 
who use no formal techniques, but also that their active use 
is, predictably, in the hands of the formal planning firms. 
Further results also show that these firms employed a wider 
variety of techniques in combination. Where computer facilities 
were in use, 85% were in formal planning firms. The survey 
also indicated the dearth of the mathematically based 
techniques of simulation, linear programming and other 
operations research methods (only active in 4% of companies). 
What is more bemusing is that they are . more likely to 
be found in informal planning firms.
iv) The Bolton Committee highlighted the disparity in management
• • 24education between large and small companies and the dearth
25of management training m  the latter * The results of this 
survey support these observations (a low but significant 
relation was found between planning modes and management 
training = 0.07). The survey enquired into the type
of management training received by contemporary managers.
Only 4% of small company managers were trained at University 
or College, with proportionate distribution in each planning 
mode. A staggering 52% of small company managers had no 
formal management training - such managers were far more 
likely to be found in informal planning companies.
Further, managers in formal planning companies had often had 
formal management training and experience in other companies, 
while informal planning companies tended to rely on house- 
bred managers.
In addition, the survey asked whether or not the company 
had an active external management training programme and, 
as expected, this was far more likely to be active for formal 
planning companies than informal planning companies.
To emphasise, 62% of informal planning companies provided 
no active external management training.
Ik
v) The survey results showed, that low levels of nepotism (the 
number of family members in managerial posts), were more 
. likely to he found in formal planning companies 
and high levels in informal planning companies,
vi) Ratiocination would dictate as a company grows, the administra­
tion of resources would he more likely to syncromesh with
efficiency, if management adopted more formal procedures of
26planning and control. Hosmer has suggested that the
characteristics of a company differ on either side of 100
27 .employees. Wild and Swann indicate that this organisational 
change is reflected in the adoption of -management techniques 
around this size.
The survey showed that the adoption of formal corporate 4*planning Increases as company size increases. Only 23% 
of companies claim formality below 10 employees, while 66% 
claim formality between 151-200 employees, with 71% in the 
over 300 category. (  ^ yx = 0.09). 90% of informal planning
companies were below the 100 employee mark. Only 69% of 
formal planning companies were below the 100 mark, with 90% 
below the 300 mark. Further, the dominant percentage of 
companies in each employee category showed a marked shift 
from informal planning to planning companies just above the 
100 employee mark (101-150 category). This evidence lends 
support to the theory of organizational change around the 
100 employee size hand.
The adoption of formal planning techniques similarly increases 
with size, when size is measured by sales turnover.. The 
dominant percentage of companies in each employee category 
shifts in favour of formal planning companies within the 
Elm to £2m category. Hence the crucial change hands in 
favour of formality appear to he over 100 employees and around 
£1.5m of turnover (predictably, the percentage of subsidiary 
companies in each size category increased from 11%, below 10 
employees, to 36% with 75-100 employees, to 55% over 300 
employees. It is these companies that largely adopt formal 
• planning modes),
This figure is unusually high. See note on p.13-1
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vii) Passer has argued that economic welfare is not increased 
by the mere improvement in the administration of existing
resources, but the application of science and new technology.
29In this respect, Salveson argues that company viability 
and profitability in the long term depends on the extent of 
planning for invention, innovation and any consequent new 
trade. Hence, the most urgent need for long range planning 
is in the technical industries. The survey substantiates 
this proposition - companies in the highly concentrated, 
highly capital Intensive industries of chemicals and 
electrical engineering, where invention and innovation are 
critical, showed a strong tendancy toward adoption of a 
formal planning mode (4-9% and 55% respectively).
The traditional industries, on the other hand, are dominated 
by informal planning companies. Textile companies, facing 
alarming foreign competition, show a low degree of adoption 
of formality (29%). Leather and Fur companies showed a 
similar reluctance towards formality (only 11%).
Metal Manufacture, in the case of steel, aluminium and metal 
cables - a highly concentrated sector with relatively low 
technology but high capital barriers to entry, consist of 
only 35% of formal planning companies); Mechanical Engineering, 
perenially•dependent on invention and innovation, with some 
concentration and high capital intensity, but with relatively 
low barriers to entry, possessed 38% formal planning companies. 
Metal Goods and Vehicles showed similar percentages (35% and 
39% respectively) of formal planning companies to their 
related industries,above. As such, they are typical of the 
sample as a whole. The materials companies of Order XVI 
have 53% of formal planning companies. Although Brickmaking 
is'la traditional industry, most manufacture is now highly 
mechanised. Cement production has undergone similar technical * 
improvement through intensive research, as has Pottery 
with considerable re-equipment and automation.
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Hence, it is plausible that where an industry reflects a high 
capital investment, the more likely the companies will a.dopt 
a formal planning mode, so the data lending support to Salveson's 
proposition. The automated food sector is indicative of this 
trend (4-3%). The clothing sector has also undergone 
mechanisation but has remained essentially labour intensive.
It has suffered severely at the hands of foreign competition 
and perhaps the consequent market uncertainty has led to only 
40% of companies pursuing formality. The construction industry 
has always sustained a plethora of small companies. The 
industry has long been adjudged an economic barometer in the 
national economy and suffered volatile swings in demand. It 
is probably this uncertainty, coupled with the number of very 
small firms in the industry that account for only 24% of 
companies pursuing formality. The low adoption of formality 
in the timber sector (30%), could perhaps be due to its 
dependence, not only on imports for supply, but on the volatile 
construction sector for demand.
When this relation is controlled on the third variable subsidiary 
company, the evidence suggests that in the non-technical 
sector even the subsidiary companies show a reluctance to 
pursue formality, while in the technical, more formal sector, 
there is a strong link between formal planning and 
subsidiary 'companies.
30viii) Drucker has argued that every additional management level
distorts objectives and mis-directs attention and that any
business with more than six or seven levels of management is
31too big. This indeed is the basis of Williamson's control- 
loss argument. Surprisingly, the survey found 33% of planning 
companies had four or more levels and 4% had more than six 
levels. If synoptic corporate planning purports to identify 
objectives - and in so doing, improve their communication to 
all managers within the enterprise', then certainly this is 
an unusual finding. Overall, however, 80% of survey companies 
had three levels of management or less, while 86% of those 
companies with no management levels were informal planning 
companies - lending weight to the argument that very 
small or new companies are unlikely to pursue any form of 
formal planning.
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An irregular relation was found between the length of 
managerial service In the company and the type of planning 
mode - informal planning companies had longer serving managers. 
The modal category for planning companies was five to nine 
years service, for informal planning companies it was over twenty 
years. Further, whereas managers in all companies tended to 
fall within the forty to fifty years old category, those in 
informal planning companies were likely to be older. This trend 
was also reflected in the ages of the chief executives in 
. the different planning-mode companies. The evidence suggests 
that chief executives over sixty years old were more likely 
to he found in informal planning companies. In addition 
formal planning companies had a greater proportion of 
chief executives in the younger age groups, although in all 
companies 84% of chief executives were over forty years of 
age. Hence informal planning companies i.e. the majority 
of small companies in the U.K. small firm sector, are made up 
of older chief executives and managers, with longer lengths 
of managerial services.
32 31 l4Perrigo , Bptler-Cole and Buchelle , are among the
managerial writers who have stressed that one of the critical
areas of small company growth is the question of managerial
succession.and that companies should constantly recognize
the need for planned managerial development. The survey
identified a startling 49% of small companies had not
considered the question of chief executive succession as yet
and another 20% were struggling to find candidates of sufficient
ability and/or battling against capital transfer tax.
This precarious trend was even rife among formal planning
companies, where it would be plausible to assume that this
area was an integral part of a longer range plan.
ix) The survey gathered data on the percentage of sales going to 
the company's main customer, the amount of sales exported 
and the size and number of companies in direct competition.
No evidence was found of.tentative relationships with the 
different planning modes. In general, 77% of survey companies 
produced less than 25% of their output for their main customer 
and 86% of small companies face 3 or more competitors,
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with 57% facing 6 or more. This suggests that the market 
facing U.K. small companies is highly' competitive-. .
However, it was evident that, as competition 
increased, firms tended towards a more formal planning mode.
In addition, formal planning companies were faced with a' 
wider variety of competition. The majority of competition 
for informal planning companies came from other small 
companies. Significantly, 10% of companies found foreign 
competition substantial. This evidence, though weak, points 
to a more adventurous approach from formal planning companies. 
True, these are mainly larger small companies or subsidiary 
companies, with arguably more extensive resources at hand.
But this still leaves a large residual sector in the U.K. 
operating on a more parochial basis.
x) Perhaps the most crucial function to any organisation, 
particularly to amall companies, is that of finance. 
Availability of finance to small companies has been given 
deserved attention over the years - from Macmillan, through 
Radcliffe and Bolton, to Wilson. But the actual manipulation 
■ and control of the internal financial function has not received 
the assiduity its crucial importance deserves. The ability 
of a small company to survive, depends on the management 
of internal finance. The ability of a company to grow and 
expand depends on the quality of that management.
The survey found that in 39% of companies, the book-keeping ■ 
was supervised by unqualified secretaries, of which 73% were 
in informal planning companies. In 27% of cases, the book­
keeping was supervised by qualified accountants, of which 58% 
were in formal planning companies. Further, where the 
accounting function relied solely on a manual system, 73% 
of these were in informal planning companies, whereas 66% 
of computerised accounting systems were in formal planning 
companies.
Surprisingly, '53% of survey companies hinted that finance 
for major purchases was easy to obtain, another Ul% said they 
had not encountered too difficult a task in raising these funds.
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Planning companies tended to use more variations of finance 
for funding major purchases than informal planning companies.
The largest single source of funds for all companies was bank 
loans (33% of companies). Leasing and lease-purchasing found 
little active pursuance among small companies. The main 
source of funds for day to day operations was bank overdrafts, 
(48% of companies), while 4% relied on internal funds with 
a tendency for informal planning companies to rely more on 
supplier credit than formal planning companies.
The recovery of debt has been a major obstacle for small 
companies over the past five very lean years. The survey 
found the debt collection period to be forty five to sixty 
days among 50% of the companies, with 87% of companies 
granting at least thirty days credit. No difference was 
observed between planning mode companies. 30% of companies 
used the traditional methods of recovery-reminder letters.
Only 3% of small companies had resorted to legal proceedings, 
which,--considering the amount of bad debts imposed on small 
companies, is probably a reflection of their lack of time,funds 
and experience in recovering those debts. 37% of small 
companies accused the large companies of being particularly 
poor payers, 5% named the Government and 4% named Nationalised 
Industries as being slow to complete their contracts with 
final payment. As 13% of small companies suggested that all 
types and sizes of business organisation took equal lengths 
of time to pay, the large proportion, (46% of companies), 
are being unfairly used by their big brothers.
In conclusion, it is evident that the minority of small 
companies (formal planning types), possess the majority of 
advanced financial systems, supervised by more qualified 
personnel. In addition, planning companies use a wider 
variety of sources of funds for major purchases. Yet, it is 
heartening to note, that many small companies do not experience 
gross difficulty in raising this capital. However, the big 
brothers of larger firms, Government and Nationalised Industries 
must suffer severe indictment for taking undue trade credit 
from smaller, less-powerful companies.
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xi) In the functional areas of Products, Markets, Finance, Personnel, 
Research and Development, 34% of all companies had no specific 
plans (68% were informal planning companies). Formal planning 
companies possessed a wider range and a greater variety of plans. 
Finance was more important to formal modes (the basis of all 
growth and expansion). Significantly, Personnel and Research 
and Development were neglected areas in both planning modes.
The aims of informal planning companies appear to be more 
diverse than their formal counterparts. The latter tended to 
pursue the more traditional aims of profit and sales 
maximisation (13%)S compared to only 11% in informal modes.
Profit maximisation was crucial to both modes, not only as a 
sole aim, but also in combinations with other aims. The welfare 
of employees, though unimportant as a single aim, was present 
in most combinations of aims for both planning company modes.
If the emphasis in both modes was on the principle aim of 
profit maximisation, there was a delicate shift in balance 
towards company survival as secondary in importance in 
informal modes and towards welfare of employees in formal 
. modes. Perhaps informal modes perceive survival as a mqjor 
issue in the day to day lives, while formal modes, arguably 
more confident of survival, consider the welfare of employees 
as critical to company continuity. Responsibility for 
determining these aims seems to be encouched in the hands of 
the chief executive in informal modes, while his opposite 
number in formal modes decides the aims in conjunction with 
his Board of Directors and external advisors. This lends 
support to the proposition that in small companies the planning 
perspective is often synonymous with the personal values 
and aspirations of the entrepreneur founder.
Both planning companies considered that most attention was 
given to customers and production, with research and development 
receiving least attention and marketing requiring more attention. 
The .vitality of R and D is crucial to the advancement of any 
industrial sector in the economy and its dearth here should 
be noted with anxiety. The concentration of small firms on 
production alone,.with little consideration for marketing, may 
be evidence of the engineer-orientated legacy of the 
Industrial Revolution. However, it is heartening to find that 
the majority of small firms still consider the customer of
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prime importance (this is useful marketing itself) and that 
labour troubles were not preoccupying the operations of many 
firms. The survey found that in 54% of companies unionisation 
was low, so thankfully the British disease has not infiltrated 
this sector markedly.
xii) The majority of U.K. small companies who engage in formal 
corporate planning appear to have adopted the concept from 
1973 to 1975» placing a 10 to 15 year duration gap since 
corporate plannings initial onslaught on the American manage- 
, ment literature of the early 1960s. In fact, 28% of firms had 
engaged in the activity before the end of the 1960s, with 13% 
before 1963. The concept seems to have been active in the 
construction sector for longer, (mean average of 10 .1 years), 
followed by chemicals, textiles, leather and clothing, whose 
companies seem to have been planning formally for most of the 
1970s. The youngest formal planners are in foods, mechanical 
engineering and shipbuilding. The survey found that formal 
planning is largely focused on the top 3/4 executives in 
the firm, with a striking similarity in length of planning 
. horizons, both within and across industrial sectors. Three 
years is the limit, with two on average, 77% of formal types 
will look rio further. This is substantiated by evidence 
from informal planners, 74% of whom will only entertain a 
horizon 2/3 years maximum in the current economic climate.
This is understandable, due not only to their dependence 
on the industrial climate and its irreverent uncertainty, 
hut also upon the inconsistency of Government policy and 
intervention in this sector.
xiii) The majority of formal planning companies (75%)» insisted
that the adoption of corporate planning had not altered the 
management structure of the company. In those companies 
where structure had changed, this took the form of the 
addition of other staff posts (32%) and a general stream­
lining of the existing structure to improve efficiency (28%).
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Only k% of these companies required new staff skills, 
and in 13% of them the job-specification of existing managers 
changed. This suggests that small companies pursuing formality, 
adopt the technique within their existing structure and without 
resort to expensive specialist functions. Hence, formal 
planning is possible in small companies.
However, the evidence does suggest that small companies who 
do plan ahead formally in their opinion, may well appear 
informal with respect to an academic interpretation. But - 
the important point is, that they perceive it to be formal 
and not as perceived by academics.
Indeed, they do appear to benefit - 18% suggested both profit and sales 
increased, size and sales increased in 9% of cases and employee 
conditions and profits improved in another 8% of cases. Size was
predominant in 18% of combination of factors that had
improved since adoption, profitability in 46% and sales
increases in 3$%. Formal planning companies also'suggested, 
that if profit increase was the greatest benefit, then 
close behind came a satisfaction that knowledge of the 
company objectives and target setting had served to co­
ordinate managerial effort and provide managerial incentive 
and direction. Only 10% of the informal planning companies 
had ever tried a formal planning procedure, 53% abandoned this 
due to the excess of uncertainty under the current economic 
climate.
It is evident that some form of corporate planning exists 
among small U.K. companies and that they have adopted formality 
at little expense. It also appears that they have reaped 
considerable benefits of improvements in profits, sales and size.
There have been drop-outs, but there have "been more successes.
The survey suggests small firm corporate planning is active 
in a form and successful - i.e. it is possible.
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The thesis is composed of 6 remaining chapters. Chapter 2 reviews 
the relevant literature on small companies and corporate planning with 
the aim of describing the role of small firms in the economy and 
drawing upon the existing knowledge for a conceptual framework in which 
to pursue the research theme. Chapter 3 describes'the method of research 
adopted and more important, why that method was considered more appropriate 
to the current research interests. If the results of a research study 
are to be treated with any degree of respect, a data collection device 
of quality and reliability must be designed and implemented. Chapter 3 
stresses the care taken in the design of the chosen method, the mail 
survey. It describes the questionnaire itself, the layout and the 
reasons for each section, together with a step by step guide of the 
principles incorporated in the instrument to elicit maximum response 
and minimum bias. Chapter 4 aims to test the reliability of the instrument 
It presents the response rates in full, the response speed and also 
examines- response quality. It tests the sample representativeness, 
the randomness of responses over time and examines response bias in 
S.I.C. Order, company size and geographical area. Chapter 5 presents 
the tentative results of two and three way cross-tabulations, in identical 
order to the questionnaire layout for ease of comprehension. Chapter 6 
presents the results of the analysis proper, in the form of an output 
from the Automatic Interaction Detector, which was used to break down 
the data into a more comprehensible format and served to confirm the 
results of Chapter 5. Chapter 6 also contains a cross-validation for 
the A.I.D. results. This is a necessary procedure which is not 
frequently performed when A.I.D. is used. Chapter 7 is a concluding 
chapter describing the implications of the main findings for policy 
makers and the professions, together with suggestions for further 
researchers.
The flow-diagram (figure 1.1) is a visual interpretation of how 
the thesis is designed to carry out the research theme.
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis
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A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE RELATING TO 
SMALL COMPANIES AND CORPORATE PLANNING
Objective of the chapter
The aim of the chapter is to point out the crucial role of 
small firms in the U.K. economy, while attempting to draw upon 
the literature for a conceptual frame of reference in which to 
examine ways of improving small company performance.
Organisation of the chapter
In order to achieve the above aim the chapter has been split 
into 3 sections. Section 2.1 reflects on the role of small firms from 
a macro viewpoint, looking at the reasons for their contemporary 
importance in part 2.1,1. The most comprehensive survey of the small 
firms sector to date is the Report of the Bolton Committee of Inquiry 
into small firms (1971)• A discussion of the reasons for the setting 
up of this Committee serves to illustrate some of the more important 
problems that did, and in many cases still do, trouble small companies 
vis-^ a-vis large companies, A discussion of the Report and relevant 
criticism appears in part 2.1 .2.
Section 2.2 seeks to illustrate the unique internal aspects' 
of small company operations. Part 2.2.1 shows that, although the 
systems approach provides useful insights into company operations, it 
suffers among the other approaches in the managerial texts in teing 
more applicable to medium and large scale operations. The essence of 
small scale operations is often reflected in the role of the owner 
manager or entrepreneur, and it is towards that role that the discussion 
turns in part 2.2.2. Here, the reasons for entrepreneurial activity 
are perused, so that a clearer understanding of small firm operation 
can be revealed. Problems which complicate the operations of small firms 
are .illustrated in part 2.2.3, providng a framework against which the 
instrument of corporate planning can be discussed.
Section 2.3 engulfs the corporate planning procedure, beginning 
with an overall discussion of the concept, its integrity as a technique, 
its popularity, the problems associated with its adoption in part 2.3.1 9 
which also indicates,- once again, that the expositions are more appropriate 
to-larger scale activities. What literature is appropriate to smaller 
companies is recorded in part 2.3.2 which concludes not only the 
sparsity of documentation in the ar'ea and the applicability of some
CHAPTER TWO
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of this literature to small companies and their problems as identified 
in parts 2.2.2 and 2.2.3* hut also asks if enough knowledge has been 
gathered for pedagogic purposes. It concludes that what is required 
is an empirical investigation.
2.1 The Role of Small Companies in the Macro-Environment
2.1.1 Reasons for the contemporary importance of small firms
If a topic monopolizes economic and political discussion, it is 
either a fashion or a necessity. If it is a fashion, its cosmetic 
apparel will dissolve in the power of critical argument. If it is a 
necessity that same argument will strengthen and crystallize its 
significance.
Academics and politicians in the United Kingdom (UK) have given 
small companies increasing attention and interest over the last 
decade so that now the subject has become a crucial election issue.
Why, after years of benign neglect, should small companies rise to 
such magisterial pre-eminence?
The importance to the economy of one and a quarter million 
independent small firms* employing over 25% of the working population 
and producing around 20% of the Gross Rational Product^ is superficially 
unquestionable?hut alone does not explain this meteoric rise.
Those reasons are inextricably bound up in the unprecedented growth 
of industrial concentration in the UK since 1950. A rise which was 
preceded by the demise of the competitive economy during the 1920s, the 
collapse of free trade and free competition during the depression of 
1929-1931 culminating in the 1932 Import Duties Act and the consequent 
promotion of cartel agreements, so that by the outbreak of the war in 
1939 the industrial economy was rife with co-operation rather than 
competition.
*The definition of small firms here is that given by the Bolton Committee 
Report which appears- at Appendix A in full, in manufacturing industry 
this consists of firms up to 200 employees. See Chapter One for a 
complete definition of small firms used in this research.
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Figure 2.1 Share of the hundred largest enterprises and establishments 
in manufacturing net output, United Kingdom.
% net 
output
Source: S.J. Prais (ref. 2, page 47)
From 1920 to 1950 the balance of power had shifted from the
entrepreneurial activity to the co-operative and concentrated activity.
The trend in the share of net output of the 100 largest companies 
2 3 4 5 .is well documented. 9 9 9 Figure 2.1 is taken from the notable and
6comprehensive study by Professor Prais. Four conclusions can be drawn 
from the graph.
1 . Note the long term increase in concentration, the rise 
in the share of output of the hundred largest firms, 
from 15% in 1909 to 42% in 1968 and towards 50% in the 
1970s, is strong, unprecedented and established.
2.
3.
The rate of increase has almost doubled between 1950- 
1970 compared to 1909-1935*
The slight hiccup in the long term trend during the
war-years has now been accepted as an exeptional
interruption. In fact, small companies stood to benefit
during the war years due not only to their flexibility
and speed of movement in adapting to the changes and
improvisations that were necessary, but also because
of the practice of sub-contracting government orders to
small firms.. Large firms on the other hand, suffered
obstacles to growth in the prohibition of capital issues 
during the period.
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4. Any simple or sophisticated extrapolation of the trend, 
should it he allowed to continue, would suggest that by 
1990, up to 66% of manufacturing output may be in the 
hands of these largest 100 companies.
The picture painted at the aggregate level is reinforced by 
market level data in Table 2.1, which, although it only covers 
93 minimum list headings, these industries were responsible for 6l% 
of employment in manufacturing industry in 1972. Note the 
overwhelming emphasis in industries for an increase in concentration 
rather than a reduction.
Table 2.1 Change in Concentration at Industry Level 1963-1972.
Share of Employment held by five largest Firms.
Change, % points Number of Industries
- 20 to - 11 1
- 10 to - 1 17
0 to 10 6l
11 to 20 10
20 4
93'
Average Change = +5*2% points (unweighted)
Source: OFT estimates for 1963, Business Monitor
PA1004 for 1972, J.D. C-ribbin '
, 8George’s research validates these results at the aggregate and market 
level. He further notes that the increases in concentration were most 
noticeable in metals, electrical engineering, vehicles, textiles, 
leather clothing and footwear, bricks and food, drinife and tobaccos. 
Indeed, the large increases in concentration occurred in those sectors 
where merger activity was rife in the 1960s.
This insatiable appetite by the 100 largest UK companies to 
consume employment is accentuated by placing it in perspective with 
other advanced capitalist countries. (Table 2.2).
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Table. 2.2 International Comparison of Industrial Concentration
U.K.
Germany
U.S.A.
Canada
Belgium
France
Sweden
Japan
Netherlands
Australia
Switzerland
Norway
Italy
Year of Observation
1963
1963
1963
1968
1962
1963
1965
1966 
1962 
1963 
1965 
1967 
1961
% Manufacturing Employment in 
Small Establishments (200 people)
31
34
39
47
51
51
53
54 
58 
60 
61 
64 
66
Source: OECD - see reference 9
Note, from Table 2.2 above, that although the years are not strictly
comparable, the importance of small firms in shares of employment is
lowest in the U.K.
From the relevant empirical data it can he concluded that not only
has the rate of increase of industrial concentration developed at
unprecedented levels in the U.K. but also it has developed at higher
degrees than other advanced economies.
There are two important observations to be drawn here. Firstly,
a prolonged, increasing rise in concentration with relevant emphasis
on the largest firms will, ceteris paribus, lead to a decrease in
the share of employment and output of small manufacturing firms.
In this light it is difficult to appreciate the blinkered emphasis
of economists and politicians on large size during this period.
10Bannock defends the economists' ignorance by pointing out that the 
many studies on concentration were misleading because of the artificial 
decrease in concentration during wartime and the consequent lapse of 
time in updating statistics.
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In addition, there is the difficulty in comparability of statistics
across countries and hence the problem of increasing concentration was
never documented as severe. But, this- is a rather meek and mild defence.
Here is a crucial issue that has dogged researchers before and since.
How can an advanced economy ever hope to control its economic destiny
when the statistics relating to its industrial performance are
five years adrift? Further, exactly at the time small companies
predominate in popularity (1975-1979)* is just the time we know nothing
about their share of net output and employment. The research that
stood as a landmark in analysing the role and problems of the small
firm against this background of increasing aggregate and market
concentration, using this type of adrift data, was conducted under
the watchful eye of John Bolton in 1968, culminating in the famous
11Bolton Committee Report of 1971 , a detailed discussion of which
follows in section 2.1 .2.
The second important observation here, concerns the relative
merits or aggravations of increasing concentration. If we are to cite .
the growing concern over the economic and political implications of
increasing concentration as a major cause of increased interest in
small companies, then we must also ask the question - is growing
concentration itself necessarily offensive? The National Economic and
12Development Corporation , favour an increased level of concentration
such that resources are transmitted from their present dispersed sites
and activities into a narrower set of high performance plants, as
a means of placing the U.K. on competitive terms with the high
performing countries of the U.S.A., Japan, France and German, compared
to which she lags behind in terms of labour productivity. However,
. ' 13Hamilton has shown , albeit with the usual econometric problems of
data discrepancies and multicollinearity, that there is no evidence
that labour productivity will benefit from further.increases in
concentration. Indeed, perhaps the most revealing of Hamilton’s
findings, is that small companies tend to increase their share of
net output more quickly, in more highly concentrated industries.
Given the inevitable growth of concentration in manufacturing
.14/industry as proposed by Prais (because firms m  all groups may grow 
at the same ratio on average, but increased concentration comes from 
a cumulative dispersion of growth rates about that average), the 
consequent advantages of concentration in terms of technical economies 
of scale and those economies in research and development, advertising, 
marketing and international distribution networks must he weighed
against their disadvantages of potential monopoly. . In this case the 
greater prices may he relative to- costs and the greater the resource
m.i sallocation and welfare losses. •
It must be noted here that perhaps the most important finding of
* .
the recent empirical work on concentration is that, although most authors 
find a positive relation between concentration and profitability, 
it is evident that concentration is only one of several other important 
influencing factors including growth, advertising, exporting and capital 
intensity and hence the effect of concentration, ’per se’, on economic 
performance is difficult to assimilate.
What is more important in this context, and an area on which 
the Bolton Report places great emphasis, is the preservation of a 
healthy small firm sector as a seedbed for entrepreneurial talent, 
invention, innovation and the growth of small companies to challenge 
existing firms. It is the role of competition in an arena of 
increasing concentration that is of crucial concern. ■ A further 
problem of the continuous growth of concentration is that it may 
well lead to a myopia of vision towards the larger enterprise.
Governments may prefer to deal with larger companies and larger 
unions as they are arguably more organised and capable of discussion 
and debate, compared to the weak and very dispersed voice of the 
small company sector. The latter rarely possess the time' to organise 
into effective pressure groups with a single voice - (perhaps the 
sector is too heterogeneic for this), and so there is a severe 
danger of legislation being designed with the large unit in mind, 
which could damage small firms. In addition, policy decisions - 
particularly with regard to tax allowances and grants, may act to 
favour the larger company. So although the debate on the pros and 
cons of increasing concentration remains vibrant, it is important 
that the health, vitality and interests of the small firm sector 
is not unduly damaged. The tragic evaporation of new companies, 
which worried the Bolton Committee, is sketched out in Figure 2.2.
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*15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
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Figure 2.2 Establishments in U.K. Manufacturing with 10 
Employees or Less.
Number of 
Establishments 
(thousands)
Year
1930 1940 1950 I960 1970
Source: Prais (reference 2), p. 187, Table B.l.
Given the shift in emphasis of the factors of production towards 
larger firms, the picture on Figure 2.2 is to be expected - a continuous 
sharp'decline from 93,000 establishments in 1930 to 355000 in 1968.
In perspective, during this period of rapid deoline the human population 
of Britain increased by one sixth and real national product was doubled. 
However, this did not detract from the Bolton Committees obsession 
with this rapid decline. An obsession which is to be expected, as 
they only possessed data up to 1963 and had no way of perceiving 
that the trend in later years was to slow down and eventually stabilize.
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Table 2.3 Trends in Small Enterprises* in U,K. Manufacturing Industry
Small Firms Share of 
Manufacturing
Year All Firms(l)
Small 
Firms(2) 2/1%
Employ­
ment
Net
Output Section
(1935 140,000 136,000 97 38 35
«) ; « f
(1963
70,000 66,000 94 24 20 I
64,000 60,200 94 20 17
(1968 62,000 58,200 94 19 a I6ab
i) (1971 75,000 71,400 95 21 • -18
ii)(1972 72,300 69,000 95 .22 18 II
iii)(1973 • 77,500 74,000 96 21 17
Source: (a) Bannock10 pp. 17-18
(B) i) Table 
ii) Table 
iii) Table
8 C of P 1971 
8 C of P 1972 
12 of C of P 1973
)
)
)
Summary
Tables
■
Notes: i) a = Includes a proportion for unsatisfactory returns
ii) b = Based on 1968 prices, preceding figures based on 1963 prices
iii) * = Small enterprises defined as having less than 200 employees
iv) C of P = Census of Production
Table 2.3 serves to illustrate this cessation. Section I, although the 
1968 figure should not be compared with the others, shows at least a slowing 
down of the rate and that this may even have stopped by the late 1960s.
Section II cannot be strictly compared to Section I as the.latter is based on 
quinquennial censuses, the former on the more modern annual censuses, but 
the figures in Section II can be compared with each other and show no specific
24continuation of a downward trend. In fact, as Johnson rightly points out,
the absence of a decline in the relative share of small firms is remarkable
given that this was a period in which Government policy was still pro the
25larger unit. Further, a recent survey of small firms hy ICFC (.and therefore 
bias in favour of more efficient small firms), suggests that during the 
early 1970s small firms proved their resilience in withstanding adverse 
industrial conditions and in some cases proved to be more efficient than 
large firms.
More recent work by Hamilton , using the crude indicators of 
the numbers of registrations and de-registrations of new companies and 
business names appears to reinforce the view that the downward trend 
has stopped and may even in fact have been reversed (see Figure 2.3).
The greater increase in the number of business names suggests that most 
new businesses may well be in the non-manufacturing or service sector.
The evidence suggests that small firms have suffered a marked
decrease in their share of industrial activity, but seem to have
survived the process of rampant concentration. Their resilience
27is further illustrated by Prais , who has shown that, in 1968, small 
establishments accounted for about a third of the number of all 
establishments with little variation among industries. Hence, there 
appears to be equal opportunity in all sectors for-small scale activity, 
even in those of high concentration, reinforcing the earlier result 
of Hamilton^.
The concern over competition with increased concentration in 
industry and the declining share of net output and employment of small • 
companies contributed significantly to focusing attention on the small 
company arena. Other factors bound up in the actual causes of 
concentration magnified the issue.
Probably the single most important cause of rising concentration
was the intense merger activity of the 1960s and early 1970s.
29 .Utton has suggested that nearly 50% of the increase m  the degree of
business concentration within manufacturing industry may be attributed
30to mergers. Between 1954-1958 , 1457 mergers took place, each with an
average value of £0.4m assets acquired. By 1964-1968 the figure had 
trebled to 4444 and average values had more than doubled to £0.9m.
By 1969 and 1973 (not direetly comparable due to change of base from 
quoted companies 1954-1968, to industrial and commercial companies 
after 1968), 3838 mergers took place with twofold increase in average 
value to £l,8m. By 1974 and 1975 the annual rate had.fallen to just 
over 400, compared to 768 in the previous five years - further, the 
value of the average acquisition was almost halved.
What is important here, is not only the scale of that activity 
but the question as to whether, on balance, those mergers were 
beneficial to the economy. Did any resultant increased economies outweigh 
the increase in market power? The empirical evidence available is 
crucially consistent. Newboulc?1 , using a questionnaire approach in a 
study of 38 mergers during 1967-8, found no beneficial effects in 45% 
of the cases two years after the merger; and in 55% of the cases 
five years after the merger. In 68% of his cases, sales remained static 
and in 79%, exports failed to improve. A later study by Kitchingp^
34
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sample of 145 mergers during 1965-1972, 30% were considered failures
and 17% were, in the opinion of the companies concerned, "not worth
33repeating'1. Similarly, Hart, Utton and Walshe , using a case study 
approach relating to mergers of the period 1958-1963 with 10 
randomly chosen product groups, found that in only 2 cases did 
plant scale economies benefit , in 8 cases "it is possible to claim 
that some variety*of firm scale economies occurred. However, in 
6 cases certain scale diseconomies were detected, while in three 
product groups the mergers were "clearly sought as a means of
34elim inating com petition ." Utton , reviewing the period I96I-I965,
delivers probably the most interesting finding. Taking a sample of
39 merger intensive companies and comparing their, company accounts
to a random sample of 39 internal growth companies during the same
period, he found that the higher average profitability belonged to
the la t t e r . This was upheld both in the period a fter  intensive
merger activity (1966-70), when the average growth of the two samples .
was similar, and also during the period of merger intensity (1961-65),
when the growth of the control group was significantly lower.
35Singh , before him, in a study of 56 merger intensive companies 
from 1955“60, found that 65% had worse profit records one year after- 
take-over. His findings agree with Utton in that taken-over firms 
had a worse profit record than non-taken-over firms, on the yardsticks 
of rate of return on capital employed, growth rate and valuation ratio. 
He concludes, "It is therefore, on balance, very unlikely that 'the 
reorganisation of a firm’s assets, which takes place through the 
take-over mechanism, leads to a more profitable utilisation of 
these* assets."
Kuehns results of 117 take-over raiders from 1937 to 1969 
substantiates the case. He found that although the raiders were 
faster growing in their respective industries, this growth had not 
generated significantly higher profits. When compared with the 
surviving firms in their industry, raiders actually earned a lower 
rate of return on assets. However, he did find that 87 of his 117 
raiders had valuation levels higher than the industry median, 
despite poor profit performance. * .
using a similar approach, reinforces the trend. With a larger
Singh , researching m  the manufacturing sectors of food, 
drinks, clothing and footwear and non-electrical engineering, 
found negligible differences between surviving and taken-over firms, 
but his evidence did suggest that firms were concentrating on size, 
rather than on profitability. 30
The extensive work by Meeks confirms the sad findings.
In a study of 213 take-overs during 1964-72, he found that in all
seven post merger years, the average profitability of the company
showed a decline from their pre-merger level. It is not difficult
to criticize these studies on the grounds of small sample sizes,
measuring success on only the profitability aspect and sometimes the
economies of scale aspect is restrictive and obviously the
questionnaire findings have subjective bias. More important, as 
. 39G n b b m  has pointed out, a comparison with the past records of
the parties or other groups of companies in the same industry
is not overtly fruitful. What is required, is a comparison
with what would have happened if the merger had not taken place -
admittedly an extremely difficult concept to analyse. Further, on
40an international level, evidence presented by Mueller , on the
conglomerate merger activity in the U.S.A. during the 1960s, is
equally as consistent in its exposition to the U.K. evidence;
and so, what these studies unambiguously suggest, is that the
efficiency gains from mergers and associated benefits have
desperately failed to materialize;
What remains important for small companies here, is not only
the re-alignment of attention they have been given by the merger
anti-climax, but also the re-alignment of the attitude that allowed
4lthose fiiergers to persist m  the first instance. True, Newbould 
provides some evidence that there was some inadequate appraisal 
of the merger by acquiring companies and so blame must be attached
42to the firm as well as at Government level, G n b b m  • describes the
attitude of both major political parties towards merger as ’benign1.
43 .Meeks describes it as 'permissive*. There can be no doubt that it
was weak in the extreme - of 1376 mergers subjected to legislation
up to the end of 1976, only 2.7% were referred to the Monopolies
Commission, of which one third were abandoned, one third were viewed
as against and one third not against, the public interest.
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However, the policy adopted by the Monopolies Commission 
possesses theoretical logic - i.e. that there can be no presumption 
that the inevitable enhancement of market power is always against 
the public interest, because greater size can lead to increased 
efficiency, higher employment and growth and improvements in the
trading balance. On the basis of current empirical evidence
. .  .  4 4however, this is not the case. Hence, Cowling has recently
condemned the Government’s Green Paper on Monopolies and Mergers,
for suggesting this type of neutral approach when what is required
is a far more stringent control, or as Cowling emphasises, complete
abolition of mergers - "Even if a more stringent view were taken,
we would still be left with vast bastions of economic power about
which we have little knowledge and even less control".
Here lies the dichotomy. The question of whether to engineer
a more stringent control of merger activity and place the emphasis
on small scale, or pursue the hardened belief that relates size to
increased benefits and economies and so risk the demise of small
scale activity. . ,
45These beliefs can be harmonious. It was Andrews , writing 
over 30 years ago, who illustrated most pellucidly that small and 
large scale can exist hand in hand in the same industry. A characteristic 
of technical economies of scale, is that they are more important in 
the earlier stages of firm growth and so firms with comparatively 
modest scale can compete with bigger rivals by adopting more flexible 
writing off periods of capital equipment; so reducing fixed cost and
maintaining a competitive price. Indeed, the preceding evidence
' . 2 7  . 2 8by Prais and Hamilton . has proven that small firms can exist in
concentrated sectors of industry. It is important that their
potential to survive is not jeopardized by a myopic vision of large
scale. In the light of the. disenchantment with the potential
results of the merger activity, it is the very reasons why small
4 5companies do survive that becomes central to the theme. Andrews 
lends further explanation here, by considering why larger firms often 
adopt smaller scale activities. He suggests a large business is 
not necessarily large in size of plant. As plant size increases, 
any resultant technical economies may be negated by diseconomies with 
regard to exhaustion of labour markets, increased union pressure 
and consequent higher wage rates, coupled to diseconomies associated 
with manageability:- the greater increase in span of executive 
control together with' increased number of managerial levels, is
39
the economic and organizational theorists' diminishing returns that 
eventually strangulate growth and efficiency. Often such firms adopt 
a multi-plant mode of operation and run on lines adjacent to small
. 46company procedure. In fact, Prais has shown that technical 
production economies are not important in explaining the rapid 
increase in industrial concentration because plant sizes have remained 
relatively constant throughout the period (see Figure 2.1), rather 
than moved hand in hand with the share of industrial activity of the 
100 largest firms. This adds weight to Andrews suggestion that 
there are other reasons afoot which will explain why the number of 
plants owned by large firms has risen so rapidly. (True, there are 
scale economies associated with multi-plant operations in terms of 
common administration or tooling facilities). Herein lies another 
reason for the profusion of attention on small companies. As the 
argument shifts from the technical production economies of larger units, 
to smaller scale operations, it nec.essarily shifts towards other 
economies intrinsic to small scale.
Those other economies of small scale are associated with improved 
industrial relations and the Identification - Motivation - Belonging 
scenario that comes from the behavioural school and will be discussed 
later.
JigRecent studies by Eisele (1968) and more recently by Shorey
(1975) which analysed the size of work unit and frequency of strikes,
concluded that increased size of plant leads to greater internal
industrial conflict and arguably to larger production costs in
those plants. (Note - from Shorey - average production costs do not
necessarily increase along with firm size, if plant size is constant.
There are economies in costs per worker to be offset, and no
specific monetary values can be attached to the rebalance ). Further
49work on workplace industrial relations by the Donovan Commission 
on establishments of below 100, from 100-500 and over 500 employees, 
concluded that 43% of managers in large plants had experienced a 
strike while in the job, but only 20% of managers in small plants.
More than 75% of those in large plants, compared with 46% elsewhere, 
had experienced other forms of pressure such-as strike threats, overtime 
bans and go slows. They found labour relations in small plants 
to he more informal and manager-shop steward relations were direct. 
Adding to this serious indictment of large scale is the evidence 
to suggest that not only does stike incidence increase with size 
but also strike duration. This process is illustrated in Table 2.4 
overleaf.
Table 2.4 Stoppages by Size of Plant in Manufacturing (GB)
Annual Average 1971”1973 manufacturing industry, number of working 
days lost per 1000 employees
Plant Size By 
Employment
11-24 
25-99 
100-199 
200-499 
500-999 
1000 or more
Source: Department of Employment Gazette,
February 1976, pp 115-130.
The above figures clearly show a lower incidence of work stoppages
in smaller manufacturing plants. Of course, some of these higher
figures in larger firms can be written down to material shortages
emanating from strikes in suppliers’ companies, but the aggregate
figures do suggest diseconomies of scale via labour alienation^0.
The main reasons for the accelerated attention on small
companies can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the growing concern
with the trend to large scale and monopolistic tendencies associated
49with it, both in eoncomic ,political and social terms. Secondly,
the disenchantment with the benefits from merger activity re-aligned
attention to smaller scale. Thirdly, industrial relations and
identification are seen as more improved- and relaxed economies of
smaller scale. Finally, small firms are essentially labour
intensive and as such have been viewed as a major component in
51alleviating the current high levels of unemployment . The Small 
. 52Industries Council for the Rural Areas of Scotland, point 
out that between 1972 and 1974, the 15% increase in employment in 
small firms was three times greater than the Scottish industrial 
average. Indeed, the argument bears fruit when you pose -the question 
what is the alternative?
Number of Working Days Lost 
per 100 employees
14.8
72.4
155.0
329.0
7191
2CA6.1
The non-market sector, already overburdened with staff, 
faces cuts in public expenditure from the 1979 Conservative Government 
(Times,l4 November, 1979, p. 12i - e.g. local authorities may lose 
up to £1000m over the period 1979~198l), which is going to place a 
limit on the public sector to solve the problem. Similarly, the 
Nationalised Industries are not only overmanned, but, like shipbuilding, 
face a drastic drop in world demand. It is possible that the 
labour intensive Construction Industry can provide some relief but 
this is only -a ’floating relief’ on the upswing of a business cycle 
and does not tackle the fundamental structural problem. The 
growing financial and private services sector, together with tourism 
and leisure, are other areas offering potential alleviations.
Many companies in these sectors are, in fact, small firms and it is 
towards the small firm sector that the recent political courtship 
has been directed, in reducing the burdens of taxation, increasing 
the availability of finance and reducing the strangulating red tape 
in order to sow the seeds for a riper entrepreneurial climate.
In so doing, it is hoped that many new companies will set up in 
business and existing companies will grow and expand to take on 
additional employment. But sowing and fertilizing an entrepreneurial 
climate is not in itself a guarantee of harvest. For attempts to 
increase the birth rate of small firms by inducements to take risk, 
is inevitably going to lead to an excess of failures over successes 
and the effects of alleviating unemployment in this case will only 
be felt in the medium to long term, and will probably only be 
marginal. Any significant impact on unemployment must come from 
the potential of existing small firms to grow and expand. It was 
John Bolton and his fellow pioneers who set out in 19&9 to 
document the small firm sector and describe its problems. The Bolton 
Committee Report then became the source document, throughout the 1970s, 
by which to assess that potential.
h i
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No-one, at the time or since, can doubt the pioneering work 
of the Bolton Committee. It was established in a climate of increasing 
attention by politicians and economists to large scale and the 
associated economic and technological benefits. The view that 
prevailed is illustrated, albeit with a slight quirk of irony, by 
Sir Val Duncan at the first annual lecture of the Institute of Directors 
on the 8th July, 1969, when he emphasised that there were too many 
small companies in industry and urged the "merger of small companies 
with similar products and services into companies of sufficient size 
so they can decrease unit costs"to Fifteen days later, on the 
23rd July, 1969, the then President of the Board of Trade,
Anthony Crosland, appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of 
John Bolton, to look into the role of small firms in the economy.
The terms of reference, which were largely reached in co-ordination 
with the C.B.I., were as follows
" To consider the role of small firms in the national 
economy, the facilities available to them and the problems 
confronting them; and to .-make recommendations.
  In the course of the study it will be necessary
to examine in. particular the profitability of small 
firms and the availability of finance. Regard should 
also he paid to the special functions of small firms, 
for example as innovators and specialist suppliers."
The nature of the Inquiry was of long term interest and those 
recommendations w'ould form the basis of any future small firm policy.
The reasons why the Committee was so surprisingly set up, 
provides insight into its- eventual recommendations. There were at 
least five factors responsible, which not only provided threats to 
small companies individually, but collectively they would have had 
drastic repercussions if allowed to persist. The first and perhaps 
most damaging, was Nicholas Kaldors Selective Employment Tax. Its 
purpose was to re-direct labour from the retail, construction and 
service sector into manufacturing and so increase exporting.
By becoming repayable to the latter sector after thirteen weeks and 
not to the former, it acted not only as an interest free loan to 
the Government but also as a tax on many small firms in the service 
sector, who had to shed labour in an effort to stabilize’costs.
2,1.2 The Bolton Committee Report
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This led to considerable inconvenience to the customer, and from 
July 1967 when the rate doubled, it was suggested that small companies 
in the Hotel and Catering sector were passing on the increase to 
customers. So by the time the Bolton Committee sat, small firms were 
already exhausted with this mechanism.
Secondly, the effect of the levy-grant system operating for 
the Industrial Training Boards (1964) was a further tax on small firms, 
who could rarely spare the manpower time to recoup the levy through 
attendance at training courses. Thirdly, under the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1962), any application for new factory premises,in the 
major industrial conurbationsiover 5,000 sq. ft., (Midlands and 
the South East = 3,000 sq. ft.), had to be supported by an 
Industrial Development Certificate issued by the D.T.I. Small 
firms anxious to expand found difficulty in obtaining I.D.C.s, 
as it .was not in their capacity to set up in the Development Areas 
of Scotland, Wales or Cornwall. Such legislation was obviously 
suited to the resources of the larger concerns.
Fourthly, the lean resources of small firms could no longer 
cope with the increasing burden of form-filling, e.g. P.A'.Y.E. , 
as executive time was necessarily devoted to operations, while 
larger companies could delegate the task to additional personnel.
Finally, the crippling levels of taxation - those taxes on 
capital, particularly Estate Duty, which presented a major problem 
in the management succession of Small companies and severely hampered 
the liquidity, so that in many cases the company had to be sold 
to pay them; and those taxes on Income which restricted the accumulation 
of private funds upon which small companies were crucially dependent 
as a source of funding, only acted to accentuate the plight of many 
small firms.
The Committee delivered its Report on the 3rd November, 1971, 
a report which Bolton himself referred to as "a charter and a book 
of reference" ^ . Bannock‘S  notes the speed with which the 1970-1974 
Conservative Government adopted the Report’s recommendations. Of 58 
that were made, 56 required action by the Government, and only 6 of 
these were rejected outright. The reasons already illustrated, 
which played a part in the establishment of the Committee, indicate 
the inequality with which small firms were treated by legislation.
The Committee were adamant that the Government was not and never 
had been, prejudiced against small firms (Report* paragraph 19.9),
*Figures in brackets in this section refer to the Report’s paragraphs.
but that small firm interests in Whitehall were nonetheless neglected 
because it was nobody’s job to attend to them. This was the basis 
of the Report's primary innovation - the establishment of a Small 
Firms Division within the Department of Trade, together with a 
Minister responsible for the present and future role of small firms 
in all industries in which they are important (19.10)* A major 
role of this Division was to supervise the signposting network of 
Advisory Bureaux which were established, as a result of the Report, 
around the country. They were to provide information on small 
firm problems and act as direction indicators for further services.
By 1975/76, Bannock* records that they handled up to 6,000 enquiries 
per month, of which about 20% related to company formation.
It was in the field of taxation that the Committee’s 
recommendations encountered their greatest opposition. Their 
suggestions that short-fall. assessment should be abolished, close 
company directors should be able to elect to be taxed as partnerships, 
that proprietors of unincorporated businesses and directors of closed 
companies should be able to plough hack their pension provisions, 
were all rejected. The major breakthrough in this area was the 
special rate of Corporation Tax applicable to small companies - 4-2% 
with profits not exceeding £1 5,000, with tapering relief for profits 
up to £25,000 (against a standard rate of 52%). The Finance Act of 
1973 adjusted the exemption limit for Estate Duty from £10,000 
to £1 5,000, flattening the remaining rates of duty and allowing 
8 years for payment.
Small firms were also exempted from the threatening Training
Board Levy and serious attempts were made to rationalise the burden
of form-filling (19.16) with a firm emphasis on the cost-benefit
5 7of every Government survey. But as Bannock rightly points out, 
subsequent legilsation - particularly V.A.T., has more than offset 
any gains made in this field. Further, the exemption limits for 
I.D.C.s were raised in December 1970, from 5,000 to 10,000 sq. ft. 
(Midlands and South East to 5,000 sq. ft.), allowing many small 
firms to expand in their own locality.
*See reference 10, pp 9-10
The Bolton Committee work deserves considerable credit and 
praise. The work was pioneering, placing small firms on the political 
agenda at last; the recommendations were far reaching and beneficial; 
and the emphatic finding that the small firm sector in the U.K. was 
rapidly decreasing, even under international comparisons, served to 
focus attention among economists and politicians on the dramatic 
consequences of such a shrinkage. But in all these recommendations
there is no call for special Government support for small firms.
T < > . . .In particular,.the Report found no Bolton Gap m  the provision of
finance for small firms and stressed that finance should not be 
provided for them at subsidised rates (12.98). Indeed small firms 
should receive no special support but be subject to the f’slings and 
arrows’ of competition that would serve to regulate their efficiency. 
"What the Report did indicate was the necessity for an economic and 
taxation system tailored to the inducement of entrepreneurial activity. 
Their view was as follows
19.17 We believe that an effective competition policy 
is of the greatest importance to the future of 
the small firms sector.
19.17*1 In making future references to the Monopolies 
Commission, greater emphasis should he placed 
on the effect of the monopoly or merger in 
question on the maintenance of a balanced industrial 
structure.
The latter recommendation was adopted and relevant alterations made ton-O
the legislation on Monopolies and Mergers. But as Yamey points out, 
firstly^the Report 'is not clear on the interpretation of balanced - is
this in the industrial sector or individual industry?, (although
. . .  n59Bolton later clarified this- to mean both) r, and secondly, the case
by case approach of that Monopoly and Merger legislation in the U.K. 
makes it difficult to 'tack on’ a more comprehensive view of the 
eventual role of small firms in those parts of the economy likely to 
he affected by that monopoly or merger.
In the area of free competition that underwrites efficiency and 
contains monopoly, the Report has been criticized by Waited who 
correctly notes that "the ability.of a small firm sector to provide 
effective’competition depends on what harriers to competition there 
are and the extent to which a few giant firms dominate the industry" .
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He suggests that the Committee were unaware of. two important considerations 
relating to industrial structure and performance, that dominant' firms may 
tolerate a fringe of small firms to give lie to the charge of monopoly 
and so independence of the small firms could he largely illusory if 
they have to follow the price leader; and that concentration may well 
not breed stagnation, as active competition may exist under conditions 
of oligopoly. In a more dynamic setting of multi-product firms,
Waite further argues that large companies could well provide many 
small company products and services and where small firms provide 
sub-assemblies to larger companies, their dependence on the large 
company renders their independence nominal. The logic of this 
argument is not questioned. In accepting this argument it is important 
to point out that the Bolton Report pursued the survival of a vibrant 
small firm sector, not only as a check on monopoly profits, but also 
as a seed-bed for invention, innovation and the flow of entrepreneurial 
talent. Further, the illusion of independence to the external 
economist of a small firm in those roles, may well not be an illusion 
to the owner-managers of the small companies and that is what is 
important internally. So long as the principle of competition is 
pursued by Government in legislation and considered by monopolies 
commissions, an alternative policy that could completely preserve 
independence remains an illusion itself.
Bannock^ notes that the Committee recognized its weakest 
point was in the treatment given to the dynamic aspects of the role 
of small firms, consequently it was in this area that the Report received 
its most ardent criticism. The Report (19.5)» had drawn a demarcation 
line amid the eight economic functions it laid down for small firms.
Six of these functions were adjudged as self-rewarding - those relating 
to the provision of a productive outlet for entrepreneurial energies; 
smaller scale industries; suppliers of components and sub-assemblies; 
limited supply or speciality products; firms as an important source 
of innovation in products, techniques and services; their role as 
sources of competition (actual and potential), providing some check 
on monopoly profits and on the inefficiency that monopoly breeds.
These roles were seen to be self-rewarding in the sense that their 
performance ought to be reflected in the efficiency and profitability 
of the firms performance ~*the private and public benefits, although 
not necessarily identical, will coincide". (19.6)
The Committee considered the remaining two functions, 
those of a breeding ground for new industries and innovation ’writ 
large’ and the role of the small firm sector as a seed-bed for new 
entrepreneurial talent to grow and challenge existing industry, as 
difficult to maintain under 'reasonably free market forces’. The 
existence of these latter functions was considered crucial from a 
dynamic competitive point of view and also that the public benefit 
accruing from them would largely dominate the private one gained by 
the companies involved. The decline of the small firm to a critical 
point so as to jeopardise those functions was seen as ground enough 
for .special treatment of the small firm sector at a later date.
(Bolton saw no immediate cause for concern at the falling small 
company sector at the time). Yamey challenges this assertion by 
pointing out that considering they already have a head start and 
protection by patents, there was no reason why the pioneers of new 
industries should not achieve considerable remuneration for their 
efforts. He challenges whether or not the Report succeeds in 
distinguishing ways in which the small firm sector generates public 
benefits which exceed their private ones and even if there was a 
discrepancy between the two, it is difficult to see why the Report 
should chose to omit innovations ’writ large' from its self-rewarding 
category of functions pertaining to innovation in products, techniques 
and services. This is because the forces of competition , the 
introduction of competitive products forcing prices down-and so 
providing considerable public benefit, applies equally well to 
innovations in both sectors. Hence, the distinction which the Report 
makes between dynamic competition and competition 'writ large' is 
not easy to make. He further argues that the case for a differential 
treatment of the small firm sector rests upon proving that large 
firms cannot provide public benefits of equal or greater merit 
(a proof which is itself a difficult task). It must be noted that 
the Report's restrictive frame of reference largely prevented it 
from exploring this area more fully and here Yamey is essentially 
using information gathered in the process of Bolton's research for a 
criticism of the Report itself.
t
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What appears more pertinent, is the argument that any
subsidisation of the sector in future would have to be a blanket
policy applying to ALL small firms, ' rather than selectively in
favour of promising firms. There are two immediate problems here:
62firstly, after Yamey , the Report fails to make it clear why the fate 
of the dynamic few high fliers should depend so much on the health 
of the small firm sector as a whole - if those few dynamic firms are 
reputed to he able to survive anyway. Perhaps Yamey is too critical 
here, Bolton advocated a vibrant small firm sector and arguably- the 
greater the total size of that sector and the healthier the economy 
surrounding it, the greater the chance of more high fliers in the sector. 
Secondly, a blanket policy applied across a very heterogeneous sector 
of industry (small firms), is doomed to helping some and being of 
minor or no benefit to others; and it was Bolton who talked of a more 
balanced' industrial structure.
In all, the Report is the most comprehensive and systematic 
study of U.K. small firms to date. It is indeed a thorough and creditable 
Report under those terms of reference. The criticism is largely 
based on the weakness of that frame of reference*upon an area of 
dynamism and future policy about which the Committee were not really 
obliged to comment or shape.
Seven years since the Committee published, has seen a large 
part of the ’honeymoon* it gave to small firms eroded. A recent/To
report by the Business Graduates Association , documents the deteriora­
tion in the social, economic, legal and fiscal climate under which 
small firms operate. They claim that since the Bolton Committee,
"little help has been given to the ailing small firm sector". The 
reasons for this neglect include the restrictive terms of reference 
of the Report, preventing research into such crucial issues as the actual 
effects of income and corporation tax, investment grants and allowances, 
the role of concentration, large firms and the growth of the service 
sector; incomplete implementation of Bolton’s recommendations; lack 
of quality in staffing the Small Firms Division of the D.T.I. and the 
Advisory Bureaux; the dearth of statistical information on small 
companies; lack of provision for training facilities for small 
businessmen by secondary schools and further educational establishments; 
inadequate provision of financial information and services by the 
clearing banks. Besides the latter information gap they also identified 
an Equity Gap in the supply of finance to small companies. But their 
host of recommendations, unlike Bolton's, are essentially championing 
the small firm cause and asking'for subsidy across the hoard. For a
long time the cry of small firms to Government.was 'get off our hacks 
and let us get on with the job', this was then amended to 'no inter­
vention but we do require help', in the light of the B.G.A.’s 
recommendations it would seem that neither of these now applies and 
the call is for intervention and subsidy.
What went wrong with the Bolton recommendations? Why were
64they so inadequate? Bolton himself says, "the simple answer is 
inflation. If only we had indexed the figures detailing the help 
needed. But inflation was then running around 3%. Who could have 
anticipated the astronomic rise?" Bolton indicates that 4 factors are 
at present suffocating small firms - the scarcity of working capital, 
due to the double action of high inflation and the depreciating assets 
that small companies can offer to cover overdrafts. This effect, 
coupled with the effect of high rates of tax restricting the 
ploughing hack of sufficient funds are the principle problems.
Secondly, the crushing burden of taxation, including the replacement 
of Death Duties by Capital Gains and Capital Transfer taxes, have 
worked to erode enterprise and risk-taking. Thirdly, the perennial 
problem of excessive paperwork persisted with the onslaught of V.A.T..
Finally, the plethora of Government legislation - Health and Safety 
at Work, the Employment Protection Act, mean not only an extravagant 
use of already precious small firm time, but also a complete re­
education within the small firm, together with drastic limitations on company- 
flexibility - the very strength of this sector.
The future holds hope from at least three sections; the now
buoyant political arena where small firms are a crucial election issue;
the growth and strength of the small firm pressure groups (Association
of Independent Businesses, Union of Independent Companies etc.)
presenting the case for the small firm to the former section;- and the
65Wilson Committee Report .
The Wilson Committee has called for an English Development 
Agency to assist in raising small firm equity capital and bank 
loans and there is every evidence that Sir Keith.Joseph's administration 
may adopt that recommendation. (Autumn 1979). But although 
Wilson once again documents the plight of the small firm, he says 
little that Bolton did not say eight years ago. Many of Wilson's 
15 recommendations mirror those made by Bolton, who has recently asked, 
"Knowing with hindsight that the Bolton recommendations ... did 
not go far enough to revive the flagging health of the small firm 
sector in Britain when compared with our industrial competitors 
abroad, has Wilson been bold enough to make a decisive shift of
•-UT n It 6 6resources possible;
Contemporary critics are emphatic that he has not. The Financial 
Times leader of 10th March 1979, entitled ’Wilson ducks the issue’, 
says '’the most remarkable thing about the Wilson Committee Report on 
the financing of small firms is the recommendation of tax breaks 
for entrepreneurs which the Committee has not had the courage to make”. 
Armstrong has criticised the Report on four grounds. Firstly, 
he suggests that to cultivate the Rej>ort into legislation would require 
a Cabinet Minister, rather than the confusing roles of the present 
two Ministers. Secondly, he accuses the Wilson Report of tinkering 
with the tax system, suggesting that "unless personal taxation levels 
are reduced no-one will be inclined to expand". Thirdly, there has 
been a marked shift in investment away from individuals towards 
institutions. The Wilson Report suggests the setting up of small 
firm investment companies (SFICs). Armstrong suggests that SFICs will 
not attract institutional finance because any rsultant gains will 
be taxable. Finally, although the Committee made many beneficial 
recommendations, it failed to spell out any of them in enough 
practical detail.
Whether the Wilson Committee will have the necessary impact 
on small firm policy development seems unlikely at this time. The 
only glimmer of hope is that ten years after appraising the sector 
through Bolton, the Government is now re-appraising it through 
Wilson; and that kind of attention, although dangerous without 
prescription and implementation, is the hasis of hope.
2.2 Aspects of the Internal Operations of Small Companies
2.2.1 The problem of conventional views of company operations 
with regard to the analysis of small companies
There has long been anxious debate among organisational 
theorists when they attempt to answer the deceptively simple question - 
what is an organisation? The debate is even rife among those writers 
who use the term organisation as one synonomous with a corporation, 
or firm (Barnard^, Etzioni^, Presthus'*'0 , Katz and Kalin'*'1), as 
opposed to those who use the term to refer to the anatomy or structure 
of the social system (Fayol^, Brech^, Sheldon^, Dale^j .
However, among the former writers there are two crucially consistent 
variables common to an organisation - people and goals.
In no other form of business enterprise are these variables 
more crucial than in small companies. Small companies are people 
companies. People plan, they have goals. That is logically simple 
and yet empirically, in small companies, it is utterly complex.
An incision will illustrate why.
Because a small company is an interaction of people and their 
aspirations, working in separate functions which themselves interact 
and because the goals they pursue are continually subject to external 
factors which constantly interact with the company it is useful 
pedagogic strategy to look at the company from a systems point of view.
"To see anything as a system is to see it as an inter-related
76 ‘set of interacting components". A business organisation can be, 
perceived as a transformation process, receiving inputs in the form 
of men, money, machines and information and combining them to 
obtain a' certain output.
Figure 2.4 The Company as an Open System
INPUTS TRANSFORMATION PROCESS OUTPUTS
Source: Author's Interpretation from references 76 and 80
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Figure 2.4 illustrates a basic model showing the relationships 
between each of the departments to the external environment, to the 
other two departments and to the organisation as a whole. It is 
sensible to talk of organisations as open as opposed to close systems.
A system is regarded as open when there are constant interactions 
between it and the environment (i.e. inputs from and output to). 
Traditional organisation theory had viewed human organisations as 
being the opposite - i.e. closed systems. But, this is essentially 
meaningless in -the light of markets, competitors, suppliers, technology, 
government tinkering and so on. Further, the second law of thermodynamics 
and the concept of entropy tell us that closed systems eventually 
move towards a stagnant state, from which there is no hope of survival. 
Figure 2,5 helps to clarify a more realistic company operating in an 
open system.
The interactions are many and varied hut .the dominant 
underlying current in this open system is uncertainty. The company 
has some degree of control within its barrier - over the transformation 
process and the internal functional areas. However, in a dynamic 
context it is faced with problems of supply in labour markets, raw 
materials, sources of finance, information, coupled with inconsistent 
and inadequate Government interference, a social responsibility 
towards society and the crucial action and reaction of competitors.
These uncertainties require the company to be alert and 
flexible (adaptive in an open system) and internally maintain a 
degree of stability in order to retain an element of balance in the 
system.
Hence, the success of the company in achieving goals depends 
largely on its ability to handle the uncertainties of the external 
environment i.e. flexibility, and on its ability to handle internal 
balance i.e. stability; and, this very complex and diplomatic task is 
given over to management.
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Talcott Parsons has suggested three managerial levels m  
the hierarchy of complex organizations - technical, organizational 
and institutional. Technical managers are concerned with the 
transformation process and associated with research and development, 
operations research and accounting. These are the engineers, used 
to optimality of relationships and concreteness of conclusions.
Their operational activity gives them a rather short run time horizon.
The organizational managers co-ordinate and integrate work performance 
at the technical level, supervising supply and markets, scale of 
operation and operating policies. His horizon can he short or long 
term and his post, one of diplomacy between the technical and institu­
tional managers. The latter are concerned with activities relating 
to the environmental interface - uncertainties. They constantly 
survey the environment for threats and opportunities, develop 
strategies and hence have a long-run horizon.
The managerial system spans all three levels by organizing 
the people, directing the technical work and relating the organization 
to its environment. The three levels are illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6 Environment of the System
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Boundaries
Source: Adapted from R. Hodgett’s "Management Theory, Process
and Practice", W.B. Saunders Company (London, 1975) 
page 380, after Thomas Petit.
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The technical core often forms a closed system in its pursuit 
of profit for goods or services. It only rarely allows a dynamic 
environment to prevent a continued production run. So although the 
core is subject to external influences it does not attempt to 
minimize them. On the contrary, the institutional level is dominated 
by uncertainty and as sucb is an open adaptive system devoted to 
innovation and flexibility. The organizational level must operate 
between these extremes in diplomatic fashion. But, the three levels 
are inter-related, constituting sub-systems in the whole company 
structure, so although each level has individual characteristics, 
effective company performance comes from co-ordination between them.rj Q
Sayles notes, "Systems concept emphasizes that managerial 
assignments do not have these neat, clearly defined boundaries; 
rather the modern manager is placed in a network of mutually 
dependent relationships".
Further, since his efforts are to build a reciprocating 
system of relationships when the parameters of the system are 
continually evolving and changing, he essentially seeks a moving 
equilibrium in the face of continuous uncertainty. That is the 
complexity of managerial task and why Koontz and O'Donnell suggest
79"Perhaps there is no more important human activity than managing".
The multitude of descriptions of the managerial process can
he safely summarized within four categories - planning, organizing,
controlling and communicating. "Although all the managerial functions
are inter-related and the manager undoubtedly performs each at one
time or another, any given phase of organizational activity must
go-start with planning" . It is the process by which, via management, 
the company adapts its resources to changing environmental and 
internal forces.
The systems concept of planning considers the company as an 
integration of numerous decision making sub-systems and the primary 
function of planning is one of designing a system to include - 
l) The establishment of goals, strategies, procedures and company 
relationships on a systematic basis to guide decision making and 
planning at the various company levels and 2) a provision for the 
flow of information to and from these planning centres. Perhaps the 
development of the systems approach and the exposition given to
Simanagement here may appear slow, but it is deliberate, Katz and Kahn 
have suggested "the theoretical concepts (of organization theory) 
should begin with the input, output and functioning of the organization
as a system and not with, the rational purposes of its leaders".
That is how the systems approach has developed and that is where
application to small company operations must temporarily cease.
The goals and objectives of the majority of small companies are
virtually synonymous with the values and aspirations of the men who
founded them. There is often a dichotomy between the intricate
pattern of the goals of the owner and those economic ones entrenched
in marginal analysis. This dichotomy is complicated by blood
relationships where nepotism constantly intervenes to anaesthetise
managerial and organizational theory. Hence, it seems meaningless
to talk of small companies as "an input-output system consisting of
an inter-related group of resources acting to achieve partially
82identifiable economic purposes", if an understanding of the 
entrepreneurial owner, the problems and relationships he faces are 
not a fundamental part of the pedagogic process. So the development 
of planning must await an explanation of the entrepreneurial role.
2.2.2 The Entrepreneur
Unfortunately that explanation of the entrepreneurial role
is not to he found in eoncomic nor managerial theories of ‘the firm,
83 . . .After Baumol , it is necessary to make a distinction between the
entrepreneurial and the management functions. The manager can be 
defined as the overseer of the transformation process, combining 
inputs in an economic manner to achieve necessary output levels, 
scheduling and making pricing and' outlay decisions (i.e. those 
activities and decisions encompassed in traditional economic models). 
The entrepreneur may well undertake some managerial activity, but 
-his prime function is to invent, innovate and implement. Baumol 
would describe him as "the Schumpeterian innovator and more,
84... who exercises leadership" . It is precisely this entrepreneurial 
function that has no part in economic theory.
At the heart of the traditional theory in its simplest form 
is the theoretical firm which is allowed to select various alternative 
values of price, output and possibly advertising outlay. The choice 
is made after due consideration of the revenue and costs associated 
with each set of values as given-by the relevant functional 
relationships, equations and inequalities. Mathematical optimality 
will then dictate the values of the variables necessary to achieve 
profit maximisation. Hence, until there is a shift in one of the 
relationships, the firm continues to replicate previous decisions ad 
infinitum. But, this is essentially a very clockwork and monotonous 
procedure, where there is no room for initiative or innovation.
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The small company entrepreneur is not a clockwork man. By his very 
nature he is a man of considerable will-power and energy who survives 
and succeeds by ingenuity.
g  g
Liebenstein has chosen to distinguish between two types of
entrepreneurial activity, routine entrepreneurship and newtype
entrepreneurship. The routine manager or 'overseer' operates in a
well-established company in which parts of the production function
are well known and in which the markets are known and definable.
On the other hand the new type entrepreneur, the Baumolian or
Schumpeterian innovator, operates in an environment of uncertainty,
of start up companies where the markets are neither well established
or clearly defined, nor are the relevant parts of production function
known. In both cases the entrepreneur co-ordinates activities
involving different markets, but in the case of the new type
entrepreneur not all the markets exist or operate perfectly and he
86must fill in for these deficiencies.- Liebenstein has suggested 
that one of the main obstacles to an understanding of entrepreneurial 
role lies in the subtle assumptions of the conventional theory of 
the production function.
The complete set of inputs are assumed to be known and clearly 
defined to all actual or potential firms in the industry. Further, 
there is assumed to be a fixed relation between input-s and outputs.O rj
But, as Liebenstein pertinently points out, "Where and to whom in 
the firm this knowledge is supposed to be available is never 
stated". Consequently the entrepreneur must make up the deficiency 
in the ill defined inputs. In addition, the entrepreneur has to 
employ some inputs that are not only vague but necessary for production 
and whose output is indeterminate e.g., leadership, motivation, 
problem-solving. The entrepreneur is seen not only as a gap-filler 
for market deficiencies, but also as an input-completer. To 
date "there is still no position in traditional theory for this
elusive entrepreneur.
88Baumol is quick to point out that none of the managerial 
theories can lend assistance either (even his own Sales maximisation). 
This is simply because whatever goal is substituted for profit - 
sales, number of employees, assets - after that choice is made the 
•system merely reverts to programmed optimality for the relevant 
variable, with the choi-ce of variable making no difference.
Even changing the maximised, variable to one of contemporary
significance, such as the firms investment program or gearing ratio,
fails to elucidate, as their calculations are still mechanistic and
automatic with no room for entrepreneurial flair. Further, it has
. 8 °been suggested by Professor Lewis ' that economic theory fails to 
understand the entrepreneur because he is doing something new and 
is more akin to a monopolist, "we have no good theory of 
entrepreneurship because we have no*good theory of monopoly. Our 
theory that monopolists act to maximise profit is obviously absurd, 
given the low elasticity of demand for most monopolistic products".
This does not mean economists have completely ignored the entrepreneur 
hut that in their prolonged and detailed discussion of their 
maximisation theories they seem to have left out the entrepreneur 
and so an understanding of his crucial role to the small company 
cannot-possibly come from there. Nor is this a serious indictment
of economic theory which, as 'optimality analysis of well defined
90 .problems’ needs no entrepreneur for a solution and which, as
a pedagogic tool, hears useful introduction to understanding.
Hence, to seek a more detailed understanding of the
entrepreneur it is now necessary to move away from the optimality
theories of economics and management which have borne little fruit,
into the areas of social psychology and cultural developments,
because that is the operating ground for entrepreneurial activity
and not surprisingly the most significant contributions in entrepreneurial
theory have come from there.
Perhaps the most fruitful contribution in this field has
been by, David McClelland. In his original work reported in 
. ' . >91'Achieving Society , his research using Thematic Apperception Tests 
and games of skill, discovered that entrepreneurs scored high on 
need for achievement - i.e. the desire to do well in a competitive 
situation where the achievement could be measured objectively.
His results can be summarized thus - l) Entrepreneurs like to take 
personal responsibility for decisions; 2) they constantly look for 
feedback on the results of their decisions and use it to modify 
their behaviour and goals; 3) they dislike repetitive or routine 
work; 4) they set targets that are both challenging and realistic,
preferring moderate risks to low or high risks. In a later work
92 .McClelland shifts the emphasis for achievement to power, suggesting
that for organizational effectiveness power motivation is required.
He concludes that a high need for power combined with high self-control,
as opposed to a high need for power and low self-control, makes for
the greatest organizational effectiveness.
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Later works based on McClelland's concept of need achievement,
93have shown some inconsistency. Schrage , analysing the successful 
R and D* entrepreneur, documents the factors contributing to 
entrepreneurial success as high on need achievement, low in power
motivation and a high awareness of self, market and employees.
94 . . 95 . . .But, Roberts and Waine and Rubm , modified Schrages findings
on the R and D* entrepreneur by suggesting that the success factors
were high need achievement and moderate need for power. In agreement
with McClelland, the correct balance between need achievement, power
and affiliation appear to be the crucial factors making for
effectiveness.
Further psychological studies have identified other characteristics
of the entrepreneur that separate him from the remainder of
96 . . .society, e.g. Litzinger , identifies motel entrepreneurs as placing
a lower value on being imderstood, receiving encouragement or
97consideration, than motel managers. Lynn finds entrepreneurs score
98 .high on neuroticism; Hornaday and Aboud find entrepreneurs score
high on need for achievement, independence, effectiveness of
99leadership and low on need for support; Komives found entrepreneurs 
score high on need for achievement^leadership orientation and 
decisiveness but low on goal orientation, need for support, 
orderliness, conformity and practical mindedness.
Although the overall contribution of the psychology school 
appears confusing, certain factors pertinent to entrepreneurial- 
development are consistent. A high need for achievement is a 
fundamental part of the entrepreneurial man but also autonomy, 
independence and moderate risk are contributory factors. Power 
motivation appears important but unclear, but it doubtless influences 
the effectiveness-of leadership style. The picture being painted 
is reflective of a man of great energy and commitment who works 
hard and long hours and pursues his work in a conscientious and 
emotive fashion. These are not clockwork men, they operate on 
ingenuity, constantly communicating with the environment for either 
opportunity or threat. "They tend to be resistant, modify their 
environment to suit their needs rather than adjust their desires 
to what is easily obtainable; they tend to generate resources 
rather than complain that there are none"^°°. What is important 
about this picture is that it is not the pipe-dream of social 
psychologists, but one based on empirical observation and analysis. 
However, this is essentially what the personality is - its shape.
^Research and Development
6o
In order to develop a further understanding of the entrepreneur
it is necessary to have an indication of how that personality was shaped.
Various writers101’ 10^ ’ have suggested that frequently
entrepreneurs come from ethnic or religious minority groups and
the essence here is on a belief in value systems different from
those held in mainstream society and hence the eventual emergence
104of unconventional traits. Hagen suggests a cycle of events 
leading to the emergence of an entrepreneurial personality.
The status deterioration of a minor group in a traditional society 
can lead to a reactionary effect typified by anger, anxiety and a 
suppression of traditional values, i.e. a reaction against society 
probably currently exampled in punk rock and previously in hippy 
communes. Personality changes occur because old patterns of 
behaviour in society and family are no longer acceptable and new, 
innovative modes have to be found to integrate the individual 
with society. This displacement from society can come in four events -
l) by force - political upheavals and wars; 2) denigration of 
valued symbols - religion; 3) inconsistency of status symbols 
with changes of the distribution of economic power; k) non- 
acceptance of expected status of immigrant groups.
A second, and more likely stage for the emergence of the 
entrepreneurial personality, lies entrenched in the family background. 
The memories of the past, fatherless families, hardship, desertion,
death, neglect are all popular underlying themes.
105Becker has conceptualized an approach using personality 
dimensions as a means of identifying those parental factors likely 
to influence the future entrepreneurial child. He specifies the 
polarities of high-low parental control as an acceptance-rejection 
criteria. The manner by which the parents are perceived by the 
child in respect of these polarities is crucial to the development
106of that child and his. eventual adult make-up. Kets de Yries , 
who systematically analyses the above contributions on entrepreneurial 
development, hypothesizes that the case of the potential entrepreneur 
is likely to be a child who perceives high parental control and 
rejection. This causes some degree of reluctant compliance to the 
parent by the child - possibly through fear, which inbreeds 
hostility, anxiety and will for autonomy, producing irrational 
conduct with respect to other children and eventual rebellion)
hence a young adult emerges who Is " no stranger to rebellious 
activities as a turnabout from originally half-hearted compliance 
toward authority figures. His confusion about career choice may not
1 07be a temporary one but may persist throughout his life”
The entrepreneur (or reactive man) is horn.
It is important for a future understanding of small 
companies and corporate planning that here is a man who is reactive 
and impulsive, whose speed and abruptness and whose lack of planning 
on a longer term basis determines the entrepreneurs actions.
“It is a short-term operational planning for the purpose of instant 
gratification which predominates"10 .^
It is this entrepreneurial man whose eventual symbol of 
autonomy becomes embedded deeply in his business firm. This is 
not the economists' enterprise of profit maximisation but a realisation 
of ambition resulting from oppression, conflict, energy, willpower 
and where the rewards are not necessarily monetary.* It is usually 
the case that the company is not only dominated by the entrepreneur 
hut dependent upon him. It is autocratic in managerial style where 
the entrepreneur is the decision centre. Its policies tend to be his 
and reflective of his impulsive traits. Hence, his time horizon is 
often frighteningly short where day to day decisions and long term 
strategies are synonymous. The company is constantly changing, 
there is rarely any well defined organizational structure and 
general confusion can emerge as an outcome of the overlapping 
responsibilities of internal managers. Rarely in the initial stages 
does authority go with managerial responsibility but it remains 
firmly seated with the entrepreneur founder and hence the seeds of 
role conflict are sown. Plans are hazy, communication is essentially 
informal hut reserved, so that any important knowledge remains in 
the mind of the master. This picture of the first stage small 
company is far removed from the niceties of economic and managerial 
texts hut is nonetheless realistic for that.
2,2.3 Problems facing, the entrepreneur and the. small company
In order to develop a wider, more integral picture of the 
small company and its planning activities, it is necessary to isolate 
the problematic stages of small company growth. For it is here that 
the important factors likely to affect future decisions about the 
company lie.
Stage models10^ 9 110,111^ ^  company growth have recently
. . . 112been severely criticized by Stanworth and Curran , on the legitimate
grounds of their inconsistency in number of stages, lack of discussion 
on variations in the sequence of stages, or omission of stages, 
small sample sizes and they being instant analysis as opposed to
longitudinal studies. Perhaps their most severe indictment is the 
implied disregard in such theories for the size distribution of 
firms - i.e. many small companies do not grow to a great size in 
terms of number of employees and substantial growth is an exceptional 
process. Further, many of the stage models contain a final stage 
of such mature managerial structure as to render the company a 
large one indeed. Their social action alternative view of small 
company growth deserves credit.1] O
Stanworth and Curran point out "Our previously published 
research, as well as that of others, indicates that there is no one 
simple stereotyped entrepreneurial role and thus, by implication no 
simple pattern of growth . They illustrate the growth of a small 
firm by suggesting that three latent identities occur in relation 
to the entrepreneurial role - the Artisan, the Classical Entrepreneur 
and the Manager and that as the firm grows the entrepreneur must 
move to the successive role. It is his ability to move that is 
the crucial element in the growth process.
The most important aspect of the Artisan role is autonomy at
work, status and satisfaction, where income is important but not
dominant. The Classical Entrepreneur has earnings and profit as the
central theme, although the ambitions can take a lesser role.
In the Manager role, the entrepreneurial latent social identity
centres on meanings and goals which are perceived by others as
pertaining to managerial excellence. They argue that growth may not
be desirable to the entrepreneur because increased size may move
the organization towards a more rational and bureaucratic structure\
this introduces a special problem of Delegation of Responsibility
and/or Authority. When management functions have to be delegated
because they become too time consuming or too complex for one man
to handle, the entrepreneur suffers a marked reluctance and often
114dangerously delegates only responsibility. Barry has pointed to 
further problems than mere reluctance. Because the company is 
personified by the entrepreneur in the eyes of .the employees, the 
acceptance of professional managers by those employees and the 
change in attitudes necessary, is another stumbling block.
Further, the entrepreneur is then not in immediate touch with his 
’old1 operating departments and must rely on information feedback.
This adjustment is often difficult to make.
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The ability of the small firm to grow depends on the ability 
of the entrepreneur to successfully overcome the delegation adjust­
ments required. Some entrepreneurs will take on the manager identity, 
having decided that growth is desirable. This is often characterised 
by an increased interest in management training and development, 
employers associations, the use of management consultants and various 
excursions into merger, takeovers or ’going public’.
However, growth ’per se1 is not necessarily desirable by the 
entrepreneur as it may weaken the very autonomy which he originally 
desired and which culminated in his precious business firm. Further, 
the raising of finance and taxation conditions may mitigate against 
growth. Associated problems of increased unionisation may also have 
adverse effects on growth. The Employment Protection Act and Health 
and Safety at Work have made the hiring of extra labour a costly and 
complex procedure. This instantly raises questions, can existing 
small firms grow and expand at all? . More important, do they really 
want to? Is it not that many of our small companies are not only 
reluctant to relinquish control in their enterprise but also 
reluctant to employ additional labour or raise additional capital to 
expand?
Small firm growth is even more complicated by family 
involvement in many small companies. There are two basic problems 
here - Nepotism and Rivalry.
There is conflicting conversation in the literature concerning
the pros and cons of nepotism. The underlying view is that family
firms are detrimental to economic development because they are
based on nepotism and paternalism which are believed to lead to
inefficiency. The major concern is the reservation of senior
115management posts for family members. Firstly, as Drucker has
hinted, this leads to more able or competent men becoming discouraged
ll6and 'leaving the company. In fact Sofer has suggested that the 
problem of recruiting inadequate middle management was inseparable 
from the practice of reserving senior appointments and director­
ships for family members. Hence, the quality of management in 
family businesses is not likely to be high, due not only to nepotism, 
but also to the unpredictable flow of family managers into the company.
The weight of the argument against nepotism appears to dissolve the
117view of Burton Benedict who suggests that the family business 
can. foster economic growth by taking a long term view, investing 
heavily in the training of family members and instilling a high 
degree of commitment and in providing a sense of security and stability.
64
But, this is really employing loyalty at the expense of efficiency 
13-8as Townsend points out " In the old world, nepotism worked fine
for the Rothschilds, It won't work in the new world for anybody .
This nepotic crisis Is often complicated by severe intra-family
119rivalry - as Levinson points out, these can take many forms of
which the most frequent are - l) Father-son rivalry - especially
with respect to delegation and continued view of the son as a
child and consequent reluctant acceptance of control hut inbred
hostility on the son’s behalf; 2) brother-brother rivalry - it
often becomes very difficult for younger brothers to attain great
status if the eldest son is the natural successor. This frequently
leads to brothers splitting off in groups from the company and
setting up in opposition - so not only complicating the competitive
position but also adversely affecting the flow of family managers in
the company; 3) intra-family rivalries occur when family members
not directly involved in the company can persistently direct
company policy and profit re-distribution. A problem particularly
120enhanced where women are involved. Miller and Rice have
concluded that, "a modern industrial enterprise can survive as a
family business only with the most exceptional of families”.
121Donnelly points to associated problems with family firms -
122 12^poor profit discipline (also noted by Woodward and Wood );
124conflicts of interest (also noted by Tilles and Contas ); and immobile 
marketing. But, he does argue a strong case for family companies 
where there is a unity of purpose stemming from dedication, 
loyalty, pride, personal sacrifice, social responsibility, provided 
'there exists a check on favouritism.
The major problem stemming from the autocratic leadership 
style, in both family and non-family companies, is executive 
succession.
The entrepreneur has created an enterprise of great dependency,
with a distinct reluctance to relinquish control. That is the
. 125predominant problem. Davis suggests consequent problems, 
e.g. the inability of the father to pass on his charismatic 
personality to a weak son. The son has never been seen by the 
workers as wielding any authority and responsibility - that was 
achieved by his entrepreneurial father and hence the son's position 
is one of a puppet while his father still retains control of the 
strings. A second conflict situation is where the entrepreneurial 
founder has become conservative and his son has progressed via
higher education to new managerial ideas and is hound on changing 
the course of his father's coveted enterprise. A further conflict
arises between inter-family functions. Davis concludes that because 
the traditional family firm is incompatible with rapid industrial 
advances, either the goals and organization of the family firm must 
change to meet the new industrial requirements, or else the family 
firm will be superceded by the share-holding, executive managed, 
corporate enterprise.
The development of a small company is not a wall chart of 
successive stages. Many small companies are entrepreneurial 
companies and many of these are interspersed with family involvement. 
It has been shown that there can be severe problems involved in the 
growth of such companies. Hence, any research into small company 
planning must have at its heart an appreciation of those fundamental 
socio-pshchological problems that dominate many small companies.
With these problems fresh in the mind it is now pertinent to 
consider the exposition of corporate planning as presented in the 
literature and ask the question - is this applicable to small 
companies?
2.3 The Technique of Corporate Planning
2.3.1 The concept of corporate planning
It is typical of the inexactness of the social sciences that 
business planning, like small companies, defies consistent descrip­
tion, Each observer has his own definition and it is not the aim 
here to enter the debate but rather to clarify a meaning to be 
used in the current exposition.
"Corporate Planning ... is a comprehensive future-orientated, 
continuous process of management which is implemented within 
a formal framework and which is responsive to relevant 
change in the external environment. It is concerned 
with both strategic and operational plans and through 
participation develops pl/ans at the appropriate levels 
within the organization.' It includes methods of monitoring 
and control and is concerned with both the short and ,
long term".
Perhaps the most monumental work on business planning belongs
to George Steiner’*^ (19&9) an<^  the above definition by Hussey 
127and Langham (1979) possesses close similarity with his (i.e.
comprehensiveness, universality, continuity, future-orientated
and responsive to externalities). Both these definitions owe much
128to the classic one presented by Drucker in 1959 when he defined 
long range planning as, "the continuing process of l) making 
present entrepreneurial (risk-taking) decisions, systematically 
and with the best possible knowledge of their futurity;
2) organizing systematically the efforts needed to carry out these 
decisions; and 3). measuring the results of these decisions against 
the expectations through organized, systematic feedback". Hence,
over a 20 year duration of corporate planning, at least the latest
. ' 129 .treatise agrees m  principle with the most monumental and
with the earliest and, possibly, most influential. Hence, corporate 
planning is a complete management system that INCLUDES strategies, 
policies, goals, objectives, control systems and iteration.
It can be concluded that any divergence from these definitions 
must be due to either a search for product differentiation by 
the authors, or a genuine misunderstanding of concepts.
Planning is generally dichotomized.into two schools of
thought. The one, a rational-comprehensive or synoptic school
based fundamentally on the setting of objectives and a discussion
. • 130 131of means and reflected m  the writings of Ansoff , Argenti ,
132 . 133 134Hussey , Steiner , Ackoff , where there is only marginal
conceptual difference but an overall fundamental agreement. The other
is an adaptive or disjointed-incremental planning school that comes
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. . . . . 135to us from the political and social science writers like Lmdblom ,
I36 237 138Wildavsky , March and Simon , and Oyert and March , who propose
that there is not enough information available for many decisions 
under the synoptic ideal and that in most organizations it is impossible 
to get all parties to agree on the objectives separate from agree­
ment on the strategies which yields the synoptic approach incongruent
139with reality. Mmtzberg , however, has chosen to categorize
strategy making into three modes - entrepreneurial, adaptive and
planning. His’ additional entrepreneurial mode is characterized by
1) the active search for new opportunities; 2) power being
centralized in the hands of the chief executive; 3) dramatic leaps
forward in the face of uncertainty; 4) growth as the dominate goal -
in other words a highly flexible, risk-taking company.
The adaptive policy maker, after Lindbloml4°, accepts a given
powerful status quo and a lack of any clear objectives. He makes
decisions only on the basis of environmental feedback and then
moves in small steps - never too far away from the status quo.
l4lThe manager m  a Cyert and March business firm reacts in much 
the same manner - avoiding uncertainty, solving pressing problems , 
rather than developing long-run strategies, reducing externalities 
by forming cartels; and because the company is controlled by various 
interests the strategy maker must be a diplomat in the face of 
conflicting interests - "smooth production and satisfy customers,
i! 2.1+2by first doing one and then the other '.
The adaptive phase is characterized by l) lack of clear 
goals, strategy being reflected in a division of power among members 
of a complex organization (management, unions, owners, pressure 
groups, government); 2) a reactive solution to existing problems 
rather than the pro-active search for new opportunities; 3) decisions 
are made in incremental serial steps based on continuous feedback of 
information from the environment and consequent adaption of the 
organization; 4) decisions are essentially disjointed because of 
the size and complexity of the organization,
Mintzberg’s planning mode is synonymous with the conceptual 
definition of corporate planning offered previously by Hussey and 
Langham and is characterized by l) distinct role of corporate 
planner in forming policy; 2) systematic analysis of opportunities;
3) overall integration of decisions and strategies. The three modes 
are depicted in graphic form in Figure 2.7 which shows the bold 
stops taken by the entrepreneur in the face of uncertainty,
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Figure 2.7 Graphic Representation of Planning Modes
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the incremental steps of an adaptive organization and the precise 
and specific path of a formal planning organization.
Clearly, the entrepreneurial mode is directly applicable to 
small companies, the adaptive mode to complex bureaucracies and 
the planning mode to larger companies. But, the beauty of 
Mintzberg's philosophy is that the modes are not distinct or 
inseparable, as frequently appears in managerial literature, hut they 
can he and often are, mixed, A period of entrepreneurship may 
revive an organization sleeping under an adaptive mode. A cyclical' 
pattern in which entrepreneurship and the adaptive mode alternate 
such that sharp progressive steps are followed by a period of 
stability, may aid organizational development and help counter 
the business cycle.
There are two important observations here. Firstly, the mix 
is subjective to the characteristics of a firm at each point in 
time i.e. size, type of leadership, competition, industry, 
organizational structure, financial situation, ownership. To the 
writer's knowledge there has been no systematic analysis of those 
factors relating to small companies and corporate planning in the 
United Kingdom. Secondly, can small firms ever hope to adopt formal 
planning procedures? The answer to the first proposition is hound 
up in the current research. The answer to the second requires a 
brief look at the relevant corporate planning literature.
The basis of formal corporate planning as opposed to purely 
reactive, intuitive or unconscious planning appears to lie in the 
synoptic and incremental definitions. Synoptic processes involve 
l) identification of objectives and values generating a range of 
alternative strategies; 2) thorough review of alternative courses 
of action to achieve the objectives; 3) evaluation of alternative 
objectives; 4) selection of strategic alternatives. Incremental 
planning would consider l) identifying the company’s current 
strategy position;- 2) identifying, the company’s strengths and 
weaknesses; 3) :identfying threats and opportunities on the 
business horizon; 4) consequent alteration or improvement of the 
current strategy.
143Wheelwright’s now famous report on research at Stanford
during the later 1960s, suggests that synoptic approaches reveal more
creative strategies and encourage a more comprehensive view of the
companies strategic position. However, incremental procedures
provided better overall strategies in the long term - so- arguably it
is quality rather than quantity that is relevant to business
planning. Some of Wheelwright’s other conclusions may have
important implications for small company planning - l) he found that
quantitative orientated planners, i.e. those with backgrounds in
engineering or mathematics - (many small U.K. companies are of an
engineering bias) - preferred the.synoptic approach and thought it
more effective; 2) companies with the least amount of flexibility
in their options should be best handled by incremental approaches
and companies of much flexibility in their options - (as indeed
many small companies may be classified) - should be best handled by
a synoptic approach. But, perhaps the crucial contribution of this
research is in its identification of three important variables in
the strategic planning process^ l) the planners “ their background,
orientation in problem-solving situations and their role in the
.144company. In fact, Guth and Tagiuui , in an earlier work, had 
confirmed that personal values of an executive will influenceNthe 
choice of corporate strategy-\e*g. where their values are diverse 
from economic maximization there is likely to be a clash in the 
choice of strategy and such executives are likely to face 
conflict in the strategy-formulation process; 2) the environment - 
factors prompting the development of strategy, the motivation of 
the planners and the urgency in completing their task; 3) the 
strategic situation - the range of alternative strategies available
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and the company's, current competitive position. Wheelwright suggests
that, after the three variables have been specified and the main
objective of strategic planning has been confirmed, the company
selects a posture between the synoptic and incremental approaches
that best fulfills the needs of the variables and the objective.
l45This is much m  agreement with Mintzberg i.e. the types of
planning activity can be mixed.
.146Argenti suggests the need to adopt a systematic approach
to corporate decision-making stems from two problems - l) pressure
for short term results leads to a lack of attention by management
on long run activities and the answer here lies in some routine or
deliberate procedural device to force management to consider the
future; 2) there is an unusual assumption that says there is a
right and a wrong way to make a decision - and the right way is
best found if a structured, step-wise, almost biblical procedure
is followed. Many writers14^ 9 ,150 ^ attempted to
illustrate systematic procedures in flow-chart terms. On the
151 . . .incremental side, the Gilmore-Brandenburg exhibition was probably 
the first and most comprehensive formulation of a corporate planning 
model. Th.eir approach, if not completely pellucid, is certainly 
logical and includes a four stage approach of l) formulating the 
economic mission, or what business is the company in and what should 
it be in; 2) determination of the competitive strategy;
3) specification of a program of action; 4) reappraisal of the 
master plan. Furthermore, the system incorporates key decisions or 
synergistic points i.e. where the joint performance of seyeral programs
is expected to be greater than their independent individual
. . . 152 performances. The system is reduced and simplified, after Gilmore
and presented in Figure 2.8, at Appendix B . Each phase is logically
related to the other phase and involves recognition of the key
planning variables. In addition, each phase is an integral part of
an overall process which is cyclical and recurring. This approach
is incremental in nature and makes no consideration of the synoptic .
153goals and objectives - a view thoroughly shared by Katz . The 
incremental school will adhere, after Katz, to a reliance on existing 
strategy and past performance, followed by an analysis of environmental 
threats and opportunities, an evaluation of company strengths and 
weaknesses, an identification of the firm’s competitive advantage 
and an analysis of the firm’s product market posture in the future.
the synoptic school who would start from these very goals. In fact,
. 154 . .Ewing has pointed to the weakness of identifying market
opportunities first and extrapolating these in terms of targets 
because of increasing difficulties of forecasting in a consumer 
society and intense competitor actions. He suggests an incremental 
approach of 'inside-out' - surveying the company's strengths and 
weaknesses and searching deeper into known, markets or their 
extensions, as ppposed to the 'outside-inT approach of the market 
forecaster.
Perhaps the most engulfing of all the synoptic approaches is
I 55provided by Cohen and Cyert who suggest a nine-step approach.
1) The formulation of goals; 2) the analysis of *the'environment;
3) assign quantitative values to the goals; 4) the microprocess
of strategy formulation - developing strategic plans for the
operating units in the company after guidance on goals has been
given by top management; 5) the gap analysis - the comparison
of the projected performance of the company as a whole is compared
to the quantitative targets of the company; 6) strategic search -
to develop policies to close the gap (if any); 7) selecting a
portfolio of strategic alternatives; 8) implementation of the
strategic program; 9) measurement , feedback and control. This is
viewed as a continuous iterative process.
It is pertinent to consider now, the synoptic-incremental
processes of formal planning proposed by the major writers, in
relation to small companies.
Qlearly their applicability can be questioned on several
grounds. Firstly, they are complex. Small business is essentially 
- 31simple. As Bolton pointed out, small businessmen have little 
formal management education and would require assistance to under­
stand such systematic procedures. Secondly, they are routine and so 
require continuous attention. Small businessmen are not clockwork 
men. They hang on an inkling and react quickly and probably 
perpendicular to a systematic overall' plan. Small businessmen 
suffer from a multiplicity of duty and managerial task. They are 
often plumber, foreman, manager, accountant, unpaid civil servant 
and salesman, together in one. They have to he adept and skillful 
in each function so the business has maximum opportunity of 
survival. They are subject to illness and are fallible. Small 
businessmen may not have the routine make-up or organizational time 
to devote to a formal planning, scheme. Thirdly, they cost money.
Only then will they consider goals or objectives, as opposed to
72
In the long term that may not he the case at all if the plan 
succeeds in organizing the available resources more efficiently 
over time. Small businessmen think in present cost. Time is 
undoubtedly money to them. The cost to educate them to understand 
the process. The cost to run the procedure. The cost to hire 
external advice to set up and oversee the procedure. The cost to 
the accounting function in developing a control or monitoring system. 
The latter is of fundamental importance - few small firms possess 
an adequate accounting function for their current operations, 
let alone for any further imposition. Fourthly, formal planning 
systfems are, tautologically, concerned with the future. Small 
businesses exist, operate and plan in the present.. It is a major 
task in consultancy to convince a small businessman that it is 
possible to reduce the uncertainty of the future. Their mind is 
often on what is controllable now and how the firm can survive 
until next year rather than three or four years hence. Finally, 
formal planning systems require a wide variety of internal and 
external information. The time to research that information is 
not only costly, but if what is needed is internal Information 
e.g. an assessment of the companya strengths and weaknesses, it is 
doubtful whether this information would be forthcoming to outsiders, 
or indeed to other managers within the small firm. 3/t is a reflection 
of this confidential and reserved approach of many small business 
owner-managers that in the following small firm survey, requests 
were often made to send the promised research summary, that had 
particular reference to the company, directly to the home address 
of the owner-manager lest it be opened by accident within the company. 
Hence, in terms of comprehensibility, cost, time, routineness, 
acceptability by the company's existing operational procedure and 
management and confidentiality of internal information it is 
unlikely, a priori, to expect small companies to adopt formal 
planning systems, (it may appear from this that, as in economic 
literature, the small firm has been read out of business policy 
literature.)
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"i *1And yet, Galloway , Johnston and Wild and Swann 
have illustrated that the adoption of well-proven managerial techniques 
in small companies in manufacturing industries can lead to considerable 
improvements in company performance - Wild and Swann state,
"the major implication of the study is that those companies which 
assess, formulate and execute their policies systematically and 
thoroughly, with the assistance of a variety of modern managerial 
techniques tend to be more efficient and profitable than companies 
that operate on a less formal basis"'*''^. Bolton^0 has identified 
eight areas in which small business, could usefully improve their 
performance and profitability. They are: finance, costing and
control information, information use and retrieval-, personnel 
management, technological change and production scheduling/purchase 
controls. "Obviously to counter the need for higher working capital, 
better utilisation of assets is necessary, involving better control 
information. To cope with the tax situation it is necesaary to 
PLAN (or at least look), further and further ahead". Ceteris 
paribus, it is reasonable to expect that the potential contribution 
to G.N.P. and employment from small companies may well he increased 
by a wider adoption of formal techniques like corporate planning.
This is central to the research here in progress and is the reason 
why further questions must he asked about corporate planning to 
arrest any doubt in the concept.
Is corporate planning a mere fashion? Firstly, 
consider the adoption of the technique. In 1967, Denning and Lehr 
found that 25% of companies from the Times top 300 were practising 
some form of corporate planning - (probably only 2-3 years after 
its importation into this country from the U.S.A.). However, at 
that time, the adoption was only in seven S.I.C. categories and was 
restricted largely to subsidiaries of overseas companies -
(6l% of these compared to only 23% of British-based companies).
162In 1969, Taylor and Irving studied 27 U.K. companies and found 
that they had only recently adopted formal planning - (in fact, 
in the survey, planning was little more than extended budgeting).
Later, in 1974, Grinyer and Norburn pointed to a much wider 
adoption of the technique, but they emphasised that there was no 
evidence to suggest that formal planning pays - i.e. there was no 
statistical relation between formality and financial performance 
as measured by return on net assets. In 1977 Higgins and Finn1611, 
in a random sample of 56 U.K. companies in the Times 1000, conclude
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that the practice of formal long-range planning is extremely common 
in major U.K. business. Further, most companies expressed positive 
views as to the success of the concept, only 40% felt it was 
only a limited success but worth carrying on with (the measure of 
success here appears to be totally subjective and qualitative),
The picture is one of a slow adoption of the technique well into the 
1970ss then a wider adoption with some question over financial 
advantage, to an even wider adoption in the later 1970s with some 
indication of success - (it must be remembered that the studies 
are neither consistent in sampling, universe or time, but a trend is 
discernable). This would suggest the concept is of more value than 
a mere fashion.
l65Secondly, consider its conceptual problems. Argenti has 
criticized the rigidity of expressing s systematic procedure in flow 
chart terms because, empirically, companies often drift from rigid 
guidelines and so the systems have to be changed frequently, 
hence no chart can show a complete planning system. Further, the 
planning charts presented by various writers revel in logical 
inconsistency - boxes, labels and arrows are sometimes misleading. 
Finally, some charts indicate that it is logically possible for 
all- managers to change company objectives by placing a feedback 
loop. This is depicted in Figure 2.9 below.
Figure 2.9 The Management Process as a closed loop
feedback loop
Source: Argenti, see reference l46}p. 31
So a manager can review the progress he is making towards the achievement 
of his objective and he will, if necessary, alter the objective in x
response to the progress he is making. In practice, under 
organizational hierarchies, this is not the case - a manager has 
no authority to change company objectives.
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Grinyer has pointed to some dangerous axioms of corporate 
planning, among which is a practical criticism of the systematic 
process. In practice, corporate planning is a 'messy business'.
The distinctions between formality and informality are difficult 
to detect and often companies resort to an adaptive or muddling 
through procedure in between'systematic planning (Mintzberg's mix). 
Grinyer argues that a systematic procedure does not take account of 
innovation which is often intuitive, informal and non-routine -
and so systematic procedures may restrict creativity. Further, he
ipoints to the confusion m  corporate planning .concerning the view
that strategic and operating management should be separate,
i.e. the separation of the planning from the operating functions,
which is common in many organizations. However, as Grinyer states,
"Strategic planning is of no value unless as the general framework
for operational planning. What determines the performance of a
company is actions taken, not words committed'to paper". Grinyer and 
1^7Norburn have also stated that formal planning has failed in U.K. 
companies. One main benefit of formal planning should be -the 
agreement among top managers on the explicit setting of objectives - 
(there was distinct confusion in most companies in their sample]; 
further benefits should be associated with the identification of 
decision-making responsibilities - (where there was equally 
widespread confusion). Further, Horowitz1^  has recently criticized 
corporate planning on a conceptual basis, questioning the ability of 
the procedure to provide the necessary perspective of the future 
in "any identifiable or probabilistic sense".
' The picture is of -adoption of corporate planning but a 
confusion over its potential benefits. This is largely so
. 169 .because as Grinyer and Norburn point out m  an earlier report, 
"whereas the intellectual appeal of conceptualizing the planning 
process (Ansoff, Gilmore and Bradenburg, Steiner et alia) is 
substantial, it seems to bear little resemblance to practice within f 
a large number of industrial segments in the U.K. The need for 
more research within companies is obvious. We must establish knowledge 
as to what exists before making recommendations for improvement".
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Gnnyer has proposed that this research takes the form of 
testing the "appropriate degree of formality or informality, 
frequency, level of involvement of top management, lengths of 
planning horizons - for given conditions. Such conditions would 
include the size of the company, its organizational structure, place 
on the mechanistic-organic scale, style of top management, type of 
business, geographical location, fragmentation and rate of change of 
its markets, type and rate of change of technology relating to its 
processes, products and materials and susceptibility to political 
influence. Others could of course be added."
The conclusion is, knowledge of empirical corporate planning 
is desperately thin. The literature on corporate planning and 
small companies may yield further insights that may add to 
Grinyer’s conceptual framework above and assist in the much needed 
empirical research of this area.
2.3.2 Corporate planning arid the small company
It is essential to recall at this stage that " the role of the 
owner-manager is the key to the understanding of human relations 
and behaviour in small firms. Unless we learn to see this role as 
he himself perceives it, any discussion of the small firm by outsiders 
is doomed to the status of a monologue, punctuated by criticism and
171preaching, unlikely to he listened to by the small firm man himself".
172Gilmore (1966) was probably the first writer to indicate 
that small companies may well need to adopt this new concept of 
strategic planning. His recommendations were stark, if not premature.
He suggested that the swing towards strategic planning in large 
companies may erode the competitive advantage of the smaller 
companies which was based essentially on flexibility and speed 
of movement. This threat of strategic planning was to take four 
lines of attack, l) Through planning, large companies would build 
a technical advantage and render small companies technically 
obsolete; 2) planning in large companies has required an importation 
of staff specialists to scan the environment for opportunities, this 
may render small companies economically obsolete; 3) joint ventures 
between large companies (mergers or otherwise) were seen as' increasing 
through planning and this could pressurize the profit squeeze in 
small companies ik) this threat relates to the adoption of small 
companies to long range planning if they wish to undertake U.S. 
defense contracts. It is easy to judge retrospectively that Gilmore 
was premature in his anticipations, hut he did touch on a factor
170
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central to this debate i.e. the change from managing by adaption
to changing conditions to management according to the strategic
plan, constitutes a fundamental change in the job of the chief
executive.' Concern for immediate profits and adaptability to meet
changes In current conditions has given way to a focus on long
range return on investment, growth, flexibility and stability.
Gilmore suggests neither how or when this change in top management
takes place or what effect it will have on the company. But
creeping into the debate here is an incremental planning procedure
scaled down from the body of corporate planning literature that
was primarily developed for large companies. Gilmore suggests a s
five stage process of l) identifying current strategy; 2) reappraisal
of present strategy; 3) formulation of alternative strategies;
4) evaluation of alternative strategies; 5) selection 0f a nev
strategy. This is something that has been seen before - how. does
it automatically become " a practical' framework for a planning cycle
in small business" if it was initially developed for large companies?
173Gilmore is not alone, John Argenti states that, "Corporate
planning techniques are considered almost essential for the larger
company, while the smaller company will probably do best to use the
philosophy without necessarily having the formal planning department" -
Stanworth and Curran, on the other hand, argue that, ".a small firm
view based on the owner-managers role in the firm is likely to lead
to more realistic suggestions ..., that prescriptions for action
derived from merely scaling down techniques appropriate to the large 
174organization" . John Mackness states that, "the problem with
the literature on small firms is that they merely either analyse
the role of the small firm or propose watered down guidelines of
175large firm principles for small firms".
This dichotomy between the views of empirical researchers
and those of large company philosophers runs merrily through the
corporate planning literature on small companies.
176. However, Golde's work in the early 1960s deserves credit.
He begins from an understanding of small company problems -
multiplicity of duties, lack of time, little formal training in
planning, paucity of resources and day to day myopia over fighting
’brush fires’. It is evident from an understanding of these
problems that many small companies shy away from planning activities -
"but without planning the danger is that the firm will overestimate
177the attention required by immediate crises". Golde develops
a Master Planning Form that is at once practical and simple, 
taking the chief executive through the various functional areas of 
the company for one, two, or more years into the future and forcing 
him to think in terms of changes in these areas and asking revealing 
questions about each one. The approach has much to commend it, 
but perhaps its real beauty is, it is based on an understanding of 
the chief executive’s role in the company and his/her attitude 
towards planning. It helps to break down the barriers surrounding 
formal planning, taking it away from the abstract world of periodical 
literature into the reality of the chief executive’s office. In a1 r-rft
later article, Golde points to the barriers affecting the adoption 
of formal planning in small companies as fear, inexactness, change­
ability, lack of proper time or place, lack of planning knowledge. 
These barriers, he suggests, explain why formal planning is not 
widely adopted in small companies even though chief executives are 
aware of it.
1 7QSteiner (1967), approaches the small company similarly 
to Golde, by an understanding of their characterisitics. "Long 
range planning is essential for a small as well as a large business 
for no other reason than it permits them to take better advantage 
of the opportunities which lie in the future and to forestall the 
threats which it contains. This is the essence of entrepreneurship". 
Both Steiner and Golde emphasise that formal planning is essential 
for small companies - hut is it really necessary? Are they not 
best suited to a totally flexible approach?
Steiner is another flow chart specialist and has decided 
that his conceptual model is applicable to large and small 
companies alike - a fact that is surprising after his article had 
begun from such a sound understanding of small company affairs. 
Steiner is of the synoptic school and predictably outlines the basic 
form of business planning as a seven step iterative process, 
beginning with the establishment of objectives. But he does 
point' out that a business - and here in particular a small business, . 
does not have to follow each step sequentially. Precisely what 
sequence is followed, he suggests, depends on type and size of 
the business, the nature of top management, available help, 
nature of problems facing the business and whether long range 
planning is just beginning or has been in operation for some time.
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Hastings found, in a survey of 100 small manufacturing companies, 
that the hardest part of planning was getting started. Hence,
Steiner suggests an approach not unlike Goldes, of asking pertinent 
questions about the business, industry, customers, goals, strengths, 
problems, markets, finance and so on. Then he suggests the executive 
should identify those few key parameters that are critical to his 
success or failure. Then as a picture of the company emerges in 
the eyes of the executive, he can then go about assessing, thinking 
and questioning his basic functional areas, using check-off lists 
or even Goldes Master Planning Form and then he can move on to 
Steiner’s synoptic interactive procedure. But Steiner's approach 
does not diverge greatly from a mere watering down.of his large 
scale comprehensive planning system, even though he appears to 
appreciate the more fundamental problems associated with small 
companies.
3 . 8 l
Foster presents another large scale synoptic ideal which
he has been able to make work in small companies. Foster's is
a completely overwhelming approach for any small business manager to
handle alone, it is one that stems from a consultants perspective
and one that is essentially installed by such. It is the usual
multiple step process, with heavy emphasis placed on accounting
information particularly ratio analysis. How, accounts in small
companies are not up to date. They often lag far beyond the legal
date for submission and so are frequently two, three or more years
adrift from their operating period. Further, such accounts tend
to hide many irregularities of small company operations (a safe
one to mention is the owner-manager living out of the company,
hut there are many others). In the light of this it seems, incredible
to rely on such an inconsistent tool as ratio analysis, on data
that is not only adrift but contains many imperfections, for your
182assessment and feedback. Foster also displays perhaps the most
confusing of all flow diagrams of strategic planning procedures
and arguably this could accentuate the harriers mentioned by Golde,
particularly of fear and so may he detrimental to the adoption of
planning in small companies. However, 'Foster makes an important
and central observation about management techniques - "Managements
must assess the techniques available and select only those that make
l83a positive contribution to their operations" „ which again must
raise the question, is formal planning necessary in small companies at all?
He calls for a tailoring of the text-book approach for each company.
But that tailoring cannot possibly be left to the owner-manager of
a small company if it is presented as in Foster's format. Certainly
the Golde approach is more appropriate.
184 ...Forbes has rightly criticized the professional planners 
for attempting to hold the subject as a mystique far removed from 
small company operations. His approach is based on the philosophy 
that change is the single most important source of opportunity.
"The challenge of change is met by synchronizing the rate of change 
within the .firm with the rate of change of the conditions for life
•j Qr
and growth of the organization". This within firm change is 
achieved by adapting objectives and supporting goals to new 
conditions and this essentially involves planning. Forbes proposes 
an incremental approach - the steps are worthy of mention because of 
the distinct lack of sophistication needed to prepare each one.
l) Analyse the boundaries of the present business; 2) analyse the 
achievements of your business so far; 3) list those key factors 
which crucially affect the success or failure of your business;
4) 'guesstimate' the probable changes in the key factors;
5) identify the values of owners and key managers; 6) establish • 
the overall objectives; 7) assess the strengths and weaknesses;
8) identify supporting goals; 9) determine priorities;
10) finally, the chief executive must take time to assess his own 
position. Forbes work must be given credit for the consideration 
given to the values and aspirations of the chief executive in the 
procedure, but again it is not far removed from a full scale 
incremental approach. But the fact that Steiner and Forbes have 
witnessed the success of such scaled-down approaches in small 
companies is worthy of mention in itself. This scaling-down can 
possibly work - but were the authors, like Foster, continually 
aiding and assisting? That would make implementation easier, but 
nonetheless costly.
I8g
Andrews has added to the practising consultants contribution
by proposing another basically synoptic procedure. He also adheres
to the philosophy that, "long range planning is more crucial to the
1 Pi 7small company than for a large corporation ..." but his reason 
that " a large corporation usually has greater flexibility
and greater buffers against uncertainty" is questionable. Andrews 
approach also involves access to detailed financial data and to 
computing facilities - which all seems more appropriate to medium or
large sized firms. Further, he sees the role of the chief executive
as changing to a corporate planner. The acceptance of that role by
an already overworked owner-manager is not questioned.
l88Gilmore (1971) has provided a revised six step approach 
for developing strategy in small companies, l) Record current 
strategy; 2) identify problems. 3) discover the core elements 
of the problems; 4) formulate alternatives; 5) evaluate the 
alternatives; 6) choose the strategy. This differs from his 
earlier work in the adoption of an additional step i.e. the discovery
of core elements of problems which is symptomatic of a system's
.. . q89analysis similar to the one presented by Mackness . But still
there is little role for people and their values and aspirations
although Gilmore suggests that corporate planning in large companies
had not reached the science stage (1971) and that O.R. techniques
were not practical in smaller*, medium sized companies, hence .
strategy there should be based on judgement, experience, intuition
and well-guided discussion which are the framework of success in
small companies - not staff work or mathematical models. One can
hardly agree more.
190Macmillan presents a much more plausible approach. He 
points out that the key advantages of a small business (at least 
for an adventurous entrepreneur) are mobility, unanimity (no 
divorce of ownership from control and so 110 discrepancies in decision­
making) , innovative potential, size of investment, and commitment.
The business should retain these advantages by keeping managerial 
levels to a minimum and keeping the business at a size controllable
by the owner-manager. The philosophy here, which is confirmed in
191U.S. literature - see McGuire , that small businesses, if kept
small and mobile, have a high chance of survival, but it is the
small growing business that has the highest fatality rate - "as the
business becomes larger the owner-manager loses his total control
over the situation, his time becomes more and more absorbed by day
192to day. crises and he is forced to invest more.heavily" and
so the business grows to a point where ultimate control is lost and 
the initial advantages are eroded. Hence, Macmillan suggests 
that the strategy of. a small business.should be composed of a long 
linked series of short-term plans which take into consideration all 
the small company advantages. ‘
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Further bottom-up contributions to small company planning
(beginning from a basic understanding rather than scaling-down),
193 194 . 195have been.duly provided by Wood , Perngo , Tmdale , and
196Tilles and Contas .
. 194 . . . .Perngo is largely concerned with releasing the chief
executive from the myopia of day to day affairs and consequent 
pressures by imposing a completely new type of management. This 
stems from the ability of the chief executive to delegate responsibility 
and authority, while still keeping in touch with major decisions.
He points out that when delegating (if this is indeed possible 
judging by the reluctance of most chief executives to do it), 
the chief executive must not confuse the different styles of subordinate 
managers with lack of effectiveness. He must distinguish between 
style and substance of a person's performance. In fact, the chief 
executive should play a role in teaching the art of decision­
making to subordinates.
When the chief executive has been freed, it is time for him 
to take an objective look at the whole company - collecting internal 
accounting information for past years and external marketing and 
environmental information - then comparing this information with 
the way he now sees his company. This is essentially an incremental 
framework (and only now should the chief executive begin to consider 
objectives, strategic position, markets, products, sales), but 
the credit lies in the release of the chief executive to begin 
the process in the first instance and the introduction of the 
views of all other managers in formulating the strategy - and in 
keeping them in continuous touch with developments. In the process 
of his research at Aston University, Perrigo found a weak 
relationship in fifteen companies between high performance and
adoption of formal planning techniques (positive).
196 . 194Tulles and Contas and Perrigo realize that formal
planning in small companies is heavily influenced by the family 
affairs - nepotism and paternalism. Hence, it is important in 
formal planning in small companies to establish managerial plans 
for succession and this is always entwined amid the chief executive's 
willingness to delegate. The process itself is a difficult task 
after the entrepreneur has developed his company on an autocratic 
basis. But the real problem comes after delegation, in continuous 
attempted manipulation of the delegates areas of responsibility - 
through habit, worry or fear, this causes unnecessary conflict and
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can lead to a high staff turnover - destroying the advantage of 
loyalty of small business staff. It is only after delegation has 
seemingly successfully taken place that the chief executive can 
begin to think about the future of his company and that thinking 
must start with a plan of succession if he wants the company to 
remain in business. It is useful to bear in mind the research
197 . .results of Trow on executive succession m  small companies.
He found, on a re-analysis of data originally collected by 
198C.R. Christensen , in a study of 108 small companies in the U.S.A., 
that - l) the length of service of owner-managers is, on average,
20 years - more for founders, less for non-founders; 2) there is 
a strong association between planning for succession and subsequent 
profitability; 3) .smaller, stable, family-owned companies tended 
not to have chosen and trained successors; 4) management ability 
appears to have two effects on the succession process. In companies 
m  which the managers son was a potential successor, a low level 
of competence on his part seemed to have delayed hoth the planning 
for succession and the succession itself. Secondly, among all 
companies in which unplanned succession occurred, subsequent 
company performance appears to be associated positively with the 
successors ability. In essence, the effects of size, growth and 
ownership appear to affect the timing of planning for succession.
In this process management ability plays a significant role.
There are no large, empirical studies available that could
shed any light on empirical small company planning. The most
. . 199significant U.K. study, by Boswell defines small companies as
below 500 employees and is restricted to a sample of 64 firms in
Engineering and Knitwear and further restricted to the East Midlands.
Boswell was concerned in his article with three questions. How
far are management goals and policies over a three year period
clearly defined in small firms? What proportion of such firms
appear to be growth and/or efficiency minded as opposed to less
economically orientated? What differences are there in policy between
large and small firms? He identified firms as drifters, conservatives,
rationalizers and expansion-cseekers.. Drifters were considered to
have no goals or objectives in an economic sense. Conservatives were
characterized by perceiving of no growth, while rationalizers
shared a disinclination to grow in size but were prepared to make
changes within the companies to strengthen their strategic position;
their emphasis was on profitability. Rapid growth dominated the
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thinking in the expansion-seeker companies - their aim was to keep 
targets above historical annual rates of inflation. An important 
observation in the study is the check on expansion and rationalization 
goals provided by conservative-minded chairmen or co-directors, 
often of an earlier generation, who were able to thwart the managing 
director by continued influence on management. Perhaps the most 
significant finding was the willingness of chief executives to 
outline five years goals - probably due to what Macmillan previously 
referred to as unanimity of decision-making^00, Further, a large 
proportion of Boswells sample was taken up by companies that had no 
economic ambition or orientation - about 33% of the sample, 
drifters and conservatives had no view to rationalize or expand.
201Boswell notes that this is consistent with the finding of McIntosh
i.e. that lack of ambition is a significant active limit on the
202growth of firms. This is congruous with what McGuire has 
suggested, that the limit on growth is personal ability. Finally, 
there was a vast difference between the goals of large and small 
companies, growth being more dominant among the smaller firms.
Boswells study in the late 1960s, although suffering from inherent 
bias and subjectivity in interviews, has produced at least an insight
into small firm objectives.
203Schumann , m  a U.S. survey restricted to 105 companies 
in the New England State - (again a small sample, biased geographically), 
has provided further insights. He found - l) Corporate Planning is 
essentially a top management activity; 2) most companies do some 
planning but the internal organization and organizational mechanisms 
that effect corporate planning vary among companies; 3) the function 
of formal planning groups differ widely; 4) the planning‘process 
varies depending on the success of past planning efforts, current 
operating results , and top management attitude towards change;
5) corporate planning horizon is essentially short term - one year 
or less; 6) there was little connection between the four variables 
tested i.e. S.I.C. category, number of employees, sales level, 
geographical location of head office - and formal planning;
7) the reason given for the unstructured nature of corporate planning 
was firm size. A more structured process would not outweigh the 
sacrifices that would be necessitated by the structure; 8) the values, 
aspirations and desires of the chief executive are often translated 
into company objectives; 9) corporate planning is still in a 
formative phase.
. Although Schumann's work possesses inherent bias and as a 
U.S. study may not be directly applicable to the U.K., it is useful 
to note the trend of the conclusions, particularly the domination 
of the process by the chief executive. The paucity of empirical 
work in the U.K. forces one reluctantly to draw upon U.S. studies 
with obvious caution. -
204The available U.S. studies mentioned m  Still , have a 
vastly different idea of small companies than British writers 
e.g. Still views a criteria of 10-2000 employees as appropriate,p0rr
while Keusch defines his small firms with fewer than 6500 employees. 
Some of their main results appear below, but must be treated with 
due caution. Keusch in a mail survey of 93 firms .found - l) Formality 
and regularity of long range planning is positively correlated with 
company size; 2) the more regularity with which formal planning is 
practiced, the sooner in the procedure objectives are established;
3) length of long range planning period is positively correlated 
to size; 4) larger companies are more likely to have recently made 
a decision with long term implications. Still, in a mail.survey of 
84 firms*found - l) Strategic planning to be an unstructured, 
irregular and uncomprehensive procedure in small firms;
2) dominated by top management (or usually the principal owner);
3) variations in patterns of strategic planning behaviour appear to 
be related more to the personality characteristics of the strategic 
planner - entrepreneurial style, goal set orientations and attitudes;
4) variations in formality or rationality of corporate planning 
were not attributable to size of firm or industry; 5) high growth 
firms were found to plan at higher levels of formality, but not 
rationality (here formality refers to the nature of structure and 
specification regarding organizational roles in strategic planning, 
rationality refers to the nature and extent of behaviour with 
respect to essential elements of the decision process). These 
studies indicate again the dominance of top management in formal 
planning systems.
It is markedly clear from a discussion of the literature
that empirical work on small companies and corporate planning is
206desperately required. Bernard Taylor has recently said,
"The small businessman has a natural aversion to bureaucracy.
To him corporate planning is associated with the meaningless
rituals which occur in large companies when they are formulating
their five-year plans. It sounds like an expensive form of forecasting
86
and budgeting. It smacks of decision-making by committees leading 
to delays and missed opportunities and to the appointment of expensive 
staff specialists. Is this what is involved? The answer is no,
tt . .obviously not. But m  asking that question Taylor aligns himself 
with the school of thought that says planning is good for small 
companies. Is this so?' If so, to which companies and to what type 
of companies? Are small firms capable of thinking ahead in a 
formal, systematic manner? The answers to such questions can only 
come from an empirical survey of planning activity in small companies. 
The research now turns to describe this activity.
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Objective of the chapter
The fulcrum, point of any research is a data collection instrument 
of quality and reliability. Only then can the results be accepted with 
confidence. This chapter aims to establish the quality of the mail 
survey questionnaire through a thorough discussion of the design principles 
embodied within the instrument. A discussion of the reliability 
of the questionnaire follows in Chapter Four.
Organization of the chapter
In order to achieve the above.aim, this chapter has been segregated 
into six parts. Section 3.1 is an outline of the overall research 
design, illustrating the timing of each activity. Section 3.2 
explains the superiority of the chosen data collection method (mail 
survey), over the alternative devices under the present research 
conditions. Section 3.3 describes firstly, the external principles' 
embodied in the survey to increase the response rates speed and quality 
and secondly, the internal principles of questionnaire design and 
wording, incorporated in the instrument itself. Section 3.4 compares 
the chosen sampling frame with the alternatives, illustrating its 
advantages. Section 3.5 presents the final version of the survey 
after pre-testing, while Section 3.6 illustrates the principles adopted 
to ensure the implementation was as error-free as possible.
CHAPTER THREE
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An area of such heterogeneity and sparsity of documentation like small
companies and corporate planning, requires a research design that must he
C"
exploratory and so eventually descriptive. The research activities 
therefore consisted of:'
1 . An initial research phase of twelve months of continuous interaction 
with small companies in the Lancashire and Surrey areas with emphasis 
on understanding core problems and especially the managerial attitude 
with regard to corporate planning.
2. Simultaneously with Phase One, a literature search to evaluate the 
state of the art.
3. Design of mail questionnaire, pre-test, correct, pre-test, correct, 
mail, collection, editing, coding, punching data into machine readable 
format.
4. And finally, computer-editing analysis.
3.2 Research Methodology'
The reasons for adoption of a mail questionnaire for data collection 
purposes should become apparent after consideration is given to alternative 
methods.
5,.2.1 Documentary Sources
1Moser has identified three areas where source documents can be of assistancet
1. , Documents giving information about the survey population;
2. Documents giving information about individual units of enquiry;
3. Personal Documents.
Because of the specialised nature of the current research, none of these 
sources of information has a direct contribution in providing the required 
information. Personal Documents, such as diaries, letters and autobiog­
raphies are thin on the ground as far as small firms are concerned. Further, 
they are likely to contain writer-myopia in their interpretation of events.
3*1 Research Design
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CLStill has pointed to support for the collection of hard and accurate 
behavioural data by means of time-keeping logs and ex-poste facto diaries. 
Here, subjects are requested to record the nature and times of behaviour 
relating to a selected activity eg. corporate planning. But the practicality 
of this in the brisk and busy atmosphere of small business is surely 
questionable. Further,, the sample is likely to be very small (subject of 
course to how many people the researcher can convince to keep one) and 
highly biased in terms of the way the keeper observes and perceives events, 
especially if the small business managers are attempting to please 
university observers. Most important, the responses are unlikely to be 
comparable unless the keeper has undertaken considerable training - this 
would mean extra time, money and effort.
Aggregate document sources collected by Government Departments were obviously 
not comprehensive enough, but were used as supplementary sources of infor­
mation (eg Censuses of Production).
Hence, due to inadequacy of coverage, inapplicability, keeper limitations 
of bias, time, money, effort and small sample sizes, this method of data 
collection was rejected.
3.2.2 Observation
Observations - of activity can be dichotomized into two groups - passive 
observation and active observation.
Passive Observation
Passive observation can be assessed in relation to the alternative method
of collecting data i.e by asking people for information regarding events
and activities. The only real advantage of passive observation is if
respondents are unable to provide the information required. Previous surveys 
3 4eg by Boswell , Bolton , have not indicated any great reluctance on the part 
of small businessmen to provide information and on these grounds alone 
passive observation must be rejected. Further, problems of observer-bias 
in perceiving and recording events complicate the procedure. Again it is 
highly unlikely that small companies would tolerate any hangers-on. Managers 
there, are preoccupied with day to day affairs and have often to engulf a
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multiplicity of duties from shop floor to boardroom and across financial, 
sales and production functions. Every man pulls his weight and there is 
little fatty flesh that can be allowed. Confidentiality and the colour­
ing of a manager's behaviour with a researcher present are associated 
problems.
Finally, the sample is likely to he small and geographically biased due to 
cost, timing and practicality. If these shortcomings are coupled with 
researcher bias in observations (no matter how well he/she is trained)^  it 
is evident that passive observation should he dismissed in the present 
circumstances.
Active Observation
This method involves actual physical participation in a company's affairs 
and it is a useful preliminary exercise to more extensive research. It 
aids in understanding how small companies operate, illustrates the crisis 
areas eg cash flow, production deadlines, labour relations- and provides 
insights into the planning attitudes of executives and managers within the 
companies. However, it suffers major defects as a complete research tool 
in itself,, eg
1 . The problem of acceptance and the time associated with the company and
managers in accepting the researcher;
2. Time associated with attaining such a level of trust with the chief 
executive for him to reveal confidential information to the researcher;
3. Limited sample size due to time considerations above and so consequent 
bias;
4. Likely geographical bias due to time, cost and practicality;
5. Researcher viewpoint bias; personal involvement may colour the way a 
researcher observes events and activities, his objectivity may be 
impaired. Being identified with top managers may restrict information 
'forthcoming from subordinates - this political role can jeopardize the 
complete activity;
6. The presence of a university researcher can easily affect the behaviour 
and activities of the company he is actually there to observe.
91
Of prime importance in considering action research, in small companies is 
the matter of acceptability. However, in this case the research deals 
with corporate planning as well. This is an activity of the highest 
political consequence. It belongs at top management level and resides in 
confidentiality. This makes the matter of acceptability one of crucial 
significance. To break-into this high level area takes time. That time 
costs a great deal of money and effort. The eventual result of action 
research is likely to be one of small sample bias, geographical bias, 
observer bias, a large degree of practical difficulty and excessive time 
and cost. Furthermore, research based on such restricted samples limits 
a generalization of any findings which is a prime function of the current 
research. On these grounds active observation was.rejected, but only after 
problems likely to arise from adopting it as a main research procedure had 
been identified empirically. However, active observation can be a useful 
exploratory phase in small company research.
3.2.3 Personal Interviews
Personal interviews are an extremely useful research tool for exploratory 
purposes eg in identifying variables and tentative relationships that can 
lead to hjrpothesis, which can then be tested by a more exhaustive research 
procedure. But any data collection tool must be appropriate for investig­
ating the problem at hand. The personal interview in context with the 
current research suffers from a variety of drawbacks:
1. Accessibility of the required information to the respondent at the time 
of the questioning;
2. Response errors associated with carelessness in recording answers 
(although a tape-recorder would provide a solution., its acceptability 
may not only jeopardize the interview but may also colour a respondent’s 
reply);
3. Response errors associated with researcher bias in the way he asks the 
questions or interprets the answers. The importance of the current 
research would negate suggestions to delegate the interviewing process 
to trained interviewers. This procedure may well achieve a larger 
sample and wider geographic coverage but suffers drawbacks of cost - in 
training and in wages, incompatibility of replies no matter how well 
trained the interviewers are, accuracy of those replies, interviewer 
bias., and a heavy reliance on the personal qualities of the interviewer.
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Of overriding importance is the acceptability of various interviewers, 
not specifically associated with the research work, to company 
executives. They are highly unlikely to answer questions of a 
political and confidential nature to anyone other than the chief 
researcher. So in this case, if the interviewer was the researcher, 
response errors would probably be reduced but not completely eliminated;
4. Cost of personal interviews per visit is likely to be in the region of 
£10-£15 compared to mail survey cost per reply of £1 .50;
5. The cost is likely to restrict the sample size and so generalizations 
_to the population become impractical;
6. The cost is likely to bias the sample to a local geographic area.
Further, the clustering or multi-stage sampling necessary with personal 
interviews lowers the precision for any given sample size;
7. There is no guarantee that the interview will either take place or be 
fully completed. Chief executives of small companies are frequently 
diverted from appointments to fight day to day 'brush fires' and may 
only be in a position to allow a short interview;
8. Preliminary active research in small companies by the researcher had 
detected the existence of a small company-university harrier or 
prejudice against university researchers. Respondents' replies may 
well reflect that prejudice;
9. Initial interviewer access is often problematical either by letter or 
telephone, as the chief executive has already a busy schedule and can 
often only allow time for business appointments
Hence due to inherent bias and excessive cost and time the personal interview 
was discarded for use with the present research.
3.2.4 Telephone Interviews
For many years* the class bias associated with possessing a telephone mitigated 
against the extensive use of it as a data collection method. Researchers 
often used the telephone as a complement to other research procedures.- 
During the current research, the telephone was used in this manner - attempt­
ing to clarify respondents’ replies lest an almost complete survey be 
discarded. However, recent years have seen an increasing adoption of 
telephone interviews, stemming largely from the efforts of market researchers
to elicit information from customers. Although the literature is rather
5barren in the social sciences, some researchers have begun to unravel, via
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trial and error procedures, the intricate art of telephone interviewing. 
However, telephones hold a host of. disadvantages for this research:
1. Cost is the overriding factor. The object of the sample design is to 
cover a wide heterogeneic group across the United Kingdom. The cost 
of telephone interviews would drastically cut the sample and reduce 
generalizations about the population;
2. The time necessary to answer an exhaustive questionnaire not only adds
to the cost, but may also lead a respondent into a false sense of co­
operation. A respondent must decide instantly whether he will 
co-operate - it is likely that the prime motivator in that decision is 
the time necessary to answer. A suggested time of ten minutes could 
well be doubled depending on the knowledge the respondent possesses 
close at hand. This is obviously impractical in the already over­
burdened world of the small company;
3. Difficulty may arise in tracing a respondent - in this case the chief 
executive. There is then no guarantee of his dismissing the telephone 
interview for more pressing affairs, mid-way through the procedure;
4. Sponsor names may not have the desired impact over a telephone that
they have on headed stationery. Instructions and descriptions can
accompany a mail survey which are difficult to translate briefly over 
the telephone.
With these limitations in mind it is now necessary to turn to the only 
really practical method of data collection in relation to this research - 
the mail survey questionnaire.
3.2.5 Mail Survey Questionnaire
The most appropriate method for obtaining a broadly-based sample of small 
companies is the mail survey questionnaire.: After consideration is given 
to available funds and £ per reply there is no question that the mail 
survey is the most practical method of obtaining reasonably compatible data 
across a large geographic base, a large heterogeneic group and also obtaining 
a large sample size. This facilitates a random sample design and hence 
generalizations about the population can be made with some accuracy. The 
method is faster in that most of the responses have been obtained after 
three weeks and it is also an easier method to supervise. The respondent
9b
also has time to collate the necessary answers, or partially complete the 
questionnaire that involves his own personal knowledge and delegate the 
residual. . The method similarly affords the respondent additional time to 
reply. In small companies this is of crucial significance, many respondents 
had taken the survey home for completion - an action hardly likely to be 
granted with the personal interview approach. Hence problems associated 
with incomplete replies in the personal interview are by-passed. Further, 
the relative anonymity and lack of presence of an interviewer helps to 
encourage response to slightly embarrassing or political questions.
(Although it is implicit in the duty of a questionnaire designer to avoid, 
as far as possible, such questions).
For the current research this method was the most applicable. But it is 
useful to bear in mind the limitations of this approach before proceeding. 
Moser^ identifies six main disadvantages:
1 . The method is only useful when the questions can be proposed in a
simple and straightforward manner. Careful design and wording with 
intelligent instructions were adopted to overcome this weakness;
2. The method is inflexible and the answers must be taken as final, unless
follow up interviews to clarify answers can be afforded. In the current
research, any imperfections in a questionnaire likely to prevent an
almost complete survey from being processed, were completed by either 
reference to known facts about a particular company or a follow up 
telephone interview to clarify the response;
3. The method is inappropriate where spontaneous answers or unique views 
are requested. In this research neither were of importance. Of course 
the views of the chief executive were sought, but a completion of the 
whole survey did not warrant a monopolization of his time. The survey
.was deliberately designed with this problem of lack of time and multi­
plicity of duties of the chief executive in mind, much of the 
preliminary stages of the survey could be completed by any manager or 
secretary with'working knowledge of the company's affairs, only the 
later sections required the chief executive's attention;
4. The method allows the respondent to see all the questions before 
providing an answer and so the different answers cannot be treated as 
separate. Care in design can often eliminate redundant questions of 
this nature in a mail survey;
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5. The method does not tell the researcher who completed the questionnaire. 
The political and confidential nature of this research necessitated 
that it remained in the hands of top management or a knowledgeable
company secretary. The research was directed at these people and the
replies indicated it was completed by them;
6. The method does not allow the answers to he supplemented by observational 
data. Although such background information is of value, its possession 
is not crucial. The crucial questions lay in the survey itself.
It is frequently the case whereby ■ such disadvantages can he overcome by
combining mail surveys with personal interviews. Thus surveys can be sent
by mail and collected by interviewers (a method that can also help to increase
response rates), who can then act to clarify replies and ensure completeness
and exactness. Or the reverse procedure of delivering the questionnaire by
hand to explain the purpose and elicit co-operation and seeking a return by
mail. Due to cost such mixtures were not possible in this research.
7However, Still has claimed success by initially gathering data for 
hypothesis using a personal interview and following up to <a larger sample
with a mail survey. The current research intention was to attempt to gather
information across as large a sample as possible with existing financial 
resources. Hence, all efforts were directed at eliciting as large a 
response as possible with a mail survey questionnaire.
3.3 Design of the Mail Survey Questionnaire
The main problem with mail surveys is in eliciting a high response rate.
Q
Moser and Kalton write, "A poor response rate must constitute a dangerous 
failing and if it does not rise above, say 20 or 30 per cent, the failing 
is so critical as to make the survey results of little, if any^ value". The 
main objective of the design is to reduce the potential non-response to such 
a level that it can cause no serious bias.
9Dillman has pointed out that the emphasis in mail surveys has long been 
directed upon the use of techniques to elicit response rather than on an 
intrinsic understanding of the respondent’s behaviour and the reasons why 
he replies. He outlines a Total Design Method consisting of two parts;
1 . Understanding why people respond and so maximise that response by
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reducing the cost of response, introducing rewards and establishing 
trust such that those rewards will be delivered;
2. Guidance of the administration of survey implementation by giving 
due attention to planning, timing, supervision and control.
Dillman's is a creditable approach because it involves treating the survey 
as a whole rather than placing emphasis on individual items ie the 
envelope, label, letter - the complete package together with its adminis­
tration are all interdependent in a successful mail survey. The following 
discussion will illustrate the efforts adopted to increase the response 
rate, the efforts adopted to reduce non-response bias and the efforts 
adopted to streamline the implementation, always bearing in mind the Total 
Design Concept.
10Kanuck and Berenson suggest that the empirical studies designed to improve 
the validity and reliability of mail surveys can be divided into two 
categories:
1. Those designed to increase response rates and
2. Those designed to reduce biases caused by non-response.
(The former are discussed in the remainder of this chapter, the latter are 
reviewed in Chapter Four and include the testing for consistency between 
early and late respondents, analysing speed of response, testing for bias 
among company size, S.I.C. Order . and geographical area and comparing the 
sample to known population characteristics for sample representativeness).
3.3.1 Designs to increase the Response Rate
These can be divided into efforts devoted to
1 . Timing (preliminary and follow-up efforts) and
2. Technique (here referred to as concurrent).
(1 ) Timing
Preliminary Notification
Research is mixed as to whether the preliminary notification of a
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necessary, due to financial restrictions, to dismiss the procedure in
12this instance. Myers and Harg are of the opinion that the increased 
cost involved does not justify the additional information acquired.
Follow-up Techniques 
13Scott has suggested that follow-ups are the most potent technique
14available for increasing response rates. Kanuck and Berenson suggest,
11... reminders are almost universally successful in increasing response
rates. Since each successive follow-up results in added returns, the very
persistent (and well-financed) researcher can potentially achieve an
15extremely high total response rate". In fact most research work is of
the opinion that follow-ups increase response. Obviously there is a cost
benefit associated with each successive reminder but a good clue is
16suggested by Hoinville , that if the first mailing produces 40% response
then it is plausible to hope for 40% of the residual at the first reminder.
17Berdie and Anderson have recommended the following with regard to follow- 
ups;
1. Be persistent;
2. Let the respondent know his reply is missed and positively desired;
3. Include a reference to the study, telephone number.and the name of a 
contact;
4. Send follow-ups when the replies to the original sample have considerably 
decreased.
All these recommendations were incorporated in the present' study. However, 
it should be noted that the second reminder of the large sample of 3»000* 
companies was posted fourteen days after the first reminder . at a time when 
the original replies were still coming in. This was necessary due to the 
imminent progress of the Christmas post. In addition, these authors suggest 
the use of telegrams and phone calls to help remind respondents. This was 
ruled out on time and cost grounds in this research.
18A final suggestion from Berdie' and Anderson is the provision of another 
questionnaire in further reminders. This was similarly ruled out on cost 
grounds. However, residual questionnaires together with questionnaires
q u e s tio n n a ire  in c re a se s  the  response ra te s .  However, i t  was adjudged
* For details of the sample see Chapter 3, section 3.4.4
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sent back blank,-were used to send a+complete copy of 
original package to non-respondents in the 200 sample with the second 
reminders. It was only possible to send 400 questionnaires to the 
1,600 non-respondents in the 3,000 sample with the second reminder.
This is probably the cause of the major disparity in response rates 
(see section!®.1 .1) between the 200 and the 3,000 sample.
The current research employed two follow-ups. The first a reminder 
postcard (Appendix C , exhibit l ) addressed by hand and personally 
signed (to save expense and time that could then be spent on affording 
a second reminder). The first reminder was posted fourteen days after 
the initial mailing, timed to arrive just after the deadline specified 
on the questionnaire. The second reminder (Appendix C , exhibit 2 ) 
contained a revised covering letter together with the original cover 
letter. This was posted fourteen days after the first reminder.
The complete mailing was deliberately timed to come in the Autumn after 
the September holidays. It began on 31 October 1978 to last until 
fourteen days after the second reminder, ie 14 December 1979. Enquiries 
with the Guildford General Post Office revealed that the Christmas rush 
begins about 10-12th December. Hence the mailshot was timed to end just 
about this period, but close enough so that the Christmas rush itself 
could be used as a prompter to hurry replies (see the wording in 
exhibit 1 , Appendix C ) and also salutations could be offered as a prompter 
for replies in the second reminder (see the wording in exhibit 2 ,
Appendix c).
In fact there was evidence from the response to the second reminder that 
these salutations led to a greater response than might normally be 
expected. This could possibly be due to a more charitable nature at this 
time of year, or equally to a reluctance to receive any more reminders and 
so questionnaires were hurriedly returned ad lib.
(2) Concurrent Techniques
These are considered to be all the techniques contained within or peripheral 
to the original questionnaire.
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Questionnaire length
A priori thought would suggest that a short questionnaire will elicit
19a higher response rate than a long one. The existing evidence suggests
that this is not the case empirically ie there is often no relation
between length of questionnaire and response rate. The current research
covered five company areas in as much depth as possible, this meant that
the questionnaire was long (ll sides of A4)*. However, although as 
20Hoinville suggests a self-completion questionnaire of more than 8 to 
10 sides of Ah will put off a sizeable proportion of the population, he 
suggests that "This need not be so, however, when a sample is made up 
of people with a special interest in the subject or with a high 
standard of literacy". Most of the small businessmen had a specific 
interest in techniques like corporate planning that act to improve 
their company's performance and so were keen to receive a summary of 
the research findings.
Survey Sponsorship
In surveys sent to commercial firms many writers suggest placing
emphasis on official sponsorship when possible, in order to establish
. , . 21 authenticity and mutual respect. Brunner and Carrol* found that university
sponsorship had a significant advantage over commercial sponsorship.
Hence, the cover letter**-was headed ‘University of Surrey’ and to add
more authenticity - ’Department of Economics'. It was additionally
stressed in the cover letter that the research was university based
and not commercially sponsored, lest the latter invoked advances of
industrial espionage. Similarly, the University of Surrey heading was
printed on the opening face of the survey report to add to the impact.
Return Envelopes 
22Dillman has suggested that decreasing the cost of reply to the respondent
is one way of inducing response. It is accepted courtesy to include a
23reply-paid envelope and the only research in the field to test the effect 
suggests it is a significant factor in increasing response. Hence, a 
reply-paid envelope was enclosed with the initial mailshot and a further 
reply-paid envelope was included in the second reminder.
*The Questionnaire appears in full at Appendix D , exhibit 2
**The cover letter appears at Appendix D s exhibit 1 .
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Cost restricted postage to a second class rate. This took the form of a
franked stamp with University of Surrey title. There appears to be
24evidence in the research that stamps, especially multiple ones, have a 
significant advantage over franking machines in increasing response rates. 
However, in terms of eventual cost and ease of administration (the complete 
mailshot of 3»200 companies was carried out by the researcher without 
assistance - such was the shortage of funds), the franking machine was 
chosen,
Personalization
The effects of personalizing a mailing on response rates are generally 
25inconclusive . The current mailshot included as much personalization 
as was possible, on the assumption that the research would then be more 
closely associated with the researcher himself rather than any commercial 
sponsor, which may jeopardize response through fear of loss of confidentiality 
and advances of industrial espionage. Each letter in the original mailshot 
and each reminder was personally signed by the researcher in blue ink to 
contrast with the black type on white background. In every case possible 
the letter was addressed to the company chairman or managing director in 
person and his name handwritten on the cover letter.
Cover Letter (At Appendix D )
26Berdie-and Anderson stress that the cover letter should be:
1. Short and to the point;
2. Professional and appealing;
3. Explain what the research is all about., 'who is conducting it and why;
4. Stress the inclusion of a reply-paid response.
The cover letter in the current research attempted to entertain all these 
suggestions. It was short (one side of A4)» describing why the research 
was being carried out (for a doctoral dissertation) and who was carrying 
the research out. It was attractively printed using off-set type in black 
on a white background. It not only stressed the inclusion of a reply-paid 
envelope and response, but also contained the telephone number of the 
researcher should any queries be forthcoming. About 100 companies (3.3%
Postage
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of the sample), used.this facility. The cover letter stressed the need for 
the respondent’s help in completing a piece of work that had been ongoing 
for two years previously. In addition, it contained a recognition of the 
respondent’s valuable time and the veiled threat that this may be imposed 
upon again with reminder letters. It was also stressed that some response 
was better than none at-all in an attempt to emphasise the importance of 
the respondent to the survey. Many Government forms that hinder small 
company efficiency are of such complexity and contain much'memory testing 
criteria as to render their completion not only extremely time consuming, 
but are also hideously complicated - so much so, that this job is often 
delegated to the outside company accountant or consultant. It was stressed 
in this survey that the eventual benefit was to the particular company 
completing the survey and that the survey was simple to fill out - by 
merely circling numbers. Many businessmen wrote in reply that this survey 
request, although adding to an already overburdened collection of requests, 
was the most sensible and easy to fulfil.
Confidentiality
27The existing research on confidentiality is inconsistent with regard to 
the affect on response rates of anonymity. Businessmen, especially small 
businessmen, are continually wary of outside interference and so are 
reluctant to disclose information, be it confidential or otherwise, lest 
the taxman and his associates, or the company's competitors, should hold 
the information against them. The current research promised, not anonymity, 
as each questionnaire was pre-coded in order to cross-check the validity of 
replies, hut complete confidentiality. This was stressed in the cover 
letter and printed in heavy red block letters across the t.op right hand , 
corner of the questionnaire proper, (see Appendix D , exhibit 2 )
Size, Reproduction and Colour
28Dillman states that, ’’the respondent’s first exposure to-the look and 
feel of the questionnaire provides the first of several critical ..tests the 
questionnaire must pass”. The sight and touch of the questionnaire are of 
upmost importance in that they determine whether the respondent will
answer positively and seriously to a lengthy imposition on his time.
29Dillman suggests that the printing and size and shape of paper are 
critical. The size, he suggests, should be 8j” by 12-^ ". These dimensions
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were adopted in this research. The form, he suggests, is a booklet
folded in the middle and stapled - which was the form adopted in this
research.
30Berdie and Anderson suggest the questionnaire should be:-
1. Professional and appealing;
2. Printed using photo offset style on high quality paper. Both these 
suggestions were incorporated in the present research;
3. The choice of colours that are pleasing to the eye and most legible 
are:
(a) Black ink on white paper,
(b) Grass green ink on white paper,
(c) Lustre blue ink on white paper,
(d) Black ink on yellow paper.
(a) was used for the cover letter. (c) was used for the' questionnaire proper.
The lustre blue on white paper together with a photo offset type gave a 
professional appeal to the document. This was strengthened by the 
inclusion of a competent coding system designed not only for ease of 
completion hut for ease of coding and punching at a later date.
Rewards
31There is evidence in the research on mail surveys that rewards can
positively increase response rates especially if they are couched in
monetary terms. The latter was obviously not feasible with current resources
nor was it particularly desirable lest it should have connotations of
32industrial bribery. However, as Dillman indicates, rewards are crucial 
to the behaviour of a respondent and consequently his decision to reply.
With limited financial resources it was decided to design an incentive 
scheme around the results of the research. It was important to stress in 
the cover letter that the results were merely averages and no one company 
could he identified, lest this should jeopardize the incentive scheme.
It was decided to offer the companies a summary of the research results, 
with particular emphasis on the company responding (by regard to their 
industry). It was emphasised that companies may well benefit from knowing
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how many and what type of small companies plan ahead formally, the 
techniques they use and the policies they adopt. This was thought to 
he appealing to many managing directors/chairmen with an eye on their 
competitors.
The cover letter was devoted to stressing the incentive rather than 
exhaustively explaining the research and why it was being carried out,
33ie a strategy was adopted based on market research as depicted by Brann . 
This essentially consists of projecting a professional image whilst 
attracting attention, prolonging attention, promoting desire and action 
through incentive and ensuring retention through reminders. This approach 
was intended to retain the selling nature of an industrial direct mailshot 
without the ’gimmickry,’ whilst retaining the principles fundamental to the 
art of mail survey design as practised by social scientists.
Deadline Dates
34Houston and Ford have criticized many mail survey researchers for being 
preoccupied with response rate alone, when what is also important is 
response speed and response quality (measured by completeness of question­
naire and errors in response). They argue that response.speed is important 
because time lags can be costly. Further, they allow external factors time 
to influence a respondent's reply.
The dominant procedure for increasing response speed has been personalization
of the cover letter. However, the research results are mixed as to the
35effectiveness of this approach. Dillman and Frey indicate a slight
improvement in response speed by use of personalized cover letter (as much
personalization as possible, under resource constraints, was used in the
cover letter), but Cox, Anderton and Fulcher^ find no difference between
speed of response of subjects receiving personalized or non-personalized
37cover letters. Additional research results on personalization and response
38speed are similarly mixed.- Advance notice by phone has been found to 
substantially increase response speed. This was ruled out on cost grounds 
in this instance.
39Houston and Ford suggest "an intuitively appealing device for enhancing 
response speed is the specification in the cover letter of a deadline date 
for returning the questionnaire". This date may well lead respondents to . 
associate
a greater urgency with the research and so reply accordingly. Although 
40existing research is mixed as to whether this is the case empirically, 
it was decided to include a deadline date of seventeen days after posting 
(and so allowing fourteen days after receipt to complete). This date was 
stamped upon the questionnaire and not the cover letter. The reasoning 
here being that the cover letter, as it is separate from the questionnaire 
proper, is apt to he disposed of. The questionnaire is the essential 
document and the deadline will always he present upon it whilst in the 
potential respondent's possession. But there are hazards with this 
approach - many companies, after receiving reminders, claimed that they 
had disposed of the forms after the deadline date presuming them to he 
of no further use. It was then necessary, at additional expense, to send 
further forms to these companies.
41Scott , in probably the most systematic and creditable study of mail
surveys in the United Kingdom, claimed that attaching a colourful sticker
'Immediate* on the questionnaire significantly improved response speed.
In this research, rather than clutter the questionnaire with 'confidential',
'University of Surrey' together with instructions and an example, it was
considered.better etiquette to include the coloured sticker 'Urgent'(red letters
on white) on the first and second reminders. This indeed had an impact on
the respondent, hut its effect was complicated by the adverse impact on many
respondents of the wording of the first reminder postcard (see Appendix C )
42which was taken from Hoinville . . Although efforts were made in the second 
reminder to alleviate the effects of that wording much of the damage had 
already, been done. This is seen as probably the greatest loss of this mail 
survey in achieving a much higher response rate.
Another effort to increase speed of response was the veiled threat included 
in the cover letter of 'further reminders'. However, the effect of all the 
measures included so far to increase response rate and response speed were 
not controlled for due to priority of the research in reporting the results 
for economics rather than sociology In addition^the revenue and time
restrictions added t o  th e  burden .
Questioimaire v Survey
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Previous work by the researcher in small companies indicated that the very 
sound of the word questionnaire does not ring true in the ears of many small
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company directors. It sings of Government and taxation circulars, having 
to take time to understand the questions, having to look and search for 
answers, of time wasting and imposition. Hence, all the documentation used 
in this research contained the word ’survey* which dilutes the above 
connotations to an extent and is easier on the ear. The two words are 
used interchangeably in' the thesis text.
A Note concerning Response Quality
The third important measure in designing a questionnaire suggested by Houston j
43and Ford is response quality - as measured by item omission and errors in 
replies. However, the reported research in this field is thin. Further,
ithere appears to be some inconsistency in the measurement of item omission vhichi 
renders comparisons of the existing research impossible. The only favourable 
influences on item omission have been identified as advance notice by phone 
(Kerin‘S) and monetary gifts (Wotruba^). However, both of these induce­
ments were financially impossible in the current research. Emphasis was
Ithus placed on incentive to respond, creating a willingness and interest to !
reply. Further, clear instructions and unambiguous questions together with 
an absence of memory questions or questions requiring research on the part 
of the respondent were given great care and attention in the hope of reducing 
item omission. <
46Reported research is similarly thin and inconclusive concerning errors in
replies. The only variable offering a potential increase in reducing errors
was the offer of compensation, although this research was directed to diary
47studies of consumer expenditures rather than mail surveys . The current 
research offered compensation in the form of a summary of-results relative 
to the respondent company.
Hence, instead of merely concentrating on efforts to increase the response 
rate, efforts were also made to increase two other variables considered to 
be important by social scientists in assessing the validity of mail surveys - 
response speed and response error.
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The following seven-point strategy was adopted in formulating the 
questionnaire as a viable test instrument:
(i) Read all the pertinent literature.
(il) Talk to Experts.
(ill) Conduct the exploratory research with those who are potential 
survey respondents.
(iV). Draft the questionnaire in the light of
1. (i), (II) and (ill) above
2. The principles of questionnaire design that are applicable.
(v) Pre-test the questionnaire.
(Vi) Re-draft the questionnaire from (v).
Cvil) Pre-test any substantial revisions.
(i), (II) and (III)
t
A collection of relevant literature studies appears in the bibliography to 
this chapter. The experts who checked the formulation of the questionnaire 
and suggested revisions of certain question wordings .and construction were 
lecturers in research methods in the Department of Sociology, University of 
Surrey, Guildford. The likely embarrassing, political or questions requiring 
further research by the respondent, were identified in the twelve month 
period working with small companies prior to the initial mailing. All of 
these companies eventually offered suggestions for improving the questionnaire.
(iV) Principles of questionnaire design*
General design
The questionnaire was divided into six categories referring to basic functional 
aspects of small company operations. The question form adopted was the 
multiple-choice type for the reasons that it is easier to handle, the simplest 
type to answer- and it lends itself more amenably to statistical analysis.
Because the questionnaire is long and small business time is short, the 
method of circling numbers*- although it has the disadvantage of putting 
words into people's mouths - is simpler and quicker for the respondent. In
*Page numbers in this section refer to the pages of the questionnaire 
at Appendix D , exhibit 2 , .
**See the_ example at Appendix E.
3.3*2  S tru c tu re  and W ording o f the  Q u e s tio n n a ire
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addition, by placing tlie numbers in columns on the right hand side of 
the page it becomes infinitely quicker to punch the computer cards directly 
from the questionnaires. In a survey desperate for time and money this is 
a most useful design.
Following more general-principles of questionnaire design a set of
instructions and a completed example appeared on the opening face of the
booklet. The instructions followed the principles of clarity and simplicity. 
48Hoinville has suggested two important tactics for maximising the chances 
of co-operation, in mail surveys. They are:'
1 . Include questions likely to he of a high interest to all recipients.
2. Ensure that earlier questions do not give respondents the impression
that the study is not applicable to them.
Under 1., it was necessary to create an interest in the survey by asking 
questions on each of several functional areas. This leads unconsciously to 
a chief executive having probably the first objective look at his company 
for a long time. There was evidence in many of the responses that small 
businessmen claimed they had been made to think hard about the future of 
their companies from filling in the survey and were eager to find out what 
similar companies were doing with regard to the use of techniques and formal 
planning. Under 2., it was important to include the views of both formal 
and informal planning type-companies. Hence the planning section was placed 
towards the end and split into two appendices - one for formal and one for 
informal planning companies. Simple and clear instructions were given 
(page 7, exhibit 2 , Appendix D ) and worded in such a way that' the informal 
planning companies were assured that their results were very valuable to 
the study, lest they felt they had little contribution to make (page 9, 
exhibit 2 , Appendix D ). It should he noted at this stage that the 
questions in each Appendix were made as similar as possible for comparison 
purposes - hut sometimes re-worded and in different orders to conceal the 
repetition. In addition, the two Appendices were designed to be of roughly 
equal length, so that a respondent would not opt for the shorter and less 
complicated one.
Attitude questions were considered to be extremely important to the research 
study, to guage the opinion of small firm managers on various aspects of 
formal planning. However, they were also used to create interest in the
^Definitions of these planning types appear in Chapter 3, p. 129
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survey for respondents who were able to express their feelings openly on 
this topic. These questions were left open-ended and placed towards the 
end of the booklet where it was felt interest may well he starting to fade.
49Hoinville suggests seven conventions that make for a high quality 
questionnaire and a high level of response.
1 . Questionnaires are type-set and colour printing is used to distinguish
instructions, questions and filtering. In the current survey as much 
professionalism was included as could be afforded. Type-setting and 
3/4 way colour printing excluded themselves from the budget.
2. Follow clarity in answering questions ie ringing codes or ticking
boxes. Hoinville argues that ticking boxes is preferential to ringing 
codes because respondents associate code numbers with inner meanings. 
However in this research the ringing of codes was considered far more 
profitable in terms of simplicity and speed of reply for the respondent. 
Further, little confusion over inner meanings could arise as the code
numbers were all defined in the text to avoid ambiguity.
3. Use sub-lettering eg Q4 a), b), c), d), in a long questionnaire as
high question numbers may deter a recipient who looks at the back page 
and sees Q220. In the present questionnaire, the question numbers were 
limited in maxima to the section concerned ie the highest question 
number in a section was Q13 in Section V, Appendix A (see page 9»
Exhibit 2, Appendix D). Further, sub-lettering was used within 
sections to further reduce the aggregate question number (eg see Q1 , 
Section Y, Appendix A on page 7 of the questionnaire at Appendix D).
4. Self-completion questionnaires need to include explicit instructions 
and to repeat them as necessary. This is because no .interviewer is 
present to guide the respondent, who is essentially acting as an 
untrained and inexperienced interviewer himself. This procedure was 
followed on pages 1, 7 and 9 of the questionnaire (at Appendix D ).
5. As questionnaire completion is a learning process with which the
respondent will become increasingly at ease as he proceeds, the more
difficult questions should come at the middle or at the end. On these
50 .grounds Berdie and Anderson have emphasised, that the beginning 
of a questionnaire is all important. The questions here are likely to 
be read by the recipient and on the basis of them he will guage 
whether or not he will reply. Hence the simplest questions must be 
placed here. This procedure was followed explicitly in the present
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research - none of the questions in Section I of the questionnaire 
require any more than a very general knowledge of the respondent's 
own company. Further as the questionnaire develops through the 
section on management structure, into the sections on strategy and 
business operation the questions become moderately more specialised.
As Section V on company planning is encountered the questions do not 
become particularly difficult for a chief executive but require thought. 
The questions in the final Section VI are confidential and are 
deliberately placed at the end of the questionnaire lest the 
respondent encounter them earlier and become reluctant to disclose 
any such financial information and hence discard the form there and 
then.
51 ... . . .Dillman has criticized questionnaire designers for not paying adequate
attention to question ordering. The importance of a flow or logical 
following on of questions, such that each question is associated with its
predecessor and successor and similarly for each section, has also been
52 53emphasised by other writers , not least of all Claus Moser . Moser
suggests that the order of questions cannot only affect the response rate,
but there is plenty of evidence that it also influences the answers obtained.
Hence, particular attention was paid to the ordering of both questions
and sections in the current research. The survey begins with general
questions in Section I leading into family involvement in management.
Question 7» Section I is the link question into Section'll on management
structure, which ends with a question (Q12, page 4 of the questionnaire
at Appendix D ) on company policy. This is the link question to Section III
on strategy and competition. .Section IV on business operation begins with
questions that require only general knowledge and ends with questions
requiring some thought on length of credit period and poor debtors
(Q7 and +8, page 5/6). The planning Section V is designed to flow
continuously into either Appendix A (formal) or Appendix B (informal).
The confidential section appears as more of an appendix itself at the end.
Although it is almost practically impossible to design an exhaustive
questionnaire covering several different functional areas in depth to
include a continuous flow of logic throughout, serious attempts were made
to link the sections contained within the survey. The end product was
more a logical step procedure, rather than a logical stream.
6. It is useful to include some notes at the end of a self-completed 
questionnaire eg an invitation to comment on the subject of the 
study, a message of thanks. Both these were included at the end of the
llO.'l
questionnaire, together with the researcher’s name and telephone 
number should any queries arise. The open-ended question permitting 
the respondent to comment on small company planning (page 11) was 
deliberately placed at the very end of the questionnaire and not in the 
planning section because the residual of page 11 and the adjacent back 
cover of the questionnaire were blank. This facilitated an unrestricted 
reply from respondents - giving them more ’white space* to add their 
comments, and avoids the habit of many respondents who are apt to 
scribble comments across the whole of the questionnaire, or anywhere on 
it they can. This often leads to illegibility of answers and makes
editing and coding more difficult. Judging by the high percentage of
respondents (43%) who used the open-ended question at the end of the 
survey (page 11) and who commented at great length, its position would 
appear to be correct.
7. Finally, the wording in self-completion surveys is more crucial than 
in any other form of data collection, since there is no intermediary 
between researcher and respondent to clarify ambiguities or explain 
intricacies. Hence, pre-tests are essential. These .were carried out 
in the current research, (see sections V, VI, VII, Chapter 3, p. 106)
Question Formulation
In order that the answer should he suitable for processing, the following
principles were adopted in the question formulation.
1. Accuracy. The aim was to ensure as much accuracy as possible in the
answers.
2. Uni-Dimensionality. The aim was to make sure the answers were 
comparable with regard to units of measurement (<£’000s).
3. Mutual-Bxclusiveness. The aim was to ensure the answers did not 
overlap and hence only necessary questions were asked.
4. Meaningfulness. The aim was that each answer should be unequivocal 
'in meaning.
5. Ensure Background Homogeneity - ie the question should mean the same 
to all recipients.
The question wording was also designed to meet standards of brevity, clarity,
simplicity and intelligibility (use of an easily understood language).
I l l
Serious efforts were made to avoid bias - (either by leading questions or 
loaded words ) and ambiguity. No questions were asked which either seriously 
taxed the respondent’s memory, or embarrassed his character (eg no questions 
were included on personal wealth or on his own personal life - perhaps the 
closest question here was on the age of the chief executive (Q5, page 3)?
hut this was arranged in age groups so he did not have to reveal his
specific age).
After the formulation and initial lay-out were complete the question content
and wording were examined using the principles and the check lists presented 
54in Paynes' classic work -"The Art of Asking Questions". The check lists 
are too lengthy to include here, but any prospective researcher is recommended 
to study this reference. Some of the more important points are outlined 
below:-
1. Be certain that the researcher understands the issue himself.
2. Ask of each question Who? Why? When? Where? How?
3. Control for consistency of answers by reversing the question wording.
This was practised for Q2, page 2.
eg 50fo of the questions were worded -
Is the turnover of your manual labour ...?
0 High 1 Medium 2 Low
and 5Q^ were worded -
Is the turnover of your manual labour ...?
0 Low 1 Medium 2 High
No difference was found ih the replies, indicating a degree of 
consistency in the answers.
4« It is possible to phrase a question to specify how many choices are 
required -
eg Which two or three of the following ...?
This was used in the current research - 
eg Q5, page 6; Q11, page 9; Q4, page 10.
5. Do not ask double-barrelled questions ie if two answers are required, 
ask two questions.
6. Ensure all words convey the meaning'you intend.
7. Do not use concept words -
eg Art, Business or Government.
8. Do not give your respondent any opportunity to show off with, for
example, qualification questions.
Note that the literature on small company planning had identified the 
educational background of the entrepreneur as a factor to be associated 
with formality of planning system.- It was deemed that asking a question 
about an educational background of an executive may well be embarrassing as 
well as giving him an opportunity to show off. Many small firm entrepreneurs 
have little or no education and it was mainly for this reason that the 
variable was omitted. However, in retrospect it could well have proved 
important.
(V), (vi), (VII) Pre-Testing
The questionnaire and letter of introduction was pre-tested with a sample of
fifteen companies local to Surrey county and known to the University* A
list of the participating companies is provided at Appendix F and due
acknowledgement offered. It is accepted that pre-testing a questionnaire
should essentially involve a random sub-sample of some 50 or more respondents
55in order to be of maximum value - see Eliot . However, resource constraints" 
and the necessity to achieve an in-depth feedback led to a more limited and 
so biased sample - but one known to the University, so co-operation was 
ensured.
The pre-test took place in April 1978, all the companies received prior 
notification by letter and all agreed to co-operate. Even after such care 
was taken in design, formulation and wording, the degree of discrepancies in 
the questionnaire soon came to light. The value of a pre-test cannot be 
under-estimated in any mail survey. The questionnaire underwent a small 
degree of transformation after the major flaws had been pointed out by the 
managing directors and chairmen involved.
The _major flaws lay in:
1. Question wording (obvious use of jargon by the researcher);
2. Questionnaire layout.
The transformations were later pre-tested by a sample of ten company directors 
in the Lancashire area. Only minor question ambiguities were traced. The 
process of pre-testing revealed:
1. The major flaws in the questionnaire;
* University of Surrey
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2. The generous extent of co-operation among small company managers who
were more than willing to assist in the questionnaire’s formulation;
3. The mistake made was not to pre-test the follow-up reminders at this
time. This would have saved confusion six months later and may well
have led to an increased response rate;
4. The value of persevering with the pre-test procedure (this procedure is
irrevocably recommended to further researchers).
3,4 SAMPLE
The population under consideration was small companies in UK manufacturing 
industry. The definition of small companies is as laid down in Chapter One, 
page
3.4.1 Sampling Frames
The search for a sampling frame was long and desperate. Essentially,s.a 
random sample of u.ipopulation would require a list of the complete population
containing enough information to enact a mail survey. If such a list exists
in the UK it defies tracking down. A number of research organizations were 
contacted (see list at Appendix G for their addresses) but yielded only 
marginal assistance. The best of these was the Industrial Market Research 
and Applied Research IFF Master File which includes details of 45,000 of 
the largest non-domestic establishments in Great Britain, but covers 
factories with fifty or more employees, offices and warehouses with twenty- 
five or more and shops with ten or more. This is not a truly representative 
file of small companies .and their Director referred the researcher to Dun 
and Bradstreet.
The Bolton Committee sampling frame in 1968 was compiled by the Government 
Statistical Office and attempts to access that frame via the researcher’s 
MP,(Arthur Davidson-Accrington^failed. However, the Central Statistical 
Office are aware*, at the time of writing,- of the inadequacy of their 
statistics to small company researchers. They are in the process of con­
structing a large sampling frame to be sold on commercial terms to potential 
researchers - either in card or machine tape form. Further researchers 
should take note. However, this facility was unavailable at the time of 
writing.
* see Erritt MJ and Stibbard PJ: ‘Industrial and Commercial Companies’ 
financial statistics’ available as a handout from the Central Statistical 
Office.
3.4.2 Trade Directories
Most researchers in sampling small companies almost inevitably end up with
5 6  5 7Dun and Bradstreet trade directories (see Schumann , Still'). These are 
probably the most flexible directories available for market research. The 
two directories that comprise Dun and Bradstreet's *Key British
Enterprises', Volumes One and Two, cover different samples of 11,000 companies 
each. Volume One contains information on the 11,000 most important companies 
in the UK, selected on a sales volume basis. Information concerning location, 
branches, products, directors, inaugural data, sales volume, number of 
employees, nominal and authorized capital and UK S.I.C. number is provided. 
More"pertinent to research in smaller and medium sized companies is 
Volume Two which provides similar information on another 11,000 companies, 
smaller in sales turnover than Volume One, but chosen for prominence in 
their own line of business.
The alternative to Dun and Bradstreet directories for UK company research 
are those providing similar information and released as Kompass, Volumes 
One and Two. These contain information on 27,000 companies, mainly larger 
ones and are biased towards those who are members of the Confederation of 
British Industry.
There are a large number of disadvantages of using trade directories for 
sampling and particularly for sampling small companies.
1. They are inherently biased - both with size, high performance, method 
of selection, members of employers’ federations;
2. They are incomplete representations of the total population;
3. Only the Dun and Bradstreet directory (Volume Two) provides immediate 
access to smaller companies, but depending on definition, they all 
need to be weeded out manually. Because of its organization on a 
geographic basis, this weeding process is far more complicated in
■the Kompass directories. Hence, they are time consuming, costly 
and inefficient.
3.4.3 Dun and Bradstreet’s Marketing Facts File
However, a further service - not widely used by academia - is frequently 
sold by Dun and Bradstreet to market research organizations. This service
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was recommended to the researcher by the Bank of England's Economic 
Intelligence Department. The Dun and Bradstreet service-comprises a UK 
computer file containing 200,000 companies (admittedly, owing to Dun and 
Bradstreet being essentially a credit collection agency, the sample is 
biased towards manufacturing companies and gives them a much more thorough 
coverage than other industries), which can be selected randomly by size, 
industry or geographic location. The system is called the Market Pacts 
Pile and provides substantial supplementary information on each company 
which includes the name of the key director, full postal address, 
telephone number, whether private or public company, general description 
of the companies' business, UK and US S.I.C. numbers, a unique company 
identification number, estimated annual turnover, number of employees and 
the year of company foundation or year of its incorporation as- a limited 
company. Output is available in tabular mailing lists, sales records cards 
(see exhibit 1 , Appendix H ), magnetic tape and microfiche.
This file has particular advantages over using directories -
1 . It is continuously updated (weekly), unlike the trade directories 
which are annual;
2. As Dun and Bradstreet are a credit agency, the file is not restricted 
to only high performing companies or members of employers' federations. 
All companies who come under' scrutiny are included. Hence, it is more 
comprehensive;
3. It is the largest sampling frame available over UK industry known to 
the researcher;
4. It has time advantages over sampling via directories. The service 
provided is automatic and highly efficient. The researcher is saved 
the time of searching and sampling incomplete and biased directories 
which can only be practically systematically sampled and not truly 
randomly sampled;
5. The researcher is provided with valuable ancilliary information, ready 
printed (see exhibit 1, Appendix H ). This not only saves considerable 
time and effort but facilitates in controlling the mailshot, promoting 
reminders and cross-validating respondent replies. '
For these reasons this facility was used in the current research.
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Due to resource limitations a sample of 3,000 companies was drawn at 
random from the Dun and Bradstreet computer file, across the following 
UK manufacturing sectors (gee Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Number of Firms in Each SIC Order in th'e Sampling Frame*
ORDER Number of firms in D & B file
III Food, Drink and Tobacco 3/933
V Chemicals and Allied Industries 3,225
VI Metal Manufacture 2,723
VII Mechanical Engineering 10,442
VIII Instrument Engineering 1,585
IX Electrical Engineering * 3,712
X Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 1,016
XI - Vehicles 1,718
XII Metal Goods not elsewhere specified 9,694
XIII Textiles 4,849
XIV Leather, Leather Goods and Fur 1,048
XV Clothing and Footwear 5,748
XVI Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement etc 2,453
XVII Timber, Furniture etc 6,366
XVIII Paper, Printing and Publishing 7,078
XIX Other Manufacturing Industries 3,167
3.4.4 Sample Size
.The minimum number of companies that can be sampled under the Dun and 
Bradstreet conditions is 3,000, at a cost of £300 (1978 price). Every
3,000 companies after that costs an additional £300.
The conditions for size selection are:-
1. 1-19 Employees
2. 20-49 Employees
3. 50-99 Employees
4. 100-499 Employees
5. 500-999 Employees
6. 1,000 plus Employees
* SOURCE: Dun and Bradstreet Market Facts File Data
■ The chosen range was 1-499 employees. A critical cut-off rate of 200 
employees may well jeopardize a study -concerned with growth and use of 
techniques and produce a rather rigid and static analysis of small firms 
up to a defined limit (200 employees)*. It would then he difficult to 
extrapolate the findings beyond that limit. The choice of size criteria 
here allows a more extensive field of analysis.
In addition to the S.I.C. Orders . selected in manufacturing, it was 
decided to examine the Construction Industry due to the profusion of small 
companies there and due to its role as a barometer for the national 
economy. However, the minimum possible number of cases (3,000) could only 
be taken across the manufacturing sector-(there is a discrepancy in the 
Dun and Bradstreet marketing Facts File that does not allow Construction 
to be included). To include Construction would have meant another sample 
of 3,000 and another £300. This was deemed unnecessary and so the 
following sampling procedure was adopted. • .
A list was drawn up from Volume Two of Dun and Bradstreet’s Key British 
Enterprises consisting of companies included in Order. 20 (contract Constr­
uction) and for reasons of compatability with the major sample of 3,000 
companies, the size criteria was 1-499 employees; 4 ;
/ . 58The method of selection was one of systematic sampling (see Moser , page
83) ie the number of companies on the list was counted (n) and divided by
the number of companies to be sampled (n) and the appropriate sampling
fraction (k) = - calculated. A number between 1 and K was selected at n :
random and this became the starting point for selection. After this 
company was selected, every Kth company afterwards was selected, the process 
being repeated around the list, continuing from the end of the list back'
to the beginning in a circular pattern, until K number of companies was
reached. (n) in this case was selected as 200 companies. The reason for
200 was that this was all that could be afforded out of the residual funds
once the large sample of 3,000 had been paid for - hence, it was the largest
possible random sample under contemporary financial constraints.
(Hr Eight companies with more than 200 employees entered the 200 sample
One Hundred and Twenty Five companies with more than 200 employees entered 
the 3000 sample.
The following points must be borne in mind when interpreting the results 
of this survey:
1 . The two samples, both of a random nature, are not strictly
comparable, because the Dun and Bradstreet Volume Two not only 
contains fewer companies than could be obtained using the computer 
facility, but also the companies are. biased towards ’prominence in 
their own field* and so are likely to have been,or are,high 
performers in the Construction field.
2. Systematic sampling is not strictly a random sampling procedure, 
as it does not give all possible samples of size (n) from a 
population of size N, an equal chance of selection ie once the 
sampling fraction is determined, the random selection of starting 
point determines the whole sample. Hence, the number of samples 
possible is far less than if a truly random sample was adopted.
Hence, the procedure adopted in the-present research of combining the 
two samples for analysis is in breach of the law so treasured by 
statistical sampling purists. The reasons for combination were entrenched 
in practicality ie those of limitations of sampling frames, cost, ease 
and economy of analysing. It is better to have some results based on as 
random a sampling procedure as possible, than reject the possibility of 
analysis due to a purist belief. '
.3*5 FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE FORMAT ( The question numbers'in this section refer
- ' to the mail survey.)
The questionnaire was split into six sections covering the functional areas 
of Company Type, Management Structure, Strategy and Competition, Business 
Operation and Company Planning. The latter section being split into two 
parts - an Appendix A for formal planning companies and Appendix B for 
informal planning companies. The literature not only pointed to the 
paucity of knowledge of both empirical corporate planning and small company 
operations, but also indicated a- conceptual framework, which may be useful 
when investigating small companies and corporate planning; Hence, the 
questionnaire included the company characteristics suggested by the 
literature in Chapter Two (Size, Type of Business, Area, Organisational 
Structure, Management Age and Training, etc); and also gathered as much 
additional information as was thought relevant to small company planning
operations.
Section One(exhibit 3.1)
Section One (Company Type), was designed as a non-taxing introduction to 
the survey for the respondent. All the questions require only general 
knowledge of company affairs and none encroach upon confidentiality. 
Questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 (i) have the additional advantage of verification 
from the Dun and Bradstreet Market Facts Cards (see Appendix H ); and 
so render an advance indication of respondent bias or inaccuracy. This 
Section collected company information on the following characteristics*:-
Type of Business (Q1)
Both the main business area as perceived by the respondent and that as 
recorded by Dun and Bradstreet information using four digit S.I.C. codings, 
was used to ascertain the business type the company was involved in.
This was considered an important condition in affecting the type of planning 
activity, as the literature had suggested that change, risk and amount of 
technical innovation required would be important conditions in considering 
the adoption of a formal planning procedure. This relationship was examined 
in the research and differences within and between industrial sectors 
recorded.
Age of the Company (Q2)
This variable was thought to influence planning activity, in that new comp­
anies are more likely to he small and with no immediate consideration of 
formality as yet. * The relation was tested in the research.
Type of Company (Q4, 5(i)»- 5(ii) )
The literature has illustrated that the adoption of corporate planning in 
the UK manifested itself largely in subsidiary companies of foreign 
parenthood. Hence the relation was tested in this research, to either 
confirm or reject that finding. Also the business area of the holding 
company was established, so as to determine whether the subsidiary was a 
diversified unit, or part of a vertically integrated framework.
Company Control and Nepotism (Q6(i), 6(ii) and 7)
The literature identified the debate concerning the efficiency of family 
controlled companies. This question seeks the identity of the body of
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E X H I B I T  - 3 , 1 ...............S ec tio n  One
i
S E C T IO N  I  C o m p a n y  T y p e
1 . W h a t  i s  t h e  m a i n  b u s i n e s s  a r e a  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  ( s p e c i f y  m a i n  a c t i v i t y .................................................. }
1  R e t a i l i n g  5 R o a d  T r a n s p o r t
2  C o n s t r u c t i o n  6 W h o l e s a l e
3  H o t e l  a n d  C a t e r i n g  7  S e r v i c e  c o m p a n y  -
4  M o t o r  T r a d e  6 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ................... ) 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 . H ow  l o n g  h a s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  b e e n  t r a d i n g ?
0  0 - 5  y e a r s  4  2 1 - 2 5  y e a r s
1  6 - 1 0  y e a r s  5 2 6 - 3 0  y e a r s
2  1 1 - 1 5  y e a r s  6 3 1 - 4 0  y e a r s
3 1 6 - 2 0  y e a r s  7  4 0  p l u s  y e a r s  2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3 . W h a t  i s  y o u r  o w n  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  c o m p a n y ?
4 .
O B o t h " '''* "1 c ' l a J-r r a a n  3  F i n a n c i a l  M a n a g e r  
" ■ " - 2  M a n a g i n g  D i r e c t o r  4  M a r k e t i n g  M a n a g e r
5  C o m p a n y  S e c r e t a r y  3
6 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ................... )
I s  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  A l i m i t e d  c o m p a n y  2  A p a r t n e r s h i p
1 A n  u n l i m i t e d  c o m p a n y  3  A s o l  e - p r o p r i e t o r s h i p  4
0
0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4 5 6
5 . ( i )  I s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  a  s u b s i d i a r y  o f  a n o t h e r  l i m i t e d  c o m p a n y ?
0  Y e s
1 N o 5 0 1
( i i )  I f  Y e s ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  m a i n  b u s i n e s s  a r e a  o f  y o u r  h o l d i n g  
c o m p a n y ?
0  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  5 R o a d  T r a n s p o r t
1 R e t a i l i n g  6 W h o l e s a l e
2  C o n s t r u c t i o n  > 7  S e r v i c e  C o m p a n y
3 H o t e l  & C a t e r i n g  8 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ...................... )
4 M o t o r  T r a d e  9  P u r e l y  H o l d i n g  C o m p a n y  6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 c
6. ( i )  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n t r o l  y o u r  c o m p a n y ? ■
0  F a m i l y  m e m b e r s  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o m p a n y
1 F a m i l y  m e m b e r s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o m p a n y
2 S h a r e h o l d e r s  n o t  d i r e c t l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o m p a n y
3 D i r e c t o r s  a c t i v e l y  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o m p a n y
4 P a r t n e r s h i p
5 E m p l o y e e s
6 O t h e r
7  C o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  ( s p e c i f y ............. ................................ ) 7-8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
( i i )  I f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  i s  f a m i l y  c o n t r o l l e d  i s  i t ?
0  F i r s t  g e n e r a t i o n
1 S e c o n d  g e n e r a t i o n
2  T h i r d  g e n e r a t i o n
3 M o r e  9 0 1 2 3
7 . H ow  m a n y  f a m i l y  m e m b e r s  a r e  e m p l o y e d  i n  m a n a g e r i a l  p o s t s ?
0  N o n e  5 r i v e
1  O n e  6 S i x
2  T w o  7 s e v e n
3 T h r e e  q M o re  ( s p e c i f y  .........................)
A F o u r  10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
NOTE: The research survey is essentially concerned with the way that small 
businessmen perceive events and activities in their world. It looks 
at the world through the eyes of the entrepreneur. However, this 
approach can lead to a bias in the responses to the survey as a 
whole and to certain questions in particular. The latter are the 
attitude or opinion seeking questions listed below;
+i.e. Section II of the Survey at Appendix D, Q’s. 2i & ii, Q3.
Section IV of the Survey at Appendix D, Q5ii.
These questions are marked in the text to remind the reader of this warning.
.It is possible that many small 'businessmen want to provide the answer that
gives a good account of his companys’ activities i.e. the answer he wants 
the interviewer^to hear rather than what actually happens in his company.
E.g. Section II, Q2i. had 60% of firms claiming to have a low turnover 
of manual labour. The small firm man may want the interviewer to think 
his labour turnover is low. On 'a priori’ grounds it is plausible to assume 
that labour turnover in small firms will be low, but the issue of bias still 
exists in the responses hence they should be treated with caution.
A further instance where the role of perception may have coloured the replies 
is the instance drawn to the readers attention on p.l4, where the answers to 
the question on formality produce a startling 23% of firms ’claiming’formality 
below 10 employees - this and other dubious claims must be treated with caution 
in the light of the above expla nation. Always bear in mind it is the way the 
; small firm men percieve events that is central to the research.
See tables 5*3.5> 5«3.6, 5-3.7> 5*3.13f
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people controlling the company. There may appear ambiguity here, as 
ownership and control often become divorced as company size increases; 
and at the larger end of the small firm scale this may well have occurred. 
However, this research primarily concerns the view of small company 
managers - who they see as controlling the company - the family? The 
shareholders? To whom are they answerable? The extent of family control 
is gauged from Q6(ii); and the extent of nepotism from Q7, in conjunction 
with Q7 Section Two.
Section Two (exhibits 3 .2 .1  and 3 . 2 . 2 )
Organisational Structure (Q7, Q1, QJ3, Appendix A)*
The research tried to establish the type of structure present in the company, 
by assessing the number of managers, the number of levels of management and 
the extent of nepotism. It also gave the chief executive an opportunity to 
reflect on whether the adoption of formal corporate planning had changed 
the existing management structure. The relationship between these conditions 
and type of planning activity were examined during the analysis stage.
*+■ -V- -+
Employee Stability (Q2(i), (ii), Q3 and Q10)
It was thought pertinent that the- stability of a company’s managerial and 
manual employees be important in determining the type of planning activity 
adopted. This may manifest itself in a number of ways -
1 . Where union activity -and/or strike activity is rampant in a companyj 
this may affect continuity'of the transformation process and lend it 
incompatible to formal planning;
2. A company with long serving managers and a chief, executive of senior 
age may well reflect a company hardened to change and adoption of new 
management techniques;
3. A persistent turnover of both managerial and manual labour, is often
a symptom of a more fundamental problem prevailing within the company.
A priori thought would suggest that a company plagued by high labour 
turnover and/or intrinsic problems eg conflict, may well be incompatible 
with formal planning procedures.
See n ote  on fa c in g  page.
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E X H I B I T  3 . 2 . 1  ...............S ec tio n  Two
S E C T IO N  IX  M a n a g e m e n t  S t r u c t u r e
1.
2.
3 .
4 .
H ow  m a n y  l e v e l s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t ,  i n c l u d i n g  f o r e m a n  a n d  u p w a r d s ,  
a r e  t h e r e  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  N o n e
1 O n e
2  T w o
3 T h r o e
4  F o u r
5  F i v e
6 M o r e  ( s p e c i f y  > . . )
( i )  I s  t h e  t u r n o v e r  o f  y o u r  m a n u a l  l a b o u r ?
2  l o w  1  M e d iu m  0  H i g h
( i i )  t h e  t u r n o v e r  o f  y o u r  c l e r i c a l  a n d  m a n a g e r i a l  l a b o u r ?  
2  L o w  l  M e d iu m  O H i g h
I s  t h e  m a n u a l  l a b o u r  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  E n t i r e l y  u n i o n i s e d  1 T a r t l y  u n i o n i s e d  2 N o t  a t  a l l
u n i o n i s e d
( i )  I s  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  t h e  f o u n d e r ?
0 Y e s 1 H o
S.
6.
( i i )  I f  N o ,  i s  t h e  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  a  m e m b e r  
o f  t h e  f o u n d e r ' s  f a m i l y ?
O Y e s  1 N o
W h a t  i s  t h e  a g e  g r o u p  o f  y o u r  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e ?
c
Y e a r s  U n d e r  3 0  3 0 - 3 9  4 0 -4 * + ijO-59 f'0+
D o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r ; ;  r e s t r i c t  t h e  p l a n n i n g  o f  a  
r e p l a c e m e n t  f o r  y o u r  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  o n  r e t i r e m e n t ?
0  N o t  c o n s i d e r e d  r e p l a c e m e n t  y e t
1  D i f f i c u l t y  o f  c h o o s i n g  b e t w e e n  c a n d i d a t e s
2 C a p i t a l  T r a n s f e r  " T a x
3 F i n d i n g  a  c a n d i d a t e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  a b i l i t y
4 N o  s u c c e s s o r  p l a n n e d  a t  a l l
5  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ............................................................. . . . . . )
6 N o n e
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7 . H ow  m a n y  m a n a g e r i a l  p o s t s  a r e  t h e r e ,  i n c l u d i n g  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  
i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  O n e  p o s t
1  T w o  p o s t s
2  T h r e e  p o s t s
3  F o u r  p o s t s
4  F i v e  p o s t s
5  S i x  p o s t s
6 M o r e  ( s p e c i f y  )
20
( i )  H a v e  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  m a n a g e r s  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  U n d e r t a k e n  m a n a g e m e n t  t r a i n i n g  i n  a n o t h e r  c o m p a n y
1  U n d e r t a k e n  m a n a g e m e n t  t r a i n i n g  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y
2 U n d e r t a k e n  m a n a g e m e n t  t r a i n i n g  a t  U n i v e r s i t y / C o l l e g e
3 H a d  n o  f o r m a l  m a n a g e m e n t  t r a i n i n g  20/21
( i i )  I s  e x t e r n a l  m a n a g e m e n t  t r a i n i n g  p r o v i d e d  b y  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  Y e s  1  N o  22
W h a t  i s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  m a n a g e r s  i n  e a c h  a g e  g r o u p ?
Y e a r s  U n d e r  3 0  3 0 - 3 9  4 0 - 4 9  5 0 - 5 9  6 0 +
( P l e a s e  w r i t e  t h e  t o t a l  i n  t h e  b o x e s  a b o v e ) .
1 0 .  W h a t  i s  t h e  a v e r a g e  l e n g t h  o f  s e r v i c e  o f  y o u r  m a n a g e r i a l  s t a f f ?
I O " I  1 i 2 | 3 ! ~4 "|
Y e a r s  U n d e r  5  5 - 9  1 0 - 1 4  1 5 - 1 9  O v e r . 2 0
1 1 .  H ow  m a n y  m a n a g e r s  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y  p o s s e s s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ?
|------1
|________ ] P r o f e s s i o n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n J  D e g r e e
( P l e a s e  w r i t e  t o t a l  i n  b o x )
1 2 .  I s  i t  y o u r  c o m p a n y  p o l i c y  t o ?
0  C o n t i n u a l l y  s e a r c h  f o r  n e w  m a n a g e r s
1 R e c r u i t  m a n a g e r s  o n l y  w h e n  n e c e s s a r y
2  D e v e l o p  m a n a g e r s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o m p a n y
3  C o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  ( s p e c i f y  ...................
4  N o n e
The literature has suggested that this area is central to small company 
planning. The research attempted to find out whether a company had plans 
for chief executive succession and if not, why not? In addition, the 
research tried to establish company policy in relation to management 
development and replacement. The relation with planning modes was tested.
Management Age and Education (Q8(i), (ii), Q9 and Q11 )
These were thought to be important a priori conditions affecting the type 
of planning activity prevailing in the company, in- terms of willingness to 
adapt to new-style management techniques and indicate whether knowledge of 
them existed. Questions were asked on age and education of managers in the 
company; and on age of the chief executive. The relation between the above 
conditions and type of planning activity was examined in the research. •
Note that the research attempts to distinguish whether the company managers 
have themselves undergone formal management training and where* and also 
whether or not the company continues to provide external management training.
Section Three (exhibit 3,3)
Factors Affecting Small Company Operation and Strategy (Q1 and 2)
The research gave the chief executive an opportunity to state which factors 
had recently seriously affected the efficiency of his company. Further, 
the research tried to establish the type of strategy the company would adopt 
if sales markedly slackened off. Question Two is an adapted version of the 
Ansoff-type* growth sector components, well-trodden in marketing literature. 
This was an attempt to find out how closely actual small business strategies 
differ from academic outlines. Taken together, these two questions provide 
invaluable assistance in illustrating the major setbacks and strategies 
surrounding small business.
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•Management Succession (Q5, Q6 and Q12)
* See Ansoff HI: " Corporate Strategy ", Penguin ( Harmondsworth, 1968), p99.
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E X H I B I T  3 . 3  ........... .S e c tio n  Three
S E C T IO N  I I I  S t r a t e g y  a n d  C o m p e t i t i o n
1 . D u r i n g  1 9 7 6  a n d  1 9 7 7  w a s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  e f f i c i e n c y  g r o s s l y  
r e s t r i c t e d  b y  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ?
0  I l l n e s s  o f  k e y  e m p l o y e e s
1 P a y  l i m i t  c o n s t r a i n t s
2  S t a t e  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d u s t r i a l  E c o n o m y
3 S t r i k e s  w i t h i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y
4  C h e a p n e s s  o f  I m p o r t s
5  S t r i k e s  w i t h i n  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s
6 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  .................................................. .. ............................................. ) 2 5 /2 6 O 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 . I f  s a l e s  s l a c k e n  o f f ,  w h i c h  o n e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o l i c i e s  i s  
m o s t  e f f e c t i v e l y  e m p l o y e d  b y  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  T i g h t e n  u p  a n d  b e c o m e  m o r e  e f f i c i e n t  i n t e r n a l l y
1  P e n e t r a t e  y o u r  e x i s t i n g  UK m a r k e t  a s  f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e
2  D e v e l o p  n e w  m a r k e t s  i n  UK
3 D e v e l o p  n e w  m a r k e t s  a b r o a d
4  D i v e r s i f y  y o u r  o p e r a t i o n s
5  D e v e l o p  n e w  p r o d u c t s / s e r v i c e s  t o  r e p l a c e  e x i s t i n g  o n e s
6 C o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  ( s p e c i f y  ..................................................... )
7  N o n e 27 /2 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 r> 7
3 . W h a t  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  y o u r  t o t a l  s a l e s  g o e s  t o  y o u r  m a i n  c u s t o m e r
0  L e s s  t h a n  10%  1  1 0 - 2 5 %  2  2 5 - 5 0 %  3 5 0 - 7 5 %  4 O v e r  75% 29 0 1 2 3 4
4 . W h a t  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  y o u r  t o t a l  s a l e s  g o e s  t o  e x p o r t s
0  L e s s  t h a n  10%  1  1 0 - 2 5 %  2  2 5 - 5 0 %  3  5 0 - 7 5 %  4  O v e r  75%  
5  N o n e  a t  a l l 3 0 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 . W h e r e  d o e s  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  y o u r  c o m p e t i t i o n  c o m e  f r o m ?
0  L a r g e  f i r m s  i n  UK 1  M e d iu m  f i r m s  i n  UK 
2 S m a l l  f i r m s  i n  UK 3  F o r e i g n  p r o d u c t s / s e r v i c e s ( i m p o r t s ) 3 ! 0 1 2 3
6 . H ow  m a n y  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s  i n  t h e  UK a r e  s e r i o u s  c o m p e t i t i o n  t o  
y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  O n e  1  T w o  2 3 - 5 .  3  6 - 1 5  4 M o r e 32 0 1 2 3 4
126
Characteristics of Company Environment 
Sales (Q3 and Q4)
It was considered of prime importance to establish whether a company 
produces goods for one buyer or a variety of buyers. This was thought 
to influence type of planning activity due to the output in the former' 
situation, being to some extent predetermined and hence more amenable to 
a formal planning system. It was further considered that due to the 
uncertainty, economically and politically, of overseas markets that export 
orientated companies would he suited to a less formal planning approach. 
However, it could be argued that due to rigid deadline, dates in export 
contracts that such companies may have to adopt a more formal approach to 
planning - especially regarding production. This relation was examined in 
the current research.
Type and Degree of Competition (Q5 and Q6)
It was considered that this competition condition was central to an 
understanding of the companies* complex interface with the environment; and 
so may directly influence the type of planning activity chosen. Where 
competition is rife, formal planning may be essential to produce goods 
efficiently and punctually. Where competition is less active and pronounced, 
apathy and conservatism may set in, leading to a day to day planning 
horizon.
It was' also considered important for type of planning activity. Whether 
small companies in specific industrial categories were in direct competition 
with large firms - gap filling in the market, with other small firms - close 
to perfect competition - or to foreign companies (imports). These 
relationships were tested in the current research.
Section Four (exhibits 3.4.1 and 3.4.2)
' +
Finance (Ql(i), (ii); Q2(i), (ii); Q3; Q4; Q5(i)» (ii); Q6; Q7; Q8 and Q9)
The core of business operation is finance. Nowhere does this exhibit more 
truth than in small companie.s - Macmillan, Radcliffe, Bolton and now Wilson 
have stressed the importance of finance to small companies. But where they
'j- See note on p.l'Al
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E X H I B I T  3 . 4 . 1  . . . . . . . . . Sec t i on  Four
S E C T IO N  I V  B u s i n e s s  O p e r a t i o n
1 .  ( i )  D o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f i n a n c i a l  t e c h n i q u e s  h a p p e n  t o  b e
i n  a c t i v e  u s e  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?  3 3 /3 4
0  B u d g e t a r y  C o n t r o l  2  F i n a n c i a l  R a t i o  A n a l y s i s
1  C a s h  F l o w  A n a l y s i s  3  B r e a k - e v e n  A n a l y s i s
4 N o n e
0 1 2 3 4
1 ( i i )  D o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o p e r a t i o n a l  t e c h n i q u e s  h a p p e n  
t o  b e  i n  A c t i v e  u s e  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  I n v e n t o r y  C o n t r o l  2  W o r k  S t u d y  4  N o n e
1 Q u a l i t y  C o n t r o l  3 M e t h o d  S t u d y  3 5 /3 6
2 .  ( i )  O n  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  y o u r  d a y  t o  d a y  b o o k k e e p i n g
c a r r i e d  o u t ?
0  M a n u a l  L e d g e r  3  C o m p u t e r  
1 - E l e c t r o n i c  A c c o u n t i n g  M a c h i n e  4  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  . . . . . . )
2  P a r t l y  M a n u a l / P a r t l y  M a c h i n e  37
( i i )  I f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  b o o k k e e p i n g  i s  m o s t l y  m a n u a l ,  h a v e  a n y  o f  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r e v e n t e d  y o u  f r o m  u s i n g  a  m a c h i n e ?
0  C o s t  2  N o - o n e  t o  o p e r a t e  i t
1  N o  n e c e s s i t y  y e t  3  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ..................................................... ) 3 8
3 .  W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a d m i n i s t e r s  y o u r '  d a y  t o  d a y  b o o k k e e p i n g ?
0  Q u a l i f i e d  s e c r e t a r y  2  Q u a l i f i e d  a c c o u n t a n t '
1  U n q u a l i f i e d  s e c r e t a r y  3 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ........................ . . . „ )  39
O
0
0
c
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
4
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4 . W h ic h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  t h e  m a i n  
d a y  r u n n i n g  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
s o u r c e  o f  c a s h  f o r  d a y  t o
0  B a n k  o v e r d r a f t  2
1  L o a n  3
4
I n t e r n a l  f i n a n c e  
C r e d i t  f r o m  s u p p l i e r s  
O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ................................... )  4 0 0 I 2 J 4
5 . ( i )  W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m e t h o d s  
f i n a n c e  i t s  m a j o r  p u r c h a s e s ?
d o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  u s e  t o
0  H i r e  p u r c h a s e  3
1  L e a s e  p u r c h a s e  4
2 L e a s i n g  5
B a n k  l o a n  
O t h e r  l o a n  
O t h e r  s o u r c e
( s p e c i f y ............. ; ..................
4 1 /4 2
) O 1 2 3 4 5
( i i )  I s  f i n a n c e  f o r  m a j o r  p u r c h a s e s ?
0  D i f f i c u l t  t d  o b t a i n  2 E a s y  t o  o b t a i n
1  A v e r a g e  t o  o b t a i n
43 0 1 2
6 . W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  a p p r a i s a l  t e c h n i q u e s  i s  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  w h e n  a s s e s s i n g  n e w  p u r c h a s e s ?
0  D i s c o u n t e d  C a s h  F l o w  2  L e n g t h  o f  P a y b a c k  p e r i o d
1  I n t e r n a l  R a t e  o f  R e t u r n  3 N o n e 4 4 0 1 2 3
7 . O n a v e r a g e ,  h o w  l o n g  d i d  i t  t a k e  y o u  t o  r e c o v e r  a  d e b t  i n  t h e  
l a s t  y e a r ?
•
O O - I S  d a y s  1  1 5 - 3 0  2  3 0 - 3 5 3  4 5 - 6 0  4 M o r e 4 5 o 1 2 3 4 •
8. W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t o o k  l o n g e r t o  p a y ?
0  N a t i o n a l i z e d  i n d u s t r y
1  L a r g e  c o m p a n i e s
2 M e d iu m  c o m p a n i e s
3  S m a l l  c o m p a n i e s
4 G o v e r n m e n t
5 O v e r s e a s  b u y e r s
6 H o u s e h o l d e r s
7  A l l  t h e  s a m e  
0  N o n e 4 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0
9. W h i c h  TWO o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h a v e  b e e n  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h e  
r e c o v e r y  o f  d e b t ?
0  R e m i n d e r  l e t t e r s
1 S o l i c i t o r ' s  l e t t e r  
. 2 C a s h  d i s c o u n t s
3 L e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s
4 C r e d i t  c o l l e c t i o n  a g e n c y
5 I n v o i c e  d i s c o u n t i n g
6 I n t e r e s t  c h a r g e  o n  d e b t
7  F i r m  o f  f a c t o r s
8 O t h e r 47 -1 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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were concerned with assessing the market contribution in terms of 
accessibility and availability, this research also takes into account 
the internal financial operations of the company. In the literature chapter 
(two) it was suggested that the cost involved in formal corporate planning, 
may be more than most small companies can hear. Further, a formal 
planning activity requires a continual flow of accurate financial data - it 
was argued that many small companies do not possess such an intricate 
financial function. Hence it was necessary in this research to establish 
the type of accounting system in operation, who oversees the activity and 
whether they are formally qualified to do the job* The type of financial, 
operational and investment techniques used in the company were identified, 
together with the type of finance the company relies on for day to day 
running and for major purchases. All these variables help to identify the 
degree-of sophistication of a company's internal financial function and its 
control. The relationships were tested with type of planning activity.
In addition, questions were asked around the area of trade debtors, because 
the reason for many recent small company failures has been mis-management 
of the cash-flow. Plausible arguments have arisen accusing large companies 
of taking excessive trade credit from their smaller brothers. Hence, if a 
company is suffering from severe cash-flow restrictions, it is not likely, 
to be amenable to formal planning activities. The research tried to establish 
whether there was a problem in this area and tested the variables with type 
of planning mode adopted.
.Section Five(exhibits 3.5.1 and 3.5.2)
Characteristics of Company Planning
The literature has described two basic types of formalised planning systems - 
synoptic and incremental. This research must essentially collect information 
from businessmen of only average education, whose hatred of form-filling is 
only equalled by their feelings for their tax inspectors. They lack time, 
and have a multitude of other duties and activities to perform. Hence,, 
for reasons of simplicity and to induce maximum possible co-operation, the 
planning modes were defined as formal (synoptic, incremental and their mixes), 
and informal (reaction, intuition, rules of thumb ' ie no specific plans at 
all). For the same reasons,- neither type of planning mode was proposed as 
superior to the other and answers to both types were requested.
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-E X H I B  I  T 3 . 5 . 1 .S ec tion  F ive
1.
4 .
6.
7 .
S E C T IO N  V C o m p a n y  P l a n n i n g
D o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  h a p p e n  t o  p o s s e s s  s p e c i f i c  p l a n s  a h e a d  f o r  
a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e a s ?
0  P r o d u c t s
1  M a r k e t s
2  F i n a n c e
3  P e r s o n n e l
4  R e s e a r c h  & D e v e l o p m e n t
5  N o n e 50/51
A r e  t h e  a i m s  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y ?
0  A i m s  o f  y o u r  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e  4 A im s  o f  e m p l o y e e s
1  A im s  o f  s h a r e h o l d e r s  5 A im s  o f  h o l d i n g  c o m p a n y
2  A im s  o f  d i r e c t o r s  6  N o s p e c i f i c  a i m s
3 A im s  o f  f a m i l y  7  C o m b i n a t i o n
( s p e c i f y ................... ...
5 2 /5 3
A r e  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n t a i n e d  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y  a i m s ?
0  M a x i m i s e  s a l e s
1  M a x i m i s e  p r o f i t
2  M a x i m i s e  s a l e s  s u b j e c t  t o  
p r o f i t  c o n s t r a i n t
3  M a x i m i s e  s a t i s f a c t i o n
4  C o m p a n y  s u r v i v a l
5  W e l f a r e  o f  e m p l o y e e s
6 M a x i m i s e  g r o w t h  o f  s a l e s  -
7  M a x i m i s e  g r o w t h  o f  d i v i d e n d s
8 M a x i m i s e  g r o w t h  o f  a s s e t s
9  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ..................................)
54 -56
( r i n g  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  i f  a p p r o p r i a t e )
A r e  t h e s e  a i m s  w r i t t e n  d o w n  a s  f o r m a l  o b j e c t i v e s  t o  b e  o b t a i n e d ?
0  Y e s  1 N o - 5 7
W h i c h  t h r e e  o f . - t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e c e i v e  m o s t  a t t e n t i o n  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  L a b o u r  P r o b l e m s
1  M a r k e t i n g
2  P r o d u c t i o n
3 R e s e a r c h  & D e v e l o p m e n t
Which iwo of the above receive lcasl attention7 
Which two of the above requite more attention?
4 L i q u i d i t y  ( C a s h  f l o w )
5 C u s t o m e r s
6 S u p p l i e r s
7  P u r c h a s i n g
8 S t o c k s
9 None
6 1 -6 3 , 
6 4 -6 6  ,
58 -60
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E X H I B I T  3 . 5 . 2    S ec tio n  F ive  co n tinued
S .  D o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  t e c h n i q u e s  h a p p e n  t o  b e  i n  
A c t i v e  u s e  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
0  S i m u l a t i o n  4 C o m p u t e r  A s s i s t a n c e
1  N e t w o r k  A n a l y s i s  5  M a r k e t  R e s e a r c h
2  L i n e a r  P r o g r a m m i n g  6 O p e r a t i o n a l  R e s e a r c h
3  F o r e c a s t i n g  T e c h n i q u e s  7  N o n e
9 .  D o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  h a p p e n  t o  p o s s e s s  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ?
0  C o m p a n y  S a l e s  4  T o t a l  M a r k e t  s i z e  i n
1 C a s h  F l o w  y o u r  i n d u s t r y
2  T e c h n o l o g y  i n  y o u r  I n d u s t r y  5  W o r ld  E n e r g y  R e s o u r c e s
3  C o s t s  6 P r o f i t s  ( o n  S a l e s )
7  N o n e
F o r m a l  P l a n n i n g  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  s p e c i f i c  
o b j e c t i v e s ,  c a l c u l a t i n g  t a r g e t s  a n d  c o n c e i v i n g  d e t a i l e d  
s t r a t e g i e s  t o  o b t a i n  t h e s e .  T h e  w h o l e  p r o c e s s  i s  
c o n t i n u a l l y  m o n i t o r e d  b y  u s e  o f  a  s u i t a b l e  m a n a g e m e n t  
c o n t r o l  s y s t e m .
1 0 .  D o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  p l a n  a h e a d  i n  a  f o r m a l  w a y ?
0  Y e s  1  N o
( i )  I f  Y ES p l e a s e  a n s w e r  A p p e n d i x  A ,
( i i )  I f  NO a n d  y o u r  c o m p a n y  r e l i c s  e n t i r e l y  o n  e x p e r i e n c e  
a n d  i n t u i t i o n  f o r  p l a n n i n g  a h e a d  p l e a s e  c o m p l e t e  
A p p e n d i x  B
6 7 /6 8  0  1 2  3 4  5  6 7
6 9 /7 0  0  1 2  3 4 5  6  7
71 0 1
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The following characteristics were included in the survey, most of which 
are suggestions from the literature, the remainder being the researcher’s 
own additions (the latter are marked thus *)„
Both Planning Modes
Functional Areas (Q1, Q5, Q6, Q7)*
Questions were asked to all companies in an attempt to establish which 
functional areas they had specific plans for, those that received the 
most and the least attention and those that required more attention.
The relation with planning modes was tested.
Aims (Q2, Q3, Q4)
The research attempted to establish the content of the company’s aims, how 
many there were, and in what combination they were held. Were they written 
down formally, as suggested by many authors? Who determines them? Are they 
synonymous with the owner’s personal values and aspirations? All these 
relations were tested with planning mode.
Quality of Techniques (Q8 and Q9)
The type and combination of advanced management techniques was recorded, 
together with the type of forecasting in active use. This not only allowed 
the relation with planning mode to be tested, but also supplied an insight 
into the depth and sophistication of those small company formal planning 
procedures that do exist.
Appendix A (exhibits 3.5.3 and 3.5.4)
Formal Planning
(Many questions asked under this mode were also asked under the informal 
mode of Appendix B, but disguised and re-arranged so the two sections did 
not look identical and so prevent some managers from replying through 
confusion). The following characteristics were suggested in the literature 
as contributing significantly to an understanding of empirical corporate 
planning and were all included in the research. In addition, the variation
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E X H I B I T  3 . 5 . 3 Appendix A
A P PE N D IX  A
F o r  c o m p a n i e s  w h o  p l a n  a h e a d  F o r m a l l y
1 . ( i )  H ow  l o n g  h a s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  b e e n  d e v e l o p i n g  f o r m a l  p l a n s ?
0  o n e  y e a r  3 f i v e  t o  e i g h t  y e a r s
1  t w o  y e a r s  4 e i g h t  t o  f i f t e e n  y e a r s
2  t h r e e  t o  f i v e  y e a r s  5  m o r e 72 0 1 2 3 4 5
( i i )  H ow  m a n y  p e o p l e  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s ?
0  o n e  3 f o u r  6 s e v e n
1  t w o  4  f i v e  .7 e i g h t
2  t h r e e  5  s i x  8 m o r e 73 0 1 2 3 •1 5 6 7 0
( i i i )  W h a t  a r e  t h e i r  j o b  t i t l e s ?
0  C h i e f  E x e c u t i v e  4  A c c o u n t a n t
1  M a n a g i n g  D i r e c t o r  5  O u t s i d e  C o n s u l t a n t
2  F i n a n c i a l  M a n a g e r  » 6 P r o d u c t i o n  M a n a g e r
3  M a r k e t i n g  P i a n a g e r  7 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  . . . . . . . . . .
74 /7 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 f> 7
2 . H ow  l o n g  i s  t h e  p l a n  e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r ?
O o n e  y e a r  1 1 - 2  y e a r s  2 2 - 3  y e a r s  3 3 - 5  y e a r s  4 m o r e
7 6 /7 7
0 1 2 3 4
3 . H ow  m a n y  t i m e s  a  y e a r  d o  y o u  m e e t  t o  r e v i e w  t h e  p l a n  a n d  
p r o g r e s s  t o w a r d s  i t ?
O o n c e  1 t w i c e  2  t h r i c e  3  f o u r  t i m e s  
4  f i v e  t i m e s  5  s i x  t i m e s  6 m o r e ( s p e c i f y  . . . ) 7.8 o 1 2 3 4 r* r,
4 . W h i c h  TWO o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  w h e n  c h o o s i n g  
b e t w e e n  a l t e r n a t i v e  p l a n s ?
0  S a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  e m p l o y e e s  3  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( R e t u r n  o n
1  G r o w t h  o f  s a l e s  p o t e n t i a l  C a p i t a l  E m p l o y e d )
2  S p r e a d i n g  o f  r i s k  4  S a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  o w n e r ' s
p e r s o n a l  v a l u e s  & d e s i r e s ,
5  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ...................................)
79 -8 0
0 1 2 3 4 5
5 . I n  d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  p l a n ,  w h i c h  ONE o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d o e s  y o u r  
c o m p a n y  p u r s u e ? .
0  I d e n t i f y  s t r e n g t h s  o f  c o m p a n y  a n d  b u i l d  o n  t h e m
1 R e v i e w  m a r k e t  a n d  s e l e c t  l i k e l y  a r e a s  t o  p u r s u e
2  R e v i e w  c u s t o m e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  t r y  t o  f u l f i l  t h e m
3 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ........................................................... ................................. ........................
4  C o m b i n a t i o n  ( s p e c i f y  ................................................................................................... . . )  1-2 0 1 2 3 4
E X H I B I T  3 . 5 - 4   Appendix A continued
• 6 . W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  
p l a n ?
0  M a n a g e m e n t  t e c h n i q u e s  2  N o n e
1 E x p e r i e n c e  a n d  I n t u i t i o n  3 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ................... ... ) 3 6 l 2 3
7 . A r e  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o f  m a j o r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  d e v e l o p i n g  
y o u r  p l a n ?
0  S o c i a l  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  4 S t a t e  o f  S u p p l i e s
1  C u s t o m e r  N e e d s  5  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  F i n a n c e
2  C o r e i g n  C o m p e t i t i o n  6 P e r s o n n e l  P l a n n i n g
3  D o m e s t i c  C o m p e t i t i o n  • 7  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ............. .....................
0  N o n e
)
4-6 o l 2 3 4 5 6 7 0
8 . H a v e  y o u  f o u n d  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  o f  u s e  w h e n  d e v e l o p i n g  a  
c o r p o r a t e  ( f o r m a l )  p l a n ?
0  M a n a g e m e n t  C o n s u l t a n t s  2  O u t s i d e  A c c o u n t a n t s
1  U n i v e r s i t y  C o n s u l t a n t s  3  O u t s i d e  M a n a g e r s
4  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ................................... ) 7-8 0 l 2 3 4
9 . W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e v i e w  p r o c e s s e s  a r e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
y o u r  c o m p a n y  w h e n  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  t h e  p l a n ?
0  M o n t h l y  f i n a n c i a l  r e p o r t s
1  F i n a n c i a l  r a t i o  a n a l y s i s
2 A n a l y s i s  o f  c a s h  f l o w  p r e d i c t i o n s
3 A n a l y s i s  o f  s a l e s
4  A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r i a n c e  o f  b u d g e t s
5  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ......................................................................................................................... ...
6 N o n e
. )
9 -1 0 0 l 2 3 4 5 6
10 . D o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  h a p p e n  t o  p o s s e s s  a l t e r n a t i v e  p l a n s  f o r  
u n l i k e l y  s i t u a t i o n s  s h o u l d  t h e y  o c c u r ?
0  Y e s  1  N o I I 0 l
1 1 . W h ic h  TWO o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h a v e  b e n e f i t e d  t h e  m o s t  f r o m  
t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  f o r m a l  p l a n n i n g ?
0  I m p r o v e m e n t  o f  e m p l o y e e  c o n d i t i o n s
1  I n c r e a s e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( r e t u r n  o n  C a p i t a l  e m p l o y e d )
2  I n c r e a s e  s a l e s
3  I n c r e a s e  s i z e  o f  c o m p a n y
4 I n c r e a s e  p e r s o n n e l  m o t i v a t i o n
5 I n c r e a s e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  c o m p a n y 12 /1 3 0 l 2 3 4 5
1 2 . W h a t  i s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  b e n e f i t  f r o m  c o r p o r a t e  p l a n n i n g  i n  
y o u r  c o m p a n y ? .
( S p e c i f y  .......................................................................................................................................... . )
1 3 . H a s  c o r p o r a t e  p l a n n i n g  c h a n g e d  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
y o u r  c o m p a n y ?
O  Y e s  1  N o
I f  Y E S , c o u l d  y o u  b r i e f l y  m e n t i o n  h o w ...............................................................
14 0 l
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Length of existence of formal corporate planning in the company. (Q.ll)
* Length of planning horizon. (Q.2)
* Frequency of review process. (Q.3)
Type of review process (Feedback information). (Q.9)
Criteria for evaluating alternative plans. (Q.4)
Factors of importance in developing the plans. (Q.5)(Q.6)(Q.7)(Q.8) 
Existence of contingency planning. (Q.10)
Major benefits from formal planning.(Q.ll)
The major benefit from formal planning. (Q.12.)
^Tested between S.I.C. Orders.
Appendix B (exhibit 3.5.5)
Informal Planning
The following factors were recorded and those marked with an asterisk were 
tested for variation between S.I.C. Orders.
* Length of time horizon for thinking ahead. (Q.2)
Type of review process in operation. (Q.6)
Criteria for assessing company policy. (Q.3)
Important considerations for decision taking on the company's future.(Q.4) 
Type of strategy adopted. (Q.5)
In addition, information was collected to try and assess;
1. Whether the company had ever undertaken formal planning and if so, 
why it was discontinued; /Q.l(i)(ii)7
2. What factors, if any, prevent the company from adopting more formal 
planning procedures? (Q.7)
Section Six (exhibit 3.6)
Trusted Information
o f some o f these c o n d it io n s  between S . I . C .  Orders 'was te s te d .
The following questions were positioned at the end of the survey to protect
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A P PE N D IX  B
F o r  c o m p a n i e s  w i t h  n o  f o r m a l  p l a n n i n g
I f  y o u r  f i r m  r e l i e s  o n  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  i n t u i t i o n  f o r  t h i n k i n g  
a h e a d ,  p l e a s e  a n s w e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n s .  
Y o u r  a n s w e r s  h e r e  a r e  m o s t  v a l u a b l e .
1 . ( i )  H a s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  e v e r  t r i e d  f o r m a l  p l a n n i n g ?
O  Y e s  l  N o
( i i )  I f  Y E S , w h y  w a s  p r o c e d u r e  d i s c o n t i n u e d ?  ( s p e c i f y  b r i e f l y )
IS 0 1
2 . W h i c h  t i m e  h o r i z o n  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i s  m o s t  s e n s i b l e  f o r  
t h i n k i n g  a h e a d  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y ?  ’
0  1  y e a r  1  1 - 2  y e a r s  2  3 y e a r s  3  4 - 5  y e a r s  5  m o r e to O 1 2 3 4 5
3 . W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i n  y o u r  c o m p a n y  
p o l i c y ?
0  S a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  e m p l o y e e s
1  P r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( r e t u r n  o n  C a p i t a l  E m p l o y e d )
2  G r o w t h  o f  s a l e s
3  S a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  o w n e r ' s  v a l u e s  a n d  d e s i r e s
4  S p r e a d i n g  o f  r i s k
5  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  .................................................................................... )■
6 N o n e  ■ < 17/IK O 1 2 3 4 5 0
4 . W h i c h  TWO o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a r e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  w h e n  t a k i n g  
d e c i s i o n s  a b o u t  y o u r  c o m p a n y ' s  f u t u r e ?
0  S o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  5  A v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i n a n c e
1 D o m e s t i c  c o m p e t i t i o n  6 P e r s o n n e l  p l a n n i n g
2  F o r e i g n  c o m p e t i t i o n  7  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ............................... )
3  C u s t o m e r  n e e d s  8 N o n e
4 S t a t e  o f  s u p p l i e s 19-21 O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 R
5 . I n  d e v e l o p i n g  p l a n s  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e ,  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p o l i c i e s  d o e s  y o u r  c o m p a n y  e m p l o y ?
0  I d e n t i f y  t h e  s t r e n g t h s  o f  y o u r  c o m p a n y  & b u i l d  o n  t h e m
1  R e v i e w  t h e  m a r k e t  a n d  s e l e c t  l i k e l y  a r e a s
2  R e v i e w  c u s t o m e r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  t r y  t o  f u l f i l  t h e m
3 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ....................................................................... ........................................)
4 C o m b i n a t i o n  o f  a b o v e
5  N o n e 2 2 /2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5
6 . W h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i s  u s e d  t o  m o n i t o r  y o u r  c o m p a n y ' s  
p r o g r e s s ?
0  A c c o u n t a n t s  B a l a n c e  S h e e t
1 I n t e r n a l  A d v i c e
2  M o n t h l y  / Q u a r t e r l y  O p e r a t i n g  S t a t e m e n t
3 B a n k  M a n a g e r ' s  A d v i c e
4 O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ................................................................................................ ............... )
5  N o n e 2 4 /2 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
7 . D o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r e v e n t  y o u r  c o m p a n y  f r o m  p l a n n i n g  
a h e a d  f o r m a l l y ?
0  C o s t  3  I n s u f f i c i e n t  k n o w l e d g e  o f
1  N o  n e c e s s i t y  y e t  t e c h n i q u e s
2 N o t  e n o u g h  s t a f f  4  P r e f e r  t o  r e m a i n  f l e x i b l e
5  O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y  ............................ )
(1 N o n e 2(./2 7 0 1 2 3 A 5 (<
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E X H I B I T  3 . 6  ...............S e c tio n  S ix
1 . K ow  m a n y  e m p l o y e e s  d o  y o u  h a v e ?
0  0 -10  p e o p l e 4  7 5 - 1 0 0  p e o p l e
1  1 1 - 2 5  p e o p l e 5  1 0 1 - 1 5 0  p e o p l e
2  2 6 - 5 0  p e o p l e 6 1 5 1 - 2 0 0  p e o p l e
3  5 1 - 7 5  p e o p l e 7  2 0 1 - 3 0 0  p e o p l e
8 3 0 0  p l u s  ( s p e c i f y  ...................
2 . W h a t  w a s  t h e  c o m p a n y  t u r n o v e r i n  1 9 7 7 ?
0  E O - E 2 0 ,O O O 4  £ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 - E 2 0 0 , 0 0 0
1  £ 2 0 , 0 0 0 - £ 4 0 , 0 0 0 5  £ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 2 5 0 0 , OOO
2  £ 4 0 , 0 0 0 - E 8 0 , 0 0 0 6 E 5 0 0 , O O O -£ 1 , 0 0 0 , OOO
3  £ 8 0 , 0 0 0 - E 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 7  £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 - £ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
8 M o r e  ( s p e c i f y  ................................
S E C T IO N  V I TR U STED  IN FO RM A TIO N
28
2‘>
W o u ld  y o u  p l e a s e  a d d  y o u r  o w n  c o m m e n t s  o n  s m a l l  c o m p a n y  p l a n n i n g ?
Th a n k  y o u .  
Peter McKiermn.- My te le p h o n e  num ber -is 0483 71281 E x t n .  851.
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confidentiality and elicit a higher response. If the information
had been requested earlier, it may have "been perceived as indicative of
the rest of the survey and many respondents may have refused to continue 
to complete the document.
Company Size (Q1 and Q2)
Two measures of size were used - number of employees and amount of sales
turnover during 1977. A priori thought would suggest that the larger and 
more complex a company’s activities, the greater would the necessity he to 
adopt more formal procedures of planning, in order to organize resources 
as efficiently as possible. The literature has suggested that companies 
tend to adopt more formal techniques around the 100 employee mark. The 
present research tests this finding.
Geographical Location
This factor was recorded from information furnished hy Duri and Bradstreet’s 
Market Facts Cards and not collected in the survey. However, the return 
postmarks were used for cross-verification. The areas were coded into the 
standard regions devised hy the Central Statistical Office and presented 
in Government publications on trade and industry, making comparison with 
overall population statistics practically feasible. It may he argued that 
different regions may herald varying degrees of formality, due to concen­
trations of similar industries, proximity to major business schools and so 
,increase managerial education and' dissemination of knowledge regarding 
techniques. This relation was tested in the research.
Additional Small Company Information (Q3)
Much additional qualitative information was collected from chief executives, 
who were given provision to respond with their feelings on small company 
planning. Many executives supplied auxiliary information on small company 
operations which assisted in an understanding of their policies.
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3.6 DESIGNS TO STREAMLINE SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION
3.6.1 Programme of Activity
Figure 3,1 shows the activities in sequential order. The mailings took
place at the beginning of the week, designed to arrive about ¥ednesday and
59Thursday. It is noted that Scott mailed his surveys on a Friday so timed 
to arrive on Monday morning. Empirical evidence accumulated by this 
researcher working in small companies suggests that Monday morning is not 
the most profitable time to tax an entrepreneur's patience with requests 
for free assistance. His mail is generally at a peak level on Monday and 
Tuesday, hence this research aimed for an arrival on ¥ednesday or Thursday. 
This would ensure a maximum chance of attention when the post is relatively 
low. Further, the chief executive has the weekend close by to complete the 
survey, should he place it on one side. If placed on one side on Monday 
morning it is unlikely to be found by the weekend.
Because two mailings were being implemented simultaneously; the burden of 
work was staggered by interspersing the two samples, beginning with the 
mailing of the 200 sample and then a week later the 3,000 sample.
The cut-off dates were not treated as rigid and replies forthcoming in 
the Christmas post and early January were processed.
3.6.2 Recording Procedure
A card index was used which contained the name of the company and the sample 
serial number of the questionnaire (together with ancilliary information 
about the company - see exhibit 1 , Appendix H ). The serial number was 
stamped on the card and questionnaire to identify the response. ¥hen a 
questionnaire was received the appropriate card was removed from the tray 
and re-filed. The residual cards became candidates for follow-up efforts. 
The procedure is simple', and for one researcher handling two surveys 
simultaneously (one of 200 and one of 3,000 mailings) it worked very effect­
ively.
60The returned questionnaires were scrutinized, as suggested by Dillman , to 
test whether any major respondent problems had been encountered - eg poss­
ibility of sections being missed out by pages sticking together, or the
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possibility of corrections that could he made in a reminder letter. No 
serious problems were detected at this stage.
Processing the Data
Editing
61Five principle checks in the editing stage, as suggested by Hoinville 
were carried out.
1 . Structure checks to ensure all the requested information had been 
provided.
2. Valid-coding range checks to ensure that no coding range was broken.
If the coding range had been breached (ie if the range goes from 0-8 
and a 9 had been placed in and ringed), a no answer code was delegated 
to the reply.
3. Filter-checks - no respondents had answered both appendices.
4. Checks for omissions. If the omitted answers could not he deduced 
from supplementary information about the company appearing on either
the company's letter heading or on the control cards (see the exhibit at 
Appendix H ) the omissions were given no answer codes.
5. Logic checks to ensure respondent is exercising due care and attention 
in his answers.
Any questionnaires that were incomplete and whose answers could not be 
.deduced from supplementary company information were discarded.
Any questionnaires showing signs of inaccuracy or carelessness on behalf of 
the respondent were similarly discarded. From this approach it may he 
deduced that some valuable answers were not used. However, It was decided 
to include in the sample only the information that was ‘’clean*'. A final 
computer edit programme was used, (the SPSS version), to add rigour to this 
stage.
Coding
62Open-ended questions were coded by taking an initial sample of 300 
questionnaires and constructing a coding frame from the more frequent
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responses, using a listing sheet (see Moser , see Hoinville ).
Where questions contained more than one answer such that two or three codes 
were circled, these were treated using the technique of geometric coding.
For example, Q1, page 6 of the questionnaire reads
"Does your company happen to possess specific plans ahead for any of
the following areas?"
0 Products (3) Personnel
1 Markets 0  Research and Development
(/z) Finance 5 None
The geometric coding works as follows
The code 0 = 01, 1 =02, 2 = 04, 3 = 08, 4 = 16, 5 = 32.
If the answer was ringed 2, 3 and 4 a simple addition of the codes 02, 08 
and 16 = 26 yield a unique number 26 for that combination of answers. No 
other combination can equal 26. Geometric coding was used extensively 
throughout the questionnaire, although it has disadvantages of being 
difficult to unravel (note well that even Moser makes no suggestions herel) 
and requires considerable -time to code all the replies this way - its beauty 
lies in identifying combinations - ie combinations of plans, strategies and 
goals that are central to the present research. Further, this method 
requires only a small number of columns on a punch card. The alternative 
is to ask a yes/no question for each area of planning in Q1, page 6. This 
■not only adds to the questionnaire length but takes up three times as much 
space on the punch cards.
Only two people, the researcher and an assistant, were used in the complete 
coding of 1494 questionnaires. Further, all the open-ended questions were 
coded by the researcher to ensure compatability and minimise the errors 
involved by using different codes in judgement and accuracy. This procedure 
occupied fourteen long working days. The main reasons for the length of the 
coding period were -
1 . Care was taken to process the data accurately;
2. Spot-checks on the assistant, supplementary company information to
ensure adequacy of respondent answers and spot-checks on the built-in
adequacy-testing question (note that Q7,-page 3, asks for the number 
of managers in the company. This .can quickly he cross-checked with 
Q9, page 3, for consistency. Any large deviations were handled with 
suspicion of respondent carelessness and those questionnaires re-checked 
for validity). These spot-checks were performed at random intervals by 
the researcher;
3. Using only two people takes time, but it ensures control and uniformity 
of coding. It is true that with further resources and more trained 
staff this period could have been reduced, or even been undertaken as 
the questionnaires were received back. However, it is doubtful whether 
the care and uniformity present in the current research would be 
repeated.
Punching
The card punching was done direct from the questionnaire by the University 
of Surrey computer unit staff. The initial punching, onto 80 column IBM 
type punch cards, was twice verified by different punch girls before being 
despatched to the researcher. This process (1,443 questionnaires with up 
to 70 answers over 2 punched cards per respondent) took six weeks to implement.
CONCLUSION
This chapter began with the aim of establishing the quality of the data 
collection instrument. This aim has been achieved by presenting the 
reasons why the methodology of the mail survey was chosen initially, followed 
fry a di'scussion of the tried and tested principles which were embodied in 
the instrument. The survey was then illustrated in its final format, 
after the pre-test corrections, along with a guide to assist the reader 
in understanding the layout of sections and the reasons for those questions 
asked. Finally, it was shown how the post-mail activities were closely 
controlled and supervised to minimize the introduction of error. Every 
effort was made to build quality into the instrument given the limited 
research resources, the results that follow in Chapter Four indicate that 
this may well have been achieved.
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CHAPTER FOUR
^LIABILITY_OF_THE_DATA_COLLECTION_INSTRUMENT
Objective of the chapter
Chapter Three outlined the principles embodied in the data 
collection instrument and its implementation in order to establish 
the quality of the mail survey. This chapter aims to establish the 
reliability of that survey by examining the response rates, response 
speed and response quality. Tests are described which intend to 
prove the overall reliability of the instrument.
Organisation of the chapter
This chapter is segregated into six parts. Section 4.1 
illustrates the response sample characteristics for both the 3,000 
and 200 samples by S.I.C. Order, . size and geographical region. 
Section 4.2 compares the known population characteristics with .those 
of the chosen sample (3,000) by S.I.C.'■’Order, _ size and geographical 
region. Section 4.3 describes the performance of a one sample runs 
test on both the 3,000 and 200 samples, to test for response bias 
over time. Section 4.4 shows the response speed and section 4.5 the 
response quality. Section 4.6 is proof that no matter how careful 
a process of design and implementation is pursued, no data collection 
instrument is perfect. The section contains serious suggestions 
for further researchers on improving surveys of this kind.
4.1 Response Sample Characteristics
4.1.1 Sample Response Rates
The responses to the current survey are depicted in table
4.1 below:
Table 4.1 Mail Survey Response Rates
All Manufact- Construction 
uring Industry Industry
3000 Sample 200 Sample
Usable Replies 1374 (45.8%) . 1.20 (60.0%)
Incomplete Replies 210 ( 7*0%) 18 ( 9*0%)
(Either not filled in or 
considered unusable due to 
carelessness and inaccuracies)
Returned to Sender 6l ( 2.0%) 15 ( 7*5%)
TOTAL 1645 (54.8%) 153 (76.5%)
Source: University of Surrey, Small Firms Survey, 1978
Note 1 : The number of surveys returned to sender in the 3000 sample,
(2.0%), seems high for a computer file that is supposed
to he continuously updated, but low in comparison with 
the use of the trade directory in the 200 sample (7*5%). 
Although the latter is obviously affected by the volatile 
nature of the Construction industry.
Note 2: The disparity in aggregate response rates between the
3000 and 200 sample. This is likely to he due to the 
complete follow up package being sent to all non-respondents 
on the 200 sample and only 400 of the 1600 non-respondents 
in the 3000 sample at the second reminder. Note, from 
Figures 4.2, and 4.1, the second reminder brought a 
■ further 30% replies in the 200 sample and only 11% 
more in the 3000 sample.
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The following table illustrates some empirical market 
research responses and those suggested 'by various market research 
writers.
Table 4.2 Market Survey Response Rates
(1 )
Area Sample Responsi
Still1 Florida State 1974
Size Rate
U.S. 296 28.0%
2Schumann New England 1974 U.S. 105 47.6%
Perrigo^ West Midlands 1972i U.K. 15 N/A
Boswell West Midlands 1969/70 U.K. 109 62.0%*
University of Surrey 3000 1978 U.K. 3000 45.8%
University of Surrey 200 1978 U.K. 200 60.0%
Pearce^
(suggest
20.0%
Ell iot -Chr i s t oph er 40.0%
Davies ^ 5-60%
Boyd and Westfall^ 50.0%
• 0 Stavey and Wilson 25.0%
Uhl and Schoner10 40.0%
Type
Area and Industry Bias 
Area Bias 
Area Bias
Area and Industry Bias 
National Random Sample
Source: Compiled by author - see references
Notes (1 )  = 
(2 )  = 
=
Research on small companies
Suggested Response Rates in Industrial Market Research 
The emphasis here was on a personal approach rather 
than a mail survey.
From the table it can be concluded that the current response rates 
are acceptable considering previous work and suggested response rates. 
Further, the current research 3000 sample does not suffer from either 
an area or industry bias, or the possibility of bias due to small 
sample size. The 200 construction industry sample does not suffer 
from an area bias.
Hh ,U.K. Construction Industry
4.1.2 Response Rates by S.I.C. Order and Size 
3000 Sample
Table 4.3 illustrates the strata response frequencies and 
rates for the 3000 sample, over both S.I.C. Order and size of 
company (as measured by number, of employees). It can be seen that 
the size totals and industry totals (response rates), vary around the 
overall rate of 0.46, indicating some degree of response bias.
The X statistic for this table is 49*50 with 24 degrees of freedom 
which is significant at the 0.995 level, confirming that the null 
hypothesis - that there is no significant difference between the 
observed and expected frequencies, should be rejected. The response 
rates suggest some degree of response bias.
Notes: l) The smallest strata frequencies are in S.I.C.
Order 20 (Construction). This order was 
independently sampled in the 200 sample, the 
companies here being those selected at random 
within the 3000 sample.
2) Larger companies show a tendency to have higher 
response rates e.g. size strata 50-59 = 0.47, 
while size strata 100-499 = 0.54. This could be 
due to large companies having more time and staff 
available to complete surveys and/or having a 
greater interest in the subject of corporate 
planning and hence the reward of a research 
summary.
200 Sample
The 200 sample was extracted systematically from Dun and 
Bradstreet's Key British Enterprises, Volume'Two, 1978.
This guide does not give size criteria for all companies it covers 
and so a response rate over size strata for the 200 sample could not 
be calculated.
Although Moser1"* suggests that all undelivered surveys should
be treated as blanks and taken out of the sampling frame before response
12rates are calculated, Mayer and Pratt have demonstrated that this can 
lead to the preservation of a serious bias source in the analysis.
In the following figures the blanks have been included after the latter 
approach, with the frequencies for undelivered surveys presented in 
Table 4.1.
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4.1.3 Response Rate by Geographical Region 
3000 Sample
Table 4,4' Response Rate by 'Geographical Region
Standard regions of 
England, Wales,
Scotland and
149
Northern Ireland. Sample Response Response
Size Size Rate
South East 1131 518 45.8%
East Anglia 75 32 •42.7%
South West 160 79 . 49.4%
West Midlands 355 170 47.9%
East Midlands 224 100 44.6%
Yorkshire/Humbers ide 303 137 45.2%
North West 368 158 42,9%
North 82 50 70.0%
Wales 69 4o . 58.0%
Scotland 189 85 45.0%
Northern Ireland 44 5 11.4%
3000 1374
TOTAL ,
Source: University of Surrey, Small Firms Survey, 1978
By inspection of Table 4.4, it can be seen that the North has the 
highest response rate of 70.0%, followed by Wales with 58%. The lowest 
response rate belongs to Northern Ireland with 11,4%. The remainder 
are grouped closely around the overall response rate of 45.9%.
The X2 for this distribution is 19.4l which, with 10 degrees of 
freedom, is significant at the 0.96 level. This indicates some 
geographical bias in the responses which is largely due to the low 
response from Northern Ireland. Expected returns for this area were 
20, but only 5 were received - perhaps a reflection of an anti- 
English attitude, distance, or the plight of planning in such political 
uncertainty.
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200 Sample
Table  4 .5  Response Rate by  G eograph ica l Area
Standard Regions of 
England, Wales, 
Scotland and
Northern Ireland. Sample Response Response
Size Size Rate
South East 86 55 64.0%
East Anglia 4 3 75.0%
South West 8 4 50.0%
West Midlands 16 11 68.8%
East Midlands 12 5 41.7%
Yorkshire/Humberside 20 13 65.0%
North West 21 15 71.4%
North 11 5 45.5%
Wales 2 0 00.0%
Scotland 16 8 50.0%
Northern Ireland 4 1 25.0%
200 120
TOTAL ....  60.0%
Source: University of Surrey, Small Firms Survey, 1978
Table 4,. 5 shows that the highest response rates belong to East Anglia 
(75.0%), the North (71.4%) and the West Midlands (68.8%). The lowest 
rate belongs to Wales (0.0% but small sample) and Northern Ireland (25.0%). 
As in the 3000 sample, the latter is low. The X^ statistic for this 
distribution is 4.59.which, with 10 degrees of freedom, is not significant 
until the 0.09 level. Hence the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference between the observed and expected frequencies 
can be accepted, (or at least not rejected). This suggests that 
area deviations around the overall response rate of 60,0% are more 
likely to be random fluctuations rather than a source of geographical bias.
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4.2 Sample Representativeness
4.2.1 Comparison with Population Size and S.I.C.-Order
Table 4.6 illustrates the representativeness of the sample by
comparing the overall distribution of companies by size and S.I.C.
Order in the U.K. manufacturing sector, with the Dun and Bradstreet
random sample, across the sample size and S.I.C. strata - (This is the
13check suggested by Moser ). As can be seen, the sample to population 
ratio overall is 0.05 and only the 1-19 employee size strata and the
S.I.C,. Orders 3S5 differ substantially from this. However, there 
appears to be a discrepancy in Business Monitor PA1003 1975, where 
introductory note 7, P - 2 ,  states "all units employing 10 or less 
persons have been excluded from all tables" and yet Table 1, p.3, 
has a strata for 1-19 employees. If this table is in error, the 
aggregate total will be larger and.hence the calculated sampling ratio 
will be reduced.
Table 4.6 also indicates that the Food sector (S.I.C. Order 3), 
may have been undersampled, while the Chemical sector (S.I.C. Order 5) 
may have been oversampled. Overall, however, the ratios do not depart 
substantially from the overall ratio and so it can be concluded that' 
the sample is a reasonable representation of the known population.
4.2.2 Comparison with Geographical Area
Table 4.7 illustrates the representativeness of the 3000 
sample, excluding S.I.C. Order 20 ( Contract Construction)
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Table  4 .7  G eograph ica l R ep resen ta tiveness  o f  3000 sample
Standard Regions of 
England, Wales, 
Scotland arid 
Northern Ireland
South East
East Anglia
South West
West Midlands
East Midlands
Yorkshire/Humberside
North West
North
Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland
Units with 
11-200 employees
Sample
Size Ratio
17137 1089 0.06
1536 72 0.05
3179 154 0.05
6813 342 0.05
4636 216 0.05
5595 292 0.05
7137 354 0.05
2101 79 0.04
1878 66 0.04
4601 183 0.04
1054 42 0.04
55667 2889 .
TOTAL ___ 0.05
Source: University of Surrey, Small Firms Survey, 1978
Note: This table assumes that all units with 1-10
employees are randomly distrubuted by area
* Source: H.M.S.O. Business Monitor PA1003 19755 
Table 3, p .l4.
** This assumes the Construction frequencies
(ill units) are randomly distributed by area.
As can be seen from Table 4.7 the sample ratios do not differ substantially 
in the areas from the overall ratio of 0.05. There is a strong 
consistency about this figure and so it can be concluded that the 
sample is a reasonable representation of the known population.
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4.3 Early versus Late Response Bias
4.3.1 3000 Sample
14Moser has suggested that a serious drawback of mail surveys 
is the tendency of respondents to he less careful and helpful with 
successive follow-ups. Their effort is drastically reduced in order 
to rid themselves of the survey as quickly as possible . and so the 
quality of the answers over time may be inconsistent. This research 
employed two follow-ups, worded such that a company could expect more 
if it did not return the present one and this threat in itself may 
have led to hurried answers. Further, as the survey was quite long, it 
could have led to boredom and consequent inconsistency of replies.
In order to detect any attitude bias resulting from- early/late responses, 
the following test was performed on the sample.
One Sample Runs Test
This test identifies the number of runs exhibited in the response 
sequence. In this instance the response sequence is the order in 
which the surveys were received back from the companies. In this research 
it was considered that the answer to a key question like - ’Does your 
company plan ahead in a formal way?’ (Section 5, Q.10) may affect the 
inclination of managers to respond due to the embarrassment associated 
with being informal planners. Further, this question.was crucial to 
the main body of the research and accurate answers to it were deemed 
essential. Hence, it was thought pertinent to check for bias in the 
survey and at the same time confirm the acceptability of the answers 
to this question. The runs test counts the number of runs from the 
answers to this question over the time period of the response, including 
both the first and second reminders. E.g.
Yes, Yes, Ho,No,No,Ho , Yes , No ,No, Yes,Yes,Yes, No 
1 2 3 4 5 6
There are six runs in the above sequence of answers. The total number
of runs in a given sample gives an indication of whether or not the
sample is random. If very few runs occur, this indicates the action of 
a time trend in the responses, or some bunching due to lack of
1 5independence. If a great many runs occur, Siegel suggests that this 
may be due to systematic short period fluctuations influencing the scores. 
This test has advantages over ptber one sample non-parametric tests 
like X2 and the binomial test, as it takes into account the order of 
events, as opposed to just their frequencies. It is this order over
a sequence of mail survey returns that is of interest here.
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1. Null Hypothesis:
Ho; This is a typical number of runs from a random 
distribution.
Hi; (2-tailed) The number of runs is not typical.
2. Statistical Test:
The one sample runs test was chosen because the hypothesis 
concerns the randomness of a single group of events over 
time.
3. Method:
Determine n^ (number of yes answers) and n^ (number of 
no answers) (with large samples (250+), this is done 
after the event) and r (the number of runs). For large 
samples, a good approximation of the sampling distribution 
of r is the normal distribution, with
mean = V  = ^n^n^ + 1
O u tlin e  o f  th e  One Sample Runs Test
Y
"l + n2
standard deviation = Sn^n^/gn^n^-n^-ng)
(ni + n2)2(n1 + n^-l)
and where z = r~\J
 r j
( 5 r
h. Decision:
In this sample r = 6J0, z = -1.4875. From tables 
(see ref. 15» p. 247) the probability of occurrence 
under Ho of z ^  -1.49 is p = 2(Q.068l) = 0.1362.
Taking a level of significance of^L = 0.05 and given that 
the probability associated with the observed occurrence, 
p = 0.1362, is greater than the level of significance, 
the decision is to accept, or at least not reject, the 
null hypothesis that the answers follow a random 
distribution. Hence early and late responses do not 
appear to be a source of bias.
It must be noted that there are no parametric tests 
for the randomness of'a sequence of events in a sample 
and so the concept of power efficiency as applied to the 
one sample runs test is meaningless.
4.3.2 200 Sample
One Sample Runs Test
The above test and purpose has already been described under 
the 3000 sample. When the test was performed on the 200 sample with 
n^ = 29, n^ = 9 1j r = 54 then z = 2.77* A level of significance was 
chosen of C£ = 0.05. The probability associated with the observed 
occurrence, p = 2(0.0028) , is O.OO56 (from table A ref. 15, p. 247). 
Hence as the probability is greater than the level of significance, 
the null hypothesis that this is a typical number of runs from a 
random sample is accepted, or at least not rejected. It can be 
concluded that early and late responses do not appear to be a source 
of bias in the 200 sample.
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Houston and Ford have suggested that methodological studies 
on mail surveys typically assess the effectiveness of a device with 
regard to only one dependent variable - response rate. They have 
called for methodological research into two other variables - response 
speed and response quality.
There is a time lag between the receipt of a questionnaire and 
its return for many respondents - much more so than either personal or 
telephone interviews. This can affect a mail survey in three ways. 
Firstly, it could extend the completion time of a study whose results 
may be needed urgently. Secondly, it' allows external events to affect 
the replies of some and not other, respondents. Thirdly, slow responses 
can lead to an increased number of follow up reminders and so any increase 
in response speed can act to reduce the costs of the survey. Designs 
to increase the response speed were built into the questionnaire and 
are discussed in Chapter Three. However, as the research concentrated 
primarily on eliciting as high a response rate as possible, response 
speed - and associated cost advantages^were not controlled 'for.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 illustrate the response speeds for the 
3000 and 200 samples respectively.
Table 4.8 summarizes the results:- 
Table 4.8 Response Speed
Response Rates:- Aggregate Percent 
of sample returned
4 .4  Response Speed
l6
3000 sample 200 sample
First week after posting 15% 18%
Second week after posting 27% 32%
Third week after posting 32% 34%
Fourth week after posting 39% 43%
Fifth week after posting 45% 51%
Sixth week after posting 49% 59%
Rising to TOTAL 54.8% 76.5%
Source: University of Surrey, Small Firms Survey, 1978
The majority of responses arrived within six weeks of each initial 
mailing, however, the fourth, fifth and sixth weeks are within the 
Christmas period where delays can be expected. Within both samples, 
at least 45% of the eventual response was received within 3 weeks 
after the initial mailing.
l 6 i
Response quality refers to the degree of effort and attention 
devoted to-the survey by the respondent. It can be assessed by considering 
the numbers of items omitted from the replies - i.e. incomplete surveys 
and by the number of respondent errors in replying. It is a difficult 
concept to measure, let alone compare with other studies who use 
different concepts of measurement. In this study, taking both the 3000 
and 200 samples together, only 25 questionnaires out of 1722 were considered 
not usable due to incompleteness - the answers could not be verified 
from .other sources, or carelessness on behalf of the respondent 
(deliberate cheating or misleading). This is quite a remarkable 
achievement, that so many questionnaires should be usable. However, 
when a company is offered a summary of the research results relevant 
to its own company in return for a fully completed questionnaire, 
it is not in the interests of a chief executive, who takes considerable 
valuable time to fill in a survey of this length, to provide misleading 
or careless information about his company.
It should further be noted that 203 questionnaires were sent back 
out of the 1722, not completed. These were re-used in the second 
reminders to prompt further replies. The main reason given for not 
completing the questionnaire was lack of time. A subsidiary reason 
was confidentiality of information required and so reluctance to co-operate. 
The latter reason is understandable. The first reason could be due not 
only to the perennial problem in small companies of lack of time/ 
multiplicity of duties/hatred of form filling, but also to pressing 
production demand prior to the Christmas period.
It should also be noted that no complaints were received concerning 
the physical process of completing the survey form. Only 14 surveys were 
received that possessed ticks instead of circles. This gives further 
credence to the validity of the document. Although it is impossible 
to adequately detect all respondent errors, this research did attempt 
the process through cross-checking replies with known company information 
from the Dun and Bradstreet Market Facts Cards. With such a small 
percentage of unusable surveys, it can be concluded that response 
quality is of a sufficient standard to accept the results with confidence.
4 * 5 Response Q u a li ty
Acceptance and V a l id i t y  o f  th e  Survey Document
Considering the three variables - response rate, response speed 
and response quality, the questionnaire appears to meet the criteria 
inherent in each. The response rates were in the higher ranges of those 
recommended, the majority of results were obtained within 6 weeks, 
with 50% within 3 weeks'and the quality was consistently high.
^ *6 Suggestions for Improvement
However, it may be of benefit to further researchers to consider 
some limitations of the current document, which, if corrected, could 
yield even higher response rates and speeds.
(l) If resources permit, use a questionnaire in the second 
reminder for all non-respondents.
(g) Pre-test the complete package including follow ups.
(3) State clearly the purpose of the identification number on 
the form. It would be useful to indicate the difference 
between complete anonymity and confidentiality to respondents. 
Many thought the two were synonymous and so questioned
the identification number. It is advisable to mention 
that this number helps the researcher to identify who has 
sent back the survey and thus makes the procedure of sending 
out reminders more efficient.
(4) Although it was clearly stated in the cover letter that 
return postage had been paid, many respondents (20%), 
either franked or stamped their reply envelopes themselves. 
This could be due to the survey being automatically placed 
into the company posting system when complete. But it is 
more likely, in the .researcher’sopinion, to be due to the 
word FREEPOST on the reply envelope not being of 
sufficient size or colour to be seen clearly. If this 
system is repeated it would be ideal to explain to companies 
exactly what FREEPOST is. Many non-respondents may have then 
completed the form. In the present.work, they may have 
thought that a promise made in the cover letter was not kept.
(5) Addressing as many envelopes to a named director has 
advantages of personalization and associated confidentiality 
and helps to direct the mail within the company without 
successive deliberations on who should deal with it. In 
addition, it keeps the document at a high managerial
level within the company. However, there was evidence
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in this research that many companies had left the envelope 
unopened waiting for the named director who may have been 
ill, absent, abroad on business or on some occasions he 
was found to have died years ago. Further, if a named 
director had left the company the survey was forwarded to 
him at his new company which was frequently a larger one, 
beyond the scope of the survey. The answer here possibly 
lies in a double address, for example, “Mr. A.J. Brown or 
The Financial Director".
(6) On follow ups, include the phrase "if your reply has already 
been posted, please ignore this reminder". Many companies 
in this survey went to the trouble of telephoning or writing 
to the researcher after they had received reminders to explain 
that their reply had been sent. They expressed concern 
that, after spending so much time completing the survey,
it had not been received. A little message, as above, will 
clarify the position.
(7) A deadline date for the survey has advantages of associating 
urgency with the replies. However, this can also lead, as
in this survey, to questionnaires being regarded as redundant 
after this date and discarded. This led to considerable 
excess expense in forwarding further survey forms. The 
choice of whether to use a deadline date must be carefully 
assessed by researchers with particular reference to the type 
of respondent and his likely interpretation of that date.
(8) Questionnaire queries:
QI page 1 It is possible here for a diversified company 
to tick more than one box.
Q3 page 1 Many managers ringed more than one job, indicating 
the multiplicity of duties in many small companies. 
The most common was the dual role of chairman and 
managing director (codes 1, 2).
- Error in format. Column 20 has been repeated
Q7 page 3 
and 
Q8i page 3
Q2 page b The reply to this question showed evidence that 
the pre-worded answers were too complex for 
small business managers. The question was not 
clear enough.
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Q5 page 4 No alternative was included for a) all the options 
or b) none at all
Q6 page 4 No alternative for 'None at all1.
Q4 page 5 Many respondents answered more than one alternative - 
this would have been better as a two column, 
geometric coding option. Most of these respondents 
ringed codes 0 and 3, or 2 and 3. It was 
adjudged that because most manufacturing companies 
take credit from suppliers (code 5)» it would be 
sensible to eliminate this alternative in all 
answers.
Q5i) page 5 Many answers to this question were in the category - 
'Other Source1. In the majority of cases, this 
was specified as internal finance. Hence, 
there is evidence here, that the alternatives 
were not exhaustive.
Q6 page 5 Error in Format. The answers to this question 
were not treated seriously in the analysis due 
to the obvious confusion of alternatives i.e. 
this was due to an unclear copy being given to 
the printer who obviously printed what he saw.
The error should have been detected in the proof 
reading by the researcher.
Q7 page 5 Another error that should have been detected on 
proof reading is the gap between codes 2 and 3 
where there is no alternative for 35-45 days.
The original read - code 2 = 30-45 days. There 
was evidence that many companies changed the 
figuring to correspond to this intended layout 
and the answers were treated as such.
Q8 page 6 . Some companies coded more than one. This should 
have been a 3 column, geometric code. However, 
so as not to lose valuable, information, the 
multiple replies were randomly reduced to single 
codes.
Q3 page 6 Some companies considered the options to be
synonymous. An ideal approach would.be to leave 
this question as an open-ended one.
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Ql(iii) page 7 Many companies included the code 7 (for ’others' 
involved in the planning process). This 
indicates that the alternatives were not exhaustive 
enough and, in small companies, probably not 
mutually exclusive considering the multiplicity 
of duties of most managers. An open-ended 
question may have been more appropriate.
Possible missing questions:-
(1) Why did your company adopt a formal planning procedure?
(2 ) Question on Chief Executive’s education.
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CONCLUSION
The research has incorporated a data collection instrument - the 
mail survey. Great care was taken in the design and implementation of 
this survey. Attention was paid to all recommendations for questionnaire 
layout. The tried and tested principles of questionnaire design were 
incorporated in the document.
Evidence provided hy the higher than average response rate, the 
acceptable response speed and the surprising quality of the responses, 
serve to indicate the reliability of the survey. Further, no significant 
bias was detected in responses over time, nor were the minor biases 
associated with size, S.I.C. Order / and geographical area of sufficient 
magnitude to cause undue concern-., provided the results are interpreted 
with caution. In addition, both the samples are reasonable 
representations of the known populations.
In view of the above findings (which were verified by appropriate 
tests), the survey can he safely accepted as reliable. Chapter Three 
has already confirmed the quality of the instrument, now the reliability 
has been established, the results can be accepted with a degree of 
confidence. Further, they are likely to be a close representation of 
the small firm manufacturing sector of the U.K. economy. However, 
due caution must he observed in interpreting the results, especially 
if the purpose is to be generalizations to the population.
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AN INVESTIGATION INTO TENTATIVE 
RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE DATA - INITIAL RESULTS
Chapter- F ive
Objective of the Chapter
This chapter examines the complete data collected in the mail survey 
in an attempt to establish tentative relationships between the 
characteristics of a small company and the degree of formality associated 
with -its planning operation. In this way a picture can be built up 
illustrating the make-up of each company type. The idea behind this 
initial approach is to gain a feel for any relationships that exist 
in the data, before a more thorough and systemmatic analysis is carried 
out in Chapter 6.
Organisation of the Chapter
This chapter is split into 3 main sections. Section 5*2 deals 
with the principal characteristics facing both the formal and informal 
planning companies and tests the relationship between these characteristics 
and the main ’dependent* variable i.e. Is the company planning informal 
or formal? Where associations are high and where clarification of 
a relationship is required, the two variable relation has been elaborated 
on a third variable, chosen for its considered 'a priori’ significance 
in explanation. The relationships have not been elaborated to extensive 
3 or 4 way treatments, this has been left to the Automatic Interaction 
Detector of Chapter 6. Section 5.3 illustrates the relationships between 
the various internal aspects of small company operations and attempts 
to identify those aspects pertaining to each planning type of company 
and highlight the disparities of make-up between the two. Section 5-4 
is concerned with the results relating to small company planning - 
formal and otherwise and comprehensively documents the data collected 
from Appendix A and B of the mail survey. In some cases, interesting 
relationships are elaborated. To aid comprehension, the sequence of 
sections in this chapter follow the sequence of sections in the mail 
survey questionnaire and if any clarification is required, the reader 
is referred to the corresponding section and question in the survey to 
be found in Chapter Three.
N.B. The Tables referred to in this chapter can all be found, in 
sequence, at Appendix I.
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In the stream of survey research, from delicate care in design 
and wording to final tabulation, the respondent alone governs the integrity 
and consistency of the answers. In small firms, the adequate knowledge 
and experience necessary to complete an all-absorbing company survey 
is often irrevocably entrenched in the mind of the chief executive.
"Quite often in a small company a number of the normal 
executive functions are combined in the chief executive who 
will make broad plans but will not necessarily formalize 
them in writing. In that respect, a small company may 
know exactly where it is going without having formal
planning." 59 Textile Machinery.*
Table 5.1.1 shows firstly, that 73% of the respondents were 
either chairmen or managing directors, emphasising that the replies 
can be accepted with some degree of authority. Secondly, note the 
importance of the finance and marketing functions as sources of information
for the survey among formal planning companies (PCs) and the importance
of the company secretaries to non-formal planning companies (NPCs) - 72% 
compared to 28% in PCs. Thirdly, the managing director was more 
likely to have replied in PCs (36%), whereas in NPCs it was more likely 
that the reply was from the integral role of both chairman and managing 
director (42%), which may suggest the latter role is to be found more 
often in NPCs.
A brief review of Table 5-1.2 shows firstly, that unlike the
Bolton Committee postal survey (upon which a central chapter of its
Report was based) which was. completed in the main hy unincorporated
businesses, the majority of respondents here are of limited liability.
Secondly, the row marginals serve to indicate the proportion of companies
alleging a type of formal planning framework (37%) and.those claiming
a more informal approach to planning (63%). Certainly -this figure of
37% is unexpectedly high in the writer’s opinion. The aristocrats of top2management planning like Steiner who claims that "the great majority
of small businesses do little, if any, long range planning", would probably
agree.
*The figure immediately following the quotations in this chapter (all 
of which were collected during the University of Surrey, Small Finns 
Survey, 1978) refers to the size category of the company as expressed 
at Q.2, Section VI of the survey which can he found in Chapter 3.
5 .1  In t r o d u c t io n
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The following descriptive analysis should help to clarify the 
characteristics associated with these two company types.
5.2 Principal Characteristics of PCs and NPCs
5.2.1 Company Age
Corporate planning is a comparative newcomer to the stage of forma!
management techniques and yet the prolific, wealth of literature on the
topic would make it readily available to the urchin entrepreneur. The
growth of business schools, courses for small businessmen and management
advice over the last five years should have facilitated the communication
of the technique. In this respect it is plausible to assume that young
companies may well adopt corporate planning contra to the rationale
that many small companies enter an industry with an ill-defined concept
of a product or service to offer an equally ill-defined market segment,
3as proposed by Naumes.
However, an examination of Table 5.2.1, a cross-tabulation of
2corporate planning and age, with Eta = 0.002, shows virtually no 
association between the variables. The insignificant Chi square 
illustrates the variables are statistically independent. This would 
suggest that there is no relation between the age of a company and 
the' adoption of planning modes.
5.2.2 Subsidiary Companies
Subsidiary companies of larger organisations, although they 
may share some of the characteristics of other small companies in 
terms of turnover of sales, number of employees, market share and an 
element of personalized management, can often readily call upon 
specialist management functions of accounting, finance, marketing, 
personnel and research and development from the parent company.
Further, they are often an ahcilliary arm of a more integrated overall 
company plan with consequent targets and accountability. So the low, 
but highly significant relationship found in Table 5.2.2a is reasonably 
plausible. The asymmetric correlation r a t i o y x  = 0.09 indicating 
that 9% of the variation in company planning modes is accounted for by 
the variation in company type.
"F Although no relation is found here, a relation 
with the age of the chief executive is shown 
in Table 5*2.5a.
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By inspection, Table 5.2.2a suggests firstly, that subsidiary 
companies are more likely to be involved in formal planning modes 
than independent companies (6l% of subsidiary companies compared to 
29% of independent companies). Secondly, note the magnitude of the 
residual 71% of independent companies who do not engage in formal 
planning, compared to 63% before the clarification by company type.
Perhaps the most important point here is not the discovery of 
the fact but potential reasons why. Possibly subsidiary companies fall 
more into Bolton’s* satellite-type companies, producing output purely for 
the parent company as part of a vertically integrated process. In this 
respect their output could be pre-determined and therefore more easily 
formalised. Alternatively, they may be marketeers, competing in the same 
or similar markets as large firms e.g. computer software, or fashion*
They may be specialist firms performing a function specifically for 
the parent company as an autonomous unit with lower fixed and overhead 
costs than the parent. To help clarify the relationship a variable 
was created from the data collected to distinguish between corporate 
planning mode and business area of the parent company. As.illustrated 
in Table 5-2.2b the association is weak (*( yx = O.Ol) and the relation­
ship is insignificant. This would suggest that there is no difference 
between a subsidiary company adopting a formal planning mode whether it 
is in the same or different business area as its parent company, nor 
if the parent company is purely a holding company.
The reason for the association between subsidiary companies and
formal planning modes is probably elusively entwined amid the managerial
intricacies of small companies. Independent companies are often owner-
managed, 'and suffer from the perennial problems of multiplicity of managerial
duties, handling all functional areas of the firm, consequent lack of 4time and as Golde points out a great deal of management time is spent 
fighting those ’brush fires’* hence time available for planning is at 
a premium. As one small firm succinctly illustrated:-
iir>i _ • _ Total Time Available  ^., ,„ „ „ _ . „Planning - ------101 Jobs------  9 or verY little, 1, Metal Goods
Interacting with these problems is that of lack of management education
and training in small companies as pointed out by Bolton^ and more
6recently by the London Regional Management Centre . The argument that
*See reference 11 of Chapter'2, pp. 31-32.
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what is required for success in small business is strong motivation,
reasonable intelligence, general business competence and compatibility
7as specifically mentioned by Lynn , is not m  doubt. What is questionable 
is do small businessmen have either the time or the capability to 
effect the management training that will augment that success and
prevent the failure attributed to managerial incompetence that persists?
t 8  9  . .■(See Dun and Bradstreet , Drexel Institute , British Institute of
Management'*'0 and ICro eger'*''*') . Hence, any attempt to elaborate the
relation of formal planning modes and company types must examine both
who controls the company and the extent and type of management training-.
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Tahle 5.2.3a illustrates the relation between corporate planning 
modes and company control. The relation is significant, hut low,
*\2yx = 0.05, indicating that 5% of the variation in planning modes is
accounted for by the variation in control types. Note firstly, that 
family controlled companies are more likely to he NPCs (69%) dropping to 
(66%) in the director-family category. Secondly, the companies controlled 
by outside shareholders are more likely to employ a formal planning mode 
(72%) - plausible due to their accountability. Finally, note that 46% 
of survey companies were controlled by families and another 6% by family 
and non-family directors. The bivariate distribution of planning modes by 
generations of family management produced only a very low relation 
(*"^ 2yx = 0.009) significant at the 5% level, but there was weak evidence
to suggest that in planning companies more companies were in the first 
generation of family management (51%) than among the NPCs 46%. (Table 
5.2.3b). The majority of survey companies were either 1st generation 
(48%) or second generation (32%).
The first-order conditional tables (5.2.3c, 5.2.3d), elaborate the 
relationship between planning modes and company control on the third
variable subsidiary company and illustrate a predictable specification.
a  2yx,, for subsidiary companies shows a 7% 
explained variation, which^ yx^ has dropped virtually to zero (0.007), 
indicating very little association between company control in independent 
companies and planning modes.
Note firstly, the relatively small percentage (27%) of family 
controlled companies among subsidiaries and the importance of them among 
independent companies (53%), hut that family controlled subsidiary companies 
are more likely to be involved in formal planning (43%) than their 
counterparts in independent companies (29%). Secondly, 21% of subsidiaries 
are controlled by outside shareholders compared to onl# 2% of independent 
companies but in both company types, these companies are likely to he 
highly engaged in formal planning (79% in subsidiaries and 48% in independents). 
Thirdly, the highest share of control in subsidiaries is taken up by 
directors (39%) compared to 31% of- the total in independents - but the 
directors in subsidiaries are far more likely to be involved in formality 
(66%) than their cousins in independent companies (26%). Companies 
controlled by families and directors together are more preponderent in 
independent companies (8% of the totalj^ than in subsidiaries (3% of the total), 
but a higher percentage of these companies in subsidiaries (42%) engage in 
formal planning than in independents (33%).
5 .2 .3  C o n tro l o f  th e  Company-
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The highest share of formality in subsidiary PCs lies with the 
director-controlled company (4-2%), the emphasis swings to family-controlled 
companies (53%) in independent PCs through their numeric dominance there. 
Finally, the row marginals illustrate the 'planning gap' between the 
company types, 6l% of subsidiaries compared to 29% of independents, are 
formalised (note that the relation in Table 5*2*3b is significant at 1% 
compared to 10% in Table 5*2.3c). The drop of 0.08 in the Gamma suggests 
that the control variable subsidiary is responsible for some of the relation 
between formal planning and control. In fact, when the relation between 
planning modes and subsidiary companies is controlled on the third 
variable 'company control', the conditional associations (in Fig 5*1 below) 
clearly illustrates the strength of the relation in-the shareholder and 
director categories.
Figure 5-1 Conditional Associations Between Planning Modes and Subsidiary 
Companies across Company Control Categories
Original “^ y x  = 0.05
 Family_________Shareholders_________ Directors________ Combinations
*\2yx = 0.01 *\2yx = 0.09 *\2yx = 0.15 *\2yx = 0.04
- p  .  _  _  _  -
* Significance
Zero Order Gamma = 0.59
First Order Partial Gamma = 0.50
The drop of 0.09 in the Gamma suggests that control does explain some,
but not all of the relation between planning modes and subsidiary companies.
5.2.4 Management Training
The Bolton Committee highlighted the disparity in management education
between large and small companies^ and the dearth of management training 
12m  small companies . The more recent work of the London Regional
Management School found that over 50% of small companies do not provide
management training.
Table 5.2.4a supports this trend (the relation between planning
2mode and type of management training is low - \ = 0 .07, confirming only
7% of the variation in planning modes is attributed to variation in types 
of management training - but''the relationship is highly significant). There 
is fruit to be gathered‘from this table. Note firstly, that only 4% of the 
total' sample of managers were trained at a university or college, with 
proportionate scatter in each planning mode company. Secondly, 52% of the
sample managers had no management training. These were more likely to he 
found in NPCs (74%). Thirdly, in-house management training is more likely 
to he found in PCs (53%) than in NPCs (47%). Fourthly, combinations of 
in-house training, training in other companies and training at university 
or college are more likely to be found in PCs (56%) than in NPCs (43%)9 
although they represent only.4% of the total. Finally, 25% of planning 
company managers were trained in another company, compared to only 17% 
of NPC managers.
Table 5.'2.4b illustrates the extent of external management training
(EMT) provided by the companies (the relation is low - *\2yx = 0.10 indicating
that 10% of the variation in planning modes is accounted for by the variation
in external management training - but the relation is highly significant).
External management training, as expected from previous results ,is
more likely to be found in PCs (63%) than in NPCs (37%). Further, 72%
of NPCs provide no external management training.
This plausible but frightening-picture of management training in
small firms does not auger well for their perceived ability to alleviate
13 14current national economic difficulties, because as Golde , MacMillan , 
Wheelwright1  ^ and Andrews1  ^point out, small companies may well require 
long range planning as much as large companies, due to scarcity of resources 
and increased competitiveness.
However, as the survey shows, the majority of trained managers in 
small firms are likely to be in the minority of companies (PCs) leaving 
a residual of untrained managers in the NPCs which, theoretically at least, 
may not be as able.to survive competition as well as their counterparts 
and assist in solving pressing macroeconomic problems e.g. unemployment. 
Further', the question of contribution to the small business training by 
universities and colleges is raised by the low percentage (4%) of managers 
trained there.
As one small firm points out:-
"Although we have always had more orders than we can cope with, 
we are restricted in obtaining qualified engineers and managers. 
Universities rarely seem to provide the practical tuition necessary 
for management or design engineering in industry." 3, Telegraph 
and-Telephone Apparatus and Equipment.
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Another points to a reason why and provides a practical suggestion
"Too little training is initiated for small company management 
as opposed to medium or large organizations. The problems are 
different and involve different analysis and treatment. A simple 
manual system of teaching would be a useful adjunct to the broader 
methods of training - for use when the individual was actually 
in the jobl' 3, Vats, Tanks and Cisterns.
But even' if universities or colleges did provide courses suitably 
tailored to small firm problems it is debatable whether or not managers 
could afford the time or money to attend e.g.
"Many years are spent gaining experience and -making mistakes 
because time is spent trying to produce without sufficient funds 
to study business methods." 0, Shipbuilding and shiprepairing.
Both measures of training were used to try and elaborate the relationship 
between planning modes and subsidiary companies. When management training 
was introduced there was neither replication or disappearance of the original 
relationship. This suggests specification but the difference between 
first order Gamma and second order Gamma was onl#.0.04, suggesting 
management training has only a small part to play in explaining the 
original relationship.
However, a more interesting specification is found when the relation 
between planning modes and subsidiary companies is controlled on-the third 
variable, EMT. (See Table 5.2.4c)
Table 5.2.4c Planning Modes by Subsidiary Companies Controlling for 
External Management Training "(EMT)
EMT NO EMT TOTAL
Planning S_
Formal 138
Informal 27
165
NS
104
S
92
1 16 119
220
X
Significance
M
Abbreviations:
= 51.81
= 1 
= 1%
= o.i4
2 11
NS
211
663
1470.  874 
x2 = 31.02
v = 1
Significance = 1% 
2
2 = °*°3
S = Subsidiary 
NS = Not Subsidiary
t
Missing Cases = 24
Zero Order Gamma = 0.59
First Order Partial 
Gamma - 0.47 
2Zero Order 1 yx = 0.09
N.B. Figures in cells are frequency counts
176
2 2Notice that the conditional associations Q  and 1 2) change
dramatically. Under the EMT category the relation is increased from 2 2
\ yx = 0,09 toQ = 0.l4 and in the no EMT category the relation is 
substantially reduced from 0.09 to = 0,03. The subsidiary companies 
providing EMT are more likely to adopt a formal planning mode (138).
The companies not providing EMT are more likely to be independent companies 
employing a more informal planning mode. The zero order Gamma = 0,59 
drops to 0.47 when EMT is controlled, suggesting that EMT is partially, 
but not wholly, responsible for the original relationship between 
planning modes and subsidiary companies.
5,2.5 Chief Executive/Nepotism
In small companies, the planning perspective is often confused 
not only by the degree of autocratic leadership of the entrepreneur 
founder and his personal aspirations, but also by the confused and
complex relation between aspirations of blood relatives and non-family
. . .  17managers. In addition, as Tilles and Contas point out, the pertinent
economic aspirations of the firm may even be divorced from these.
Table 5.2.5a illustrates a weak but significant relation between
planning modes and the age of the chief executive (only 2% of the
variation is explained). Firstly, there is weak evidence in the table
suggesting that chief executives over 60'years old are more likely
to be found in NPCs .(75%) than in PCs (25%). Secondly, PCs tend to have
a greater proportion of managers in the younger age bands of 30-39
(l6/0 and 40—49 (36%) than do NPCs (l4%) and (27%) respectively.
Thirdly, observe that 84% of chief executives in all companies are
40 years plus. The mean age for PCs being 49 years with standard
deviation 9.3 years, while NPCs have a mean of 48.6 years and larger
standard deviation of 11.7 years, PCs being more clustered around their
mean. Finally, note that, although there are only 17 observations for
all companies in the below 30 age band, 82% are NPCs.
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When planning mode is cross-tabulated with whether the chief 
executive of the company is the founder or not, there is only a very low, 
significant relation I yx = 0.01. (Table 5.2.5b).
To examine the relation between planning modes and the extent of 
family involvement in management, a variable was created by taking 
the ratio of family managers to the total number of managers - (Nepotism). 
A crude percentage scale ranging from LOW to HIGH nepotism was 
constructed, with the following allocation:-
0-19 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-100
LOW LOW TO MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH
MEDIUM TO HIGH
Hence if a company had 10 managerial posts and 3 family members in 
management it was classified thus 3/10 x 100 = 30% and allocated to 
the LOW to MEDIUM category. Admittedly this is a rather crude process 
and the results must be treated with great caution. Table 5.2.5c shows 
a low, significant relationship. Note that low levels of nepotism 
are more likely to be found in PCs (48%) and high levels in NPCs (78%). 
The percentage of companies in each level of nepotism decreases from 
48% = low, to 22% = high, in PCs and increases from 52% = low, to 
78% = high, for NPCs.
However, this result, though interesting, must be treated with 
caution. Firstly, many companies in the six or over category failed 
to specify how many managerial posts they possessed and so were 
allocated the missing code (see Q7, section 2 of the survey). Hence, 
it is possible that the above ratio of nepotism is misleading for these 
companies as they belong to other categories. Secondly, many artisan- 
type companies, with the chief executive in the only managerial post, 
would be classed here as perfect nepotism (l/l) but is more likely to 
be autocracy, if there is no other family involvement.
'The pros and cons of nepotism in small companies were discussed 
in section 2.2.3, but whatever the academic viewpoints on the topic,
there should always be a place for sound practical advice e.g.
"My son is my assistant, age 23. Don’t have family managers
unless they earn their position and thus respect*" 7, Soft Drinks.
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Ratiocination would dictate that as a company grows, the
administration of resources and capital would he more likely to
synchromesh with efficiency if the management adopted more formal
l8procedures of planning and control. Indeed Hosmer has suggested that
the characteristics of a company differ on either side of a hundred employees.
1 9  .  .V,Tild and Swann suggest that this organizational change is reflected
in the adoption of formal management techniques around this size.
Table 5.2.6a shows a clear-adoption of formal planning procedures
as company size increases. Observe firstly, that only 23% of companies
<  10 employees claim formality, with 66% in the 151-200 employees
category and 71% in the^300 category. The relation is significant at
the 1% level and 9% of the variation in planning modes is explained by
variation in the company size. Secondly, note that 74% of NPCs are
clustered below fifty employees and 90% below one hundred employees.
Only 69% of PCs are below one hundred employees, with 90% below three
hundred employees. Thirdly, the dominant percentage in each category
shows a marked change from NPCs to PCs just above the one hundred
employee mark.(in category 101-150 employees 59% PC, 4l% NPC), thus
lending support to both Hosmer1^ and Wild and Swann1 .^ Finally, the'
mean number of employees for NPCs is 49 with standard- deviation 66
compared with a mean of 96 employees with standard deviation of 102 in PCs.
Table 5-2.6b shows a similar picture when size is defined by
turnover. The relation is significant and 10% of the variation in planning
modes is accounted for by the variation in company turnover. Although
there is some instability among the lower categories of turnover
(£0-£80,000), 75%* of these companies are NPCs while in the category
greater than two million pounds 66% of these companies are PCs. 94%
of NPCs compared to 79% of PCs lie below the two million pound turnover
nark." The dominant percentage in each category swings towards PCs
within the one million pound to two million pound category. The crucial
categories for size appear to he over one hundred employees and over
£1.5m turnover.
*From the percentages in the 6 cells (3 formal, 3 informal) below 
£80,000 turnover, the frequencies for each cell can be calculated 
using the row totals and from these it can he shown that 75% of 
companies below £80,000 turnover are NPCs.
5 .2 .6  Company S ize
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Couched in practical experience, one small company confirms 
the mystique surrounding the 100 employee mark and provides explanatory 
insights:
"Up to 100 employees, I am a great believer in 'seat of pants 
style' management - it gives a greater degree of flexibility 
to meet the demands of the day, move in or out of markets 
which grow or decline. With growth you have to be more 
formal - channels of communication etc., a lot of which 
really, if you have been able to manage a small company,
- is time wasting, boring and unchallenging. I may be mad but
as years go by I feel like going back to 100 employees - certainly 
not forward". 8, Drop Forgings etc.
This advantage of flexibility of smaller scale is enhanced by 
a special way of life e.g.
"For 30 years until 1976 we were a private limited company - 
. the team effort and personal will to succeed at all levels 
was perfect with the family spirit predominating. Now, as 
part of a public company the spirit is not the same and life 
revolves around the balance sheet and figures, figures, 
figures ..." 7, Space Heating, Ventilating and Air-conditioning
equipment.
The great problem to many small firms of growth seems to lie in 
a loss of control, besides the loss of spirit e.g.
"It is possible to control a company employing about 30 people, 
which is very satisfying and not too much of a strai-n. To 
expand would mean amalgamation and loss of control which 
that brings. Having always been in control, sharing is definitely 
not on." 2, Cardboard boxes, cartons etc.
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However, amalgamation is not the only way to grow. Internal 
growth via a delegation and the addition of new managers can occur 
without loss of control or spirit. However, there does appear to he a 
change in the manner of management if growth is pursued e.g.
"£5,000 p.a., in 19T2 to £400,000 in 1978/79 ~ no one can 
achieve this without planning - which, with our specialised 
product, means anticipating customer requirements and keeping 
abreast of modern technology. Up until now this planning has 
largely been the founder’s responsibility with his knowledge 
' of the market and feedbacks from reps in the field. With new 
products, internal planning and marketing is having to be put 
on a more formal basis." 1, Other radio, radar goods.
Hence it is possible for small firms to retain control and spirit 
and grow by the adoption of more formal methods, but as one astute 
chairman pointed out, "Unfortunately, it is difficult to know which 
should come first, the growth or the cost of formal planning".
3, Construction.
Figure 5.2 Conditional Associations Between Planning Modes and 
Subsidiary Companies across Company Size Bands
Original **\2yx = 0.09
Employees 0-10
11-
25
26-
50
51-
75
75-
100
101-
150
151-
200
201-
300 300
V n , 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.45* 0.07 0.04
Significance 1% 1% 1% 9% 9% 1% 1% 11% 20%
% Subsidiary 11 17 22 27 36 44 46 50 55
Zero Order Gamma - 0.59
First Order Partial Gamma = 0.46
* Cell size unstable. One cell = zero
Figure 5*2 illustrates the specification achieved when the relation between 
planning modes and subsidiary companies is controlled on the variable company 
size. The Gamma change of 0.13 illustrates that size explains a proportion 
of the variation but that other variables are also responsible.
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Note firstly, the increasing association between size and 
percentage of subsidiary companies in the categories. Secondly, 
in employee category (151-200) all subsidiary companies were PCs and 
in category (l01-150jj 83% of subsidiary companies were PCs. Finally, 
the conditional associations drop in seven of the nine categories but 
not completely to zero, suggesting that the relation between planning 
modes and subsidiary companies has been partially explained by the 
variable company size but there still remains some indirect association 
between planning modes and subsidiary companies.
' 5-2.7 S.I.C. Order
20 . .Passer has argued that economic welfare is ‘not increased by the
mere improvement in the administration of existing resources, hut by
the application of science and new technology. In this respect
21 . . .Salveson argues that company viability and profitability in the long
term, depends on the extent of planning for invention, innovation and
any consequent new trade. Hence the most urgent need for long range
planning is in the technical industries. This is clearly illustrated
in Table 5-2.7 - where companies in the highly concentrated, highly
22 23 24capital intensive industries 9 9 of chemicals and electrical
engineering where invention and innovation are critical, show a
strong tendency towards a formal planning mode (49% and 55% respectively).
The traditional industries on the other hand are dominated by. . .  . 25NPCs. Textile companies facing alarming foreign competition
which has made it necessary to modernize equipment and introduce new 
26techniques , shows a low degree of adoption of any formal planning
mode (28%). The leather and fur sector, although the sample size is too
small to generalize, shows a similar reluctance to adopt -formality (11%).
Metal manufacture, in the case of steel, aluminium and metal
27cables, a highly concentrated sector with relatively low technology 
but high capital barriers to entry, consists of only 35% PCs.
28Mechanical engineering, perennially dependent on invention and innovation ,
29with' some concentration and high capital intensity, but with relatively
30low barriers to entry , possesses 38% of PCs. (Note the profusion of
small companies in the category 17% of the total). Metal goods, an
31industry dominated-by small companies (15% of the sample) and vehicles - 
where the small companies supply components to the larger assemblers 
and to this extent some of their output is predetermined, show similar 
percentages of PCs to their related industries above (35% and 39% 
respectively) and as such are typical of the sample as a whole.
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Of the materials companies in Order 16, 53% are PCs. Although
brickmaking is a traditional industry, most manufacture is now highly
mechanised. Cemfent production has undergone a similar technical
improvement, through intensive research, as has pottery with considerable
32re-equipment and automation
It is plausible that where an industry reflects a high capital
investment, the more likely it is to adopt a formal planning mode.
21 . .The data here lending support to Salveson’s proposition. The automated
food sector (43%) is also indicative of the trend. The clothing sector
has similarly enjoyed mechanisation, but remained essentially labour 
. - . 33 . . . 34intensive . Further, foreign competition has eroded the domestic 
market and perhaps this has reflected in a lower.proportion of companies 
in the sector pursuing formal planning (40%).
The construction industry has always sustained a plethora of small 
companies. Technical and commercial economies of scale are not widely
available, barriers to entry are relatively low and the nature of the
.  .  .  3 5task and its supervision invites the attention of small scale .
Further, the industry has long been adjudged an economic-barometer in
the national economy and suffered volatile swings in demand. This
uncertainty often yields a formal planning mode impractical, reflected
in only 24% of companies pursuing the technique. The comparatively
low adoption of formality in the timber industry (30%) could perhaps
be due to its dependence, not only on imports for supply, but on the
volatile construction sector for demand. Although the sample of 21
is too small to generalize, there is evidence that small companies
in the ship building and marine engineering sectors pursue a degree of
formality (48%).
The overall relation between planning modes and S.I.C. Orders is 
significant, with 3% of the variation in planning modes explained by 
the variation in S.I.C. Order.
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Figure 5.3 Conditional Associations Between Planning Modes 
and Company Control Across S.I.C. Orders
Original ^  ^ yx - 0.05
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 9
13,14
15
,16,17 8,11
18,19 20
0.29 ’0.12 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.05
Significance 2% 12% . 1% 5% 9% 9% 18% 1% 10%
The conditional associations specifying the relation between 
planning modes and who controls the company for each S.I.C. Order in 
Figure 5*3 shows strong relationships are upheld in Orders 3 (food), 
5 (chemicals) and the combined Order 8,11,18,19 (instrument, Vehicles, 
paper, printing, publishing and other manufacturing industries).*
Figure 5.4 Conditional Associations between Planning Modes and 
Subsidiary Companies across S.I.C. Orders
Original [ yx = 0.09
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 •9 13,14 15 * 16,17
8,11
18,19 20
q 2yxs 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09
Significance 11% 1% 1% 1% 5% 3% 1% 1% 1%
Zero Order Gamma = 0.59
First Order Partial Gamma = O .58
Figure 5.4 shows the conditional associations between planning modes 
and subsidiary companies after controlling for S.I.C. Order. Note the 
original association increases for categories 5 (chemicals) and 7 
(mechanical engineering). 83% of chemical subsidiary companies pursued
formality, compared to only 50% of subsidiary companies in .the textile
*The S.I.C. Orders were collapsed down in order to preserve cell 
frequencies. Orders (6,12), (7,10), (13,14,15) and (16,1 7) 'were 
grouped together on the broad categorization of similarities on the 
production side. The residual (8,11,18,19) have been reclassified 
as ’Other Manufacturing Industries’. Hence the comments that follow 
are necessarily brief and no generalization is assumed.
group for which the relation drops to 0.04. This interesting 
specification lends some explanation to the technical versus non-technical 
industry planning as proposed earlier in this section. Even though 
there is an association between planning modes and subsidiary companies, 
the evidence suggests that, in the non-technical sector even the 
subsidiary companies show a reluctance to formalize planning, while 
in the technical, more formal sector, there is a stronger link with 
planning via subsidiary companies. However, as the change in Gamma 
shows (0.59-0.58) not much of the original relation is explained by 
the controlling on the variable S.I.C. Order.
5.2.8 Market Conditions 
Sales to main customer
The relation shown in Table 5.2.8a is significant at the 12%
2level. The association is weak ( yx = 0.005. Note firstly, 77%
of the survey companies produce less than 25% for their main customer, 
only 4% of survey companies produce over 75% for their main customer,. 
Secondly, 69% of the companies producing over 75% of their output for 
one customer are NPCs, compared to 60% of NPCs in the category producing 
less than 10% output to one main customer. This weak evidence may, 
suggest that companies producing increasing amounts of output to one 
customer are more likely to he NPCs.
Sales to exports
The relation in Table 5.2.8b is significant at the 1% level. A 
low level of association (^ 2yx = 0.03) between the variables suggests
that PCs are likely to be export conscious.
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Figure 5.5 Percentage of Sales going to Exports by PCs
Output to 
Export None 0-10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75%
PCs 29 35 46 54 49 4l %
TOTAL 32 38 15 9 4 3 %
Total = 1465 companies 
Figure 5*5 above is taken from Table 5.2.8b and shows, more clearly that:-
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1) - 70% of small companies in the sample export less than 10%
of their output.
2) - PCs tend to increase their share of exported output categories
reaching 54% in the 24-50% category, then falling to 4l% in 
the 75% category. Hence, very low and very high exporting 
companies are more likely to he NPCs, while in the mid-range, 
companies striking a balance between home and overseas markets 
are equally likely to be of either planning mode.
In assessing the existence of formal planning on small company 
exports, one executive involved in exporting provides an insight e.g.
"Only limited formal planning can be undertaken as demand in 
overseas markets changes so rapidly that management must be 
able to change policy quickly. Experience of trade is essential 
for this". 2, Other Mechanical Engineering
When the relation between planning modes and sales to exports 
was controlled on the variable S.I.C. Order, the association in seven 
of the nine categories was insignificant. The conditionals represented 
specification - but generalization beyond the data would be risky..
(No table included).
Figure 5.6 Percentage of Companies and Export Output by S.I.C. Order
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 9 13,1415 16 17it,if l8 1^9 20
Companies with 
<10% output 
exported
83 59 70 64 49 6l 83 67 88
Companies with 
^-75% output 
exported
5 12 7 7 13 8 6 5 2
Figure 5.6 illustrates the percentage of companies in each S.I.C. Order 
and the amount of exporting they engage in. The low exporters are food, 
metal, manufacture, bricks, pottery, glass and cement and construction.
The export orientated sectors being in chemicals and electrical engineering 
The latter two industries possessing a high proportion of PCs, as do some 
of the low exporters like food and bricks. The relation between 
planning modes and exporting seems to be confused at this stage.
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The relation between planning modes and type of competitor in 
Table 5.2.8c is significant at the 1% level but low (*\^yx - 0.02).
Three particular points should be noted from Table 5.2.8c:-
1) There is evidence to suggest that PCs find more competition 
among large, medium-sized and foreign companies, while NPCs 
find more competition from other small firms. A plausible 
relation considering PCs tend to be larger small companies and 
able to compete with medium sized companies on a slightly 
higher plant scale.
2) 10% of small companies consider foreign competition as significant.
3) The majority of competition for small companies (71%) comes from 
medium sized or other small companies.
When the above relation is elaborated on S.I.C. Order seven of 
the nine categories were insignificant. The conditional associations 
showed specification. (no table included).
Figure 5*7 Percentage of Companies Facing Types of Competition
Type o f  C om petito r
by S.I.C. Order
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 9 13,1415* 16,17
8,11,
18,19 20
% of firms who 
consider their main _ 
competition is 
foreign
15 9 10 15 25 4 11 3
% of firms who 
consider their main » 
competition comes 
from medium and 
small companies
59 72 77 59 60 81 69 95
Figure 5*7 illustrates the perceived significance of foreign competition 
to each S.I.C. Order. Note firstly, that textiles, chemicals and 
electrical engineering firms suffer from high levels of foreign 
erosion of domestic markets, while food, bricks and construction companies 
perceive the effect of foreign companies as of little significance. However, 
caution must be exercised here. The former companies were among the 
higher exporters and the latter among the lower exporters - it is 
plausible that respondents considered foreign companies in overseas markets 
to be of significant competition and not foreign companies in domestic 
markets which was the effect that the question was attempting to elaborate.
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Secondly, note that the profusion of small company competition in 
construction (95%), bricks et al (8l%), mechanical engineering (77%) 
and metal manufacture (72%). Finally, note the marked similarity in 
competitive structure between the chemicals and electrical engineering 
sectors - both exporters and both planners.
Number of Competitors
The relation between planning modes and the number of competitors
in Table 5.2.8d is significant at the 1% level hut "with low ( *\2yx = 0.01)
association. The following points should he observed:-
1) 86% of small companies in the sample face three or more competitors,
57% face six or more and 34% face fifteen or more, illustrating
that the market in which small firms exist is highly competitive.
2) 74% of companies facing only one competitor and 62% of companies
facing only two competitors are NPCs.
3) . There are only 26% PCs in the one competitor category rising to
43% in the 6-15 competitor category and falling to 33% above 
fifteen competitors. The latter category contains 34% of the 
sample and is dominated by NPCs (67%). As PCs tend to operate 
at a larger scale than other small companies they may compete 
in markets with fewer competitors e.g. oligopoly, which would help 
explain the above trend.
When the above relation was elaborated on the control variable
S.I.C. Order, all the category associations were insignificant. The 
conditional associations increased in every case (no table included).
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Figure 5*8 Percentage of Companies Facing Various Degrees of 
Competition by S.I.C. Order
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 9 13,14,
15
16,17 8,11,
18,19
20
Firms with:- 
< 2 COMPETITORS 16 . k. 3 6 11 7 5 8 3
Firms with:- 
> 6  COMPETITORS _ 63 42 58 54 50 53 60 54 69
Figure 5.8 above illustrates the extent of competition faced by small 
firms in each S.I.C. Order, Note in particular the number of individual 
competitors in construction, food, brick, pottery, glass and cement. The'
S.I.C Orders with fewer firms are in chemicals, electrical engineering, 
textiles and leather and other manufacturing industries.
The difficulty of planning under such intense competition associated with 
low harriers to entry is explained by one small firm:
"We are in a section of the construction industry where anyone 
can set up cheaply - hence competition is intense. There are 
few large firms i.e. the industry consists of very small and ■ 
very large and never the twain shall meet. All planning is 
based on survival as it is not possible to grow steadily one has 
to suddenly become large." 1, Shop and Office Fitting etc.
The evidence from this section suggests that there is a weak 
association between planning mode and the market structure. There 
appears to be a dichotomy between chemicals and electrical engineering 
on the one hand and bricks et al, construction and metal, manufacture 
on the other, with food being a unique case.
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5.3. Aspects of Internal Company Operations
5.3.1 Management Levels
The' relation between planning modes and the number of management
levels (Table 5.3.1) is significant at the 1% level and shows a low^ 2level of association ^  yx = 0.10. Table 5*3.1 illustrates that as
management levels increase, the proportion of companies pursuing
formality does also, A plausible relation, as management levels is
only another proxy for size. The critical categories where the dominant
percentage changes in favour of PCs is between three and four levels
38of“management. Drucker argues that ’every additional level distorts
objectives and mis-directs attention’ - so it is unusual to observe
that 33% of PCs have four or more levels. In fact, 4% of PCs had
37six or over and as Drucker adds any business with six or seven 
levels is too big.
Note in particular, from Table 5. 3.1:
1) 67% of small companies in the sample have two or three levels
of management and 80% of small companies in the sample have three 
levels or less.
2) 86% of ’entrepreneur companies’ (no levels) were NPCs.
3) 69% of companies having six or more-levels were PCs.
4) The modal category for both PCs and NPCs was three levels,
5) 69% of NPCs had two or three levels, while 68% of PCs had three
or four levels, which is as expected with PCs being slightly 
larger small firms.
It would he plausible to argue that there is a physical limit 
to the number of management levels that could exist in PCs before 
information crucial to the effectiveness of the plan becomes distorted. 
In-addition, commitment to the plan and implementation of it become 
easier as long as communication between levels is efficient. As one 
small company executive states:-
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"It is important to us that all managers from the chief executive 
downwards are personally actively involved in the day to day 
commercial running of the business in order to properly account 
for- the future planning and growth of the company. In this way, 
we try and take account of contributions coming up through the 
management structure and involve as many people as practicably 
possible in planning decisions to give a sense of "belonging1 
to the employee. It helps when implementing the plan!" 5S Animal 
and Poultry foods.
That remark 'also serves to highlight another finding of this survey 
that follows - i.e. that small companies engage in formal planning 
within their own day to day management team and without resort to 
specialist employees.
5.3.2 Length-of Management Service
The relation between planning modes and length of management
service (Table 5.3.2) was significant at 1%, with a low level of ^ 2association ( yx = 0,04. As the length of management service increased, 
so did the percentage of NPCs in each category. Note, in particular 
from Table 5.14.2:
1) In 21% of the companies, the average length of.service was over 
twenty years and 79% of these companies were NPCs,
2) The modal category for PCs was five to nine years and for NPCs 
over twenty years.
3) The mean length of service for PCs was 11.7 years, for NPCs
15.3 years.
5.3.3 Chief Executive Succession
Perrigo^, Butler-Cole^ and Buchelle40 among other managerial 
writers, have stressed that one of the critical areas of small company 
growth is the question of managerial succession and companies should 
urgently recognize the need for planned managerial development. The 
relation of the existence of a plan for chief executive succession and 
planning modes was significant at the 1% level, with low association 
*\2yx = 0.02. (Table 5.3.3).
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' Note, in particular, from this table:
1) k9% of the sample companies had not considered a replacement 
for' their chief executive, of which 37% were PCs.
2) l4% of all companies said no successor was planned at all - 
only 25% were PCs.
3) 8% of all companies suggested that finding a candidate of 
sufficient ability was a problem, of these 45% were PCs.
4) Only 20% of sample companies were not hindered in planning for 
a replacement for their chief executive, 46% were PCs.
5) A staggering 49% of PCs and 50% of NPCs had.not considered 
replacements at all.
The evidence suggests that many small companies in the sample 
had not seriously considered the problem of chief executive succession, 
even among formal planning companies, wh&re it would be plausible to 
assume this area was part of the long range plan, but as one PC 
executive explains, succession is not an easy problem to solve:
"We have grown from a small firm to a medium-sized company. .
To go from this to a large company .is more difficult unless 
one enters a group or expands the management structure. To 
be honest, lack of confidence in succession is the greatest 
problem we have." 5, Bread and flour confectionery.
5.3.4 Management Succession
The relation with planning modes (Table 5.3.4) was significant
t\ 2at 1% level, with low association ( yx = 0.07.
The following points should be noticed:
1) PCs were more likely to be continually searching for managers (52%).
2) NPCs were more likely to look for managers only when they 
' required them (65%).
3) NPCs were more likely to train their own managers (63%).
4) Of the 16% of sample companies who considered that there was no
need to look for or train new managers, 86% were NPCs.
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The relation with planning modes, shown in Table 5-3-5 was not 
significant with no association.
Note: Only 9% of sample companies declared their turnover to he high,
60% declared it was low.
5.3.6 Turnover of Clerical/Managerial Labour
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% 
level (Table 5-3-6) with no association. Two points should he noted 
from Table 5-3-6.
1) 8% of sample companies declared turnover to. be high, 
with a vast 78% suggesting it was low.
2) 18% of PCs compared to 11% of NPCs considered their turnover 
to he medium.
5-3-7 Degree of Unionisation
The relationship with planning modes was significant at the 1%^ 2level with low association ( yx = 0.02, Table 5.3.7 shows:
1) Only 19% of sample companies suggested high unionisation, 
of which 49% were PCs.
2) 54% of sample companies suggested unionisation was low,
of which only 31% were PCs. This slight evidence suggests 
unionisation is more common among PCs, which is plausible due 
to their size.
5.3.8 Mean Manager Age (M.M.A.)
The relation with planning modes (Table 5*3.8) was significant 
at the 1% level with association ^  yx = 0.04.
The most important observation in Table 5.3.8 is that survey 
companies having a M.M.A. in the higher categories (50 years plus) 
are far more likely to be NPCs. On a broader theme, it can he seen 
that 52% of all small company managers are aged between 40-49, with 
74% between 40 and 59.
5-3*5  Turnover o f  Manual Labour «
1“ See note on p. |<2I
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5.3.9 Managerial Qualification
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% 
level (Table 5*3.9) with association 2yx = 0.03.
This variable was created by dividing the total number of 
qualifications possessed by the management team by the total number of 
managers in the company - the resultant variable used as a crude 
indicator of qualification on an arbitrary scale from low (no qualification) 
to high (all managers possess a qualification of some kind). The 
scale was percentage! thus:-
0-24 25-49 50-74 75-100
LOW L0W-MED MED-HIGH HIGH
But caution must be exercised in interpreting the table as the 
limitations attached to the variable ‘number of managers’ has already 
been spelled out (see section 5.2.5), so the unusual structure of 
category HIGH is noted in this context .
It is immediately apparent from the data in Table 5.3.9 that the 
majority of managers in survey companies were not very highly qualified 
at all with 74% falling into the categories LOW and LOW to MEDIUM and
that these were far more likely to be in NPCs. The trend therefore,
is for PCs to have a high proportion of qualified managers, which, 
retrospectively, is predictable considering their size, ability to 
sustain external management training and continual search for managers.
5.3.10 Factors Affecting Small Company Efficiency (Table 5-3.10)
The relation with planning modes was not significant, with no 
association. The following observations should he noted from Table 5.3.10:-
1) Surprisingly, the efficiency of 22% of survey companies was not 
significantly restricted during the depressed months of 1976 and
*' 1977* The sharp effect of the state of the industrial economy 
on 42% of small companies is both immediate and frightening.
Over 45% of survey companies were grossly restricted in efficiency 
by the state of the industrial economy and the cheapness of imports.
2) Only 3% of survey companies blamed strikes in other firms and 
notably very few suffered from-strikes within their own company.*
*This observation was' so small it was placed in the other combination 
category (8) when re-grouping took place.
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3) . 3% of survey companies blamed the illness of key employees which
appeared to be more detrimental to PCs, as did pay limit constraints.
4) 11% of survey companies blamed some other reason, not specified, 
that grossly restricted efficiency - this appeared to be more 
detrimental to NPCs.
In summary, the survey companies of both planning modes were 
grossly affected by the general state of the industrial economy, 
other factors appeared to affect PCs and NPCs equally.
5-3.11 Company Policy During Decreasing Sales (Table 5*3.11)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1%
2level with association \ yx = 0.03. The.following points should be 
noted from Table 5.3.11:-
1) The immediate reaction of l8%.of survey companies to a decrease
in sales is to concentrate on rationalising their existing operation, 
these companies being mostly NPCs (72%). Only 1% of survey 
companies would pursue their existing U.K. market to the limit. 
However, PCs tend to be more varied in their choice of strategy 
in that they employ combinations of strategies more readily and 
are prepared to take risks and develop overseas markets to a 
greater degree than NPCs (6% of PCs compared to 4% of NPCs).-
2) Only 6% of survey companies suggested that no particular strategy 
or combination would be used.
In summary, NPCs dominate the single strategy options and PCs 
dominate the multiple categories and showed evidence of greater risk- 
taking.
5.3.12 Types of Management Techniques
Financial (Table 5.3.12a)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
with association yx = 0.20, Note:
1) 25% of companies used no financial techniques at all, 89% were NPCs.
2) 17% of companies used the most- popular combination of budgetary
control and cash flow analysis, 51% were PCs.
3) 12% of companies used only budgetary control, 13% of PCs and
11% of NPCs.
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4) 16% of companies used only cash flow analysis, 11% of PCs and 
18% of NPCs.
5) Only 8% of companies used all the financial techniques listed,
76% were PCs.
6) Break even analysis is more popular among NPCs (4% compared to 2% 
in PCs).
The evidence suggests financial techniques are in more active 
use in PCsc budgetary control and cash flow analysis were the most 
popular in both company typesv
Operational (Table 5-3.12h)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% 
level with low levels of association ^l^yx = 0.12. Note:
1) 31% of sample companies employ no operational techniques, of 
which 8l% were NPCs.
2) 24% of sample companies employ only quality control (21% among 
PCs and 26% among NPCs), this being the most popular individual 
technique.
3) 14% of sample companies employ the most popular combination of 
quality control and inventory control (20% among PCs and 11% 
among NPCs).
4) Combinations of other techniques are used more in PCs than in NPCs.
Again the evidence suggests PCs make more use of all the individual 
operational techniques, apart from quality control and more use of all 
the combinations of techniques.
Management Techniques*.(Table 5*3.12c)
■ The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
with association ^ y x  = 0.23. Note:
l) .A staggering 62% of survey companies used no management techniques; ■ 
these companies were most likely to be NPCs (79%). Note the small 
percentage of companies using each .category of techniques or 
their combinations, only forecasting with a 9.8% share of the total 
could he considered as in active popular use.
^Management Techniques here refers to the specific techniques designated 
at Q8, section 5 of the survey in Chapter 3 and not to the complete 
array of techniques available to management.
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2) Companies using the most popular technique of forecasting were, 
predictably, most likely to be PCs (63%) but notably 10% of all 
survey companies proclaimed the use of these techniques. Of the 
5% of survey companies who had computer facilities 53% were
PCs and where computer assisted forecasting techniques were 
used (3% of companies) PCs dominated the field (85%),
3) Unusually, NPCs were more likely to use market research alone 
(59% of the category) but where this technique was used in 
conjunction with forecasting, computer assistance or both,
- PCs monopolized the categories (78%, 71%, 100% respectively).
4) The dearth of the mathematically based techniques is strikingly 
apparent, simulation, linear programming and operations research 
in general, only survive in 4% of survey companies. What is more 
bemusing is that they are more likely to be found in NPCs - 
especially operational research (79%).
5) Network Analysis found few supporters in this league.
In summary, the market-orientated techniques are in the hands of 
PCs, while the more sophisticated, mathematical-based techniques, 
although thin on the ground, are more likely to be found in NPCs. .
Forecasts (Table 5*3.12d)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
with association ^  2yx = 0,22. Note:
1) Once again, a significant proportion of companies (27%) had no 
forecasts whatsoever and not surprisingly, 92% were NPCs.
2) The larger combinations are predictably in the hand.s of PCs but 
it is heartening to see the minor combinations - those essential 
ones of profit, cash flow, costs and sales being used by a large 
proportion of NPCs. The latter companies dominated the individual 
forecasts.
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The results for this table are in error and should be treated
with great caution. Not only was the zero-code (section IV of the 
survey, Q.6) accidentally labelled in the printing process with the 
heading for both the zero and one code (discounted cash flow) which
should obviously have been Net Present Value, but there is evidence
of misunderstanding by respondents who seem to have confused the 
internal rate of return with the length of payback period.
All that can be safely said is that 29% of companies use .no 
investment appraisal technique of which 78% were NPCs.
5.3.13 Aspects of Internal Finance
Manual Versus Machine System (Tables 5.3.13a, 5.3.13b)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% 
level with ^ yx = 0,09. Note:
1) 57% of survey companies had manual systems, 73% being in NPCs.
2) 17% of survey companies had computerized systems, 66% being PCs.
3) Mixed systems (manual/machine) were of equal importance to 
PCs and NPCs.
4) 84% of companies using a manual system suggested that they had 
no necessity to mechanize yet. The cost of mechanization was 
important to both PCs and NPCs (see Table 5.3.13b)
Qualified Versus Unqualified Personnel (Table 5.3.13c)
The relation between planning modes was significant at the 1%
^  2
level, with association ( yx = 0,07. Note:
1) 39% of sample company book-keeping was supervised by unqualified 
' secretaries, of which 73% were in NPCs.
2) 27% of the sample company book-keeping was supervised by qualified 
accountants, of which 58% were in PCs.
3) 16% of the sample company book-keeping was supervised by qualified 
secretaries, of which 67% were in NPCs.
The results from section 5.3.13 to date suggest that the large 
majority of small U.K. -companies (NPCs) use manual accounting systems 
supervised by unqualified personnel. What sophistication exists in 
the sector is monopolized by PCs.
Investm ent A p p ra is a l Techniques (T ab le  5 .3 .12e )
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Main Source of Cash for Day to Day Running (-Table 5.3.13d)
The relation with planning modes'was significant at the 1% level 
with little association. Note: .
1) In 48% of survey companies, the main source of cash for day to
day running of the business was the bank overdraft - this appeared
slightly more so in the case of PCs, 52% of whom relied on this
source.
2) In 40% of survey companies, the main source of cash was internal 
finance.
3) NPCs tended to rely equally on overdrafts and internal finance 
(45% and 42% respectively) while PCs bent toward the overdraft 
(52% and 38% respectively).
Finance of Major Purchases (Table 5*3.13e)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level
with association 2yx = 0.02. Note:
1) 33% of survey companies relied on bank loans alone for a major 
purpose - the largest single source, 36% were PCs.
2) 16% of survey companies relied on H.P. alone, 29% were PCs.
3) 24% of survey companies relied on another source, which was 
specified in the majority of cases to he internal finance.
4) Only 4% of companies used lease purchasing - 50% PCs.
5) 5% of survey companies used loans from an unspecified source, 
qf which 54% were PCs.
6) PCs tend to use more combinations of finance than NPCs (12% 
compared to 7%).
Availability of Finance (Table 5»3.13f)
The relation with planning modes was not significant with no 
association. But the following points should he noted:
1) 53% of survey companies said finance for major purchases was 
easy to obtain (36% were PCs).
2) 4l% of survey companies.said finance was average to obtain (39%
were PCs) and only 6% thought it was difficult (47% being PCs).
-h See note on p.\Ql
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The relation with planning modes was significant at the 5% level 
with no association. But the following points should be noted:
1) 50% of survey companies took, on average, 4-5-60 days to recover 
a debt.
2) 87% of survey companies took over 30 days.
3) Of the 4% of survey companies who took less than 15 days, 80%
were NPCs.
4) The mean collection period for PCs =49.5 days, compared to 47,2 days 
for NPCs.
Difficult Debtors (Table 5-3.13h)
The relation with planning modes was not significant with no
association. But the following points should be noted:
1) 37% of survey companies suggested large companies took longer 
to pay. (equally for both PCs and NPCs).
2) 16% blamed other small companies (15% of PCs to 17% of NPCs),
11% blamed medium companies (with equal dispersion among the 
planning modes), 5% blamed the Government, 4% "blamed Nationalized 
Industries and 13% suggested they all took similar periods.
Recovery of Debt (Table 5.3.13i)‘
The relation with planning modes was significant with no association. 
But the following points should be noted:
1) 30% of survey companies relied solely on reminder letters, 
another 7% on solicitors letters and 9% on both.
2) Reminder letters dominated the combinations, with legal proceedings 
(3% of companies), with credit agency (5%), with another unspecified 
source (6%).
3) Legal proceedings were only relied on by 3% of companies.
4) 13% of survey companies relied on another way of recovering 
debts, than those mentioned in the survey. No space, was left
for them to specify, hut. where companies had written on the survey, 
many hinted at a personal approach to the managing director of the 
relevant company.
Debt. C o lle c t io n  P e rio d  (Tab le  5 *3 .13g )
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The relation with planning modes’ is significant at the 12% level 
with association ^ 2yx = 0.01.
There was only very little regional difference in the adoption 
of formality in planning, PCs did marginally better in East Anglia, 
the South West, the North — and predominated in Wales (53%). Otherwise 
the categories did not depart significantly from the 37% formal to 
63% informal breakdown in the sample as a whole. The cell sizes in 
Wales were reasonably large and stable and no apparent reason for this 
more than average adoption of formal planning in Wales appears at 
this stage.
5.4 Aspects of Small Company Planning
Plans in Functional Areas (Table 5.4.1)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
with association yx = 0.19. Note, in particular, the following points:
1) 34% of survey companies possessed no specific plans in the 
functional areas of Products, Markets, Finance, Personnel,
Research and Development, of these 86% were NPCs.
2) Only 5% of survey companies possessed plans in all areas, of 
these 83% were PCs.
3) 15% of survey companies had'plans for Products alone, of these 
68% were NPCs.
4) 9% of survey companies had plans for Markets alone, of these 64% 
were NPCs. However, PCs tended to be more dominant in categories 
of combinations of plans for different areas. They occupied 60%
of the minor combinations category. The more popular combinations 
were Products/Markets/Finance (4% of companies), of which 66% 
were PCs; and Products/Markets (6% of companies), of which 48% 
were PCs.
5) Finance was more important to PCs than NPCs (4% compared to 3%).
6) Personnel along with Research and Development* appeared to; be 
neglected areas.
*Research and Development was such a small percentage it was re-grouped 
within the other combinations category.
5.3.14- G eograph ica l Area (Tab le  5 .3 .1 4 )
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Responsibility for Company Aims (Table 5*4.2)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
with association *\ 2yx = 0.06. Note, in particular, the following points:
1) hl% of survey companies aims were determined by the company 
directors, of equal share in PCs and NPCs alike.
2) 26% of the company aims were determined by the chief executive 
alone, 73% of these companies were NPCs.
3) 3% of the survey companies had no aims, 91% of these were NPCs.
4) In only 4% of companies were the aims determined by the family 
and predictably, 77% were NPCs.
5) 5% of the survey company aims were determined by the holding 
company, of which 63% were PCs.
Hence, within NPCs the chief executive plays a major role in 
determining company aims (71% of NPC aims were determined by the chief 
executive and the directors), while 84% of PCs have their aims 
determined by chief executives, directors and combinations of the other 
categories.
The role of the chief executive in small company planning appears 
to follow a definite trend. In very small independent companies he 
is usually the sole creator of plans although their implementation is 
a more difficult process, e.g. '
"Ours is a very small company and much of the planning at ’top’ 
level is done in the bath, in bed before going to sleep, or 
-whilst gardening and the plans are promptly destroyed by the 
demands of a large customer or some new Government action!'
1, Electric light fittings, wiring accessories etc.
This research has identified that size is an important criteria 
in the adoption of formal planning, but perhaps the attitude of the 
chief executive is also important e.g.
"We have no experience of formal planning because it was not 
necessary and the chief executive, by temperament, had no time 
for it. With a change in chief executive, formal planning will 
be instituted as a means of achieving an objective (other than 
personal satisfaction) and measuring progress towards identified 
objectives-;" 5,.Optical instruments.
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As the company grows, the chief executive brings the ideas and 
advice of his co-directors into strategy formulation - not only because 
they can provide specialist advice hut also because commitment to the 
plan stems from involvement in formulation and this action facilitates 
implementation.
As one PC stated:
"We place the greatest stress on personal discussion 
between-managers and general managers and myself as managing 
director and this has become a daily routine rather than relying 
on formal meetings." 7, Integrated Circuits.
This statement also illustrates that small companies may not 
adopt such a rigid procedure in their formal planning, preserving the 
smaller scale benefits of communication and feeling of belonging 
whilst simultaneously producing, in their eyes, an effective and 
flexible formal plan.
Company Aims (Tables 5.4.3al, 5.4.3b)
The following points should he noted:
1) NPC aims appear to he more diverse than PCs, 13% of PCs pursuing 
the traditional aims of Profit and Sales Maximisation compared 
to only 11% in NPCs.
2) Profit Maximisation is crucial to both planning mode companies 
not only as a sole aim but also in combinations with other aims.
3) Welfare of Employees, though unimportant as a single aim, is 
dominant in most combinations of aims for both planning mode companies.
4) Survival appears to he a more crucial aim to NPCs.
5) Growth of Dividends and other aims appear unimportant to both 
planning mode companies.
6) The most important aims for PCs are Profit Maximisation alone (7%) , 
Profit and Sales Maximisation (4%) and Profit Maximisation and 
Welfare (4%). The most important aims for NPCs are Survival (4%), 
Profit Maximisation alone (5%) and Profit and Sales Maximisation (4%).
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The emphasis in both modes in on Profit Maximisation but there 
appears to be a delicate shift in balance to NPCs where Survival is 
of secondary importance and to PCs where Welfare of Employees is 
important. It is plausible that NPCs perceive Survival as a major 
problem in their daily lives, while PCs - more formalized and arguably 
more confident of Survival, perceive that Welfare of Employees is 
crucial to company continuity. The latter may well be instigated 
by their larger size.
Functional Areas (Tables 5.4.4a to 5.4,4d)
The collection of tables 5.4.4a to 5.4.4d are a clarified 
summary of extensive cross-tabulation and refer-to Qs. 5, 6 and 7, 
Section 5 of the survey. The following interesting observations 
should be noted:
1) Customers and Production received most attention by both 
types of planning mode companies, Research and Development was 
significantly ignored by both types.
2) Liquidity and Marketing were important to both company types, 
Marketing marginally more so in PCs and Liquidity more so in NPCs. 
Labour problems received very little attention, as did Suppliers 
and Stocks.
3) The combination receiving most attention in both planning types 
was Customers, Liquidity and Production - 17% NPCs, 11% PCs, 
followed by Customers/Production and Marketing - 4% NPCs, 7% PCs.
4) The combination receiving least attention in NPCs was Research 
and Development/Marketing (l6%) and Research and Development/
Labour (13%) in NPCs. In PCs the balance shifted to Research
and Development/Suppliers (12%) and Research and Development/Labour 
(ll%). Note that NPCs score high on their neglect of Marketing 
combinations compared to PCs.
5) Companies in both planning types perceived Customers/Production 
needed more attention, as did Research and Development/Marketing.
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The picture painted by Tables 5.4.4a to 5-4.4d does not auger 
too well for the future survival of many small companies in the sample.
The dearth of Research and Development in survey companies is significant, 
the minor attention given to Marketing - even in PCs and the mesmorised 
attention given to Production may well illustrate that small British 
manufacturing firms are still engineer-orientated and dominated. This 
fear is partially offset by the knowledge that the Customer is still 
of prime importance to small companies - and that the English disease 
of Labour Problems is not pre-occupying the small firm sector as yet.
How close and how dedicated small firms are to their customers 
is depicted by one NPC ;chairman:
"Our philosophy is to provide every consideration for our 
customers, the majority of whom are known to us by name, we 
feel that small company planning in the formal sense to be 
unnecessary if the following are given, prime consideration:
Quality of goods, speed of service, competitive prices and customer 
relationship. We confess to having no wish to expand to a point 
at which the senior executives lose personal contact with customers."
1, Surgical, dental and veterinary instruments and appliances.
Formal Aims (Table 5.4.5)
The relation with planning modes was significant at the 1% level 
2with association £ yx = 0.l4. Notej
1) 8l% of companies had no formally written aims.
2) -75% of companies who had written aims were PCs.
3) Only 39% of PCs had formally written aims.
4) Surprisingly, 8% of NPCs had formally written aims.
Duration of Formal Planning
Table 5.4.6 outlines the duration of formal planning for U.K. 
small firms. Note:
l) The modal category for corporate plans in the sample was
3-5 years, most formality having begun during 1973.to 1975.
The mean age was 7 years (1972). This would place a 'duration 
gap1 of 10 years between the adoption of the technique in the 
U.S.A. and its adoption in Britain.
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2) 28% of companies had begun formal corporate plans before the
1970s and 13% before 19&3•
When the relation between duration and S.I.C. Order was tested, 
it was significant at the 10% level with association = 0.04.
Figure 5*9 Average Duration of Formal Planning by S.I.C. Order
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 . 7,10 9 16,17 Jj’11 20
Modal Category (years) 3—5 3-5 3-5 3~5 3-5 3~5 3~5 3-5 15+
Mean (years) 6.2 8.2 6.4 5.9 6.6 7.8 ‘ 7.2 7 10.1
Figure 5*9 shows the duration of formal plans across S.I.C. Orders. Note:
1) Although construction companies make up only 8% of PCs, they 
appear to have been undergoing formal planning procedures 
longer than other S.I.C. Orders.
2) Small companies in chemicals and textiles/leather/clothing 
appear to have been formal planning for most of the 1970s.
3) The youngest planners are in foods and mechanical engineering/ 
shipbuilding.
Number of People in the Planning Process
Table 5*4.7 illustrates the number of people involved in the
planning process. Note:
1) The distribution was almost bi-modal, with 116‘/counts of 3 
people and 118 counts of 4 people.
2) -The evidence suggests formal planning in small companies
revolves around the top 3 or 4 people in the company.
When the relation with S.I.C, Orders was tested, it was not 
significant ( 2yx = 0.03).
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Length  o f  P la nn in g  P e rio d
F ig u re  5*10 Length o f  P la nn in g  P e rio d  By S . I .C .  Orders
S.I.C. ORDER 3 5 6,12 7,10 9 13,1415 16,17
8,11
18,19 20
PC Modal Category (yrs) .1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1 1-3 . .1-3 1-3 1-3
Mean (yrs) .2.2 2.1 . 2.0 . 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.6
NPC Modal Category -(yrs) 3-5 1-3 1-3 1-3 1 1-3 1-3 1-3 1
Mean (yrs) .2.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 2,1. 2.4 2.5
There are two Important observations to be made from Figure 5.10. 
Observe not only the striking similarity in planning horizons hy 
both company types but also the similarity across industrial groups.
Three years is the limit, two on average. 74% of NPCs and 77% of PCs
will look no further (see Tables 5.4.8, 5.4.9, respectively).
Two further observations are also worthy of consideration:
1) Note the very short planning horizons in electrical’engineering -
perennial invention and annual innovation dictate the immediacy 
of the horizon. The length of the duration of contract from 
negotiation through design to final product in construction may have 
lengthened the horizon in this sector.
2) Slight evidence from Tables 5.4,8, and 5.4.9 suggests that the
horizon is likely to be shorter than the one stated in Figure
5.10, as the distribution was almost bi-modal between the categories-
one year and one to three years.
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Perhaps the shortness of these horizons across British industry 
is due to three principal factors. The first two are aptly described 
by a chief executive e.g.
"in other words we find the short term plans, i.e. our annual 
budget - most effective. The emphasis on the shorter term 
is due firstly to the enormous increase in the rate of change of 
technology which has made formal longer term planning rather a 
waste af time and secondly, the fluctuation in recent years in 
the general economy made a nonsense of our longer term exercises"
7, Integrated Circuits.
The general uncertainty in the economy was posed as a key 
stumbling block to any formal planning by the small firm sector and 
this -uncertainty was aggravated by a third factor acting adversely 
on the adoption of formality - the ’political interference' e.g.
"The greatest obstacle to planning is uncertainty throughout 
industry due to political influences, government interference etc., 
which sometimes appears to work against the 'natural' laws of 
economics without regard to the fundamental need of every 
company to pay wages EVER! month and provide security and comfort 
in the long term for their families ,.. Industry has to EARN 
the money and be ALLOWED TO before government can spend it!
The policy of deciding how national income can he spent before
it is available - living beyond our basic means - causes 
uncertainty and confusion in industry and commerce, making corporate 
‘planning difficult,-if not impossible." 2, Scales and weighing 
machinery.
It is logical that the small firms should depend so crucially 
on the stability of the economy (as illustrated in Table 5.3.10).
They are often the first to feel any depression or lull in trade.
But they appear to be crying out not only for stability but also as
little government interference as possible. If there has to he 
interference, even on a small scale, it. would benefit the small firm 
sector if it were consistent.
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Table 5*4.10 Issues of Importance in Choosing Between Plans
%NPC %PC Epsilon
Issues o f  Im portance in  Choosing Between Plans
Other reason 4
Satisfaction of Owners Desires 17
Growth of Sales/Profit/Satisfaction of Employees 4 
Satisfaction'of Employees 4
Profitability 33 18. 15
Profitability/Satisfaction of Employees 4 9 5
Growth of Sales Potential . 15. 4 - 11
Growth of Sales/Profitability 4 36 32
Growth of Sales/Satisfaction of Employees 4
Profitability/Risk Spread 10
Profitability/Owners Desires 5
Combinations 17 15
102 ’ 101
Note from Table 5.4.10:
1) When considering their companies future, NPCs emphasize the 
importance of Profitability, Growth of Sales and Satisfaction of 
the owners personal values and aspirations. Risk Spreading was 
not significant to them.
2) FCs relied more on a combination of Profitability and Growth 
-of Sales potential and the Spreading of Risk; the Satisfaction
of owner desires was not really applicable here (most PCs were 
subsidiaries).
3) The Satisfaction of Employees played a significant role in both 
planning mode companies.
Just how important employees are to small firms is highlighted 
by a small firm producing plastic products:
"Flexibility is essential in planning but people are equally 
important - plans must take into account the hopes of all 
employees and the security of their employment. Success 
may be initiated by the ideas and inspiration of directors 
and management but it will only be consolidated by the whole­
hearted support of all concerned." 2, Plastic products not 
elsewhere specified.
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Table 5•4.11 Specific Strategies
%NPC %PC Epsilon
S p e c if ic  S tra te g ie s
1. Identify company strengths and build
on them 14 28 14
2. Review Market and select likely areas 4 16 12
3. Review Customers requirements 32 28 4
Combinations of 1, 2 and 3 not specified 29 3 26
Both 1 and 2 . 6
Company strength/Customer requirements 9 5 4
Customer requirements/Market Review 3 6 6
Other Strategy 5 2 3
All 7
None 4
100 101
The evidence in Table 5.4.11 suggests:-
l) PCs tend to be more market-orientated and tend to pursue their
companies natural advantages to a greater extent than NPC s.
2) NPCs place slightly more emphasis on customer requirements and 
had few specific strategies compared to PCs - 7% of whom 
employed all the strategies.
Significant Issues in Developing Small Company Plans
Table 5•4.12 Significant Issues in Developing Small Company Plans
%NPC %PC Epsilon
Customer 10 25 15
Customer/Domestic Competition 16 8 8
Availability of Finance 3 5 2
Customer/Finance 25 . 9 14
Customer/Social Responsibility 5
Customer/Suppliers 6
Finance/Domestic Competition 6
Customer/Personnel 6
Domestic Competition 5
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%NPC %PC Epsilon
Customer/Domestic & Foreign Competition 3
Customer/Finance/Domestic Competition 4
None 3 . 2 1
. .78 6l
Table 5*4 .12  co n tin u ed
The following observations should he noted from Table 5*4.12:
1) In choosing between different plans, Customer Needs become 
all-important to PCs, other major considerations being the extent 
of Domestic and Foreign Competition and the Availability of 
Finance. Although these issues are of importance in NPCs,
the combination of Customer Needs and the Availability of 
Finance is of prime consideration. Foreign Competition does 
not1 appear as a concern to NPCs.
2) Social Responsibility was not significant on its own to either 
planning type companies hut some NPCs consider it important 
along with Customer Needs.
3) Other factors (not specified) were significant in NPCs but
not for PCs who relied on combinations of the specified categories.
Review Process (PCs) (Table 5.4.'13a)
Note:
l) A large portion (24%) of PCs relied on monthly financial reports 
-for assessing their position vis-a-vis the plan. It is difficult 
to ascertain what the reports included hut from a brief glance 
down Table 5*4.13 many simple and effective financial tools 
seem to be in use. The remainder relied on comprehensive 
combinations of analysis of sales/cash flow/variance/ and ratios, 
variance analysis being the more popular.
2) Only 4% of PCs used the complete array of processes which
may indicate that control information is in use but not 
comprehensive.
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Note:
1) 38% of NPCs relied on monthly / quarterly operating 
statements while 28% relied solely on the end of year 
balance sheet, with 10% relying on both. This is a stark 
dichotomy between continual monitoring throughout the year 
by some NPCs and extreme retrospective monitoring by others, 
especially considering that many small company balance 
sheets are not prepared until 12 months after a year end.
2) 2% of NPCs were reluctant to monitor their progress by any 
means, but on the whole the usage of review processes by NPCs 
is widespread.
Executives Involved in Plan Formulation
Table 5•4.l4 Executives Involved in Plan Formulation
%
1. Chief Executive 4
2. Managing Director 6
Both 1 and 2 4
Chief Executive/Managing Director/Financial Manager 3
Chief Executive/Managing Director/Accountant 3
Managing Director/Marketing/Accountant # 3
Managing Director/Production Manager 3
Managing Director/Financial Manager/Marketing/Production 5
. Chief Executive/Managing Director/Finance/Marketing/Production 3
Managing Director/Production/Accountant 3
Managing Director/Marketing/Production/Accountant 3
Chief Executive/Managing Director/Marketing/Production/Accountant4
Chief Executive/Managing Director/Consultant/Production _3
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The evidence from Table 5*4.14 suggests that:-
l) Corporate Planning in small firms is inevitably dominated by
the Chief Executive/Managing Director (l4%). However, only in 
10% of the cases did they develop a plan without consultation. 
The role of the Financial Manager/Accountant was crucial here, 
in 6% of the cases this was the only function directly involved 
and in 21% of the cases the function was involved in other 
significant combinations.
Review Process (NPCs) (Tab le  5 .4 .1 3 b )
- 14
h
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So the importance of the Financial Manager/Accountant appears 
crucial in the formulation of the plan, however, some executives are 
reluctant to involve accountants until really necessary e.g.
"Corporate planning must be simple and flexible - 
3 months is a long time in the life of a small company.
Do not on any account give any planning responsibility 
to trained accountants until your turnover is more than 
£1,000,000." 3, Other rubber goods.
Perhaps a reason for this is their renowned conservatism and reluctance 
to take risk which lends them mentally incompatible with the entrepreneur. 
This could be aggravated by inconsistencies in the quality of advice 
provided to the small firm e.g.
"We have now a very effective firm of accountants working 
with us who have set up a management control system on a 
monthly basis. But for many years we had an old firm of 
accountants who gave us no real information - we sacked them.
It was the best piece of planning we ever did!" 1, -'Shppand 
Office fitting etc.
2) The Marketing Manager played a similar important role in 
conjunction with other functions but never with the Chief 
Executives alone - unlike Production which not only featured 
in 22% of cases where major combinations were important but 
also in 3% of cases in sole conjunction with the Chief Executive.
Ancilliary Aspects of Formal Planning (Tables 5.4.15 to 5*4.25)
The organizational structure in many small companies often 
lends itself to informal communication and so much debate on operations 
and progress is conducted continually. But, many PCs showed evidence 
of regular formalized meetings to discuss the plan and variances from it. 
29% of PCs met formally at least once a month with 38% meeting at 
least every 2 months and 77% meeting at least once a quarter. (See 
Table 5.4.15).
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However, the procedure in developing plans appears to he 
persistently parochial, 73% of survey companies relying purely on 
their own experience and intuition, rather than on the basis of any 
management techniques extrapolating past performance or estimating 
market size (see Table 5.4.16). Further, where outside advice is 
brought in (and 4l% of survey companies insisted it was not), the 
reliance of small companies on the accountancy profession is emphatic.
48% of companies pursuing outside advice relied on accountants alone - 
not always the most risk-taking, creative institution available,
19% of companies called in management consultants, however the minute 
percentage of university consultants contributing to small company 
planning (l%) was embarassing (see Table 5.4.17).. Perhaps a legacy 
of their reluctance to call in outside advice is reflected in the 
large percentage of PCs (62%) who have failed to develop any form 
of contingency plan (see Table 5*4.18).
The reliance of experience and intuition, the reluctance to call . 
in specialist advice and the lack of contingency planning can he 
taken as indicative that what formal planning exists in small firms 
is relatively unsophisticated and indeed must hq, due to limited 
time, cost and in some cases, ability. But the strength of many 
small firms is their speed of reaction and that perhaps this, more than the 
latter limitations, is the principal reason for an unsophisticated 
plan. As one chairman explained :
"It seems to me that in a small company, flexibility and 
the ability to respond quickly to changing situations are of 
vital importance. We prepare annual sales, profit and capital 
expenditure budgets and monitor our performance on a monthly 
basis against these budgets. The budgets are not considered 
as targets hut more of a reference against which to measure 
our performance. We tend to use common sense rather than 
sophisticated formal techniques". 3, Construction equipment rental.
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A further reason for lack of sophistication could well he an 
inkling of distrust by small firms of professional advisors. It 
has already been noted that accountants are looked upon with suspicion 
and universities have been accused of lack of appropriate training of 
their students. Another executive points to the Achilles heel of 
small company planning and calls for tailored techniques to suit 
small firms e.g.
"Many small companies fail, due to lack of planning especially 
in the financial (cash forecasting). Much more emphasis.should 
be made in simplifying control techniques for non-financial 
people. I,often think banks should be more helpful in advising 
in view of the fact that professional accountants tend to be so 
expensive and are therefore only considered useful for dealing 
with the Inland Revenue". 3, Other paper, cardboard or papier 
mache/ goods.
However, as there exist many useful books* for non-financial 
managers together with many small firm management courses, it would 
appear that lack of time .and/or ability emerge as explanatory factors 
of the unsophisticated and also lack of more widespread adoption of 
formal corporate planning.
The majority of PCs (75%) insisted that the adoption of formality 
had not changed the management structure of their companies (see 
Table 5-4.19). In those companies where structure had changed, this 
took the form of the addition of other staff posts (32%) and a general 
streamlining of the existing structure and so increased efficiency 
(28%). Only 4% of these companies required new staff skills but in 
13% the job specification of existing managers changed (see Table 5.4.20). 
This suggests that small companies pursuing formal planning procedures 
adopt the technique within their existing structure and without resort 
to expensive specialist functions.
This evidence may also suggest that small companies who do 
plan ahead formally in their opinion, may well be informal with respect 
to academia and the management literature. But, the important point is
*E.G, R.H. Parker, 'Understanding Company Financial Statements’, Pelican 
(Harmondsworth, 1972).
D. Goch,• 'Finance and Accounts for Managers', Pan (London, 1969).
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that they perceive it is formal and not as perceived hy academia.
Indeed, they appear to benefit. 18% of PCs suggested both profit and 
sales had increased since adoption, size and sales in 9% of cases 
and employee conditions and profits in another 8%. Size was a 
dominant factor in combinations attributing 18% to the total, 
profitability in 46% and sales increase in 39% (see Table 5.4.21).
PCs also suggested that if profit was the greatest benefit (l6%), then 
close behind came a satisfaction from knowledge of the company objectives 
and target setting (15%) which served to co-ordinate managerial 
effort and provide managerial incentive and direction (see Table 5.4.22), 
14% of companies hinted that the greatest benefit of formal planning 
was controlled growth.
Only 10% of NPCs had ever attempted formal planning before 
(see Table 5.4.23) their main reason stated for discontinuity being
the uncertainty of the market in the current economic climate
(32% of companies - see Table 5*4.24). In fact the majority of NPCs 
preferred total flexibility rather than formality (46%) while 17% of NPCs 
suggested there was no necessity to formalize their operations as yet.
This emphasis on flexibility is clearly explained by a small 
firm executive :
"The strength of a small company lies in its flexibility -
i.e. its ability to bend to.all external activities quite
quickly. To negate this feature by tying the company to a’ rigid 
(albeit well-thought out) longer term plan, seems a waste of 
a useful strength." 1 , Sawmilling etc.*
Neither cost, nor insufficient knowledge of techniques involved 
were barriers to adoption of formality but 3% of NPCs hinted at an 
unspecified factor that may hinder adoption (see Table 5*4.25).
Insights into what that factor could be are provided by one
suspicious firm ;
"Planners are not productive people and have to be carried by 
those who actually do the work. In myoopinion they would cause 
friction among those who will never do more than sweep a floor 
and those whose lives it-should be every company^ aim to make 
more interesting." 3, Wheat Milling.
* It may be the case that many small firms are unfamiliar with the
formation of a flexible formal plan.
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The results of the survey have identified the existence of some 
type of formal planning in small firms. The quality and sophistication 
of that procedure may be questioned by the academic and what small 
firms actually do may not deserve the title of 'corporate planning' 
at all. However, it must be realised that they perceive the process 
as formal rather than as purely reactionary and given their limitations 
of time, ability, cost, information, staff and uncertain market 
conditions, they pursue a formal planning process that suits them.
This is what-small company planning is - as it is done by practitioners 
and not planners, in small firms those two roles are one.
The type of procedure that many small firms follow is illustrated 
in the following remarks of a small firm chairman:
"Planning in my view is essential. We carry out formal planning 
on an annual basis in some detail. A five year outline plan 
is in existence but not considered very accurate. Probably 
the most important facet of planning the future is the collecting 
of information on what is happening in the present. We collect 
quickly sales, production and finance statistics together with 
management accounts and variance reports monthly - some of this 
information is available within a few days of the end of a 
period. Cumulative information, trends in the industry we 
serve and intuition form the basis of our planning routine."
7, Building Materials etc.
That kind of planning need not take much time - perhaps a few hours a 
month and as can be witnessed it is a little more than budgetary 
control. It may not be corporate planning but it is certainly a form 
of 'controlled advance' in the face of sometimes overwhelming uncertainty. 
The major task is, as one company points out:
"The difficulty in getting people to understand the benefits 
but once understood, all, even those not involved in planning, 
realise how essential it is." 2, Miscellaneous Metal Goods.
The degree of formality involved in planning changes as the company 
grows, acquires new skills and resources. Within a very small company, 
executives need only begin thinking about the future by analysing past 
balance sheets, followed by the introduction of simple controls, 
the collection of information, quarterly then monthly checks moving 
on to more sophisticated analysis when and where appropriate. This 
size/degree of formality scale is illustrated by one executive:
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"Our company planning is presently by management discussions
and reviewing monthly analysis of financial statistics. As much
as it would appropriately benefit our company, the expense
■$£ •involved to produce an overbundence of analysed information 
would not warrant the cost at this stage. We aim for a more 
formal planning system in the near future as we grow larger, 
but a lot depends on the finance to. support the planning."
4, Wire and Wire manufacturers.
It would appear that the degree of sophistication and expense of the 
’controlled advance' need not worry small companies as this is 
tailored to size and ability.
However, inherent in the size/degree of formality scale is the 
acceptance of growth. Firms intent on growth would do well to adopt 
such progressive formality as size and resources change. But many 
small firms in the survey were adamant that growth was not for them e.,g.
"in the past we planned for growth and acquired modest success 
in this at the expense of labour problems, cashflow problems, 
overdrafts, sleepless nights, no holidays etc., etc. We now 
plan for staying small and have achieved success with no 
labour troubles, improved health and above all, p6&.ce of mind."
0, Other printing, publishing etc.
Other small firms are reluctant to relinquish control and will only 
grow to a point where it can be retained. Furthermore, small companies 
require an incentive to plan and so to expand and ironically it is 
the Government itself, with inconsistent interference, that has 
hindered this activity e.g.
"There is no incentive.to plan anything or do anything in the face 
of the tide of legislation which is pouring over us. Anything 
planned can be nullified by the next political interference 
in industry. From contact with small companies, the most 
general plan is to get smaller and minimize involvement with 
all the industrial punitive legislation." 2, Miscellaneous 
Metal Goods.
That kind of small firm planning, or 'planning for a smaller firm', 
is dangerous for the development of the economy.
*This 'word' is quoted verbatim from the executive's reply.
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Chapter Five attempted to identify tentative relationships between 
variables in the data set and present them in the form of 2 and 3 way 
cross-tabulations. The objective of this chapter is to clarify the 
order of those relationships, adding verification or invalidation 
where appropriate. In this light, it is hoped that a large, almost 
incomprehensible, set of relationships can be neatly summarized and 
presented. This extensive task is approached through the utilisation 
of the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID).
Organization of the Chapter
The chapter is split into 6 parts. Section 6.1 seeks to justify 
the use of the AID technique by noting the limitations of tabular 
analysis (6.1 .1 ) and the limitations of the direct alternative methods 
in multivariate statistics. The process is thoroughly discussed in 
section 6.1.2 with an example to assist in comprehension. All multivariate 
techniques are subject to limitations and AID is no exception. A full 
discussion of these are included in section 6.1.3. However, when 
sufficient attention is paid to the characteristics of the data set 
and the limitations of alternative multivariate procedures, this 
section concludes that the choice of AID is justifiable. Section 6.2 
illustrates the preliminary AID analysis and its limitations that are 
corrected for the second AID run which is documented in section 6.3.
The final groups of an AID analysis are singled out in section 6.4 for 
separate documentation, not only to assist in understanding, hut also 
as these groups are often of considerable theoretical importance.
Indeed, this section serves to prove that in further research, more 
variables may need to be included. Throughout this chapter the 
emphasis is on caution of interpretation, particularly when bearing in 
mind the AID limitations. Hence, section 6.5 is devoted to a systematic 
and painstaking analysis of the corrected AID run in order to justify 
the interpretation of that run and attempt to elaborate on-the various 
splits. Finally, continuing the trend of care and caution, section 6.6 
contains a validation of an AID analysis - a very necessary and not a very 
common documentation.
CHAPTER SIX
^I^jm A L Y SIS
O b je c tiv e  o f  th e  Chapter
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6.1.1 Limitations of Tabular Analysis
Perceptive surveillance of the elaboration and specification developed 
in the previous chapters immediately indicates the technical and human 
constraints of tabular analysis. The process is not only time consuming 
and essentially ad hoc, hut also it can only he really practical with 
small numbers of variables.
Silvey1 has pointed to further weaknesses of the tabular -approach. 
Firstly, increasing the number of cells for the same number of cases 
not only means eventual exhaustion of observations-for•cells, but also 
the distribution of consequent related variables in the cells need not 
he even. Secondly, variables contributing to the dependent variable 
often have to he ignored because of this necessity to preserve 
acceptable cell frequencies and limit the analysis to a level comprehensible 
to the human brain. Further, the tabular appros.ch can often he 
ambiguous in hiding composite variables and interaction effects.
Thirdly, holding a third variable constant does not necessarily mean 
that variations within categories is eliminated. Probably the most 
frustrating weakness of tabular analysis is the lack of finality of this 
approach. The researcher can never know the limit to his analysis and 
so can never be sure when to conclude the procedure.
Computer based binary segmentation procedures were developed to 
overcome these very difficulties. The current data consists of a 
dichotomous dependent variable, predictor variables measured at nominal, 
ordinal- and interval levels, and some a priori suspicion of interaction 
effects in small company operations. Such a large data set (l494 
cases and 23 variables per case) also requires a data dredging procedure 
to tear the information down into manageable proportions. With this 
criteria the choice of the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) appears 
to he itself automatic.
6 .1  J u s t i f i c a t io n  o f  A . I .D .  A n a ly s is
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AID is a sequential search procedure developed by the Institute of
6 .1 .2  The A . I .D .  Technique E xp la ined
It begins with a dependent variable that is either interval-scaled or 
dichotomous, while the predictor variables can originally be nominal, 
ordinal or interval and'are all recoded into nominal variables for the 
algorithm. The objective of AID is to perform a series of binary splits 
of the total sample, choosing those splits that dichotomize the sample 
into sub-groups which maximally account for criterion-variable variance 
at each stage. For each candidate, predictor variable, AID searches 
all the allowable splits on that variable and chooses the split that 
maximises between groups variation associated with ‘the two groups so 
split. It then chooses from all of these best splits the specific
predictor variable and so the split leads to the maxima of these
separate maxima.
3This can be presented algebraically as follows'
IF:-, y ' = mean of parent group of size n
y^ , y2 = subgroup means from a binary split on predictor
variable x into groups of size n, , n0 respectively.
El X. ri.
ylk(k = 1 ,2,  nq) , Observation's on the de-pendent variable
y2k(k = 1 ,2, .... ng) , in each group.
1 = Frequency weighted sum of squares of deviations of group means from
the grand mean.
2 = Sum of subgroup.deviations from their mean (betrogeneity of subgroups).
3 = Heterogeneity of parent group.
2Social Research at the University of Michigan by Sonquist and Morgan.-
DEFINE:-
1 - - y)2 + n2 (y2 - y )2 = # #n (yx " y2)2
2 in
1 = 1 = 1
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The AID split that occurs is the one that maximizes the distance
"between group criterion 1 and so minimizes 2.
Hence by maximising the distance function between group sums of 
squares, AID maximises the proportion of variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the binary split i.e. :-
— 2 — — oBetween Group Sum of Squares n^  (y^  - y) t i®, (y^  ~ y)
~ 2 nl — 2Total Sum of Squares ^  (y - y)
1 = 1 k = 1
- which is equivalent to the correlation ratio ETA square which
was used as the measure of association in Chapter 5‘.
AID also has the additional feature of constraining variables 
where ordering of categories is considered a priori important. For 
example - Age may be restricted monotonically to categories 0-5,
6-10, 11-15, 16-20 etc. such that no free split could occur placing 
0-5, 16-20 in one group and 6-10, 11-15 in another, the split being 
restricted to 0-5 and 6-10, 11-1 5, 16-^20, or 0-5, 6-10 and 11-1 5,
16-20 or 0-5, 6-10, 11-15 and 16-20. This is a useful feature if y is 
considered to be monotonically related to a predictor variable as is the 
case with the size criteria (number of employees), in.this research.
The main result of the splitting process is a tree structure that 
shows at each stage a) the predictor variable leading to the best 
binary split and how that predictor is split b) the size of the subgroups 
and c) the dependent variable mean on each subgroup. An example taken 
from reference-2 will help illuminate the procedure.
The analysis attempts to find what the major variables associated 
with 'plans to move' are. Plans to move becomes the dependent variable. 
Table 6.1 shows that the average value for the sample is 0.15.
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Table 6 .1  AID Example P lans to  Move
No children 
in school 2
0.67 n = 96
No relatives
nearby
0.53 Children in 
school 
0.24 n = 46
3
Under 35 
0.27 Do not own home 4
0.27 n = 285
1 All 0.15
Some relatives 
nearby 
0.20 Own home
0.11 n = 253 5
35 or over 
0.10 n=1704
Source: Reference 2 .
When the algorithm examines the total sample, the greatest 
reduction in unexplained sum of squares is obtained by splitting the 
sample into two groups on the Age variable - Under 35 (y = 0.27) 
and over 35 (y = 0.10).
The behavioural interpretation of this split is illustrated by 
the means - i.e. people under 35 are far more likely to be willing to move 
than people over 35- For the older group, no variable creates any 
meaningful difference in the dependent variable mean given the AID 
stopping rules*. The next split illustrates that people who have 
relatives nearby are more likely to move, even more so if they have 
no children in school (the next split). Also people who own their own 
home are more likely to move than those who do not. Thus AID has 
logically broken down a large heterogenous group (l) into several 
homogenous subgroups (2,3,4,5,6).
*The program provides the-researcher with various rules for cessation 
of the AID algorithm. These will be explained at a later stage.
However, this simple and explicit illustration should not he 
allowed to disguise the limitations of the AID program. These have 
been clearly documented 5 . Firstly, AID requires very large samples 
of 1000 or more because it uses groups as the unit of analysis as 
opposed to multiple regression which considers the individual unit 
and so requires smaller samples.
Secondly, AID cannot handle multicollinearity among the predictor 
variables and this leads to spurious interpretation of the output. Of the 
highly correlated predictors, one is likely to he chosen exclusively and 
hence may restrict the choice of another at a later stage and hence the 
order of appearance of the variables in the splits is not one of relative 
importance. In addition if a correlated predictor does not work in the 
analysis and its correlate does, this is no indication of its insignificance.
Thirdly, AID has difficulty in handling skewed distributions of 
both dependent and predictor variables. The algorithm repeatedly 
splitting off small groups.
Fourthly, measurement errors and noise in the data can considerably 
affect the choice of binary splits and hence elicit inconsistency of 
tree structures over different samples of the same population. Sonquist 
suggests that although this is the case, the structure of the final 
groups is stable. However, Doyle ' has found considerable instability 
in tree structure where correlated predictors are involved. Bias from 
sampling error can accentuate the interpretation problem.
Further, AID has been found to be insensitive to various forms 
of interaction, only identifying the immediate form of predictor 
interaction and not any consequent interaction i.e. interactions that 
are not one stage are ignored. Finally, the AID stopping rules can 
lead to spurious results. If they truncate the tree too soon an 
important variable will he eliminated. If they allow the tree to ramble, 
then noise can cause a series of meaningless splits.
The alternative of multiple regression cannot properly handle 
interaction effects with large numbers of predictors, as the number of 
possible terms is considerable. Further, those terms built into a 
regression equation are only likely to explain variation particular 
to the sample and it is this specific reference to the individual 
unit and emphasis on within group differences which is inappropriate 
in a study which attempts to explain group behaviour. In addition, 
multiple regression cannot handle nominal level categories unless 
dummy variables are used to an extensive degree and, unlike AID,
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6 .1 .3  L im ita t io n s  o f  AID and O ther M u lt iv a r ia te  A lte rn a t iv e s
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it places constraints of linearity and additivity on the procedure.
The specific structure of AID to deal with measurement at a nominal and 
ordinal level stress its importance over other stepwise procedures based 
on product-moment correlations in extracting the maximum possible 
information from a data set.
However, if provision is made for cross-validation8,9 in order to 
identify problems of interpretation caused by bias from multicoilinearity, 
sampling error and measurement error, the AID technique is a useful pre­
requisite to regression or multiple classification analysis and so is
. . , . .  xobeneficial to specifying the form of the model. As Fielding has 
pointed out AID attempts to simulate the activity of a researcher in 
examining structural relationships in large data sets and so "the end 
result is a systematic rather than haphazard approach to data summary 
which facilitates directed rather than undirected explorations".
The previous discussion has helped to identify the weakness of 
tabular analysis and the search for an alternative form of data dredging. 
The AID package suits this particular data set more than any other 
multivariate technique. However, the interpretation of the AID results 
has been shown to be unstable and spurious. The following AID analysis 
is therefore conducted with the necessary caution and reserve.
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The purpose of the preliminary AID analysis was to determine the 
nature and'extent of the characteristics of the data set and identify 
various problem areas. Table 6.2 illustrates the variables included 
in the analysis
Table 6.2 Predictor Variables and Dependent Variable Included
Number of Free(F)/ 
Classes . Monotonic (M)
6 .2  P re lim in a ry  AID A n a ly s is  o f  th e  Data Set
Variable No. Name Run 1 Rim 2 .Run 1 Run
1 Age of Company 9 ■ 6 F F
3 Is the Company a .Subsidiary? 3 3 F F
4 Who controls the Company? 7 7 F F
6 Number of Family Managers 7 7 F F
8- Turnover of Manual Labour 4 4 F F
9 Turnover of Managerial Labour 4 4 F F
10
11
Degree of Unionisation 
Chief Executive the Founder
4 4 F F
12
or not?
Chief Executive from Founder's
3 3 F F
family? 3 . 3 F F
13 Age of Chief Executive 6 6 F . F
15 Management Training 7 7 F F
16 External Management Training 3 3 F F
17 Length of Managerial Service 6 6 F F
21 Sales to Main Customer 6 6 F F
22 Shies to Exports 7 7 F F
23 Type of Competitor 5 5 * F F
24 Number of Competitors 6 6 F F
-31 Raising of Finance Easy or> Not 4 4 F F
33 Debt Collection Period 6 6 F F
40 Number of Employees 10 7 F M
43 Geographical Area ‘ 12 7 F F
44 
= 22
39
S I C  Order 
Formal Plan or Not*
10 10 F F
^Variable number 39 is the Dependent Variable.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the tree output for the initial run. The 
initial trunk branch symmetric structure of the tree is typical of the 
first few.splits in an AID tree but the symmetry here is prolonged as 
far as the third section of splits.
The first binary split maximising between group sum of squares is on 
the predictor variable External Management Training (EMT). This has 
intuitive appeal as the degree of formality in small company planning 
operations is plausibly linked to the communication of techniques through 
education. Observe the very high mean of 0.72 given to those companies 
who do not pursue External Management Training for 1106 companies in 
group three. The next split on those companies who pursue EMT is on 
whether the company is a subsidiary or not. If the company is a subsidiary, 
it achieves a low mean of 0,l6 (group four) on the dependent variable, 
indicating that these companies are far more likely to plan formally.
These two initial splits on EMT and subsidiary companies were also 
highly significant in the tabular analysis of the previous chapter, 
suggesting the reinforcement of their influence on formal planning 
by the AID technique. The next split on this branch is into final 
groups on the crude nepotic variable - number of family managers.
Again this makes logical sense. In the tabular analysis there was a 
correlation between informal planning and .high levels of nepotism in 
a small company. Here it can be seen that those subsidiary companies 
with some family involvement in management gain a higher mean of 0.38 
(group 9) on the dependent variable indicating that they are less 
likely to adopt formal procedure than those subsidiary companies with 
low levels of nepotism.
Of the companies who are not subsidiaries but pursue 'EMT (group five) 
the next split., is. on whether their existing managers have ever received 
formal management training. In those companies where they have (group ten), 
they are more likely to be involved in formal planning procedures - 
indicating once again the central importance of education as, perhaps, 
a vehicle in communicating formal techniques.'
The companies who provide no EMT (group three) are further split 
into the length of service of their managers i.e. greater or less than 
15 years. Again this is a logical sequence. The small cramped offices 
occupied by the same loyal Dickensian servants for many years fertile 
breeding ground for structured, dated methods and the persistence of 
inflexibility and gives little hope for formalised planning and strategy 
making. These types of companies receive a high mean of 0.8l on the 
dependent variable and must eventually harbour loyalty of staff, probably 
at the expense of efficiency.
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Discussion beyond these first few groups is curtailed by the very
problems illustrated earlier in the chapter. Group six is split off
into groups twelve and thirteen on the size predictor - number of employees.
The relation between size and the dependent variable was shown to be
monotonic in the tabular analysis. However, all variables were left
free in mode in the initial run as suggested by Sonquist and Morgan11,
hence using the program as a device for locating conceptual problems.
Further, from a relatively large group (six) where n = 628, a small group
12is split off (group eleven where n = 56). As Sonquist and Morgan
point out ’when a relatively small group is partitioned on the "basis of
an unconstrained predictor (one left free in mode) with a large number of 
categories, the sampling variation of the class means will he large 
because of the small number of observations in each class and hence the 
probability of a fortuitous split is relatively high’. They suggest a 
remedy of constraining predictors having a rank-order to their classes 
and restricting unordered predictors to five or six classes. In the 
second run the size predictor number of employees is constrained to 
the order across its categories. This trill evidently affect the structure 
of the tree hence restricting further comment on the remainder of 
Figure 6.1.
Moreover this splitting off of a small group from a relatively 
large one has occurred again from group seven to groups fourteen and 
fifteen. Another fortuitous split may have occurred by the dichotomizing 
of group eighteen into groups nineteen and twenty on the geographical 
predictor - area. Area is not a central variable to the analysis and 
no importance is attached to such a split. However, area is a predictor 
having a large number of categories in the first run which were re­
grouped and condensed for the second run. Age of companies was similarly 
condensed for the second run. It was considered necessary to leave the 
SIC ' Order classifications unchanged at 10. These had already been 
condensed from 18 original classifications and further change would 
have meant loss of accuracy within individual industry groups and 
consequent difficulty in interpretation.
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Figure 6.2 illustrates the AID tree after constraining the size 
predictor - number of employees and condensing the categories for the 
Age of the Company and Area variables.
Symmetry of an AID tree can take two forms. Firstly, symmetry and 
non-symmetry referring to the extent to which the same variables are 
used in the splits on the various trunks of the tree. Non-symmetry 
implies interaction. Secondly, trees can be symmetrical with respect 
to the way that the algorithm splits off top terminating, bottom 
terminating or alternate terminating final'groups. *
Figure 6.2 possesses fifteen final groups, eight top terminating
and seven bottom terminating compared to the AID tree of the first run
which had sixteen final groups, six top terminating and ten bottom
terminating. The tree from the corrected analysis elicits far more
symmetry in this respect and bears some resemblance to Sonquist’s
13Additive type of model structure at least as far as the third series 
of splits.
However, the tree in figure 6.2 is non-symmetric to the extent that 
different variables are used to make the splits on different branches 
of the tree. This is one early indication of interaction.
The sequence of variables in the binary split is similar to the 
preliminary analysis in the first section of the tree, indicating 
some stability in the algorithm. Almost identical groups are split off 
on the top branch ending in the crude nepotic variable at group one.
The major change manifests itself at group four which is split 
on the previously problematic size predictor - number of employees. In 
this instance a smaller group is split off but the split makes more 
intuitive sense. Again the parameter of 100 employees becomes crucial as 
it did in the tabular analysis suggesting some organizational problems 
of manageability may incorporate themselves around this level and so 
require a more formal procedure.
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Those companies with less than 100 employees are then split on the
basis of high or low levels of managerial turnover. Indeed, this is
plausible. If a company has high levels of managerial turnover it is
more likely that managers will enter the company bringing with them
experience of formal management techniques. This group of high managerial
turnover is then split on the amount of exporting the company achieves.
If the company is involved in exporting it achieves a mean of 0.32 on
the dependent variable (group nine), perhaps reflecting the degree of
formality and necessity for looking ahead to overseas markets and consequent
planning and control in export-orientated firms. The companies not
inclined towards exporting are split on the age of the company into
terminal groups. This split makes little intuitive sense and may
ihreflect the fact that m  many cases, but not all , the less important 
or possibly spurious splits are at the end of the twigs.
Returning fervently to group .nine, those companies with' low 
levels of managerial turnover - the Dickensian loyalists, are split on * 
the nature and extent of their managers’ past training. Those with some 
trained managers are split off into a final group ten, but their 
counterparts with no training are further split on the competition 
variable. Now, the split on management training is logical, those 
companies with untrained managers and low rates of managerial turnover 
are hardly likely to encounter modern managerial methods and so achieve 
a high mean on the dependent variable of 0.77 in group eleven.
But, the split on the number of competitors instills intrigue into the 
interpretation. Those companies with either very low numbers of competitors 
(<, 3) or very high numbers (^15) receive a mean of 0.86 on the dependent 
variable - the highest in the analysis. Possibly> companies in highly 
competitive industries are reluctant to formalize their procedures, 
preferring complete flexibility. But, the reasons for such a high 
reluctance to formalize probably do not lie in that kind of reasoning, 
but rather in the educational background of their managers. These are 
all untrained managers with no access to external management training.
Their companies are in the smaller bracket of less than 100 employees 
and may well not require formality. Hence any interpretation attached 
to the competition predictor variable must be steeped in caution.
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Those companies having between 3 and 15 competitors (group eigh­
teen) are further split on the age of the Chief Executive in charge of 
the company. This would make more intuitive sense had the predictor 
been used earlier in the analysis, because small company destiny often 
lies in the hands of its creator or guider. It would then be plausible 
to argue that older executives may well be reluctant to formalize.
Perhaps consequent researchers may wish to constrain the Age variable 
across its categories to make more sense of the split.
In the age of the English disease it is interesting to note that 
the larger companies (^100 employees) are split on Unionisation 
criteria into final groups .twenty, eight and twenty nine.
Those larger companies having only partial unionisation have a much 
lower mean on the dependent variable of 0.23 compared to those companies 
having high or low degrees of unionisation. This may well indicate that 
companies where union interference is visible, but not dominating, are 
able to formalize and plan ahead more easily. Noticeably, highly 
unionised companies are hindered in this respect.
In addition, those companies with no EMT and with long serving 
managers are then split on the control predictor into whether they are 
accountable to external shareholders or not. This split appeared 
fortuitous in the preliminary run hut there is hidden appeal here. It may 
well he that these Dickensian loyalists are susceptible to external 
accountability as this group fourteen, albeit small ,has a much lower mean 
the dependent variable of 0.52 compared to 0.83 for their counterparts 
with only internal accountability. This may trigger them into more 
formal and more efficient planning modes.
6.4- Analysis of the Final Groups
For convenience the final groups are presented in Table 6.3 in 
rank order of their means.
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Table 6.3 Final (Truncated Groups) In Rank Order by Their Means, 
Group No. ' "1 ”  Mean
27
19
15
21
17
10
29
20
26
l4
l6
Number of 
Cases
28
154
453
66
66
160
34
67
51
25
154
0.86
0.86
0.83
0.80
0.76
0.60
0.56
0.54
0.53
0.52
0.43
Characteristics
No External Management Training (EMT), managers 
served on average less than 15 years, company 
has less than 100 employees, a high turnover of 
managers no exporting and is less than 6 or 
over 35 years old.
No EMT, small average length of managerial service 
less than 100 employees, low manager turnover, 
untrained managers, very low or very high 
competition.
No EMT, managers with long length of service 
>15 years, companies not accountable to outside 
shareholders,
No EMT, managers served on average less than 
15 years, less than 100 employees, low turnover of 
managers, managers untrained, competitors 
between 3-15 and with Chief Executive age 
40-49 or over 60.
Some EMT, not a subsidiary, with untrained managers
No EMT, low average length of manager service, 
less than 100 employees, low rate of manager 
turnover, with some trained managers.
No EMT, low average length of manager service, 
greater than 100 employees with either very low 
or very high unionisation.
No EMT, low average length of manager service, 
less than 100 employees, low manager turnover, 
untrained managers, 3-15 competitors, with 
Chief Executive below 40 or between 50-60,
No EMT, small average length of manager service, 
less than 100 employees, high turnover of managers 
no exporting, company age between 6-25 years.
No EMT, larger average length of manager service, 
company accountable to external shareholders.
Some EMT, independent company with some trained 
managers.
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Table  6 .3  co n tin u e d  . . .
Group No. Number of Cases Mean
25 37 0.38
22 37 0.32
28 31 0.23
24 128 0.10
Characteristics
Some EMT, subsidiary company with some nepotism.
No EMT, smaller average length of manager service 
less than 100 employees, high rate of manager 
turnover hut with some exporting.
No EMT, smaller average length of manager service 
greater than 100 employees and partly unionised 
labour force
Some EjMT, subsidiary company with no nepotism.
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Table ■6.4 Final Groups -- Reasons for Cessation of Splits
B SS T SS Observations Closest Predictor
24 0.78 11.7 128 Sales to Exports
25 8.7 . 37
16 1.50 37.7 154 Length of Managerial Service
17 0.86 12 .1 66 Type of Competitor
14 6.2 25
15 1.23 64.6 66 Turnover of Manual Labour
29 8.4 34
28 5.4 31
22 8.1 37
10 l.4l 38.4 160 Age of Company
26 0.60 12.7 51 Number of Family Managers
27 3.4e 28
19 i.o4 18 .1 154 Age of Company
20 0.76 16.7 67 Number-of Family Managers
21 1.72 10.4 453 Area
AID will not split unless BSS = 1.74
TSS = 3.48
E = Explained
BSS = Between group sum of squares 
TSS = Total sum of squares
The total number of final groups is dependent on the AID stopping rules, 
which are pre-selected by the researcher:-
1 . Pq, a proportion of the total sum of squares which must be contained in'
any group if that group is to become a candidate for splitting. 1% was
used in this study (suggested by University of Manchester Applied Statistics 
1 5Package ). .
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2. P , the best split on a candidate group must reduce the explained
sum of squares by proportion of the total sum of squares, otherwise
that group will not become a candidate for further splitting (even
though it may meet the P criteria). 0.005 was used in this study as 
16 1suggested by UMRCC
3. The process is further stopped by a pre-selected number of final groups 
into which the input data may be split. 80 was used in this study,
to allow as many groups as possible in the preliminary run.
4. There must also be a minimum number of observations in a group if
that group is to become a candidate for splitting - hence small groups
with unstable means, will not be split off, as these are likely to
he affected by sampling error. 25 was used in this study as suggested 
.17by Sonquist
Three types of final groups can usually he distinguished in AID 
trees, their analysis often of considerable theoretical importance - 
small groups, explained groups and unexplained groups. A small group is 
one containing too few observations to warrant an attempt to split it.
An explained group has sufficient observations to he split hut has 
insufficient variation to warrant an attempted split. An unexplained 
group has both sufficient observations and variation hut no predictor in 
the analysis works in reducing the unexplained variation.
For convenience the reasons for cessation of the final groups are 
shown in Table 6.4. Note firstly that all groups are of sufficient size 
to he split except group l4. Secondly only group 27 has been 
explained, although groups 25, 14, 29, 2 and 22 have only a 
small proportion of variation remaining.
The remaining groups still have variation and adequate observations 
hut no predictor worked for them in reducing the unexplained variation.
This suggests that additional variables may be required in further analysis. 
Notably, two variables which had not previously been used in the analysis 
nearly ’made it* for final groups 17 (Type of Competitor) and 15 
(Turnover of Manual Labour).
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The perpetration of interaction in an AID analysis is detected in 
three ways
1. .As has already been illustrated, the structure of the tree itself 
serves to identify possible influences i.e. variables entering one 
branch and not another (assymmetry).
2. The mean profiles of important or suspected variables can be plotted 
at each split. Additive effects are indicated by congruence, sharp 
changes in the mean profiles are indicative of interaction.
3. For each split, an examination of the BSS/TSS ratio can give clues to 
interaction. A fairly large increase in the predictive power of a 
variable after controlling on another, providing this increase is in 
one split group and the predictive power in the other is reduced or 
remains the same, is an indication of interaction. This can be further 
substantiated if the variable is a correlate of the one used in the 
split, as under those circumstances the BSS/TSS ratio should drop to 
insignificance in both the split groups.
However, to be sure of the existence of genuine interaction the 
three indications must be used in conjunction, as it is possible to have 
sharp assymmetric changes in the BSS/TSS ratios accompanied by congruent 
mean profiles, generally resulting from the action of suppressor variables. 
Further, similar changes in the BSS/TSS ratios may occur accompanied by 
incongruent mean profiles which Sonquist^ 8 suggests may be a genuine 
interaction effect.
The interaction graphs relating to the following variables can be 
located at Appendix J . (For reasons of clarity the category observations 
have been eliminated, except where suitably small as to aid interpretation). 
The main BSS/TSS table is at Appendix K table number 6.5 .
Examination of Possible Interaction based on the -BSS/TSS Table (Table 6.5)
In this section, each predictor variable is discussed in turn, to 
try and identify possible interaction effects. The interaction graphs at 
Appendix J are provided to assist the reader with the interpretation of this
r / . .  .1
section.
6.5  The D e te c tio n  o f  In te r a c t io n  ■ .
After the split of group 1 into groups 2 and 3 on the variable 
EMT, Age rises by 14 fold in group 2 and 5 fold in group 3. When group 2 
is split on the predictor Subsidiary into groups 12 and 13, Age again 
enjoys a substantial increase in power. However, when group 3 is split 
on Length of Managerial Service into groups 4 and 5, Age drops in power.
This indicates that there are groups for which Age is an important 
predictor (subsidiary companies with EMT) and those in which it has little 
effect (companies with no EMT).
The Age variable does not gain enough power to be used on the splits 
of the upper branch but notably comes closest in two of the final groups 
10 and 19 and would have been used there but for the BSS stopping criteria. • 
The mean profiles in Figure 6.3 show incongruety and therefore possible 
interaction.
Is Company a Subsidiary? (Figure 6.4)
After the initial split on EMT, this predictor variable gains power 
in group 2, enough to be used as the split variable into groups 12 and 
13 but loses power in group 3 where it is the closest contender to the 
split variable, Length of Managerial Service. This poses problems - 
are the two variables related? Was the split by pure chance factors?
The interpretation of the split on Length of Managerial Service is logical 
but must be considered in the light of possible multicoilinearity.
Similarly, after the split on Managerial Service into groups 4 and 5, 
the subsidiary variable gains power in group 4 and loses power in group 5*
If the 2 variables are related, the power of the subsidiary variable 
could be expected to fall in these two groups but because of the assymmetry 
there is ground to suspect interaction.
The further complexities of this variable are illustrated in group 4 
where its power is equal to that of the split variable, Number of Employees - 
each explaining 30% of the variation in the group. This split could be 
interpreted as spurious and due to chance factors as the competing 
subsidiary variable failed to win a split. But, again the split is logical 
and again the subsidiary predictor gains power in one of the split groups 
(7) and loses it in the other (6], After this it fails to gain enough 
power to be considered a competitor for a split in any of the branches 
or final groups.
Age of Company (Figure 6.3)
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Figure 6.4 illustrates some departure from congruence and therefore 
additivity for this variable - especially in group 2 (some EMT), is 
unlikely. Hence the subsidiary variable shows evidence of collinearity, 
a possible loss of split due to chance and indicators of interaction.
Who Controls the Company? (Figure 6.5)
This is another predictor showing possible interaction tendencies 
after the initial binary split on EMT. It gains power in group 2 and 
loses power in group 3. When group 2 is split on the subsidiary predictor 
into 12 and 13, it has its power increased in group 12 and reduced to 
insignificance in group 13. In fact it is a competitor variable to the 
split variable Number of Family Managers in group 12 but when this group 
is split into 24 and 25 (final groups) its- power is reduced in both to 
insignificance indicating multicollinearity with the nepotic predictor.
Further, when group 3 is split into 4 and 5, this predictor suffers 
a fall in power in group 4 and a doubling of power to group 5, enough * 
for it to be used as the split variable there. Similarlywhen group 4 
is split on into 6 and 7 on the predictor Number of Employees, the control 
predictor loses nearly two thirds of its power in 6 and increases its 
power over four and one-half times in group 7 ~ further evidence of possible 
interaction. The divergence of the mean profiles in Figure 6.5 reinforces 
the claim of interaction.
Number of Family Managers (Figure 6.6)
Another predictor showing evidence of interaction patterns is the 
nepotic'variable - Number of Family Managers. Its original low power in 
group 1 is transformed threefold in group 2 and drops to insignificance 
in group 3 after the initial binary split on EMT. The increase in power in 
group 2 is enough to make it a competitor variable in the split of group 2 
hut it loses this to the subsidiary variable which splits group 2 into 
groups 12 and 13 where the nepotic variable falls in power in both groups 
but not enough in group 12 to prevent it becoming the split variable there.
Further, as group 3 is split into 4 and 5 the nepotic variable gains 
power in 5 and loses it in 4. When group 4 is split on the size predictor 
Number of Employees into groups 6 and 7, the nepotic variable loses power 
in group 6 and gains considerable power in group 7 , where it becomes a 
competitor variable in the split with the eventual split predictor for 
this group - Unionisation. When the split occurs from 7 into final groups 
28 and 29, the nepotic variable reduces to insignificance in both groups -
an indication of possible collinearity with unionisation.
Figure 6.6 illustrates the interaction tendency. However, much of 
the divergence from congruence in groups 7j 12 and 6 -is due to low
category sizes, so the algorithm has an easier chance to find a large
disparity between the means. The split on group 12 in this case could well 
be fortuitous and any interpretation based on the split needs extreme 
caution. Obviously, the remedy would be to increase the sample size or
alternately condense the categories on this variable.
Turnover of Manual Labour Chief Executive Founder Finance Easy or Not
Neither of these variables showed sufficient predictive power in the 
analysis and should be considered as having little effect on formality of 
company planning.
Turnover of Managers
This variable was used in the splits of group 6 into groups 8 and 9. 
However, it had strong competition from management training, sales to 
exports and the subsidiary company variable. An examination of the 
intermediate program output indicates small category sizes'and increases 
the chances of this split being fortuitous.
Unionisation
This variable was used in the split of group 7 into final groups 
28 and 29. However, the intermediate program output indicates that 2 of 
the 3 categories for the variable were below 21 observations, so increasing 
the chance of a fortuitous split here. Indeed, the variable had close 
competition in the group with another variable exhibiting low category 
sizes - the number of Family Managers employed.
Chief Executive: a Member of the Founder's Family? (Figure 6.7)
The variable exhibits some interaction patterns - after the initial 
split on EMT into groups 2 and 3 the variable gains power in group 2 
and loses it in group 3. But, when group 2 is split by the subsidiary 
variable into groups 12 and 13 the power of this variable drops dramatically,
suggesting the two are related.
• \ • 1 ♦When group 3 is split to groups 4 and 5 there is still assymmetry m
the BSS/TSS ratio and again when group 4 is split to group 6 and 7 the 
predictive power of the above variable decreases to insignificance in 
group 6 and multiplies sevenfold in group 7 5 where its power places it 
among the top 4 predictors there. However, when group 7 is split, 
fortuitously or otherwise, on the Unionisation variable, the power of the
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above predictor is reduced to insignificance in the consequent final 
groups 28 and 29.
Figure 6.7 shows that the mean profiles on the various branches of 
the AID tree do not depart significantly from congruency (excepting 
group 5) and what may be happening here is the appearance of suppression.
Age of The Chief Executive (Figure 6.8)
This variable also reflects the possibility of interaction patterns. 
After the initial binary split on EMT the Age variable increases in power 
in group 2 and decreases by over two thirds in group 3. When group 3 is 
split a similar differential change in explanatory power occurs, increasing 
in group 5 and decreasing in group 4. Its power rises high enough for it 
to become a competitor variable in group 8, however the intermediate program 
output for group 8 shows 4 of the 6 categories for the predictor are below 
22 observations - increasing the chance of artificially large BSS/TSS 
ratios. Figure 6.8 shows the divergence from congruency is due to small 
category sizes and probably not to any specific interaction effect.
In fact when the predictor is used as a split variable in group 18 to 
groups 20 and 21, the larger BSS/TSS ratio here is due again to small 
observations in categories leading one to suspect a fortuitous split here.
Management Training (Figure 6.9)
This begins as a powerful predictor and a priori thought would 
dictate that it was collinear to an extent to the split variable on group 1 , 
EMT. Although its power drops in the first split, it does not do so as 
dramatically in group 2 as in group 3. In fact, after the split of group 
2 into groups 12 and 13 on the subsidiary variable, its power drops 
significantly in group 12 and increases almost twofold in group 13 to be 
used as an unchallenged split variable on that group into final groups 
16 and 1 7.
In group 4 it becomes a split contender and does not have its power 
decreased enough by the split on group 4 into groups 6 and 7 , to prevent it 
becoming a further competitor in group 6. In fact it explains the same 
variation of 2% in this group as does the winner of the split Turnover 
of Managers', which has already been identified as a split bordering on 
fortune. Even so, when this group is split to groups 8 and 9 it enjoys 
a differential power effect strong enough for it to split group 9 into 
groups 10 and 1 1 , virtually unchallenged.
24-2
However, an examination of the mean profiles (Figure 6.9) would 
indicate stark avoidance of congruety. This is almost certainly due to 
small number of observations in the categories. The split on group 13 
was accomplished when 3 of the 6 categories for this variable were less 
than 25, similarly for the split on group 9. This suggests the algorithm
has capitalised on the large sampling variation of the class means and
the probability of a fortuitous split is high.
Length of Managerial Service
This variable is reduced in power in both of the first 2 groups formed 
(2, 3). However, it does not lose power to such an extent as to prevent 
it being used as a split predictor in group 3, seriously challenged by 
the subsidiary variable. It does not regain enough power after the splits 
on groups 2 and 3 to contend for a binary segmentation again, although it 
would have been used in final group 16 hut for the BSS stopping criteria.
Sales to Main Customer
This variable loses power after the initial split on'group 1 hut 
after both the splits on group 2 and 3 it enjoys strong increases in power 
hut never really attains the level of a competitor variable.
Sales to Exports (Figure 6.10)
The exporting variable is another contender with interaction patterns, 
as can be seen from BSS/TSS table. Although it loses power after the 
initial split on group 1 , it enjoys differential power effect after that 
in groups 4, 5 and groups 12 and 13* Its power is increased enough in
group 4 for it to become a competitor variable but it loses to the size
criteria Number of Employees. As its power is reduced in both groups 
6 and 7 after the split on group 4, there is slight evidence of collinearity 
with the size variable. Hhwever, the exporting variable does not reduce 
enough to prevent it becoming a competitor in group 6 where it again 
loses the position to the possible spurious split on Turnover of Managers 
and again the exporting variable shows differential power effects.
The consequent power increase to group 8 is enough for it to be used 
virtually■unchallenged here as the split variable.
However, examination of the mean profile indicates that the incongruety 
is probably due to small number of observations in the categories,
pointing to a fortuitous split,- -
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This variable is never very high in predictive power but reaches a
high level in group 12 to become a competitor variable for the split,
eventually losing out to the variable number of Family Managers. However, 
examination of the intermediate program output reveals that 3 of the 6 
categories of this variable in group 12 had less than 8 observations.
Its power is therefore probably of a spurious nature.
Number of Employees (Figure 6.1 1 )
This variable is a powerful predictor in group 1 and competitor for
the split there. It then falls in power, to groups 2 and 3 but enjoys a
power differential when group 3 is split into 4 and 5, strong enough for 
it to be used as the split variable in group 4. The intermediate program 
output -indicates that 3 of the 7 categories were less than 13 observations 
so care must be heeded when this split is interpreted.
The mean profiles at Figure 6.13 show divergence from congruety 
due to small observations for group 5 and possible interaction pattern 
for group 2.
Type of Competitor (Figure 6.12)
This variable also exhibits interaction tendencies in the BSS/TSS 
table, enjoying differential power effects after the first split to groups 
2 and 3 and the subsequent split of group 3 into groups 4 and 5. The mean 
profiles diverge from congruety and are based on reasonably stable group 
sizes. This suggests an interaction pattern for this variable.
Number 'of Competitors (Figure 6.13)
The power of this variable is never very strong but the differential 
effects after controlling on other variables are notable in groups 2, 3 and 
groups 4,5* It increases its power enough to become a split variable at 
group 1 1 .
Examination of the intermediate program output and the mean profiles 
suggest some interaction pattern and that the split on group 1 1 , which was 
unchallenged, had reasonably stable cell sizes and should be treated 
with a mixture of confidence and caution.
Debt C o lle c t io n  P e rio d
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This is never a very powerful predictor hut it does rise in power 
enough after the first binary split to become a competitor for the split
in group 5, although 3 of the 8 categories have less than 22 observations
at this point. It never again reaches the competitor stage but would have 
been used to split final group 21 if not for the BSS stopping criteria 
but predictably at this stage in the tree all the categories for the 
Area variable had less than 27 observations.
S I C  Order (Figure 6,l4)
This is another variable which shows some interaction pattern after 
the first binary split, enjoying differential power effects in groups 2, 3 
and substantially in groups 12 and 13. The predictor always has a degree 
of power and is a losing competitor variable in group 13 (where the intermediate 
program output indicates very small number of observations in the 
categories with 8 of the 10 having less than 14 cases) and further in group 
23 (where understandably with so many categories (10) there are too few 
observations in each at this stage to merit any confidence). Similarly, 
it would have been used as the split variable on final group 24 if the BSS 
stopping criteria were altered.
The mean profiles at Figure 6.l4 indicate that what departure from 
congruety exists is probably due to the small observations in the categories 
rather than any powerful interaction effect.
This section has explained the problems associated with interpretation 
of the AID tree. It has highlighted possible multicollinearity, possible 
interaction and the existence of spurious splits. It advances the warning 
of caution mentioned earlier.
Area
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AID is peculiarly susceptible to sampling variation, measurement 
error and correlated predictors and hence the stability of the tree 
structure over different samples of the same population is questionable.
The most stringent empirical strategy for investigating AID 
stability is that of cross validation i.e. comparing the tree structure 
on 2 random halves of the same sample. There is one specific problem, 
intrinsic to the present sample, which renders exhaustive comment impossible 
in the cross-validation procedure. The previous analysis indicated that 
a sample of 1494 cases was not really large enough when precision among 
the categories was maintained, hence fortuitous splits were encountered 
in the AID tree. Further, splitting the sample into 2 halves of 750 each 
(approx.) accentuates these inconsistencies.
A fortran program was written to divide the data into two random 
halves using a bank of random numbers lying between 0 and 1. If the value 
of the random number was less than 0.5, the case-was directed to group A, 
if greater than 0.5 it was directed to group B,
In the final event group A contained 748 cases and group B 746 cases. 
The two trees are presented overleaf and suggest the following conclusions:
1. Group A tree is far more assymmetrical in respect of top versus 
bottom terminating groups, having 6 top and 10 bottoms, compared to 
9 top and 8 bottoms for the group B tree. The structure of the two 
trees is similar on the top branch hut markedly different on the central 
and lower branches.
2. The evidence suggests the program is selecting the same variables hut 
at different points in the tree. The most important predictor still 
remaining External Management Training while on the top branch the 
.subsidiary variable and the nepotic variable appear to substitute 
for each other, indicating correlation. Interestingly, the algorithm 
uses similar splits on the variables, Number of Employees, Management 
Training and Length of Service of Managers in both trees, albeit
at different split positions.
The predictors used to split groups towards the end of the tree 
■have been chosen largely fortuitously, as they have small numbers of 
observations in their categories i.e. SIC Order, Area and Debt Collection
6 .6  Cross V a l id a t io n
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Period. Hence little can be said of the structure at the end of the 
tree. Further, the terminal groups show substantial differences due partly 
to the above fortuitous splits, so overall the trees must fail this valida­
tion test. However, as perfect replication is virtually impossible and 
as the splits are on the same variables hut in different orders and as 
the partitions within the main predictors are the same, there is hope of 
some stability and further interpretation should he possible if caution 
is exercised.
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Chapter Seven
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
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This chapter discusses the implications of the main survey 
findings and describes the appropriate recommendations for policy 
makers. Prospective researchers in the small firm field -will 
benefit from guiding suggestions, many of which can he immediately 
pursued using the current data. A full list of suggestions for future 
research appears at the end of the text.
<
250
CONCLUSION
Recent economic and political discussions have argued that small 
firms have.a key role to play in the national economy and could directly 
act to alleviate many ailments in the industrial sector, particularly 
with regard to employment and performance. Previous research in the field 
of small companies and manufacturing industry-has indicated that 
companies which systematically assess, formulate and execute their 
policies with the assistance of a variety of modern management techniques, 
tend to he more efficient and profitable than companies which operate 
on a less formal basis. This research has concentrated on the central 
theme of the potential of small firms to organize their resources 
more efficiently and think ahead in a formal and systematic manner, 
through the vehicle of corporate planning.
Due to the paucity of knowledge and empirical research, not only 
in the area of small firms, but also with regard to the extent and 
depth of corporate planning in U.K. industry, it was deemed necessary 
to analyse as wide a cross section of U.K. small firms as resources 
would permit. To this end a mail survey questionnaire was'designed 
and implemented to cover the aspects of small company make-up
l . .including company type, management structure, strategy and competition,
the operation of finance and control and company planning. The survey
examined 3,000 '.companies across the U.K. manufacturing sector, including S.I.C. 
Orders (ill) and (V) to (XIX) and 200 companies in S.I.C. Order (XX).
The response rates, speed and quality together with sample representativeness, 
level of bias and consistency of replies over time were tested and 
found to he satisfactory. The results of the survey were subjected, 
firstly, to two and three way cross-tabulation analysis in order to 
detect tentative relationships and secondly, to systematic-analysis 
using the Automatic Interaction Detection technique. The latter had 
two main functions; on the one hand it helped break down the data into 
a more comprehensible format and on the other it served to identify the 
important characteristics associated with those companies that plan ahead 
formally and those than plan ahead informally.'
The implications of the major findings relating to company planning 
and the management characteristics of the companies are formidable.
The evidence suggests that formal planning and with it the active use of 
techniques that have been shown to improve performance, is not particularly 
well established among U.K. small companies. The formality that 
exists is in the hands of larger small companies, where size has 
dictated the necessity. The problems here are two-fold. Firstly, the
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majority of small firms possess informal planning procedures and the 
majority of these are family-controlled.companies. As the latter are 
the most preponderant group among U.K. small firms, it is likely that 
the very backbone of small business enterprise is without formal 
planning techniques that can act to assist their performance and 
expansion and hence, ceteris paribus, that of the national economy.
It could well be argued that corporate planning techniques are not
a panacea for improved performance and that there are other management
techniques available that could profitably be coupled to a more informal
planning mode to achieve equal, or even better, overall performance.
In addition, it may well be that small companies are best left to their
basic strength of flexibility and speed of movement. But if, firstly,
formal planning procedures help organize resources more efficiently
2and so increase profitability (as previous research has indicated ); 
and secondly, formal planning activity is more deeply rooted in subsidiary 
companies already possessing greater operational and strategic advantages 
than independent small companies, perhaps there is a danger that the 
greater part of the U.K. small company sector is not quite operating as 
efficiently and profitably as it could.
Secondly, it is this preponderant part of the small firm sector 
(family controlled companies) which, more than any other, suffers from a 
distinct lack of formal management education or the active pursuance of 
external management training. These problems are exacerbated firstly, 
by those associated with nepotism (e.g. inter and intra-family rivalry, 
the flow of managerial and entrepreneurial talent within the family, 
the reservation of top management posts for family that leads to problems in 
±ecruiting staff of quality and competence); and secondly, the existence of 
older managers with longer lengths of service together with older chief 
executives could be indicative of conservative trains of thought leading 
to a reluctance to change the status quo. Taken together these characteristics 
could render the widespread adoption of formal techniques difficult, partly 
due to the mental and physical inability of the existing management team 
and partly due to an inherent reluctance, based.on suspicion, to adopt new 
fangled techniques. The adoption of techniques is further aggravated by 
the usual small firm problems of time, multiplicity of duties, paucity 
of resources, the burdens of form-filling and strangulating legislation.
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After consideration of these problems, the potential of small firms to 
think ahead systematically is severely .questioned. The picture is a 
dichotomy. On the one hand there are the larger firms, that not only 
possess the few trained managers that exist in the small firm sector, 
but also monopolise the active use of techniques designed to improve 
efficiency and performance, including corporate planning. On the other 
hand, there are the majority of U.K. small firms (80% of the sample) who 
lack both formally trained managers and the use of those techniques 
designed to improve efficiency.
Recent debate has suggested that small firms are the answer to many 
national economic and social ailments. This research questions that 
assertion. True, there is plenty of evidence cited in Chapter Two, that 
suggests small firms possess characteristics which are amenable to a 
happier, less troublesome and more desirable social unit. However, the 
research results have suggested that they may not he operating as 
efficiently and profitably as they could; and. in that lies both the irony 
and the difficulty for policy making. The Government has suggested a 
policy of engineering an economic environment conducive to entrepreneurial 
existence and development, in order that small firms can grow and expand 
thereby adding to G.N.P. and reducing unemployment. But if the Government 
pursues that policy without, firstly, enquiring of the small firms whether 
they want to grow and expand; and secondly, without evaluating their 
potential to do so, then a high risk is run of a blanket policy falling on 
barren land. This research has indicated that not only do small firms not 
want to grow and expand under the present economic climate, but growth and 
expansion itself is not of prime consideration to them.
-However, the possibility of improved performance and expansion 
through a much wider adoption of formal techniques remains for many small 
companies, hut their potential to do so is grossly hindered by intrinsic 
problems, the removal of which is of prime importance. The implications 
here are dramatic for two bodies of people - the policymakers and the 
experts who provide education and advice to small businessmen.
The urgency with which policymakers should destroy those consequences 
of their actions which contribute to the above small firm problems cannot 
be overemphasised. There are three specific areas in which the Government 
can act to directly dilute or even completely eliminate those problems.
All have been voiced before, but for reasons of persistence and emphasis 
will be voiced again. They are the areas of form-filling, legislation and 
taxation. Form-filling is perhaps the easiest to remedy. The Prime Minister, 
Mr. James Callaghan, had announced in July 1978 that his Labour Government 
would look thoroughly at the burd.en of forms and questionnaires emanating
kfrom all official departments . It is crucial here, not only to analyse 
the cost benefit of each and every question (let alone survey form) 
which is sent to small companies, hut also to ensure that what information 
is collected is not available elsewhere e.g. duplicated on the V.A.T. 
computer.
The remaining areas require systematic investigation, hut there is no 
necessity for undue delay. The most painful thorn in the small company 
artery is the effect of the Employee Protection Laws. Particularly 
guilty were the 1975 Employment Protection Act and the _1974;-;Health and Safety 
at Work Act. Both have added to the complexity and scope of the rules 
for playing the game of small business. To gain an understanding of the 
Acts and your duty as an employer requires considerable time and ability 
and therefore cost, all of which are already at a premium in small companies. 
The former Act has made the process of hiring and firing labour so acute 
that many small firms in this survey confirmed that they had the potential 
and desire to take on additional labour but were reluctant to do so 
because of the difficulties of dismissal, which may involve time consuming 
and costly industrial tribunals.
"We cannot consider increasing our staff since it is near impossible 
to dismiss operatives whatever their demeanours. We dare not 
engage young women who may have children, in the view of the 
conditions attached ..." 2, Worsted Spinning.
"Planning for expansion is risky not just because Corporation
Tax takes such a slice out of the profit hut because some
provision for wrongful dismissal or redundancy situations has
to he made. Thus the road to expansion leads to excessive
borrowing and the edge of the cliff." 1 , Synthetic resins and plastic
materials,
"Planning for a small company is hindered by the restrictions 
placed on the employer which make it almost impossible to give 
notice to an employee for fear of adverse results from the tribunals. 
This, of necessity, places a burden on the employer who finds it 
impossible to displace poor labour by labour which could prove 
more advantageous." 2, Plastic products not elsewhere specified.
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Although the Temporary Employment Act has allowed companies to take 
on labour for short periods, it does no.t act to induce labour planning in 
small firms over the medium term. In essence, the employment laws act 
to protect the employee, but they fail to take into account the role of the 
employer, who carries with him the persistent burden of risk. It is the 
role of the employer, the entrepreneur and the potential entrepreneur 
that must be hoisted as equal or even greater than that of the employed; 
because it is with this body of people that the decision for further growth 
and expansion lies. A risk taking environment must be created if that 
decision for growth is going to be a positive one; and such strangulating 
legislation that mitigates against informal, let alone formal, planning 
must be adjusted. The trend of ignoring the employers' role is further 
evident in the third area - that of taxation.
There are two important principles in U.K. company taxation that
mitigate unfairly against the small firm. Firstly, small companies are
people companies - they provide personal service and rely crucially on
customer contact and the skills of their existing personnel. The taxation
system ignores this characteristic by concentrating on plant as opposed to
people. (Consider the Accelerated Tax depreciation for machinery,
factories, cars which get relief, unlike offices of shops.) Hence, as 
5Sandy points out, the stimulus is towards plant-based business while most 
small businesses are in servicing or retailing. Secondly, the tax system 
does not distinguish between the part of the profits due to the employer 
or entrepreneur, which are his by nature of him being manager of'the 
enterprise and those that are his as a reward for the risk and as a 
return for his initial investment.
Once again the human ability and desire to take risk is reduced by 
artificial barriers. Other disincentives to planning ahead come in the 
form of the Capital Gains and Capital Transfer Taxes, which both mitigate 
against the growth of a company over time and aggravate management 
succession problems. The impact of all the aforementioned legislation on 
small company growth provides rich material for further researchers.
For policymakers, the implications are more serious. The legislation and 
taxation system in the U.K. acts to prevent the creation of wealth and 
the taking of risk. The underlying philosophy is frightening, because 
that legislation is the signpost to complete socialism. If the desire is 
for a healthy small firm sector, then the creation of wealth and the taking 
of risk are to be encouraged; and the legislative and taxation systems 
urgently adjusted through direct policy intervention.
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The research results have equally important implications for those who 
educate and provide advice for small firms, as they too can play a significant 
role in reducing those problems preventing the wider adoption of more 
efficient techniques. The research identified the importance of size in 
the adoption of formal management techniques. However, the majority of 
small firms lie below the criteria where size would directly influence 
adoption (100 employees). For these smaller companies, the motivation 
to adopt more formal methods must come from elsewhere. Two possible 
avenues are, ..adoption by choice and adoption via advice. It is feasible 
to increase the number of small firms adopting management techniques by 
choice through increasing the number of courses open to small firm 
managers and increasing the number of publications .in the field. But there 
is a severe problem here. If the small firm manager learns of a technique 
and applies it in his company without professional advice, he runs the risk 
of applying the technique solely for its prestige, rather than its 
utility for solving the problem in hand, or its value to the company as a. 
whole. The avenue of adoption by advice is far more sensible. A well- 
trained analyst or consultant would ensure the correct technique to suit 
the problem and the company after having perused the complete company 
operations. Further he would help implement the techniques and monitor 
their progress. Both of these two avenues are directly linked to education 
and the supply of information and advice.
In this light, it is suggested that further researchers should look 
thoroughly at the extent and, more important, the quality of the' advice 
given to small firms by the Small Firms Information Centres, the professions 
and academia. Small Firms Information Centres have recently been criticised 
by the*Business Graduates Association , as being staffed by career civil 
servants. What is really required is a staffing by people well versed 
not only in small firm problems as the BGA suggest, but also people 
capable of diagnosing those techniques - of which corporate planning is 
only one, capable of improving the efficiency and performance of particular 
companies. In addition, the BGA suggest that the accountancy and legal 
professions have failed to meet the specific needs of their small firm 
clients in the ways suggested by the Bolton Committee.
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7 ..........Back has taken the initiative m  researching the information arena
in the small firm sector and has uncovered an ’information gap' there.
It is evident from his research that those small companies which use 
professional advice rely heavily on accountants and bank managers. The 
University of Surrey Small Firms Survey, 1978 has shown that 4l% of survey 
companies used no advice at all, while 48% relied emphatically on their 
accountants. Only 19% of survey companies had used management consultants 
and a meagre 1% had used university consultants. Back notes that the 
majority of advice supplied by accountants is in the realms of taxation 
(income and Corporation Tax, followed by V.A.T. and Capital Transfer Tax), 
followed by only a moderate degree of advice on debtors and inventories. 
Little advice was supplied on leasing, factoring, long term planning, 
marketing or production; which is partially due to the lack of time 
among accountants who are often overburdened by the everchanging legislation 
and partially due to their lack of training in small company management.
If accountants have neither the time nor training to assist in the 
education of small company managers, then the burden must fall on hank 
managers, management consultants and academia. Further research could 
profitably review their potential contribution and policymakers could well 
advise academic institutions as to the necessity of monitoring and assisting 
small firm sectors in their surrounding community. This could be done by 
allocating the task to graduate students on Masters projects. The initial 
interest that the student will need would come from a larger percentage 
of business school curriculums being devoted to the small company 
together with increased interaction of the group as a whole with the "live" 
business community. This could take the form of seminars held within 
business firms and then returning the compliment by inviting local small 
businessmen into the groups’ internal seminars/lectures. What is important 
is that academia must take the initiative to establish the links - 
small firms have not the t,ime.
But if academic institutions are to gather momentum in their 
research and monitoring of the small firm sector, policymakers must 
regard the available national statistics of this sector as grossly 
inadequate and sampling frames as unrepresentative. It is suggested 
that the Government look closely at available statistics with a view 
to achieving a more comprehensive coverage of small firms and a view to 
continuously updating that coverage. Mention has already been made of 
the Business Statistics Office* attempt to organize a sampling frame 
covering companies of all sizes that could be purchased at commercial rates; 
but the Government may well consider waiving those rates for serious non­
commercial research into the small firm sector.
*See section 3*4.1
257
Although the research suggests the necessity for increased and improved 
advice provided for small firms, it also notes the problems likely to 
arise in adopting this policy. Small businessmen are often suspicious of 
outside advice and perhaps of organized attempts to educate them. Of 
prime consideration is confidentiality and loss of independence through 
the introduction of outsiders. Secondly, in more practical terms, the time 
necessary for education and advice is rarely available in small firms.
Thirdly, advice usually spells cost to many small firm company managers.
All of these three initial barriers have been surmounted by professional 
consultants, particularly when small firms realise the cost-benefit of 
professional advice. However, this research has identified a fourth 
factor that might act to hinder the effectiveness of advice. In the majority 
of small companies (informal-planning companies) where the greatest potential 
for improving performance lies, managers are often older and have served 
longer. This may well indicate a more conservative train of thought, 
many of these managers being already set in their ways and reluctant to . 
entertain change.
Further, Wild and Swann have found "significant correlations betweenothe use of techniques and success for companies having 25-100 employees" .
This research found few companies below .100 employees pursuing formality.
Firms in the 25-100 employee size band are likely to be first or second 
generation companies where the role of the entrepreneur/manager is still 
quite potent. In Chapter Two, it-was explained that the entrepreneur 
character was not really conducive to formal planning and yet Wild and 
Swann state that this is the area of the greatest potential success.
Perhaps .future academic research, utilising the tools of organizational 
behaviour, may wish to review this area of potential conflict, with a 
view to designing approaches for consultants and academics, so that the 
adoption of formal management methods could be more widespread.
This research notes the preponderance of family.owned and managed 
companies in the small firm sector. It further notes that this group 
dominate the informal planning category and show a reluctance to adopt 
management techniques. The research does not call out for special financial 
considerations for the small firm sector, or for particular groups in it; 
but policymakers and researchers alike should place a close watch on the 
size of the family-controlled -group. A proposition for further research 
comes in the form of testing the relation between family groups and 
performance vis a vis other small firm groups and the degree and extent of 
nepotism' and performance within family owned and managed companies.
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A fundamental assumption of this research is that formal management 
methods do in fact improve performance in small companies. Further 
research should work to test this assumption on a large cross-section of 
the small firms community. The logical extension of this research is 
to gather performance data from Companies House on a sample of the small 
firms in the survey and .using multiple regression techniques, attempt an 
evaluation of the above assumption. The lodging of the accounts of many 
small companies with Companies House is often subject to considerable 
delay. Further, the documents themselves are often far from a ’true and 
fair view' of the companies operations - and certainly this will have 
become aggravated by the growth of the so-called cash market during 1978/ 
1979. But given these problems, an estimate of the. effect of formality 
on performance is better than mere assumption.
A particular extension to this would be an analysis concerning the 
performance of non-formal planning companies with formal planning subsidiary 
companies of the same size, to establish the relative differences/ 
similarities. Furthermore, an in depth study of employee commitment to the 
work task would examine the presence of an owner-manager and his effect 
on the labour force, as. opposed to that of a branch manager in a company 
interspersed with systems, controls and incentives sent down from Head 
Office. Such a study would provide critical information for consultants 
in advising small, owner-managed companies on take-over offers and what 
type of organization to expect thereafter. The formality/performance 
assumption could be extended to research across industrial sectors, 
with particular reference to the impact of formality on profitability 
and export performance of firms in each sector.
Perhaps the most profitable research that could now be carried 
out concerns the issue of scale. This research found that-at the 
hundred employee mark or thereabouts, companies are more likely to 
pursue formal management techniques, including corporate planning.
The research produced evidence in Chapter Two, that small scale had 
significant benefits in terms of improved industrial relations and 
employee identification with the work task. It was also stated that in 
some cases, small scale is more efficient and profitable. Larger 
organizations suffer from certain structural and operating problems 
brought about by their very size. In particular, the more levels of 
authority that exist, the greater the distortion of information - this 
being the basis of the control-loss argument advanced by Williamson*, 
where messages become distorted producing adverse affects on employee 
morale and efficiency. However, there are advantages of operating at 
a larger scale-economies in technology,
*See reference 31 9 Chapter One.
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advertising, marketing, distribution, supplier discounts and the provision 
of specialist services. Ideally, it would be beneficial to pursue 
that size that amalgamates the flexibility, drive and employee stability 
of the smaller company with the benefits of scale reaped by being large. 
Further research should be directed towards identifying this size band 
and how it varies between industrial sectors, to establish the most 
effective operating size. Consequent micro policy could then be directed 
towards inducing firms to operate at these levels in order to maximise the 
competitiveness of U.K. companies, rather than merely directing policy ad 
lib at a very heterogeneic sector, with the loose hope that it will grow 
and expand. If small businessmen know that there is a certain size 
band that equates personal control, or the retention of it, with maximum 
economic effectiveness, they may well formalise plans to get there.
Rerhaps the greatest implication of the findings concerning 
company planning is the fact that formal planning in small companies 
exists and is beneficial. Furthermore, its adoption does not require a • 
drastic alteration of the existing management structure -or the 
acquisition of expensive specialist functions. Hence formal planning in 
small companies appears to be practicable. What this research could not 
pursue was the problems associated with the implementation of formal 
corporate planning and to that end further research may direct itself.
Three further implications of these findings must he brought to
the attention of policymakers and-those who proffer advice. Firstly,
the attention in most small companies is centred on production at the
expense of marketing. Furthermore the research points to the plight of
9R and D among small firms. Now Bolton had stressed that the seed bed
function of small firms was of prime significance to the competitiveness
of the industrial economy. The prolonged existence and growth of a small
firm sector of sufficient size to fulfill that function is questioned
here. Invention and innovation among the existing small firms appears
to be a rare commodity and the perennial focusing on production as
opposed to marketing of goods and services,which is probably a legacy
of the industrial revolution, is indicative of the dominance of the
engineering role among small firms. Bolton stressed the necessity of a
10 .dynamic small firm sector and if that aim is to be achieved, marketing 
needs to be given prime attention in the education of U.K. small firms.
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Secondly, the planning horizon of U.K. small firms is strikingly short 
term and it is arguable that corporate planning, as perceived by academic 
authors, could not really exist under these limited horizons i.e. it is 
a much longer term process. So what really exists is a perception of 
formality by those small firm managers who actively practice planning.
This is the crucial issue as it leads to the question - is formal corporate 
planning, as it is outline in the managerial texts, practicable for small 
companies in the current uncertainty of the U.K. industrial economy?
This places great weight on policymakers to help stabilise the environment 
in which small firms operate. Stabilise the tax rates, the allowances, 
the rate of inflation, the growth of legislation and union power.
Admittedly, these have already been heard as cries £rom the small firm 
sector, hut if this sector is to grow and expand, it requires considerably 
longer planning horizons than 2/3 years in which to do so.
The Government’s record of instability is quite frightening.
11 . .Since 1950 , there have been thirty three changes m  the form, rates, or.
coverage of purchase tax or V.A.T. and nineteen changes in H.P. controls.
Pay and price controls were introduced in 1966, ended in 1970, re­
introduced in 1975 and radically altered in mid-1977- If the intervention 
was inconsistent, then so were the schemes - designed to smooth out 
recessions, they were usually short run programmes, subject to extinction 
and addition e.g. those that became extinct, included schemes in the 
sectors of wool textiles, ferrous foundry, machine tools, textile machinery 
and the job creation programme; additions are the small firm employment 
subsidy (the qualifying number of employees being later tampered with and 
reduced from 50 to 25 and then to 10) and the temporary employment 
programme. It is vital for.the future health and vitality of the small 
firm sector that Governments strive to provide a stable macro-environment 
in which they can operate and plan ahead. At the micro level, any 
intervention, if it is required at all, must he consistent. Further, 
any subsidies to firms in particular industrial sectors or size categories 
must be viewed in the light of competition both nationally and internationally. 
It lacks commercial sense to pursue a subsidy policy of non-competitive 
sectors, while those sectors that could provide increased competition at 
home and abroad (small firms in particular), are left to face a plethora 
of problems from inconsistent and inconsiderate intervention and legislation.
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firms who have not yet planned their chief executive's successor.
12 13 lbAs many managerial writers have stressed 5 5 , this is a critical
area of small company growth and central to the company's existence. 
Academics in designing courses and texts and the professions in providing 
advice must assist small companies in this area lest the death rate of the 
sector increases once again. It is quite plausible that the non-existence 
of a successor can lead to the closure of a viable business operation and 
so the loss of precious jobs and output. In the current environment it is 
the duty of policymakers and advisors to prevent those problems by treating 
the source. This is an area in which a cross-sectional study of small 
firms who have successfully negotiated this crucial4stage of small 
company development is required. Researchers need to act at the practical 
level, gathering data on past successes and using observation to gain 
insights into transformation periods. Specific questions that would require 
an answer are - what happens when no family successor is available?
Does the outgoing executive still effectively retain control? What effect 
does the change have on other managers and labour? Does the change affect 
company profitability? It has been stated elsewhere in this chapter 
that the Government could help ease this problem of succession for many 
small firms, by reducing the burden of Capital Transfer Tax, which in 
turn would reduce the fear of that tax (which is often greater than the 
burden).
Further researchers could investigate why the majority of small 
firms who practice .formal planning should adopt the technique between 
1973 and 1975. This would entail the further co-operation of firms in 
this survey and would help to establish the impact of macro-economic 
factors e.g. Oil Crisis, on the adoption of formal planning. In addition, 
information could be gathered from those companies that adopted corporate 
planning in the early 1960s - analysing their characteristics and 
establishing why - was is due to management competence? Education? Advice? 
Risk? Parent company policy? An extension of this work would be to 
analyse the start up date of small companies in the sample to detect 
any existence of bunching around specific years. By analysing the state 
of the national economy, legislation, taxation, incentives, human birth 
rates, income per capita and so on during those years, it may be possible 
to identify the climate - and more important, the specific-macro and micro 
policies in the industrial sector - that were so conducive to small 
business start ups.
T h ir d ly  and o f  d ir e c t  re le v a n c e , is  t h e ■s ta g g e r in g  number o f  sm a ll
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This research has basically identified what exists with regard to 
small company planning. It has not questioned the effectiveness of what 
exists and can therefore not suggest reasons for improving it. Further 
research should look harder at the types of planning that are in operation 
in small companies. Are some systems more effective than others?
Can existing systems be improved? The main aim of this kind of research 
is with the quality and effectiveness of the planning activities that 
operate in small firms. An extension of this work, utilising the current 
data, could look deeper at the planning process itself, particularly with 
regard to the problems involved in implementation and the overall cost/ 
benefit of the activity.
The major implications of the findings relating to small firm 
finance of this survey are threefold. Firstly, the findings lend weight 
to the existing proposition that there is no gap in the provision of 
finance for small firms. However, there appears to be a considerable gap 
in the quality of internal financial, control between formal and informal 
planning companies. This suggests that the active pursuance of formal 
planning, in that it requires financial data for projections and monitoring 
and so leads to a streamlining of small company Internal financial operation, 
is recommended for small firms and should be noted by academics and 
consultants. The majority of small firm failures have been blamed on mis­
management (particularly of the cash-flow) and if the size of the small 
firm sector is not to be continuously threatened by such failures, 
policymakers might well consider the subsidisation of the cost of management 
consultants in a scheme designed to review company internal financial 
control. Often the company accountant has not the time to analyse,
■recommend and implement systems and the consultancy profession must be 
pressed to accept this task.
Secondly, the findings confirm the precarious dependence of small 
firms on their banks for working capital and finance for major purchases.
This is an area in which policymakers can take direct intervention on 
interest rates through the Bank of England. Too great and too frequent 
fluctuations in the rate can render small firm operations very unstable.
Any marked increases in the Minimum Lending Rate (e.g. November, 1979), 
has a direct effect on small firms cost, competitiveness, eventually 
price and perhaps very existence. The implication here is for the viable 
and pursuasive existence of a small firm pressure group in Westminster, 
capable of countervailing power on such Issues as interest rates.
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At present the pressure is supplied by a variety of ginger-groups - 
the Association of Independent Businesses and the Union of Independent 
Companies being the more significant, both often work in conjunction with 
political party groups e.g. The Conservative Small Business Bureau, with 
the C.B.I. providing weight where appropriate. But although such independent 
groups have an important influence, this still remains an outside influence. 
Policymakers should he actively concerned with the establishment of a more 
permanent body with a greater voice and influence along the lines of the 
United States Small Business Administration. The latter was founded in 
1953 and provides creative countervailing influence for small firms in 
Washington. Its budget in 1978 was over $173 million and its main area 
of interest is in loan guarantee schemes- of which 320,000 have been granted, 
totalling over $22 billion. It concerns itself with start up projects 
with particular emphasis on capturing new inventions and innovations.
It has considerable backing in terms of resources and provides large 
teams of retired businessmen - conversant with .small company operations - 
to act as consultants in existing small firms (the Government only paying 
their expenses). Such a body in the U.K. could ensure the well-balanced 
economy that Bolton called out for - ensuring that legislation and the 
allocation of grants does not operate against the small firm interest.
In addition, it could ensure that a greater share of Government contracts 
go to small firms and could help co-ordinate the education and management 
training programmes and facilities that this research deems necessary to improve 
small company performance. Perhaps most important, it would underline
the commitment of successive governments toward the small firm sector 
and provide some guarantee that the interest was not a passing fashion.
Further ^ researchers could help outline propositions for such a scheme 
by pursuing an international comparison study of the impact of the 
U.S.S.B.A. and the U.K. approach (via ginger groups) on small company 
interests. The research should consider the problem already faced by the 
SBA and the problems likely to arise in Westminster with the establishment 
of such a body. In addition, this type of research must consider the 
interest and acceptability of such a body with the existing small firm 
community.
264
Thirdly, the findings indicate that larger companies take extensive
credit from small firms. There has been a recent movement - led by Shell
1 5  . . . .U.K. , to pay small firms directly on application. The quicker and wider
this scheme develops the better for the small firm. The Government and
the Nationalised Industries are not without blame in this respect and
it is here that direct action should be instigated before policy suggestions
that small firms be entitled to charge high interest rates on overdue
accounts are made. This is a'delicate area and one in which small firms
cannot Ptfield great weight without Government assistance. But the shape
and form of that assistance cannot be defined without the latter party
alleviating itself from guilt.
It was thought relevant to the practical nature of this thesis 
that any suggestions for policy or .'future research be themselves 
couched in practicality. There is no call for a large scale subsidisation 
of the sector, no large scale increase in grants. The call lies primarily 
in the provision of education and training - a. call that could be 
facilitated by the practical commitment of the Government to the importance 
of the small firm sector by the establishment of a body with power and voice 
to co-ordinate and influence; and secondly for stability and consistency 
in the area of Government intervention together with a long hard look at 
the existing legislation and taxation schemes. However, researchers and 
policymakers must always be wary of the contemporary romantic view of 
small firms, not all of them are beautiful and not all of tbeir grievances 
are genuine. It is the duty of the practical researcher to tear’down 
the romantic veils that exist and identify the real problems and needs 
rather than the casual grievances - many of which, with minimal effort and 
advice'could be quickly remedied.
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1. Research uncovering the extent and quality of advice given to
small firms by the Small Firms Information Centres, the professions 
and particularly academia.
2. Research into the potential of ’academic-monitoring’ of adjacent
small business communities by Masters students on a continuous 
basis. Research into the potential interchange of academics and 
small businessmen into each others environment to co-ordinate 
ideas, solve problems and dispel suspicion and inhibition.
3. Research into the potential of improving the statistics - at both
local and national levels, of the small business sector with 
particular regard to ease of access for non-commercial researchers.
4. Research into the potential conflict areas between consultants
and entrepreneurs that are likely to reduce participation and 
involvement and so hinder the more widespread adoption of formal 
techniques.
5.i) Research regarding the testing of the relationsip between family 
firms and efficiency with regard to the extent and influence of 
nepotism on industrial performance, utilising the data and results 
of this research.
ii) Furthermore, the association between formal planning methods and 
company profitability requires further research work to establish 
the impact of formal management methods on company profitability. 
The profitability of informal planning companies could then be 
compared and the similarities and differences identified.
iii) An extension of this work would provide a more detailed analysis 
of the impact of formality on profitability across industrial 
sectors in order to identify those sectors that gained most 
benefit from adoption and those sectors that could well improve 
performance but are reluctant or hampered in their pursuance of 
formality.
6. Further research should concentrate on the impact of formality 
on export performance in order to identify the potential of 
organizing resources in a formal manner for export-orientated 
companies. This research would be particularly beneficial in 
the light of Britain’s unfortunate reputation for failing to meet 
delivery dates. Important work here could assist the balance of 
payments position.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
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7. Further research should examine the effect of size on the adoption 
of formality. Previous research and this research have found that 
around the 100 employee mark, firms undergo a transition to formality. 
Why is this so? Is it associated with a change in structure?
Small scale has certain advantages in terms of industrial relations 
and job identification coupled with easier and more effective lines 
of communication. Larger scale also possesses advantages in terms 
of economies in technology, advertising, marketing, distribution, 
supplier discounts and the provision of specialist services.
Is the 100 employee mark significant in amalgamating the flexibility 
"and stability of small scale with the economies of large? Is their 
an efficient scale of small company operation? How does this vary 
between industries?
8. In depth research into the actual planning process in small companies 
could continue using the information already gathered in this study. 
Particular attention must he paid to the implementation problems, 
the effect on existing management of formalising procedures, 
potential conflict situations, the cost, the ability of the firms 
existing financial system to cope, the provision of sufficient 
information for strategy making, monitoring and control and the
role of top management, particularly the chief executive. In addition, 
it would be profitable to examine, using present data, the effective­
ness of those formal planning systems in operation with a view to 
identifying the more productive ones and suggesting improvements 
where appropriat e.
9. Many small firms in the survey indicated that there was a scarcity 
of labour, particularly management skills. Research may concentrate 
on why management recruitment is a strenuous task to small firms.
Are graduates tempted into large firm jobs without knowing the
• benefits of small scale? Do small firms pay enough? This could 
be an important factor which restricts the wider adoption of formality.
10. Further research utilising present results, may enquire into the
unusual findings in the data e.g. why is formal planning preponderant
in Wales? Particularly in the light of a recent report by the
l6Thames Valley Regional Management Centre who identified the areas 
of low provision of advice to small businessmen as being in Northern 
Ireland, Wales, Scotland the the South West. What is the unspecified 
factor that many NPCs indicated restricted their adoption of formality?
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11. Research is immediately required into the critical stages of small 
company growth. A cross-sectional study of those companies that 
successfully negotiated the stages and those that failed and
why, would he of considerable assistance to advisors and academic 
researchers. Attention must be paid to the planning for management 
and chief executive succession - an area that was neglected by 
companies in this survey, so that policies can be developed for 
companies without immediate successors.
12. To gain clearer insights into the factors that are beneficial 
- to small company start-ups research should examine the macro-
factors predominating in the economy when the companies in this 
survey were started. Is there any bunching around specific years? 
Can factors such as legislation and taxation help to explain why 
so many companies started up during those years? How are the 
fortunes of small business dependent on the business cycle? Do 
start-ups lag behind economic troughs? If so, by how long?
Is there any rate of economic growth associated with a greater 
birth rate of small firms? In short, how do the macro-factors 
influence small company fortunes and existence?
13. Research should be carried out into why the majority of small firms 
in this survey adopted formal planning between- 1973-1975'* What was 
the role of the Oil Crisis of 1974 on this adoption? Why should 
adoption be so bunched together? Furthermore, it would be 
worthwhile to investigate the reasons why some small companies 
adopted formal planning very quickly in the early 1960s. Was this 
due to their stature as subsidiaries, management competence, 
education, advice, diversification?
14. Further research should be carried out to investigate the 
potential of a U.K. Siu&H Business Bureau along the lines of the 
existing and successful U.S. Small Business Administration. An 
international, comparison study would be required with particular 
emphasis on the structure of the industrial economies and nature 
of the problems in both the U.K. and U.S. Hence suggestions 
concerning the nature and powers of such a body, its role in 
providing finance and advice and its acceptability could be 
profitably entertained.
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15. This research identified the principal role of education in 
increasing the adoption of formal techniques in small firms. 
Research must go deeper and find out whether the solution is 
education, or do academics perceive it as that? Many small 
firms are capable of operating more efficiently when the burden
of Government legislation, form-filling and interference is reduced 
or eliminated. Research may wish to prove that the efficiency 
gain of the latter approach may well be greater than the former.
16. This research suggested that many small firms were engineer- 
orientated, with little emphasis on marketing and R and D.
Further research using this data could examine in which industries 
this is dominant, which industries could benefit from a marketing 
input and those industries that, to their own eventual detriment, 
have lagged behind in the research for new products and services.
It may be the case that researchers and eventually Government 
policymakers should take a direct initiative in identifying key 
problems in individual industrial segments a long time before they 
begin to undermine the international competitiveness and/or 
productivity of the sector. Further research using the current 
data could look into the relative attention given by small firms 
to these various functional areas and.find out why personnel
and R and D are given least attention. More research is required 
on the combinations of functional areas receiving most, least 
and requiring more attention to discover their implications across
S.I.C. Orders.
17. Utilising the current data, further research into planning modes 
and market structure could be undertaken to examine the effect of 
competition on formality. Additional macro data would be required 
to identify the ratio of small to large firms in each S.I.C. Order
'and clarify the above effect. This research would also have to 
examine the interdependence of small and large firms in each S.I.C. 
Order and examine the effect on formality. This research may 
discover, among other things, why the Food Sector appears to be a 
unique case within the results of this survey.
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18. Utilising the current data, it is possible to re-examine the 
management techniques used hy small firms to identify possible 
clusters of techniques across S.I.C. Orders. With a little more 
company information, the utility of those techniques could be 
tested against profitability. This research could discover why 
forecasting was so popular, particularly when many small firms 
suggested the environment kas too uncertain to plan. With 
additional information it would be advantageous to examine the 
degree of sophistication of that forecasting.
19. Many small firms in the sample suggested that finance was easy 
to obtain. Further research, utilising this data base, could 
examine the structure and industry of those companies suggesting 
it was easy and those companies suggesting it was difficult,
in order to discover why.
20. From the current data, it is possible to examine the location 
(S.I.C. Order) and size of those companies with older managers and 
chief executives and those companies where succession is a problem. 
If the existence of those factors is clustered into particular
S.I.C. Orders or sizes it may be possible to reason why.
Appropriate recommendations could then be made before the companies 
are lost. In addition, it would be beneficial to test the 
profitability of small firms against the age and quality of their 
managerial personnel and examine the effect across the different 
planning modes.
2 1. 11% of the survey companies confirmed the existence of factors 
affecting their efficiency during 1976/1977j but few companies 
specified the nature of the factors. With further help from these 
companies it would be possible to pinpoint and then eliminate 
those factors.
A  P  P  E N D I X  A  BOLTON CO M M ITTEE D E F IN IT IO N  O F SMALL F IR M S
A P P E N D I X  A
271
Small firm sector as defined for this Inquiry
Statistical definition Small firms Proportion Average
Industry
of small firms 
adopted by the
as a % of 
all firms in
of total 
employment
employment 
per small
Committee the industry, in small firms, firm, 1963
1963 1963
Manufacturing (1) ' (2) (3) (4)200 employees or less 94% 20% 25Retailing turnover £50,000 p.a.or less 96% ’ 49% 3Wholesale trades turnover £200,000 p.a.or less 77% 25% 7Construction 25 employees or less . 89% 33% 6Mining/Quarrying 25 employees or less 77% 20% 11
Motor trades turnover £100,000 p.a.or less 87% 32%* 3*
Miscellaneous turnover £50,000 p.a.services or less 90% 82% 4
Road transport 5 vehicles or less 85% 36%* 4*Catering All excluding multiples and bresvery-man- ,aged public houses 96%* 75%* 3*
Source: Reports on the Censuses of Production and Distribution and otherofficial inquiries(and Research Unit Estimates).
All figures relate to enterprises but with the exception of Manufacturing relate only approximately to the year indicated. (For definition of an enterprise sec Chapter 4, para. 4.4.)
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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  S U R R E Y
Guildford Surrey GU2 5XH T  0483 71281 Telex 859331
Department of Economics 20th September, 1978.
f \  . \  -
c C x L e V  WX.VUV .»
VV^XXA. C^A-faSV OX
Dear ^
For nearly two years now I have been undertaking university 
research into small and medium sized companies for a doctorate degree.
The topic area involves company operations, their structures and planning 
methods - a very important area in the current political and economic 
climate. The research thesis will be made available for any interested 
reader.
To complete the research requires a little of your help. Enclosed 
please find a survey report I need you to fill in and send back to me.
In return for your assistance I will send you a summary report of the 
research, especially relevant to your own company. You will then be 
able to see how other companies operate and plan ahead, the techniques 
they use and the policies they adopt,and compare them with your own 
company. The research is completely confidential, any summaries are 
merely averages and no one company con possibly bo identified. There 
is no commercial sponsor, my research is self-financed and university 
based. So if you can spare some time to complete the survey I will, 
in return, send you, free of charge, a summary relevant to your company, 
to peruse to your advantage. I have already paid for return postage 
and addressed the envelope for you.
The survey is quite easy to complete by merely circling numbers 
in the right hand column. If you have any difficulties just ring me 
at 0483 - 71281, extension 851, I will be pleased to assist.
I feel sure you will help me with this research and I don't have 
to impose on your valuable time again with reminder letters and so on.
Thanking you in anticipation of an early response.
Yours- sincerely,
R
P. McKiornan, B.A., M.A.
Ph.D. Researcher, Department of Economics.
P.S. A half-completed response is much better than none at all.
Thank you.
A P P E N D I X  ■,_Q-
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  S t f i
Guildford Surrey GU2 5XH 
Oopaptcsesat of Ecosaomics
T  04B3 71281
w , \  
x  € # % x
T e lX 8 5 9 3 fl| iX v
X .  V
1 7  8  3 SMALL FIRM SURVEY REPORT
. ,1 3  NOV 1978
Please Return Fully Completed by
Answer to following questions by placing a circle 
around the appropriate number in the right hand margin
For Example;
O Both
... .
SS ^
x ^ e
3. What is your own position in the company?
1 Chairman 3 Financial Manager
2 Managing Director 4 Marketing Manager
5 Company Secretary
6 Other (specify .......)
SECTION I Company Type 
What is the main business area of your company?
0 Manufacturing (specify main activity.............. ...)
1 Retailing 5 Road Transport
2 Construction 6 Wholesale
3 Hotel and Catering 7 Service company
4 Motor Trade 8 Other (specify ....... ) 1
How long has your company been trading?
0 0-5 years 4 21-25 years
1 6-10 years 5 26-30 years
2 11-15 years 6 31-40 years
3 16-20 years 7 40 plus years 2
What is your own position in the company?
0 Both'"'"’""1 cha;’-rman 3 Financial Manager
'"'■''■"2 Managing Director 4 Marketing Manager
5 Company Secretary 3
6 Other (specify ....... )
Is your company?
0 A limited company 2 A partnership
1 An unlimited company 3 A sole-proprietorship 4
(i) Is your company a subsidiary of another limited company?
0 Yes
1 No 5
0
0
(ii) If Yes, which is the main business area of your holding 
company?
*
*
0 Manufacturing 5 Road Transport
1 Retailing 6 Wholesale
2 Construction 7 Service Company
3 Hotel & Catering 8 Other (specify ...... .)
4 Motor Trade 9 Purely Holding Company 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
*
9
6. (i) Which of the following control your company? I
0 Family members directly involved in company
1 Family members not directly involved in company
2 Shareholders not directly involved in company
3 Directors actively involved in company
4 Partnership
5 Employees
6 Other
7 Combination of these (specify ................) 7-8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4
i
(ii) If your company is family controlled is it?
0 First generation
1 Second generation
2 Third generation
3 More 9 o 1 2 3 *
7. How many family members are employed in managerial posts?
0 None 5 Five
1 One 6 Six
2 Two 7 Seven
3 Three 8 More (specify........ )
4 Four 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SECTION II Management Structure
1. How many levels of management, including foreman and upwards, 
are there in your company?
♦
0 None 3 Three 6 More (specify........ )
1 One 4 Four
2 Two 5 Five 11 o 1 2 3 4 5 6 9
2. (i) Is the turnover of your manual labour?
2 Low 1 Medium 0 High 12 0 1 2 9
(ii) Is the turnover of your clerical and managerial labour?
2 Low 1 Medium 0 High 13 0 1 2
3. Is the manual labour in your company?
0 Entirely unionised 1 Partly unionised 2 Not at all
unionised 14 
4. (i) Is the chief executive of your company the founder?
0 1 2
*
0 Yes 1 No 15
2
0 1
*
(ii) If No, is the chief executive of your company a member 
of the founder's family?
O Yes 1 No
What is the age group of your chief executive?
0
Years Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
Do any of the following factors restrict the planning of a 
replacement for your chief executive on retirement?
0 Not considered replacement yet
1 Difficulty of choosing between candidates
2 Capital Transfer Tax
3 Finding a candidate of sufficient ability
4 No successor planned at all
5 Other (specify..................... .....)
6 None
How many managerial posts are there, including chief executive 
in your company?
0 One post
1 Two posts
2 Three posts
3 Four posts
4 Five posts
5 Six posts
6 More (specify
(i) Have the majority of managers in your company?
0 Undertaken management training in another company
1 Undertaken management training in your company
2 Undertaken management training at University/College
3 Had no formal management training
(ii) Is external management training provided by your company? 
0 Yes 1 No
What is the number of managers in each age group?
j Years Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
(Please write the total in the boxes above).
10. What is the average length of service of your managerial staff?
O
Years Under 5 5-9 10-14 15-19 Over 20
*L1. How many managers in your company possess the following 
qualifications?
Professional qualification
Both
j Degree
(Please w r i te  t o t a l  in  box)
16 O 1
17 0 1 2 3 4
18/19 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
)
20 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
20/21 0 1 2  3
22 0 1
23 0 1 2 3 4
0 Continually search for new managers
1 Recruit managers only when necessary
2 Develop managers within the company
3 Combination of these (specify ......
4 None
12. I s  i t  your company p o l ic y  to?
24 o
25/26
SECTION I I I  Strategy and Competition
During 1976 and 1977 was your company efficiency grossly 
restricted by any of the following?
0 Illness of key employees
1 Pay limit constraints
2 State of British Industrial Economy
3 Strikes within your company
4 Cheapness of Imports
5 Strikes within other companies
6 Other (specify...................................)
If sales slacken off, which one of the following policies is 
most effectively employed by your company?
0 Tighten up and become more efficient internally
1 Penetrate your existing UK market as far as possible
2 Develop new markets in UK
3 Develop new markets abroad
4 Diversify your operations
5 Develop new products/services to replace existing ones
6 Combination of these (specify...................)
7 None
What percentage of your total sales goes to your main customer 
0 Less than 10% 1 10-25% 2 25-50% 3 50-75% 4 Over 75%
What percentage of your total sales goes to exports
0 Less than 10* 
5 None at all
1 10-25% 2 25-50% 3 50-75% 4 Over 75^
27/28
29
30 O
Where does the majority of your competition come from?
0 Large firms in UK I Medium firms in UK 
2 Small firms in UK 3 Foreign products/services(imports)
How many other companies in the UK are serious competition to 
your company?
0 One 1 Two 2 3-5 3 6-15 4 More
31 0
32
1.
SECTION IV Business Operation
(i) Do any of the following financial techniques happen to be
in active use in your company? 33/34
0 Budgetary Control
1 Cash Flow Analysis
2 Financial Ratio Analysis
3 Break-even Analysis
4 None
(ii) Do any of the following operational techniques happen 
* to be in Active use in your company?
0 Inventory Control 2 Work Study 4 None
+ 1 Quality Control 3 Method Study
2. (i) On which of the following is your day to day bookkeeping
carried out?
•t
0 Manual Ledger 3 Computer
1 Electronic Accounting Machine 4 Other (specify .....
2 Partly Manual/Partly Machine
(ii) If your company bookkeeping is mostly manual, have any of 
the following prevented you from using a machine?
0 Cost 2 No-one to operate it
1 No necessity yet 3 Other (specify.... ...............
3. Which of the following administers your day to day bookkeeping?
0 Qualified secretary 2 Qualified accountant
1 Unqualified secretary 3 Other (specify .............
4. Which of the following is the main source of cash for day to
day running of your company?
0 Bank overdraft 2 Internal finance
1 Loan 3 Credit from suppliers
4 Other (specify .............
P
5. (i) Which of the following methods does your company use to
finance its major purchases?
0 Hire purchase 3 Bank loan
1 Lease purchase 4 Other loan
* 2 Leasing 5 Other source
(specify .............
f (ii) Is finance for major purchases?
0 Difficult to obtain 2 Easy to obtain
1 Average to obtain
*
6. Which of the following investment appraisal techniques is most 
important when assessing new purchases?
* 0 Discounted Cash Flow 2 Length of Payback period
1 Internal Rate of Return 3 None
7. On average, how long did it take you to recover a debt in the
* last year?
0 0-15 days 1 15-30 2 30-35 3 45-60 4 More
35/36 0 1 2
)
37 0 1 2
) 38 0 1 2
) 39 0 1 2
) 40 0  1 2
41/42 0 1 2
43 0 1 2
44 0 1 2
45 0 1 2
5
8. Which o f  the  fo l lo w in g  to o k  lo n g e r to  pay?
0 Nationalized industry
1 Large companies
2 Medium companies
3 Small companies
4 Government
5 Overseas buyers
6 Householders
7 All the same
8 None 46
9. Which TWO of the following have been most effective in the 
recovery of debt?
0 Reminder letters
1 Solicitor's letter
2 Cash discounts
3 Legal proceedings
4 Credit collection agency
5 Invoice discounting
6 Interest charge on debt
7 Firm of factors
8 Other 47-49
1.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
SECTION V Company Planning
Does your company happen to possess specific plans ahead for 
any of the following areas?
0 Products
1 Markets
2 Finance
3 Personnel
4 Research & Development
5 None 50/51
2. Are the aims of your company determined by?
0 Aims of your chief executive 4 Aims of employees
1 Aims of shareholders 5 Aims of holding company
2 Aims of directors 6 No specific aims
3 Aims of family 7 Combination
(specify ............. )
52/53
Are any of the following contained in your company aims?
0 Maximise sales
1 Maximise profit
2 Maximise sales subject to 
profit constraint
3 Maximise satisfaction
4 Company survival
5 Welfare of employees
6 Maximise growth of sales
7 Maximise growth of dividends
8 Maximise growth of assets
9 Other (specify........... )
54-56
(ring more than one if appropriate)
Are these aims written down as formal objectives to be obtained?
O Yes 1 No 57
Which three of. £ the following receive most attention in your company?
0 Labour Problems
1 Marketing
2 Production
3 Research & Development
Which two of the above receive least attention? 
Which two of the above require more attention?
4 Liquidity (Cash flow)
5 Customers
6 Suppliers
7 Purchasing
8 Stocks
9 None
58-60
61-63____ ^
64-66 -- ^
6
*♦
; 9 .
'f
#
%
r
10.
K
♦
8.
r
1.
»
*
*
2.
r
Do any of the following management techniques happen to be in 
Active use in your company?
0 Simulation 4 Computer Assistance
1 Network Analysis 5 Market Research
2 Linear Programming 6 Operational Research
3 Forecasting Techniques 7 None 67/68
Does your company happen to possess forecasts of the following?
0 Company Sales
1 Cash Flow
2 Technology in your Industry
3 Costs
4 Total Market size in 
your industry
5 World Energy Resources
6 Profits (on Sales)
7 None 69/70
Formal Planning is defined as the setting of specific 
objectives, calculating targets and conceiving detailed 
strategies to obtain these. The whole process is 
continually monitored by use of a suitable management 
control system.
Does your company plan ahead in a formal way?
O Yes 1 No 71
(i) If YES please answer Appendix A
(ii) If NO and your company relies entirely on experience 
and intuition for planning ahead please complete 
Appendix B
APPENDIX A
For companies who plan ahead Formally
(i) How long has your company been developing formal plans?
0 one year 3 five to eight years
1 two years 4 eight to fifteen years
2 three to five years 5 more 72
(ii) How many people are involved in the planning process?
0 one 3 four 6 seven
1 two 4 five 7 eight
2 three 5 six 8 more 73
(iii) What are their job titles?
0 Chief Executive 4 Accountant
1 Managing Director 5 Outside Consultant
2 Financial Manager 6 Production Manager 74/7
3 Marketing Manager 7 Other (specify.......... )
How long is the plan established for?
O one year 1 1-2 years 2 2-3 years 3 3-5 years 4 more
76/77
7
3. How many times a year do you meet to review the plan and 
progress towards it?
0 once 1 twice 2 thrice 3 four times
4 five times 5 six times 6 more(specify . ..) 78
4. Which TWO of the following are most important when choosing 
between alternative plans?
0 Satisfaction of employees 3 Profitability (Return on
1 Growth of sales potential Capital Employed)
2 Spreading of risk 4 Satisfaction of owner's
personal values & desires.
5 Other (specify ............ )
79-80
5. In developing the plan, which ONE of the following does your 
company pursue?
0 Identify strengths of company and build on them
1 Review market and select likely areas to pursue
2 Review customer requirements and try to fulfil them
3 Other (specify............................................ )
4 Combination (specify............................   ) 1-2
6. Which of the following is most important when developing the 
plan?
0 Management techniques 2 None
1 Experience and Intuition 3 Other (specify ............. ) 3
7. Are any of the following of major significance in developing 
your plan?
0 Social Responsibility 4 State of Supplies
1 Customer Needs 5 Availability of Finance
2 Coreign Competition 6 Personnel Planning
3 Domestic Competition 7 Other (specify ............. )
8 None 4-6
8. Have you found any of the following of use when developing a 
corporate (formal) plan?
0 Management Consultants 2 Outside Accountants
1 University Consultants 3 Outside Managers
4 Other (specify........ .....) 7-8
9. Which of the following review processes are most important to 
your company when assessing the performance of the plan?
0 Monthly financial reports
1 Financial ratio analysis
2 Analysis of cash flow predictions
3 Analysis of sales
4 Analysis of Variance of budgets
5 Other (specify............................................ )
6 None 9-10
10. Does your company happen to possess alternative plans for 
unlikely situations should they occur?
0 Yes 1 No 11
O
8
11. Which TWO of the following have benefited the most from
* the adoption of formal planning?
0 Improvement of employee conditions 
f 1 Increase profitability (return on Capital employed)
2 Increase sales
3 Increase size of company
4 Increase personnel motivation 
f 5 Increase communication in company 12/13
12. What is the most important benefit from corporate planning in
 ^ your company?
(Specify..................................................)
* 13. Has corporate planning changed the management structure of
your company?
0 Yes 1 No 14
If YES, could you briefly mention h o w   ................
APPENDIX B 
For companies with no formal planning
If your firm relies on experience and intuition for thinking 
ahead, please answer the following very important questions.
Your answers here are most valuable.
1. (i) Has your company ever tried formal planning?
0 Yes 1 No 15
(ii) If YES, why was procedure discontinued? (specify briefly)
Which time horizon in the future is most sensible for 
thinking ahead in your company?
0 1 year 1 1-2 years 2 3 years 3 4-5 years 5 more 16
Which of the following is the most important in your company 
policy?
0 Satisfaction of employees
1 Profitability (return on Capital Employed)
2 Growth of sales
3 Satisfaction of owner's values and desires
4 Spreading of risk
5 Other (specify ........................................ )
6 None 17/18
9
4. Which TWO of the following are most important when taking 
decisions about your company1s future?
0 Social responsibility
1 Domestic competition
2 Foreign competition
3 Customer needs
4 State of supplies
5 Availability of finance
6 Personnel planning
7 Other (specify ........
8 None
5. In developing plans about the future, which of the following 
policies does your company employ?
0 Identify the strengths of your company & build on them
1 Review the market and select likely areas
2 Review customer requirements and try to fulfil them
3 Other (specify..........................  )
4 Combination of above
5 None
6. Which of the following is used to monitor your company’s 
progress?
0 Accountants Balance Sheet
1 Internal Advice
2 Monthly /Quarterly Operating Statement
3 Bank Manager's Advice
4 Other (specify....................................... )
5 None
7. Do any of the following prevent your company from planning 
ahead formally?
0 Cost 3 Insufficient knowledge of
1 No necessity yet techniques
2 Not enough staff 4 Prefer to remain flexible
5 Other (specify.......... )
6 None
SECTION VI TRUSTED INFORMATION
1. How many employees do you have?
0 0-10 people 4 75-100 people
1 11-25 people 5 101-150 people
2 26-50 people 6 151-200 people
3 51-75 people 7 201-300 people
8 300 plus (specify ....
2. What was the company turnover in 1977?
0 £0-£20,000 4 £120,000-£200,000
1 £20,000-£40,000 5 £200,000-£500,000
2 £40,000-£80,000 6 £500,000-El,000,000
3 £80,000-£120,000 7 £1,000,000-E2,000,000
8 More (specify .......
10
19-21 0
22/23 0
24/25 0
26/27 0 1 2
28 0
29 0
Would you p lease  add your own comments on sm all company p lann ing?
Thank you.
Peter MoKiernan. My telephone number is 0483 71281 Extn.85l.
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A P P E N D I X  E ... METHOD OF CIRCLING NUMBERS IN THE MAIL SURVEY
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A P P E N D I X  F..... LIST OF COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN THE PRE-TEST
282''
A P P E N D I X
Aerogen Co. Ltd., Anstey Mill Lane Works, Alton.
Alan Payne Ltd., Riverside, Godalming.
Billing and Sons Ltd., Walnut Tree Close, Guildford.
Crater Controls Ltd., 102 Lower Guildford Road, Rnaphill.
Dzeus Fasteners (Europe) Ltd., Farnham Trading Estate, Farnham. 
Guildwav Ltd., Portsmouth Road, Guildford.
Induction Ltd., Wade Road, Basingstoke.
Lefthill Ltd., 18 Azalea Way, Camberley.
Martinair Ltd., Farnham Trading Estate, Farnham.
Nelco Ltd., Guildford Road, Farnham.
Plasmec Ltd., Weydon Lane, Farnham.
Rees Group Ltd., Westminster Hous.e, Old Woking.
RonsonLtd., Randalls Road, Leatherhead.
Technigraph and Telegraph Ltd., East Hampstead Road, Bracknell
(Berkshire).
Weyside Engineering (1925) Ltd., Middleton Industrial Estate,
Guildford.
A sincere Thank You is offered to the above companies for their 
valued assistance.
.LIST OF RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS
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A P P E N D I X  G
Mr A R McIntosh
Mr Howard Biggs
Mr Martin Callender 
B.Com. F.C.W.A.
Mr A R Merchant 
M.Inst M. M.I.P.A*
Mr Gordon Heaid
Mr Michael Kirk 
(Secretary)
Mr P M Knowlson
Industrial Facts and Forecasting 
12 Argyll Street 
London W1V 1AB
InterScan Ltd 
International Building 
71 Kingsway 
London W C 2
Marketing and Economic Research Ltd 
7-10 Bell Yard 
London W C 2
Marketing Consultancy Services Ltd 
Churchill House 
87 Jesmond Road 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE2 1NH
Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd 
211 Regent Street 
London W 1
British Institute of Management 
Management House 
Parker Street 
London WC2B 5PT
Confederation of British Industry 
21 Tothill Street 
London SW1
Mr J C Smuts 0 B E 
(Secretary)
Industrial Management Research Associatioi 
Watergate House 
York Buildings 
London WC2N 6LA
Miss P M Skitmore 
(Secretary)
Society for Longe Range Planning 
132 Terminal House 
Grosvenor Gardens 
London SW1
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■ A P P E N D I X  I CROSSTABULATIONS OF THE RESULTS FROM CHAPTER FIVE
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Table  5*1*1 P lann in g  Modes by Survey Respondent
PL.M R0* PCT COL PCT
RESFOI'J
C 11 &
. M D
DENT 
C M M D FINDIR
MARK
DIR
! CO 
SEC OTHER
ROW
TOTAL
Formal 33.1
31.9
5.8
46.4
36.0
44.1
• 4.5 
47.2
2.2
57.1
8.1
28.1
10.3
.35-0
553
37.1
Informal 41.6
68.1
3.9
53.6
26.9
55.9
3.0
52.8
1.0
42.9
12.3
71.9
11.3
65*0
937
62.9
1490TOTAL 38.5 4.6 30.3 3.6 - • 1.4 10.7 10.9 100.00
2Raw Chi Square = 30.39, v = 6, (Significance = 0.00), ( yx = 0.02, M.O. = k 
Source. T^e source of all the Tables in this chapter (Appendix I) is the
University of Surrey Small Firms Survey 1978.
Abbreviations:
C M = Chairman Fin Dir = Financial Director
M D = Managing Director Mark Dir - Marketing Director
Co Sec = Company Secretary M.O. = Missing Observations
v - degrees of freedom PL.M = Planning Modes
a 2/[ yx = Eta Square, the assymetric correlation ratio.
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Table  5 .1 .2  P la nn in g  Modes by Company L e g a li ty
ROW PCT
„  „ COL PCT PL.M
LEGALITY
LIMITED UN­LIMITED
PARTNER­
SHIP
SOLE-
PROP
R0Wr
TOTAL
Formal 99.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 .
553 ' 
37.1
37.1 33.3 50.0 25.0
Informal 99.0 0.4 0.2 0.3
938
62.9
62.9 66.7 50.0 75.0
l4'91
TOTAL •99.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 100.0
M.O. = 3
Table 5.2.1 Planning Modes by Age
ROW PCT 
COL PCT
PL.M
AGE
0-5
IN YEA 
6 1^0
RS
11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30- 31-40 40PLUS
ROW
TOTAL
Formal 9.8
41.9
14.8
36.0
11.9
38.6
8.3
37.4
7.2
37.4
6.9
32.5
8.5
37.9
32.5
36.7
573
37.1
Informal 8.0
48.1
15.6
64.0
11.2
61.4
8.2
62.6
7.2
62.6
8.4
67.5
8.2
62,1
33.2
63.3
62.9
1490
TOTAL 8.7 15.3 11.5 8.3 7.2 7.9 8.3 33.0 100.OC
Raw Chi Square = 2.70, v = 7, significance -0.91,^2yx = 0.002, M.O. = 4
Table 5*2.2a Planning Modes by Company Type
PLANNING ROW PCT 
MODES COL PCT
COMPANY
SUBSID
TYPE
NOT ROWTOTAL
Formal
42.0
61.4
. 58.0 
28.9
553
37.1
Informal 15.6
38.6
84.4
71.1
937
62.9
1490
TOTAL 25.4 74.6 100.00
Corrected Chi Square == 126.35 
*\2yx = 0.09, M.O. = k
v  = 1 , S ig n if ic a n c e  = 0 .0 0 }
Table 5.2.2b Planning Modes in Subsidiary Companies 
By Business Area of Parent Company
PL.M R0W PCT COL PCT
BUSIN]
S B A
ESS OF PA 
D B A
RENT
P P H C ROWTOTAL
Formal 50.9
64.1
22.4 
• 53.1
26.7
64.6
232 
. 61.4
Informal
45.2
35.9
31.5
46.9
23.3
35.4
146
38.6
378
Total 48.7. 25.9 25.4 100.00
Raw Chi Square = 3.86, v = 2, Significance = 0.l4, *"j 2yx = 0.01
Abbreviations:
SBA = Same Business Area 
DBA = Different Business Area 
PPHC = Parent Purely Holding Company
Table 5.2.3a Planning Modes By Control of Company
ROW PCT 
COL PCTPL.M
C0NTR0
1
L OF THE 
2
COMPANY
3 4  ^ 5
ROW
TOTAL
Formal 38.6 * 31.0
13.1
72.0
33.0
37.6
5.8
33.7
9.5
43.7
549
37.1
Informal 50.869.0
3.0
28.0
32.3
62.4
6.8
66.3
7.2
56.3
930
62.9
1479
TOTAL 46.2 6.8 32.5 - 6:4' " 6.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 6 5 . 8 6 ,  v _» 4 ,  Significance = 0.00, ^ 2 y x  = 0.05,
M.O. as 15 *
Abbreviations:
1 = Family 5 = Other (Minor combinations of the
2 = Shareholders first four categories).
3 = Independent Directors
4 = Independent Directors and Family
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TABLE 5.2.3b PLANNING MODES BY GENERATION OF FAMILY
Planning ROW PCT 
inodes COL PCT
Genera
1st
tion of 
2nd
Family
3rd More Row
Total
Formal 51.0
33.9
27.7
27.6
10.6
26.3
10.6
41.9
292
31.6
Informal U5.9
66.1
33.5
72.4
13.8
73.7
6.8
58.1
632
68.4
924
Total 1*7.5 31.7 12.8 * 8.0 100.0
A
Raw Chi Square = 8.4l, v = 3» Significance = 0.04, ( yx.^ 0.03, M.O. =
TABLE 5.2.3c PLANNING MODES BY CONTROL CONTROLLING FOR SUBSIDIARY 
COMPANIES 1
Planning ROW PCT 
Modes COL PCT
Subs
1
idiary Cc 
2
Dmpany
3 4 5 Row
Total
Formal 18.8
43.4
2 6.6 
79.2
41.5
66.0
2.2
41.7
10.9
59.5
229
61.2
Informal 38.6 
56.6
11.0
20.8
33.8
34.0
4.8
58.3
11.7
40.5
145
38.8
374
Total 26.5 20.6 38.5 3.2 11.2 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 27.06, v = 4, Significance = 0.00, 2yx = 0.07
292
TABLE 5.2.3d PLANNING MODES BY- CONTROL » CONTROLLING FOR SUBSIDIARY 
COMPANIES 2
ROW PCT
PL.M COL PCT
Not a 
1
Subsid: 
2
Lary
3 4 5 Row
Total
Formal 52.8
28.9
3.4
47.8
26.9
25.5
8.4
32.5
8.4
35.1
320
29.0
Informal 53.0
71.1
1.5
52.2
32.0
74.5
7.1
67.5
6.4
64.9
785
71.0
1105
Total 52.9 2.1 30.5 7.5 7.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 7.83, v = 4, Significance = 0.10, ^  2yx = 0.007, M’.O. - 15 
Zero Order GaTnma = - 0.118, First-order Partial Gamma = -0.0344 
Abbreviations for Tables 5.2.3a, b and c:
1 = Family Controlled U = Tamily/Directors
2 = Outside Shareholders 5 = ° + er combinations of thefirst four categories
3 - Directors
Table 5-2.Ua Planning Modes by Management Training .
PLANNING ROW"PCT 
MODES COL PCT
MAT
IN 
A C
IAGEMENT
' IN 
0 C
TRAIN]
U OR 
C
:ng
NONE OTHER ROWTOTAL
Formal 25.4
46.6.
27.8
53.4
4.2
36.5
35-7
25.6
6.8
56.9
543-
37.1
Informal
17.2
53.4
14.3
46.6
4.3
63.5
61.1
74.4
3.0
43.1
921
62.9
1464 '
TOTAL 20.2 19.3 4.3 51.7- .4.4 100.0
Raw Chi Square - 97.21, v = 4 ,
Significance = 0.00, ^ 2yx = 0.07, M.O. = 30 
Note: Category Other’ represents combinations of the previous 4 
Abbreviations: IN A C = In another company
IN 0 C = In own company
U OR C = At University of College
Table 5.2.4b Planning Modes by External Management Training
PLANNING
MODES
ROW PCT 
COL PCT
EMT
EMT NOEMT
ROW
TOTAL
Formal
44.4 
. 62.9
55.6
27.9
545
37.0
15.4 84.6
926
63.0
-
Informal 37.1 72.1
1471
TOTAL 26.2 73.8 100.0
Corrected Chi Square = 147.43
A 2v = 1,  ^yx = 0.10 # M.O. = 23
Significance = 0.00
Abbreviations: EMT = External Management Training
NO EMT = No External Management Training
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Table 5 .2 .5 a  P la n n in g  Modes by Age o f  C h ie f E xecu tive
PLANNING ROW PCT 
MODES ■ COL PCT
AC
UNDER 30
IE OF CHII 
.30-39
:f execut: 
4o-49
EVE
50-59 60 PLUS ROWTOTAL
Formal 0.6 
17.6 1
15.6 
40.5'-
36.1
43.8
33.8
37.9
13.9 
24.6 •
545
37.0
Informal
TOTAL
1.5
82.4
1.2
13.5
59.5
14.3
27.3-
56.2
30.6
32.5
62.1
' 33.0
25.2
75.4
21.0
926
63.O
1471
100.0
- 2Raw Chi Square = 33.25, v = 4, Significance = 0.00, | yx  = 0.02,
M.O. = 23
Table 5.2.5b Planning Modes by Chief Executive Founder or Not
PLANNING MODES ROW PCT 1 
COL PCT
FOUNDER
YES NO ROWTOTAL
Formal 39.7 60.3
549
37.0
31.9 41.5
- Informal 49.9 50.1
933
63.0
68.1 58.5
1482
TOTAL . 46.2
...
53.8 • 100.0
C o rre c te d  Chi Square = 1 4 .1 7 ,  v  = 1 ,  S ig n if ic a n c e  = 0 .0 0 02 , / ^ 2yx  = 0 .0 1 ,
M.O. = 1 2
295
Table 5*2.5c Planning Modes with Nepotism
PLANNING ROW PCT 
MODES COL PCT
NEPOT
LOW
ISM
LOW TO 
' MEDIUM MEDIUM
MEDIUM 
TO HIGH HIGH
. ROW 
TOTAL
Formal
49.4
47.6
9.2
38.3
21.3
34.7
9.4
28.7
10.7
22.3
553
37.1
Informal
32.0
52.4
8.7
61.7
23.7
65.3
13.8 • 
71.3
21.9 ’ 
77.7
938
62.9
1491
TOTAL 38.4 8.9 . 22.8 12.1 17.7 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 58.28, v = 4, Significance = 0.00, = 0.04,
M.O. =3 ’
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TABLE 5.2.6a PLANNING MODES BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
. Row PCT 
PL,M Col PCT
Num
1
ber of Emplo 
2 1 3
yees
4 5 6 7-' 8 ' 9 Row
Total
Formal 10.7
22.8
17.1
25.1
20.8
35.2
11.8
42.5
8.7
45.3
10.9
58.8
4.9
65.9
6.0
58.9
8.9
71.0
549
37.0
Informal 21.4 
| 77.2
29.9
74.9
22.5
64.8
9.4
57.5
6.2
54.7
4.5
41.2
1.5
34.1
2.5
4l.l
2.1
29.0
935
63.0
1484
I - Total Ul-,5 25.2 21.8 10.3 7.1 6.9 2.8 3.8 4.6 100.0
= 10
1 = 0 -1 0
2 = 11-25
3 = 26-50
4 = 51-75
5 = 75-100
6 = 101-150 
7 = 151-200 
8 = 201-300
9 = 300 plus
TABLE 5.2.6b PLANNING MODES BY TURNOVER OF SALES
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Turi
1
lover
2
of Sal 
3
es
4 5 6 7 8 9 Row
Total
Formal 0.5
20.0
0.9
15.6
4.6
29.4
4.2
16.0
7.3
21.2
24.1
33.4
18.6
39.5
19.Q
54.7
20.8
65.5
548
37-0
' Informal 1.3
80.0
2.9
84.4
6.4
70.6
13.0
84.0
16.0
78.8
28.2
66.6
16.7
60.5
9.2
45.3
6.4
34.5
934
63.0
1482
Total 1.0 2.2 5.7 9.7 12.8 26.7 17.4 12.8 11 .-7 100.0.
Raw Chi Square = 147.15, v = 8, Significance = 0.00,^ yx = 0.10, M.O. = 12
1 = £0-20,000 6 = £200,000-500,000
2 = £20,000-40,000 7 - £500,000-1 million
3 = £40,000-80,000 8 = £1 million—2 million
4 = £80,000-120',000 9 -- £More
5 = £120,000-200,000
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TABLE 5.2.7- PLANNING MODES BY S I C ORDER
Row PCTPL.M Col PCT
S I C
3
Order
5 6 7 8 9 10. 11 12 13
Formal
3:3
42.9
5.4
49.2
3.4
35.2
17.2
37.8
2.0
36.7
• 8.3
54.8
1.8
47.6
2.5
38.9
14.3
35.3
4.0
28.0
Informal 2.6
57.1
3.3
50.8
3.7
64.8
16.6
62.2
2.0
63.3
4.1
45.2
1.2
52.4
2.3
6l.l
15.5
64.7
5.8
71.1
Total 2.8 4.1 3.6 16.8 2.0 ’ 5.6 1-4 2.4 15.0 5.1
Table 5*2.7- continued
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
S I C
14
Order
15 16 17 18 19 20 Row
Total
Formal 0.4
11.1
3.8
40.4
3.3
52.9
6.7
30.1
10.3
37.7
5.1
40.0
8.3
24.2
553
37.1
Informal 1.7
S8.9
3.3
59.6
1.7
47.1
9.2
69.9
10.0
62.3
4.5
60.0
12.6
75.8
938
62.9
1491
Total 1.2 3.5 2.3 8.2 10.1 4-7 10.9** 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 39.95, v = 17, Significance = O.OOj'^yx = 0.03, M.O. = 3 
3 = Food, Drink and Tobacco
5 “ Chemicals, Allied Industries
6 = Metal Manufacture
7 = Mechanical Engineering
8 = Instrument Engineering
9 = Electrical Engineering
10 = Shipbuilding and Marine Eng.
11 = Vehicles
12 = Metal Goods not Elsewhere Specified
* The SIC Orders are expressed here in arabic numerals as opposed to the normal 
exposition of roman numerals'. In later Tables the SIC Oreders are collapsed down 
to preserve cell frequencies and this method of expression renders the Tables 
easier to assimilate. -
** Overleaf
13 = Textiles
lb - Leather, Leather Goods and Fur
15 = Clothing and Footwear
16 = Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement 
17. = Timber, Furniture etc
18 = Paper, Printing and Publishing
19 - Other Manufacturing Industry
20 = Contract Construction
** This percentage includes companies from the '200* sample as 
well as 44 companies from the ’3000’ sample which fall into the 
construction and service sector. Many companies in the Dun and 
Bradstreet Market Facts File have more than one SIC number, hence 
it is difficult to sample companies solely involved in manufacturing. 
The 44 companies represent the overflow and have been added to the 
120 companies from the 200 sample construction sector.
298
TABLE 5,2.8a PLANNING MODES BY SALES TO MAIN CUSTOMER
Sales to main Customer .
Row PCT Le s s than Over Row
PL.M Col PCT 10# 10-25# 25-50# 50-75$ 75$ Total
537
Formal 44*5 3 5 .9 1 1 .4 5 .2 3 .0 3 7 .4
3 9 .7 38 .8 30 .8 32 .2  - 30 .8
900
Informal 4 0 .3 33 .9 15 .2 6 .6 4 .0 62.6
6 0 .3 61.2 69 .2 67 ;8 69.2
____ 1437 '
Total 4 1 .9 34-7 13 .8 6 .1 3 .6 1 00 .0
* p
Raw Chi Square = 7*42, v = 4, Significance = 0.12, \  yx = 0.005, M. 0. = 57
TABLE 5,2.8b PLANNING MODES BY SALES TO EXPORTS
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Sales to 
Less
than 10#
Exports
10-25# 25-50# 50-75$
Over
75$ None
Row
Total
Formal 35-1
34-5
1 9 .0
4 6 .4
13 .3
53-7
5 .0
49.1
3-1
4 0 .5
2 4 .5
2 8 .9
542
3 7 .0
Informal 39.1  
6 S .5
1 2 .9
53 .6
6 .7
4 6 .3
j 3 .0  
50 .9
2 .7
5 9 .5
3 5 .5
71-1
923
6 3 .0
.146£_
Total 37 .6 15 .2 9 .1 3 .8 2 .9 3 1 .5 1 00 .0
2Raw Chi Square = 42.80s v « 5* Significance « 0.00,^ yx = 0.03, M* 0. — 29
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TABLE 5.2.8c PLANNING MODES BY TYPE OF COMPETITOR
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Type of
Large
Firms
Competitor
Medium
Firms
Small
Firms
Foreign
Firms
Row
Total
Formal 19*4
39.3
40.3
42.8
28.5
29*1
11.8
43.0
541
37-2
Informal 17.7
60.7
31.9
57.2
41.1
70.9
9-3
57-0.
913
62.8
1454
Total 18.4 35-0 36.4 10.2 100.0
^  2Raw Chi Square = 24-34* v = 3* Significance = O.OO, £ yx — 0.02, M. 0. == 40
TABLE 5*2.8dPLANNING MODES BY NUMBER OF COMPETITORS
Number of Competitors
Row PCT 1 2 3-5 6-15 More Row
PL.M Col PCT * Total
524
Formal 4.0 8.8 31-9 25.8 29.6 37-5
26.3 37.7 41-3 42.5 32.8
873
Informal 6.8 8.7 27.1 21.0 36.4 62.5
73*8 62.3 58.7 57.5 67.2
1397
Total 5.7 8.7 28.9 22.8 33.9 100.0
Raw Chi Square *** 14*70, v ~ 4, Significance = 0.01, r\2yx ~ 0.01? M.O. = 97
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TABLE 5.3.1 PLANNING MODES BY MANAGEMENT LEVELS
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Manage.
None
rial Lev< 
One
2ls
Two Three Four Five More
Row
Total
Formal 1.7
13.8
3.1
13.4
18.0
25*1
44.0
40.7
23.5
59.5
6.1
58.0
3.7
69.0
545
37.0
Informal 6.0
86.2
11.9
86.6
31.6
74-9
37.6
59.3
9.4
40.5
2-5
41.1
1.0
31.0
927
63.0
1427
Total 4.4 8.6 26.6 40.0 14*6 3.8 2.0 100.0
PRaw Chi Square = 143*84 v = 6, Significance = 0.00, ( yx = 0.10, M. 0. - 22
TABLE 5.3.2 PLANNING MODES BY LENGTH OF MANAGEMENT SERVICE
Length of Managerial Service (years)'
Row PCT Under Row
PL.M Col PCT 5 5-9 10-14 15-19 Over 20 Total
536
Formal 17.9 31.7 24.1 14*4 11.9 37-4
45.7 44.5 43.9 30.9 21.5
896
Informal 12.7 23.7 18.4 19.2 26.0 62.6
54*3 55.5 56.1 69.1 78.5
1432
Total 14.7 26.7 20.5 17.4 20.7 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 56.02, v - 4, Significance = 0.00,*\2yx = 0.04, M. 0.= 62
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TABLE 5.3.3 PLANNING MODES By CHIEF EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION
Chief Executive Succession
Row PCT 
pl;m ColPCT
1 2 3 4 5 Row
Total
Formal 49.1
36.9
9.1
44.5
9.3
25.3
24.8
45.7
7.8
31.3
540
37.2
Informal 49.6
63.1
6.7
55.5
16.2
74.7
17.4
54.3
10.1
68.7
913
62.8
1453
Total 49.4 7.6 13.6 [ .’20.2 9.2 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 25 .78 , v - 4, Significance^ O.OO^yx =  0 .0 2 , M. 0 .- -4 1  
1 = Not Considered 2 — Finding a Candidate of Sufficient Ability 
3 = No Successor Planned for this Company 4 = No Factors Prevent Replacement
TABLE 5.3.4 PLANNING MODES BY MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Manager
0
ial Succes 
- 1
sion
2 3 4 Row
Total
Formal 3.1
51.5
-23.3
35.3
39.2
37.3
28.4
57.8
6.0
14.1
546
37.2
922
Informal 1.7
48.5
25.3
64.7
38.9
62.7
12.3 - 
42.2
21.8
85.9
62.8
1468
Total 2.2 24.5 39.0 18.3 15.9 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 105.77, v « 4, Significance = O.OO^yx -0.07, M. 0.= 26 
0 = Continually Searching l = Only When Necessary 
2 5=5 Train Their Own 3 — Combinations 4 = None of the Alternatives
302
-V*TABLE 5.3.5 PLANNING MODES BY' TURNOVER OF MANUAL LABOUR
Turnover of Manual Labour
Row PCT Row
PL.M Col PCT High Medium Low Total
Formal •
9.2
36.2
31.3
37.4
59.6
37.1
544
37.1
Informal
9.5
63.8
30.8
62.6
59.7
62.9
922
62.9
1466
Total 9.4 31.0 59.6 100.0
Raw Chi Square - 0 . 0 7 ,  v « 2, Significance = 0 . 9 7 ,  * | 2 y x  =  0 . 0 0 ,  M O .  — .28
TABLE 5.3.6 PLANNING MODES BY TURNOVER OF CLERICAL/MANAGERIAL LABOUR
Turnover of Clerical/Managerial Labour
Row PCT Row
PL.M C 0lP C T High . Medium . Low Total
547
Formal 8.6 17.6 73.9 37.1
38.5 48.0 35.1
- - 926
Informal 8.1 11.2 80.7 62.9
61.5 52.0 64.9 .
1473
Total 8.3 13.6 78.1 100.0 !
Raw Chi Square = 12.2fy v = 2 , Significance - O.OQ, ^  yx - 0.00& M- 0- = 21
See note  on p .121.
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TABLE 5.3 .7 PLANNING MODES BY COMPANY UNIONISATION
Row PCT 
PLtM Col PCT
Company
High
t Unionisati 
Medium
.on
Low
Row
Total
Formal 25.6
48.8
30.1
41.8
44.3
30.5
544
37.1
Informal 15-8
51.2
24.7
58.2
59.5
69-5
923
62.9
1467
Total 19.4 26.7 53.9 100.0
Raw Chi Square =  35*13. V s  2 , Significance = 0.00, \ 2yx = 0.02, M Q, = 27
TABLE 5.3.8 PLANNING MODES BY MANAGEMENT AGE
Planning ROW PCT 
Modes COL PCT
Age (Y< 
20-29
2ars)
30-39 40-49 50-59 60+
I
Row
Total
Formal 1.8
32.1
26.2
46.6
56.4
39.4
14.4
23.2
1.2
1 1 .1
493
36.0
Informal 2.2
67.9
16.9
53.4
48.7
60.6
26.8
76.8
5.5
88.9
878
64.0
1371
Total 2.0 20.2 51.5 22.3 3.9 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 53.1*0, v = 4, Significance = 0.00, ^  2yx = 0.04, M.O. = 123
Hr
See no te  on p .121.
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TABLE 5.3.9 ' PLANNING MODES BY MANAGERIAL QUALIFICATION
Planning ROW PCT 
Modes COL PCT
Qual:
LOW
Lfications ' 
LOW-MEDIUM MEDIUM-HIGH HIGH Row
Total
Formal 41.8
30.0
22.1
37.4
. 15.6 
53.1
20.6
49.1
553'
37.1
Informal 57.6
70.0
21.7
62.6
8.1
46.9
12.6 
50.. 9
938
62.9
119.3..
Total 51.7 21.9 10.9 15.6 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 49.01, v = 3, Significance = 0.00, ^  ‘‘yx = 0.03, M.O, = 3
TABLE 5.3.10 -PLANNING MODES BY FACTORS AFFECTING SMALL COMPANY EFFICIENCY
Row PCT 
Col PCTPM
1
Facto
2
rs affe 
3
cting F 
4
mall -Cc 
5
mpany E: 
6
Ticiency
7 8 9
Row
Total
Formal' 41.1
37.5
8.6
29.2
3.5
43.6
4.5
46.8
2.7
35.1
2.5
32.4 •
2.9
37.8
11*5
45.2
22.8
39.1
487
38.0
Informal 41.9
62.5
12.8
.70.8
2.8
56.4
3.1
53.2
3.0
64.9
3.1
67.6
2.9'
62.2
8.6
54.8
21.8
6O.9
795
'62.0
1282
TotatL 41.6 11.2 3.0 3.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 9.7 22.2 100.0
Raw Chi Square =  1 0 .3 4 , v =  8 , Significance =  0 .2 4 , T^yx =  O.OO&M. 0. =  212
1 - State of British Industrial Economy 2 =  Other Reason
3 = Illness of Key Employees 4 =  pay  Limit Constraints
5 Imports/State of British Industrial 6 = Cheapness of Imports
Economy
T = Strikes in Other Companies 
9 = None of these
8 = Other Combinations 
PM = Planning Modes
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TABLE 5.3.11 PLANNING MODES BY COMPANY POLICY DURING RECESSION
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Compa
1
iny Pol
-2
icy Du 
3
ring F 
4
*ecessi
5
on
6 7 8 9 10
Row
Total
Formal 13.2
27.9
8.8
31.8
3-7
46.5
7.2
32.8
3-1
44-7
6.2
46.6
4.8
28.9
5.7
39.7
43-1
45.5
4.2
26.1
545
37.5
Informal 20.4
72.1
11.3
68.2
2.5
53-5
8.8
67.2
2.3
55-3
4.3
53*4
7.0
71.1
5.2
60.3
31.0
54.5
7.1
73.9
918
62.5
1455
Total 17-7 10.4 3.0 8.2 2.6 | 5.0 6.2 5.4 35-5 6.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 40.11, v = 9, Significance = 0.000, *\2yx = 0.03, M.O.— 39 
1 = Tighten Up Internally 2 = Penetrate Existing U K Markets 
3 = Combination of 1 and 2. 4 = Develop New U K Markets
5 = Combination of 1, 2 and 3* 6 — Develop New Markets Abroad
7 = Diversify 8 = Develop New Products 9 = Combinations 10 « None
TABLE 5.3.12a PLANNING MODES BY FINANCIAL TECHNIQUES
Row PCT 
~tol PCTPL.M
Finar
1
lcial r 
■2
rechniq
3
ues
4 - 5 6 7 8 9 10
Row
Total
Formal 12.6
39.9
1 1 . 1
26.4
23.9
51.0
10.6
7 1 .6
1 . 8
21.3
1 .8
19.6
9.3
64.6
16.2
76.1
7.3
10.8
5.3
42.0
548
37.1
Informal 1 1 . 2
60.1
18.3
73.6
13.6
49.0
2.5
28.4
4.0
78.7
4.4
80.4
3.0
35.4
3.0
23.9
35.7
89.2
4.3
58.0
928
62.9
1476
Total 11.7- 15.7 17-4 5.5 3.2 3.5 5.4 7.9 25.1 4.7 [100.0
Raw Chi Square « 298.55 , v = 9, Significance =  O.OOO^yx = 0.20, H  0.= 18
1 « Budgetary Control 2 » Cash Flow Analysis 3 = Both 1 and 2
4 =  Financial Ratio and both 1 and 2. 5 - Break-Even Analysis
6 - Break-Even Analysis and Cash Flow Analysis 7 =  Break-Even Analysis and bot
1 and 2. 8 — All 9 ~  No techniques used 10 = Other .Combinations
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TABLE 5.3.12b PLANNING MOOES BY OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Oper
1
ational
' 2
. Techi 
. 3
liques
4 5 6 7 8 9 Row. 
Total
Formal 7.5
38.7
21.2
32.4
20.0
52.4
4.8
65.0
2.9
39.0
6.2
72.3
11.7
73.6
15.4
18.8
10.3
41.2
546
37.1
Informal 7-0
61.3
26.2
67.6
10.7
47.6
1.5
35.0
2.7 
61.0
1 . 4
27.7
2.5
26.4
39.4
81.3
8.6
58.8
925
62.9
1471
Total 7.2 24.3 1 4.I 2.7 2.8 3.2 5.9 30.5 9.2 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 177.94, v - 8, Significance = 0.00,^^yx = 0.12, M.O. = 23
1 = Inventory Control 6 = Method Study/Quality/Inventory
2 = Quality Control 7 = All
3 = 1 and 2 8 = None
4 = ' Wsifk rStudy/ i ‘~and 2 9 = Other
5 = Method Study/Quality Control
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TABLE 5.3.12c PLANNING MODES 3Y MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
. Row PCT Planning
vr  ^ Co1 PCTModes
Manag
1
;ement
2
Techn:
3
Lques
4 5 6 . 7
Formal
0.9
35-7
1.7
37.5
16.9
63.4
6.6
53-0
6.2
84.0
5.1
48.0
5.8
77.5
Informal
1 .0
64.3
1 .6
62.5
5.7
36.6
3.4
47.0
0.7
15.4
4.3
59.1
1.0
22.5
Total 1.0 1.7 9.8 4.6 2.7 4.6 2.8
. Row PCT Planning
„ , Col PCT Modes
8 9 10 11 12
Row , 
Total
Formal 2.3
70.6
4-7
100.0
0.6
21.4
14.1
73.5
35.0
20.8
531
36.8
Informal 0.5
29.4
0.0
0.0
1.2
.78.6
3.0
26.5
77-7
79.2
911
63.2
1442
Total 1.2 1 . 7 1.0 7.1 61.9 100.0
Raw Chi Square —  327.65, v
1 =  Simulation
2 — Linear Programming
3 ~ Forecasting.
4 =  Computer
5 =  Computer/Forecasting
6 = Market Research
119 Significance — 0.005^ 2yx = 0.23, M.O.—  52 
7 = Market Research Forecasting 
8^ =  Market Research Computer 
9 =  Market Research/Computer Forecasting
10 = Operational Research
11 — Other Minor combinations
12 = None
TABLE 5.:3,.12d PLANNING MODES BY FORECASTS.
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Row PCT 
?L.M Col PCT
Forecas
1
ts
2 3 4 5 6
1
7
Formal
4.6
30.5
3-1
26.6
4-4
36.9
2.4
37-1
2.4
27-7
3-1
34-0
6.0 
47-8 1
Informal
6.2
69-5
- 5-1 
73-4
4-5 ‘ 
63.1
2.4
62.9
3-7
72.3
3-6
66.0
3-9.
52.2
Total 5-6 4.4 4.4 2.4 3-2 3-4 4-7
TAJBLE 5.3.12d continued ...
Forecasts
Row PCT Row
PL.Mcol PCT 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total
548
2.6 3-8 10.0 9-9 42.0 5-8 37-4Formal 41.2 67-7 87-3 84.4 49-4 8.1
919
2.2 1.1 9-9 1.1 25-7 39-7 62.6
Informal 58.8 32.3 12.7 15-6 50.6 , 91-9
1467
Total . 2-.3 2.1 4-3 __34 *8 27.1 100.0
Raw Chi Square —  324-55* v = 12,^2yx = 0.22* Significance = 0.00* M* 0* = 27
1 = Sales 2 = Cash Flow 3 — Both 1 and 2. 4 — Costs and both 1 and 2.
5 = Profits 6 = Profits and Sales 7 = Profits, Cash Flow and Sales
8 = Profit, Cost and Sales 9 = Profit, Cost, Sales, Cash Flow and Technology
10 = Profit, Cost, Sales, Cash Flow and Market Size 11 = All(no Energy)
12 = Other Combinations 13 = None.
J . _
Row PCT 
PLMcol PCT
Investme
1
nt Apprai 
2
sal Technic 
3
[ues
4
Row
Total
Formal 18.5
55-3
34-5
39.1
30.3
44-6
16..7
21.9
534
37-6
Informal
9-0 . 
44-7
32.3
60.9
22.7
55-4
35-9
78.1
885
62.4
1419
Total 12.6 33-1 25.6 100.0
Raw Chi Square =  74-95, v =  3, Significance = O.OOjT^yx — 0.05s M-0-= 75 
1 — Discounted Cash Flow 2 =  Internal Rate of Return 3 ~ Length of Payback 
Period 4 “ None.
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TABLE 5.3.13a PLANNING MODES BY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM'
Accounting System
Row PCT Row
PL.M Col PCT 1 2 3 4 5 Total
549
Formal 41.7 11.7 1 6 . 4 29.5 0 .7 37.0
27.1 4 1 . 0 39.5 6 6 . 1 4 0 . 0 -
936
Informal 65.9 9 .8 14.7 8.9 0 . 6 6 3 .O
72.9 59.0 60.5 33.9 6 0 . 0
1485
Total 57.0 10.5 1 5 .4 1 6 . 5 0 .7 100.0
o  2Raw Chi Square = 126.70, v = 4, Significance = 0.00, ( yx » 0.09, M-0.= 9 
1 = Manual 2 = Electronic Accounting Machine 3 — Manual/Machine 
4 = Computer 5 ~ Other.
TABLE 5.3.13b PLANNING MODES BY WHY COMPANIES DO NOT MECHANIZE
Row PCT 
PL.M col PCT
Why Comp 
Cost
anies do not 
No
Necessity
Mechanize 
No-one to 
Operate it Other
...
Row
Total
Formal 12.2
41.3
7 8 .9  
2 6 . 5
1.9
23.8
7 .0
3 8 . 8
2 7 0
28.3
Informal 6.9
58.8
8 6 . 4
73.5
2.3
76.2
4 .4
61.2
6 8 4
71.7
95.4.
Total 8 . 4 84.3 2.2  • 5.1 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 10.76, y « 3, Significance = 0.01,^2yx = 0.01, M. 0. = 540
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TABLE 5.3.13c PLANNING MODES BY ACCOUNTING PERSONNEL
Row PCT ' 
PL.M Col PCT
Ac count ii 
1
ig Personne 
2
1
3 4
Row
Total
Formal
14.0
32.6
29.0
27.3
41.7
58.0
15-3
31-5
549
37.1
Informal 17.1
67.4
45.4
72.
17.8
42.0
19.7
68.5
931
62.9
1480
Total 15-9 39.3 26.7 18.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 103.28 9 v — 3 Significance = 0.00, ^  2yx = 0.07, M.0.= 14 
1 = Qualified Secretary 2 — Unqualified Secretary 3 = Qualifified Accountant 
4 = Other
TABLE 5.3.13d PLANNING MODES BY SOURCES OF CASH
Row PCT 
PL.M Co1 PCT
Sources of 
Overdraft
Cash
Loan
Internal
Finance
Supplier
Credit Other
Row
Total
51.5 2.0 37.7 4.8 4.0
544
37.0
Formal 40.1 39.3 34.7 27.4 . 37.3
45.1 1.8 41.6 7.5 4.0
926
63.0
. Informal 59.9 60.7 65.3 72.6 62.7
* 1470
Total 47.5 1.9 40.1 6.5 4*0 100,0
Raw Chi Square - 8.04, v = 4, Significance - 0.09, *1 2yx - 0.005 M 0.= 24
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TABLE 5.3.13e PLANNING MODES BY FINANCE FOR MATOR PURCHASE
Row PCT 
PM col PCT
Finance
1
for Maj 
2
or Pure! 
3
lase
4 5 6 7 8
Row
Total
Formal 12.3
28.8-
5*4
50.0
4*3
39*0
32.2
36*4
4*3 • 
35*4
6.7
53*7
22.7
35*1
12.1
50.4
537
37*6
Informal18.3
71.2
3*2
50.0
4*0
61.0
33*8
63*6
4-7
64.6
3*5
46.3
25*3
64*9
7*2
49*6
893
62.4
1430
Total 16.0 4*1 4*1 33-2 4*5 4*7 24*3 9.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 29*18, v = 7» Significance = O.OOOl, #\ 2yx = 0.02, M* 0. =* 64 
1 = Hire Purchase 2 = Lease Purchase 3 1=3 Leasing 4 = Bank Loan 
5 = Bank Loan/Hire Purchase 6 = Other Loan 7 = Other Source 8 = Other
'PM = Planning Modes
- f
TABLE 5.3.13f PLANNING MODES BY AVAILABILITY OF FINANCE
Availability of Finance
Row PCT Row
?M Col PCT Difficult Average Easy Total
527
Formal 7*4 42.1 50.5 38.0
47*0 38.7 36.4
861
Informal 5*1 40.9 . 54*0 62.0
53*0 61.3 63*6
1388
Total 6.0 41*4 52.7 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 3.76, v = 2, Significance = 0.15, « 0.003, M. 0. = 106
PM as Planning Modes
sf. See n ote  on p . 121.
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TABLE 5.3il3g PLANNING MODES BY DEBT COLLECTION PERIOD
t r Row PCT 
PL'M Col PCT
Days
0-15 15-30 30-45 45-60 More Row
Total
. 543
Formal 2.2 7.9 22.1 53.2 14.5 37-0
20.3 33.6 35.1 • 39.2 39.5
923
Informal 5.1 . 9.2 24.1 48.5 13.1 63.0
79.7 66.4 64.9 60.8 60.5
1466
Total 4.0 8.7 23.3 50.3 13-6 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 10.28, v = 4, Significance = '0.04,^2yx = O.OOT, M.O.=2-3
TABLE 5.3.13h PLANNING MODES BY DIFFICULT DEBTORS
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Difficult Debt
Nationalized
Industry
ors
Large
Companies
Medium-Sized
Companies
Small
Companies
Formal 4.8
47-3
37-1
37.1
10.6
36.1
15.2
35.0 £
Informal 3.2
52.7
37.4
62.9
11.1
63.9
16.8
65.O
Total 3.8 37.3 10.9 16.2
Row PCT 
PL.M Col PCT
Government Overseas
Buyers
Householders All
Similar
None Row
Total
Formal 4.6
37.9
8.5. 
51 7
•2).0
37.9
11.7
32.5
5.4
35-8
539
37.3
Informal 4.5
S2.1
4.7
48.3
2.0
62.1
14.5
67.5
5.7
64.2
906
62.7
1445
Total 4.6 6.2 2.0 13.4 5.6 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 12.86, v = 8, Significance = O.lPj^yx = 0.008, M.O.=49
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TABLE 5.3.131 PLANNING MODES BY RECOVERY OF DEBT
Planning ^ow
u , Col PCT Modes
Recov
1
ery of 
2
Debt
3 4 5 6 .7
Formal 29-6
37-9
7.1
36.2
8.7
37.6
3.3
29.O
3.2
37.8
•2.8
40.5
2.4
32.5
Informal 29.4
62.1
7.6
63.8
8.8
62.4
5.0
71.0
3-2
62.2
2.5
59.5
3.0
67.5
Total 29.5 7.4 8.8 4.4 3.2 2.6 2.8
Row PCTPlanning
Modes Col PCT
8 9 10 11 12 Row
Total
Formal
4-3
30.3
5.4
45-3
12.6
39.5
6.1
36.7
14.-5
41.3
538
37.8
Informal
6.0
69-7
3.9
54.7
11.7
60. 5
6.4
63.3
12.5
58.7
887
62.2
1425
Total 5.3 4.5 12.1 6.3 13.3 100.0
Raw €hi Square = 7*35, v. = 11, Significance = 0.77,‘\2yx = 0.005} M^O - 69
1 = Reminder Letter (r )
2 = Solicitors Letter (SL)
3 = Both 1 and 2
4 ~ R/Cash Discount
5 = Legal Proceedings (LP)
6 = LP/R ' . .. '
7 = LP/SL
8 = Credit Collection Agency. (CCA)
9 = R/CCA
10 — Other
11 = Other/R
12 — Other Combination
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TABLE 5.3.1U  PLANNING MODES BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
Geographical Area
Planning Row pCT 
Modes Co1 PCT 1 2 3 4 5 . 6 ' '7 8
Formal 36*7
35*4
3*1
48.6
7*3
49*4
11.6
35*6
6.9
36*5
10.4
38*5
4-0
32.0
• 3*8 
40.0 I
Informal 39*5
64.6
1.9
51*4
4*4
50.6
12.4
64*4
7*1
63*5
9*8
61*5
12.0
68.0
3*5
60.0
Total 38*5 2.4 5*5 12.1 7*0 10.0 11.6 3.7
•r,. * . Row PCTPlanning
Modes Col PCT 9 10 11
Row
Total
Formal 3.8
52*5
6.0
36.3
0.2
1-6.7
550
37*1
Informal 2.0
47*5
6.2
63*7
0.5 
83. -3
933
62.9
1483
Total 2.7 6.1 0.4 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 15*56, v = 10, Significance » 0.11, ^ 2yx = 0.01^  M# Ot ~ 11
1 = South East
2 = East Anglia
3 = South West
4 = West Midlands
5 = East Midlands
6 = Yorkshire and Humberside
7 = North West
8 = North
9 = Wales
10 = Scotland
11 = Northern Ireland
TABLE 5.4.1 PLANNING MODES BY PLANS IN FUNCTIONAL AREA S
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Planning Row PCT 
Modes Col PCT
Plans
1
in Fur 
. 2
iction
3
al Are 
4
as
5 6 7 8 9
. .  „ , j
i
Row
Jo tiil _
Formal 13*0
32.3
8.4
36.2
7-9
48.3
3.5
42.2
6.0
66.0
2.7
39.5
10.4
82.6
12.8 
14.1 ■
35-2
60.0
546
37.6
Informal 16.4
67.7
8.9
63.8
5.1
51.7
. 2.9 
57-8 34.0
2.5
50.5
1.3
17-4
46.9
85.9
14.1
40.0
. 908 
62.4
1454
Total 15.1 ..-.. 8.7 6.1 3.1 3.4 ■ 2.6. 4.7 34.1 22.0 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 269*54
1 — Products
2 = Markets 
3 = 1  and 2 
4 = Finance
= 40
5 = Products,Markets and Finance
6 = Personnel
7 = All
8 = None 9 ~ Other Combinations
TABLE 5.4.2 PLANNING MODES BY RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMPANY AIMS
Planning Row PCT 
Modes Col PCT
Respoi
1
isibil
2
ity f< 
3
Dr Comj 
4
)any A: 
5
Lms
6 7
Row
Total
Formal 19.0
27.4
39.2
35.4
4.5
48.0
2.6
23.0
7.8
62.7
0.7
8.7
26.2
53.6
538
37.0
Informal 29.4
72.6
42.0
64.6
2.8
52.0
5.1
77.0
2.7
37.3
4.6
91.3
13.3
46.4
917
63.0
1455
Total 25.6 41.0 3.4 4.2 4.6 3.2 18.1 100.0
Raw Chi Square = 88.96, v = 6, Significance — 0.00,l\ 2yx
1 = Chief Executive 5 = Holding Company
2 = Directors 6 — No aims
3 = Chief Executive/Director - 7 — Combinations
4 — Family
0.06, M.0.= 39
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TABLE 5.4.3a COMPANY AIMS
%NPC %P0 Epsilon
Maximise Sales 2 4 2 4 o •
Maximise Profit 5 7 2
Maximise Sales w.r.t. Profit Constraint 2 3 1
Maximise Satisfaction 3 2 1
Survival 7 3 4
Welfare' of Employees 1 1 0
Growth of Sales 3 1 . 2
Growth of Dividends 0 0 0
Growth of Assets 1 1 0
Other . 0 0 o •
28 24
TABLE 5 .4 .3 b  IMPORTANT COMBINATIONS OF COMPANY AIMS
$NPC %PC Epsilc
Profit Maximise/Satisfaction 1 2 1
Profit Maximise/Survival 3 2 1
Welfare/Profit Maximise 2 4 2
Welfare/Profit Maximise/Sales Maximise 2 3 1
Welfare/Profit Maximise/Satisfaction 2 2 0
Welf are/Survival 3 1 2
Welfare/Survival/Prof it Maximise 2 2 0
Welfare/Survival/Profit Maximise/Sales Maximise 2 2 0
Welfare/Survival/Satisfaction 2 1 1
Welfare/Growth of Sales 2 1 1
Welfare/Growth of Sale^/Profit Maximise 1 2 1
Welfare/Growth of Sales/Profit Maximise/Sales Maximise 1 2 I
Growth of Assets/Profit Maximise 2 1
Growth of Assets/Welfare/Profit Maximise 0 2 2
25 27
f
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TABLE 5.4 .4a FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND ATTENTION
RECEIVING:- MOST LEAST NEED MORE ATTEP
AREAS ■ $NPC $PC $NPC $PC $NPC $PC • •
Labour Problems 1 1 2 3 1 1
Marketing 1 2 1 0 2 2
Production 5 5 0 0 1 2
Research and Development 0 0 5 5 2 2
Liquidity 2 2 0 1 2 1
Customers 7 5 0 0 1 0
Suppliers ' 0 0 1 * 2 0 0
Purchasing 0 0 0 0 1 1
Stocks . 0 1 1 1 1 1
None 3 4 3 3 4 4
19 20 13 15 15 14
TARLE 5.4.4b MOST ATTENTION t
$NPC $PC Epsilon
Production/Marketing/Labour 2 2 0
Research and Development/Production/Labour 0 3 3
Liquidity/Production/Labour 2 3 1
Liquidity/Production/Marketing 2 7 5
Customer/Production 2 2 0
Customer/Production/Labour 5 5 0
Cu stome r/Pro du ction/M arketing 4 7 3
Customer/Research and Development/Marketing 0 2 2
Customer/Research and Development/Production 2 2 0
Cu s t ome r/Li quidi ty 2 1 1
Customer/Liquidity/Labour 4 3 1
Customer/Liquidity/Marketing 4 5 1
Customer/Liquidity/Production 17 11 6
Customer/Supplier/Production 2 1 • 1
Customer/Supplier/Liquidity 2 1 1
Customer/Purchasing/Production' 4 2 2
Cu st omer/Purchasing/Liquidity 2 1 1
Customer/Stocks/Production 1 2 1
57 60
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TART.E 5.L.1+C LEAST ATTENTION
' %NPC ' %PC Epsilon
Marketing/Labour 3 2 1
Research and Development/Labour 13 11 2
Research and Development/Marketing 16 6 10
Research and Development/Production 2 3 1
Liquidity/Labour 3 4 1
Liquidity/Research and Development 3 3 0
Supplier s/Labour 4 6 2
Suppliers/Marketing 2 3 . 1
Suppliers/Research and Development 7 12 5 ■
Purchasing/Labour 1 4* 3
Purchasing/Reasearch and Development 2 3 1
Purchasing/Suppliers 2 3 1
Stocks/Labour 4 4 0
Stocks/Marketing 2 1 1
Stocks/Research and Development . 8 6 2
S to cks/Supplier s 2 4 2
Stocks/Purchasing 2 2 0
TART.E 5-U.Ld NEED MORE ATTENTION
76
%NPC
77
%?C Epsilon
Labour/Marketing 2 3 1
Pro duction/Labour 3 3 0
Production/Marketing 6 5 1
Research and Development/Marketing 7 7 0
Research and Development/Customers 1 4 3
Research and Development/Production 3 3 0
Li quidity/Labour 3 2 1
Li quidity/M arke ting 3 3
l 0
Liquidity/Production 6 3 3
Customer/Labour 3 2 1
Customer/Marketing 4 3 1
Customer/Production 8 7 1
Customer/Research and Development 1 4 3
Customer/Liquidity 6 5 1
Purchasing/Marketing 3 3 0
Stocks/Marketing 3 3 0
Stocks/Purchasing 2 5 3
63 65
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TABLE 5.4.5 FORMAL AIMS
Planning ■ ROW PCT 
Modes COL PCT
Formal Wr: 
Aims
YES
Ltten
-NO Row
Total
Formal 39.4 , 
74.8
•60.6” 
18.9
338
36
Informal 8.3 
• 25.2
91.7
81.1
1137
64
...1475
Total 19.1 80.9 100.0
Corrected Chi Square = 532, v = 1, Significance = 0.00, ^ "^yx = 0.l4, M.O. = 19
TABLE 5.4.6 DURATION OF FORMAL PLANNING
DURATION 
(Years) 
1
2.
3-5
5-8
8-15
MORE
NO. OF 
PCs 
68 
60 
156 
1 1 6  
81 
71
PCT
12.3
10.9
28.3 
2 1 .0  
14.7
12.9
CUMULATIVE
PCT
12.3 
23.2
51.4
72.5 
87.1
1 0 0 .0
TABLE 5.4.7 NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE PLANNING PROCESS
NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
MORE
NO. OF 
PCs
39 
92
1 1 6
118
74
49
ih
6
40
PCT
7.1 
1 6 .8  
2 1 .2
21.5
13.5 
8.9 
2 .6
1 .1  
7.3
CUMULATIVE
PCT
.7.1
23.9
4 5 .1  
6 6 .6
80.1
89.1 
9 1 .6  
92.7
1 0 0 .0
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TABLE 5.4.8 LENGTH OF PLANNING PERIOD (PCs)
LENGTH NO OF CUMULATIVEf t  X
(Years) PCs PCT
1 169 ' 31.5 31.5
1-3 246 45.8 77.3
3~5 1 0 1 ' 1 8 .8  - 9 6 .1
MORE ‘ _21 3.9 100.0
537
TABLE 5.4.9 TIME HORIZON FOR THINKING AHEAD (NPCs)
LENGTH 
(Years) 
1 
1-3 
3-5 
MORE
NO. OF
NPCs
300
375
208
32
915
PCT
32.8
41.0
22.7
3.5
CUMULATIVE
PCT
3 2 .8
73.8
96.5
1 0 0 .0
TABLE 5.4.13a REVIEW PROCESS (PCs)
PROCESS • NO. OF PCs PCT
Monthly Financial Reports (MFR) 132 24.0
Analysis of Cash Flow Predictions (CFP) 20 3.6
Analysis of Sales (AS) 48 8.7
MFR/AS 42 '• 7.6
CFP/AS 20 3.6
CFP/AS/MFR 23 4.2
Analysis of Variance of Budgets (VB) 28 5.1
VB/MFR 36 6.5
VB/CFP/MFR ' • 15 2.7
VB/AS ‘ 14 2.5
VB/AS /MFR 35 6.4
VB/AS /MFR/CFP 30 - 5.5
Other combinations 86 15.6
ALL 21 3.8
TABLE 5.4.13b REVIEW PROCESS (NPCs)
PROCESS NO. OF NPCs PCT
Accountants Balance Sheet (ABS) 257 27.7
Internal Advice (IA) 82 8.8
ABS/IA 33 . ' 3.6
Monthly/Quarterly Operating Statement (MQ) 352 37.9
MQ/ABS 89 9.6
Other (not specified) 29 3.1
Combinations 72 7.8
None 15 • 1.6
TABLE '5.4.15 FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS TO DISCUSS PLAN (PCs)
TIMES PER YEAR NO. OF 
PCs PCT
1 37 6.8
2 87 15.9
3 46 . 8.4
4 144 26.3
5 . 23 4.2
6 53 9.7
MORE 159 28.8
TABLE 5.4.16 FRAMEWORK FOR PLAN (PCs)
FRAMEWORK NO. OF 
PCs
. PCT
Management Techniques 118 21.5
Experience and Intuition 401 73.2
None 12 2.2
Other (not specified) 17 3.1
TABLE 5.4.17 OUTSIDE ADVICE FOR PLANNING (PCs)
ADVISORS NO. OF 
PCs
PCT
Management Consultants (MC) 50 18.8
Accountants (A) 128 48.1
AC/MC 10 3.8
Outside Managers 14 5.3
Other (not specified) 42 15.8
University Consultants 3 . 1 . 1
Minor'Combinations 19 7.1
None 183
w
40.8
CUMULATIVE 
. PCT , ‘
6.8
22.6
31.0-
57:3
61.5
71.2
100.0
TABLE 5.4.18 CONTINGENCY PLANNING (PCs)
IN EXISTENCE . NO. OF PCs 
Yes ' 208 
' No 339
TABLE 5.4.19 AFFECT OF FORMAL PLANNING ON MANAGEMENT
PCT
38.0
62.0
STRUCTURE (l
CHANGED STRUCTURE NO. OF PCs PCT
Yes 130 ' 24 .7
• - No 397 75.3
TABLE 5.4.20 MODE OF STRUCTURE CHANGE (PCs)
MODE NO OF PCs PCT
Addition of Accountant • 3 2.7
Addition of Marketing Manager 2 1.8
Addition of Other Staff Posts 36 31.9
Introduction of New Staff Skills 5 4.L
Changed Joh Specification . 15 13.3
Streamlined Existing Structure 31 27.4
Other 21 18.6
TABLE 5.4.21 BENEFITS.OF FORMAL PLANNING (PCs)
Benefit NO,. OF PCs PCT
Increase Profitability (P) 35 6.5
Improved Employee Conditions(E)/P 42 7.8
Increase Sales (s) 30 5.6
2/S 31 5.8
S/P . 97 18.1
Size (Z) 14 2.6
Z/P 39 7.3
Z/S 48 9.0
Increase Personnel Motivation/Z/S 27 5.0
P/S 17 3.2
Increase Communication (C)/P 34 6.3
C/P 15 2.8
Other combinations. 107 20.0
TABLE 5.4.22 MOST IMPORTANT GAIN FROM FORMAL PLANNING (PCs)
GAIN NO. OF PCs PCT
Increase Profitability 64 -15.8
Evens Out Workload 18 4.5
Controlled Growth 55 13.6
Motivates Personnel 31 7*7
Communicates Aims . 24 5.9
Greater Control of Production ‘ 30 7.4
Enhances Security (Survival) 37 - '■ 9.2
Improves Overall Company Efficiency 51 12.6
Improves Target setting and
Decision Making ’ 59 ' * 14.6
Other 35 8.7
TABLE 5-4.23 PAST EXPERIENCE WITH FORMAL PLANNING (NPCs)
EXPERIENCE BEFORE NO. OF NPCs • PCT
Yes 91 9.8
No 840 90.2
TABLE 5.4.24 REASONS FOR DISCONTINUANCE OF FORMAL PLANNING (NPCs)
REASON NO. OF NPCs PCT
Market Changes too rapidly 16 20.5
Not necessary in this company 4 5.1
Lack of appropriate staff/skills 7 9.0
Not practical in current
economic climate - too uncertain 25 '32.1
Other reason 26 - 3 3 . 3
TABLE 5.4.25 REASONS PREVENTING ADOPTION OF FORMAL PLANNING (NPCs)
REASON NO. OF NPCs PCT
Cost 36 3.9
No necessity yet .■ 159 17.3
Insufficient knowledge 36 3.9
Prefer Flexibility 420 45.8
Other reason (not specified) 24 2.6
None 8l 8.8 .
Other combinations l6l 17.6
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OF CHAPTER'SIX - - - . — — *
A P T E N D I X  J   INTERACTION GRAPHS .RELATING, TO THE AID ANALYSIS
Figure 6.3 shows the general layout of the graphs. The numbers on this 
figure indicate the group for which the mean value for each category of the 
predictor variable Is plotted. All the graphs after 'Fig. 6.3 have the group 
number on the right of the y-axis only; the numbers on the graph itself 
indicate the category oservations and have been included to aid interpretation 
only where necessary. The Total Sample means are given in dotted lines.
The graphs are provided to assist with the interpretation of the interaction 
analysis of section 6.5* Where the deviations of the means from the total 
sample is large and this is due to small category sizes, these have been 
marked on the graphs to distinguish the effect from one of genuine interaction.
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R E F E R E N C E S
The layout of the following references is hy chapter. The 
form is taken from the Modern Humanities Research Association "Style 
Book", second edition (London, 1978), Chapter 10.
However, as italics are not readily available, the titles 
of all books are expressed in double quotation marks and all articles 
appear in single quotation marks. In addition, later referrals to a 
reference already fully expressed, are illustrated as follows:- see 
reference 9, P* 9. All such references refer to the current chapter 
unless otherwise stated.
Abbreviations
HBR = Harvard Business Review
JBP = Journal of Business Policy
JIE = Journal of Industrial Economics
LRP = Long Range Planning
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1. E.F. Schumacher, "Small is Beautiful" (London, 1973), p. 245.
Chapter 1
2. See reference 1 of Chapter 2
3. See reference 11 of Chapter 2
4. See reference 11 of Chapter 2, para. 19•5, p. 343
5. See reference 11 of Chapter 2, para. 19.5» p. 343
6. See reference 11 of Chapter 2, para 1 .8, p,.2
7. See reference 11 of Chapter 2, para 19.2 1, P. 353
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9. See reference 2 of Chapter 2
10. See reference 128 of Chapter 2
1 1 . See reference 156 of Chapter 2
12. See reference 157 of Chapter 2
13. See reference 158 of Chapter 2
14. See reference 158 of Chapter 2 > P. 19
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pp 4k5“6, p. 445.
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22. See reference 34 of Chapter 3
23. See reference l6l of Chapter 2
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